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ABSTRACT 
The field of socialist law generally has incorporated two paradigms of study. 
The first focuses on the former Soviet Union, China and other "communist" 
nations and analyses how legal systems have developed in these nations and why 
they differ from Western ones. The second rejects the classification of the former 
U.5.S.R. (China, etc.) as representatives of the socialism envisioned by Marx and 
Engels and concentrates on a Marxist exploration of legal phenomena in capitalism. 
The first approach ignores the divergence between the socialism expatiated upon by 
Marx and the socialism which was (and is) I functioning in these nations; the second 
disregards the problem of a regulatory system in post-capitalist society. Arguments 
that do address the regulatory problem in socialism often call for a re-definition of 
law (usually rights-based) which embodies socialist principles. Such a demand, 
however, is in conflict with Marx's original position (one that was expanded by E.B. 
Pashukanis) that law will become unnecessary in such a society. The purpose of this 
thesis is to construct theoretically a regulatory system based on the writings of a 
selection of Marxist legal theorists (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stuchka, Reisner and 
Pashukanis), ascertain whether such a system might be considered law, and 
determine whether or not there is a legitimate claim for a "socialist jurisprudence". 
Both theoretical constructs and historical examples are used during the course of 
discussion. In addressing the lacuna in the two paradigms of this field, the results of 
the thesis indicate that there is a viable alternative to law which does not ignore the 
regulatory needs of society and is compatible with the Marxist critique of the legal 
order. 
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PREFACE 
No term has generated such a variety of conceptions (and misconceptions) as 
the word "socialism". While "socialism" often refers to the transition period from 
capitalism to communism, this meaning is rather confusing. Marx and Engels often 
spoke of socialism or socialist theory, when indeed they were referring to post-
transition-period society. In some of their works (notoriously the Communist 
Manifesto), however, this future society was referred to specifically as communist 
and much space was dedicated to the justification of this label. In the current 
political lexicon, the meaning of socialism is even more confusing. Often "welfare 
states" are described as socialistic, and various political parties proclaiming to be 
socialist can advocate anything from a welfare/market economy to radical 
overthrow of the capitalist system. 
Also in confusion are the meanings of "communism" and "Marxism". What 
was referred to in the West as the "Communist Bloc" was in technical terms, still in 
the "socialist" phase of things (if even that), despite the fact that the political party 
was the "Communist" party. As Ivo Lapenna points out, the phrase "Communist 
State" often used in articles or books on the former Soviet Union or China is "an 
obvious contradiction in terms: either a State exists-and in that case being a class 
category, it cannot be 'Communist'-or there is a classless communist society, and in 
that case it cannot be organised as a State."l Similarly, "Marxism" is used both to 
describe the ideological basis of the former U.S.5.R. and to refute the claim that the 
U.5.5.R. actually was "socialist". It has also been associated with the regimes of Cuba 
and China, the legacy of Pol Pot, the activities of the Shining Path and Sandinistas 
and a host of other campaigns which have been described alternatively as "people's 
movements" and "terrorism". Lapenna aptly sums up the situation: 
1 Ivo Lapenna, "Marxism and the Soviet Constitutions" in Conflict Studies, No. 106 (London: The 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979) p. 1 
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Given the nature of Marx and Engels' polemics, terms that appear to have 
obvious meaning, such as "politics" or "democracy", become clouded. For example, 
Marx and Engels asserted that communist institutions would be "non-political". 
Similarly, a Marxist definition of democracy would include direct control over 
economic resources. Using the term institution or democracy with their current 
meanings while speaking of communism would breed confusion. More specific to 
this thesis, which explores the legal aspect of socialism, using such terms as "law", 
"arbitration" and "rules" might prove misleading. The problem becomes even 
larger when considering the traditional Marxist position that communism will 
have no "law" per se. For the most part, I have used the term "law" until it 
becomes necessary (and this occurs quite early) to distinguish between what might 
be considered "law" in capitalism and "law" in communism. At this point, I 
continue to use law, when referring to capitalism, and use the term "regulation" 
when referring to communism. The term "rule", as initially defined by Marx and 
Engels, implies an outcome of necessity and is generally not used to express any 
meaning which may be associated with current jurisprudential debates (e.g. Hart). 
Similarly, it becomes necessary to differentiate the process of dispute resolution in 
capitalism and communism. For the process of conflict resolution in communism, 
I have used the term "arbitration". As with the term "rule", arbitration does not 
refer to the current legal meaning of arbitration in Western systems. It is merely 
used as a linguistic tool to differentiate between the legal process in capitalism and 
the dispute resolution process in communism. Once it becomes established that 
there may be fundamental differences between law in capitalism and conflict 
resolution in communism, I refer to the entire future system as "regulation" rather 
than "law" to avoid confusion. As with the other terms discussed, "regulation" 
does not imply any formal "legal" concept. 
Other problems occur within quoted materials. The German word Recht, for 
instance, can mean "right", "privilege", "law", "justice" or the administration of 
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justice; while Gesetz translates in English as "statute". Similarly in Russian pravo 
resembles the German Recht and zakon is akin to Gesetz. Unfortunately the 
English usage of law reflects all of these meanings. Most often, the meaning of 
various terms is clarified in context. Translation ambivalences are mentioned in 
footnotes. 
The method of transliteration of Russian titles and text follows the Library of 
Congress system (with diacritical marks omitted). Titles of Russian materials not 
transliterated by me are, however, as they appear in the source. 
The old style Russian calendar was 13 days behind that of the West. As of 
February 1, 1918 old style, the Bolsheviks standardised dates with the West. When 
relevant, the new style calendar date appears in parenthesis. 
November 1 (14), 1917. 
For example 
All quoted material is cited precisely; including the use of American spellings, 
the now outdated universal "he" as a representation of a person and various styles 
of transliteration (for instance Trotsky instead of Trotskii). Footnotes restart at each 
chapter; op cit and loc cit are not used, but rather the author's last name and short 
title of work followed by the page number are used for multiple references. Any 
contribution on my part is denoted by brackets. 
A special thanks ... 
In such a project as a thesis, the number of people to thank grow with each 
year of work. For those that I do not mention directly, and there are many, I offer a 
generic "Thanks" for all the input, rip-roaring discussions, "study breaks", article 
exchanges, whining sessions, etc. and hopefully a pint or two when we meet again. 
Formally 1'd like to thank Elspeth Attwooll for her advice, theoretical 
critiques, enthusiasm and pleasure in working with students; Stephen White for his 
encouragement and source hunting assistance; the post-graduate scholarship 
committee of Glasgow University and Bowdoin College, and the Politics and Law 
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departments for financial aid; and those closest to me, my family and my partner, 
for putting up with me. 
An opening remark. .. 
Often I am confronted with students who do not see the point in theoretically 
exploring possibilities of social organisation. Mired in the day-to-day trauma of 
passing tests, making a living, keeping up with assignments and fulfilling roles in 
their various partnerships and relationships, such work seems beyond the purview 
of "real" life and to some extent rather pointless. At best it is a method to engage in 
utopian visions, at worst it is a cruel waste of precious energy. I have never met one 
student, however, who did not have some idea of how things could be different. I 
have also never met a student who, once charged with the task of analysing our 
own society, has not discovered new pieces of information that in one way or 
another have changed the way they thought and approached things. Such is the 
process of scholarship. It is a process of growth, of gathering new information, of 
assembling that information into coherent thoughts and progressively re-defining, 
defending, expanding those thoughts in order to apply them to our own lives. It is a 
process to understand where we are in historical context, and in doing so a process 
that aids in directing where we might go, both as individuals and a society. By 
nature, scholarship cannot operate within any defined realm of possibility. If we are 
not willing to take information we gather and pose why not, then the whys of what 
we do become lost, and we become passive agents rather than creators. Many social 
"facts" today were the imagination of yesterday. So, I tell my students, it is your duty 
to imagine the future into becoming; if you do not, the future is only the present, a 
predicament too bleak for the human spirit to endure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE NEED AND PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to construct theoretically a regulatory system in 
communism compatible with the principles outlined by Marx and Engels on the 
subject of law and socialism. The search for clarification of such a system makes use 
of historical examples, philosophic works and theoretical constructs. After such a 
regulatory system has been defined and discussed, it can be ascertained whether such 
a system can be considered law, and whether it merits a "separate" jurisprudence. 
Exploration into a socialist theory of law has developed along two distinct 
paths. One branch restricts itself to the writings of Marx and Engels and those 
theorists that have closely followed the precepts of dialectics and materialism 
(notably E. B. Pashukanis), and the other focuses on the development of legal 
systems in nations proclaiming to follow a socialist path. Consequently, analysis 
most often results in either a discussion of the merits (or demerits) of Marx's 
critique of the capitalist legal system or a critique of Marxist theory based on the 
shortcomings of the legal systems of "communist" nations, in particular the former 
U.S.5.R. 
A large part of the problem, as previously discussed in the Preface, rests with 
the confusion over the meaning of "socialism" and whether, despite the claims of 
officials, countries like the U .S.S.R., China or Cuba can be considered "socialist". 
Though there is ample evidence from the writings of Marx and Engels that they 
cannot, such nations have drawn, nevertheless, on certain Marxist doctrines in 
shaping their political ideologies; and the connection is undeniable. Whilst they 
may not be considered "socialist" they cannot be considered "capitalist" either. Such 
a differentiation has fostered the growth of the notion that these legal systems do 
not resemble Western legal systems and therefore should be considered "socialist" 
legal systems. 
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The former U.5.S.R. represented a crucial element in the development of the 
concept of socialism throughout the modern world. There are several reasons for 
this. Foremost, it was the first nation to attempt to put Marxist theory into practice. 
Second, the founding ideologists of the Soviet Union (namely Lenin and Trotskii) 
drew heavily on Marxist theory. Third, it was the first nation to proclaim itself 
"socialist". The link between Marxism and the U.S.5.R. should therefore be obvious 
and unproblematic. As is well-known, however, this is not the case. The structure 
and philosophy of the various periods of Soviet history are extremely diverse and in 
some instances contradictory. This is definitely true for the subject of law. Up until 
1936, it was proposed and taught that law was to weaken constantly until it 
completely "withered away". With the consolidation of the power of Stalin, 
however, law was proclaimed to be an instrument of the Soviet State and it was 
stipulated that it, along with the state, must actually be strengthened until the world 
revolution had occurred. 
The branch of "socialist law" that pertains to legal systems in "communist" 
nations has developed sub-branches within its own general paradigm. There are 
those that approach the Soviet Union from a completely Western perspective, and 
examine the former U.S.5.R. in terms of its legal culture (or lack of it), the absence 
both of the rule of law and of the separation of powers principle-concepts which 
are prominent in the legal theory of Western societies. Much has been done in this 
regard with historical analysis of the development of Soviet law and the 
ramifications for its own infrastructure} 
1 See Toward the "Rule of Law" in Russia? ed., Donald Barry (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) with 
contributions by Eugene Huskey and Louise Shelley among others; Gordon Smith, "Development 
of 'Socialist Legality' in the Soviet Union" in Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, eds., 
F.J.M. Feldbrugge and William Simons of the Law in Eastern Europe (series), No. 24, general ed., 
F.J.M. Feldbrugge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982) pp. 77-97; and also Teruo 
Matsushita, "Legality in East and West: A Comparative Study of 'Socialist Legality'" in the 
same work, pp. 99-106. See also works by John Hazard, notably Communists and Their Law 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R. (London: 
Stevens and Sons, 1953); Harold Berman, notably, Justice in the U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of 
Soviet Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). Also interesting is Peter Solomon Jr.'s 
"Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-1941" in Soviet Studies, VoL 37, No.3 
(July, 1985) pp. 305-329; Richard Pipes' Legalised Lawlessness: Soviet Revolutionary Justice 
3 
The second branch focuses far more on theory. These authors have tried to 
explain the shift that took place from the withering away thesis of law (1917-1936) to 
the consolidation of state power (1936-1991). Several authors attempt to explain the 
differences between Marxist theory and Soviet theory and try to unite them on one 
plane or another, treating Sovietology as a logical and predictable outcome of 
Marxism, hence labelling the entirety of Soviet history "socialist".2 Others use the 
Marxist influence on the development of the U.5.S.R. as a basis for distinguishing a 
"communist" legal system from a Western one.3 As interesting as this material is, 
an in-depth examination is not directly pertinent to the subject under investigation. 
Far more relevant is that body of literature which primarily focuses on the 
works of Marx and Engels. Whilst this branch has recognised that the U .5.5.R. did 
not represent the socialism described by Marx and Engels, authors restrict 
themselves to a largely critical position. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes "It is 
almost a commonplace to say that there is no Marxist theory of law, though it is less 
commonly acknowledged that there are a few Marxist theories against law."4 Such a 
concept arises from the common notion that Marx and Engels actually called for the 
end of law as society progressed towards communism. As a result, the thrust of the 
literature critiques,S defends or tries to fine-tune6 a Marxist interpretation of legal 
(London: London Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1986) and Robert Sharlet's 
"Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture" in Stalinism, ed., Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1977) pp. 155-179. 
2 Imre Szabo writes a fascinating theoretical history of socialist law from this perspective, see "The 
Socialist Conception of Law", International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, VoL II, chief ed., 
Rene David (The Hague: J.C.B. Mouton, 1975) pp. 49-83. See also Michel Villey, "The 
Philosophy of Law in the Communist World" in Marxism, Communism and Western Society, ed., 
C.D. Kerning (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973) voL 5, pp. 140-147 and Hans Kelsen's The 
Communist Theory of Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1955). 
3 See the works of Alice Ehr-Soon Tay and Eugene Kamenka especially "Marxism and the Problem of 
Continuity or Heritability of Law" in Perspectives on Soviet Law for the 1980s, pp. 1-12, "Beyond 
the French Revolution: Communism, Socialism and the Concept of Law" in University of Toronto 
Law Journal, VoL 21 (1971), pp. 109-140 and "Socialism, Anarchism and Law" in Law and Society, 
eds., Eugene Kamenka, et al. (London: Edward Arnold, 1978) pp. 48-80. Also interesting is 
Olimpiad Ioffe's Soviet Law and Soviet Reality of the Law in Eastern Europe (series), No. 30, 
general ed., F.J.M. Feldbrugge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985). 
4 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Popular Justice, Dual Power and Socialist Strategy" in Marxism and 
Law, eds., Piers Beirne and Richard Quinney (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982) p. 364 
S See for example Paul Phillips, Marx and Engels on Law and Laws (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble 
Books, 1980); Alan Hunt, "Law, State and Class Struggle" in Marxism Today, VoL 20, No.6 (June, 
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phenomena in capitalism. This approach has given rise to the critical legal studies 
movement and the radical or "new criminology" which began to flourish in the 
1970' s.7 As several authors point out, however, such a field does little for 
construction of socialist regulation. 
Because of the lack of focus on how the future society will be regulated 
without law, some authors have questioned the validity of the claim that law will 
actually "end". Concluding that it will not, they pose arguments from a socialist 
perspective that actually call for the preservation of law. Hence the Marxist branch 
of literature has "sub-branched" much as the Sovietologist branch. 
Thus a dichotomous situation has arisen. One side assumes that law will play 
no role in a future society and that, therefore, a socialist theory of law should be 
restricted to the critical evaluation of capitalist legal phenomena. The major 
1976) pp. 178-187; Maureen Cain, "The Main Themes of Marx and Engels' Sociology of Law" in 
British Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 1, No.2 (Summer, 1974) pp. 136-148; Colin Sumner, 
Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law (London: 
Academic Press, 1979) and Paul Hirst, On Law and Ideology (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1979). 
6 See: Chris Arthur, Introduction to E.B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, trans., Barbara Einhorn 
(London: Ink Links, 1978) pp. 9-31; Andrew Fraser, "The Legal Theory We Need Now", Socialist 
Review 40-1 (July-October, 1978) pp. 147-187; Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image, trans., 
Elizabeth Kingdom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). Also interesting is an excellent 
collection of essays by authors Piers Beirne, Douglas Hay, Karl Klare, Nicos Poulantzas, Richard 
Quinney, Colin Sumner, E.P. Thompson and others prominent in this field, see Marxism and Law; 
Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Leichhardt, Australia: Pluto Press, 1984) which 
includes a discussion of the role of law as a tool for working class; Bob Jessup, "On Recent Marxist 
Theories of Law, the State, and Juridico-Political Ideology" in International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, Vol. 8, No.4 (November, 1980) pp. 339-368, which surveys several Marxist 
approaches to law including, Pashukanis, Poulantzas, Edelman and Hirst; and Issac Balbus, 
"Commodity Form and Legal Form" in The Sociology of Law, eds., Charles Reasons and Robert 
Rich (Toronto: Butterworth, 1978) pp. 73-90. 
7 See the collection of articles in Capitalism and the Rule of Law, eds., Bob Fine, et al. (London: 
Hutchinson, 1979) including articles by Jock Young, Bob Fine, Phil Cohen and others; Essays in 
Law and Society, eds., Zenon Bankowski and Geoff Mungham (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980); Radical Issues in Criminology, eds., P. Carlen and M. Collison (New Jersey: Barnes and 
Nobel Books, 1980) and The Sociology of Law: A Conflict Perspective especially William 
Chambliss, "Toward a Political Economy of Crime", pp. 191-211 and Austin Turk's "Law as a 
Weapon in Social Conflict", pp. 213-232. See also Robert Brown, "The new criminology" in Law 
and Society, pp. 81-107; Gordon Hawkins, "The new penology" in Law and Society, pp. 108-127 
and Richard Quinney's Class, State and Crime (New York: David McKay, 1977). For a critique of 
radical criminology from a Marxist perspective see Paul Hirst, "Marx and Engels on law, crime 
and morality" in Economy and Society, Vol. 1, No.1 (February, 1972) pp. 28-56. Also useful is 
Mark Kelman's A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 
1987). 
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shortcoming of this approach is well put by Steve Redhead who does not necessarily 
disagree that law could be transformed but asserts that "the question 'into what' 
cannot be allowed to ring out for too long."s Those representing the other point of 
view argue that, whilst Marx's evaluation of law may be correct in part, it does not 
necessarily commit a socialist to abandon law. Some elements of capitalist law (e.g. 
rights, the rule of law), just as some elements of capitalist production, can be 
incorporated into socialism-indeed must be for any system to maintain its 
integrity.9 On a more basic level, some argue that to insist on the disappearance of 
law is simply ridiculous given the organisational needs of society.1o As Richard 
Kinsey asserts, "no socialist society will be 'free' from organisation any more than it 
will be free from the need to produce."ll 
The absence of discussion of a viable alternative to a law-based regulatory 
system on the part of the theorists who wish to defend Marx's claim that law will 
disappear forces one to accept that there is no alternative to law. Apparently if one 
wants to argue for some sort of regulation, socialism must incorporate a theory of 
law into its programme. The apparent gap in this literature, then, is the need for an 
exploration into what the "disappearance" of law actually indicates. Are there 
grounds in the writings of Marx and Engels that suggest a need for some sort of 
regulation in communism? If the answer is yes, what might this system entail and 
could it be considered law? Not only do answers to these questions provide an 
S Steve Redhead, "Marxist Theory, The Rule of Law and Socialism", Marxism and Law, p. 342 
9 See Alan Hunt's "The Politics of Law and Justice" in Politics and Power, eds., Diane Adlam, et al. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) pp. 3-26 and" A Socialist Interest in Law", New Left 
Review, No. 192 (March-April, 1992) pp. 105-119. Also, Piers Beirne and Alan Hunt, "Law and 
the Constitution of Soviet Society: The Case of Comrade Lenin" in Law & Society Review, Vol. 
22, No.3 (1988) pp. 575-614 and Amy Bartholomew and Alan Hunt's "What's Wrong With 
Rights" in Law and Inequality, Vol. 9, No.1 (1990) pp. 1-58. Also pertinent is E. P. Thompson, 
Whigs and Hunters (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975); Timothy O'Hagan, The End of Law? 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Christine Sypnowich, The Concept of Socialist Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990) and Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1983). 
10 See Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Paul Hirst, Law, Socialism and 
Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986) and Richard Kinsey, "Despotism and Legality" in 
Capitalism and the Rule of Law, pp. 46-64. 
11 Kinsey, "Despotism and Legality", p. 64 
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alternative to the two positions described above, but they also throw light on exactly 
why the labelling of the legal systems of the former U.5.S.R. and China as "socialist" 
might be a misnomer. The interest for those concerned with socialism is 
grounded in fundamental issues that must be addressed if the road to communism 
was not that posed by the U.S.S.R. On a broader level, the interest to the field of 
jurisprudence in general assumes more theoretical importance. Indeed, is there a 
system of social regulation that can be considered non-legal? Why is it considered 
non-legal? How might it work? Is law a perpetual category, a concept embodied by 
the famous phrase of Roman jurisprudence ubi societas ibi juS?12 To delve into 
such questions the meaning of law itself must be explored, as well as the nature of 
its form, content and function. 
The purpose of this thesis then, is to fill the gap existing in the literature of 
"socialist law". Its primary focus is to define the theoretical concept of regulation in 
communism and ascertain whether such a system might be considered "law". Once 
these areas are explored, the question as to whether or not there is a legitimate claim 
for a "separate" socialist jurisprudence can be addressed on a more substantial basis. 
To this date, such an attempt to define theoretically a regulatory system in 
communism compatible with the writings of Marx and Engels has not been made. 
Thus the originality of the thesis rests in the fact that it is the first attempt of its 
kind. 
MElHODOLOGY 
The search for the definition of what is meant by regulation in communism 
will not include a defence or critique of socialism in general. Such issues as 
economic feasibility, socialist institutional structure, abundance issues, direct control 
over resources, etc. will not be explored. Since there has never been a "real" 
communist society per se, much of what communism entails must involve 
12 Where there is society there is law. 
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theoretical constructs. Since the purpose of the thesis is only to address what is 
meant by regulation in communism rather than to define socialism as a whole, 
basic precepts of socialism (summed up in the Preface) are accepted to allow focus on 
regulation itself. There are, nevertheless, certain principles that relate to a 
discussion of regulation, such as direct control of resources, that need to be 
conceptually defined in order to allow analysis to proceed. These elements shall 
only be discussed to the point that they are theoretically clear. 
Although a description of elements of communism must by necessity 
involve theoretical constructs, this construction should take place within a defined 
framework. Theoretical works which relate to the future of law provide the basis 
for such a framework and are focused on in this thesis. Other avenues, such as 
historical examples, provide concrete cases to exemplify certain theoretical 
principles. As there are no examples of communist societies, the historical 
examples that do contribute to a theory of regulation do so in a limited way, 
primarily by providing a source to demonstrate how theoretical principles might be 
applied and also to draw to the forefront issues of concern. 
The methodology used in the search for a theoretical definition of a 
regulatory system in communism primarily engages philosophic works and 
theoretical constructs. Historical examples are used to pinpoint pertinent issues and 
demonstrate some principles derived from theoretical discussion. 
If a regulatory system in communism is to be based on the principles 
proposed by Marx and Engels, a natural starting point for the inquiry begins with the 
writings of Marx and Engels. The first chapter (Marx and Engels) elucidates these 
writers' general views on law and its role in society. Also examined are the scant 
writings that describe the future society. Though none of these writings contains a 
"legal theory", there is enough information to extract a general framework of 
discussion. 
8 
Chapter two (The People's Courts) investigates the initial endeavour by 
Russia13 to incorporate into societal structure a judiciary that attempted to fulfil 
some of the criteria established by Marx and Engels for a communist regulatory 
system. Analysing the situation of the People's Courts further illuminates some of 
the concepts proposed by Marx and Engels, and raises important questions with 
regard to the construct of a communist regulatory system.14 
The main thrust for a development of a Marxist theory of law occurred in the 
Soviet Union during the twenties. Studying the works of several key theorists from 
this period serves to detail and clarify some of Marx and Engels' more general 
precepts. Chapter three (The Theorists) is dedicated to an in-depth survey of the 
works of these theorists and a summation of their analysis of the phenomena of law 
and the role for law (if any) in communism. 
From the works of Marx and Engels, the analysis of the People's Courts and a 
survey of pertinent theoretical literature quite an extensive portrait of what a 
socialist legal theory might incorporate emerges. Despite this more specific 
framework, however, certain gaps and problems in the theory of regulation in 
communism become evident. Chapter four (Theoretical Synthesis) sums up the 
conclusions drawn from the previous three chapters and addresses possible 
theoretical difficulties through the use of philosophic constructs within the 
framework established in the summary. 
Chapter five (Towards a Model) uses the material of the previous four 
chapters to elicit any theoretical questions as yet unanswered in order to present a 
succinct, yet full summary of what is meant by "regulation" in communism. After 
13 There are many brands of socialism in current political practice, many of which were influenced by 
the former U.S.s.R., but all of which have individual variations. However, for the purpose of 
theoretical debate, major problems and questions regarding a Marxist view of law are well-
illustrated by the example of the Soviet Union. 
14 Also interesting were the Comrades' Courts which were designed specifically to handle problems 
inside industrial enterprises. See Albert Boiter, "Comradely Justice: How Durable Is It?" in 
Problems of Communism, Vol. 24, No.2 (March-April, 1965) pp. 82-92 and Robert Sharlet's 
"Pashukanis and the Withering Away of Law in the U.s.S.R." in Cultural Revolution in Russia 
1928-1931, ed., Sheila Fitzpatrick (Ontario: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1978) esp. pp. 178-179. 
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such a model has been drawn, the chapter draws once again from historical example 
to evaluate and clarify definitions thus far developed. 
Drawing from the definition established through the proceeds of the previous 
chapters, the final chapter addresses the issues of: (1) whether communist regulation 
could be considered law; and (2) whether there is a defensible argument for a call for 
a separate socialist jurisprudence. 
lHE SPEOFICITIES 
Marx and Engels 
The sole purpose of this section is to investigate what Marx and Engels' vision 
of a regulatory system in communism entails. The task becomes complicated due to 
the nature of Marxist analysis. In short, one phenomenon, such as law, cannot be 
evaluated in isolation from other social phenomena (notably economic relations). 
Thus a discussion of communist law incorporates the writers' analYSis of law in 
capitalism as well as their theoretical portrait of what socialism and its 
accompanying social relations might involve. Since the purpose of this thesis is to 
construct a theory of communist regulation, I will not be addressing critical 
arguments regarding their analysis of law in capitalism. As mentioned earlier, the 
literature in this area is rich. When certain criticisms become relevant to regulation 
discussions, however, they are incorporated in the discussion. For the most part, 
the interpretation of law and legality by Marx and Engels is accepted. 
Similarly, debates regarding the merits and demerits of the basic tenets of 
socialism will not be explored. By "basic tenets" I mean such assumptions that 
socialism will be a technologically advanced society able to produce an abundance of 
products for human consumption. Also included are the methodological approach 
of dialectics, the theory of materialism, the schematic interpretation of society via 
base and superstructure and the key role class antagonisms play in historical 
10 
progress. My approach is to accept these tenets, and draw them to their logical 
conclusions as they pertain to the field of law. 
Victor Serge expressed concern over turning the "scientific spirit of Marxism" 
into a "Marxist orthodoxy."ls Serge, in essence, warned of the danger of subjecting 
human thought towards a pre-determined path. Such interpretative variety has 
been stimulated by Marx's works that he is both classified as the founder of 
totalitarianism and anti-humanist and the true father of democracy and defender of 
human individuality. It appears implausible that such a variety of interpretations 
even could result in an orthodoxy. History has proven the reverse, however, and 
Serge's warnings must go heeded. Any interpretation of theoretical work involves 
the reader's personal views to some degree. Whilst some positions may be better 
supported than others, it is important to keep in mind that the works of these two 
authors were: (1) composed over a life-time; and (2) were written by two different 
people. When considering that a life entails a certain amount of development, 
change of perspective and added experience, theoretical "inconsistencies" which 
take place over a forty year period should assume a lesser importance. There has 
been much ado in regards to the different theoretical "stages" of Marx. As Terrell 
Carver aptly describes: 
... in many accounts Marx's career is conceived as a series of logically related stages, e.g. 
romanticism, liberalism, Hegelianism, and Feuerbachianism, which lead as a succession to 
an 'end', namely the 'self-clarification' which Marx mentions as a feature of The German 
Ideology. In these accounts Marx is presented as somehow imprisoned intellectually within 
each stage as a kind of 'cell', yet magically granted the right key in producing each 'key' 
text, in order to unlock that particular' cell' and proceed to the next. 
While there is considerable continuity of a developmental sort in Marx's early (and 
indeed later) works, a mysterious teleology is not required in explanation. Marx's political 
interests and circumstances provide a sufficient clue, the one he himself offered in his 
autobiographical sketch.16 
There are noticeable differences in the "early" (pre-1844) and "later" (post-The 
German Ideology) Marx; and as Carver points out, there is a definite intellectual 
IS Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, trans., Peter Sedgwick (London: Oxford University Press, 
1963) pp. 375-376 
16 Terrell Carver, Marx and Engels: The Intellectual Relationship (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1983) p. xii 
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development towards a more defined theory of historical materialism. For this 
reason, I rely more heavily on materials that are in accordance with materialism, 
which eliminates some of Marx's earlier work on law. It is erroneous, however, to 
assume that the use of any position described by the young Marx is indefensible 
when trying to define Marxism. Certain congruities between the "early" and the 
"later" Marx exist; the specification of the role of law, however, is heavily 
influenced by the developments in Marx's later works. 
Another concern associated with studying "Marxism" is the exact nature of 
the relationship between Marx and Engels. Although Terrell Carver asserts that 
Engels greatly diverged from Marx (to the point of actually doing Marx's work a 
disservice),17 and W.O. Henderson emphasises the fact that Engels "made his own 
contributions to socialist doctrines",18 Gustav Meyer and Isaiah Berlin support the 
common view that there was no serious discrepancy with regards to fundamental 
issues.19 While Carver's argument has merit, in terms of law there appears be no 
essential variance between their views (different as their writings may be). 
Following Robert Tucker's thoughts that "[c]lassical Marxism is an amalgam in 
which Engels' work is an essential and inalienable part,"20 in this thesis their works 
shall be considered in tandem in the search for the foundation for a socialist view of 
law. When the term "Marxist" or Marxism is used, some concepts and ideas most 
succinctly expressed and widely recognised as originating from Engels are included. 
The specificities of "Marxist" theory and its ramifications for the legal structure in 
capitalism and socialism I leave to the chapter itself. 
17 Ibid., pp. 152-158. See also Norman Levine's The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Clio Books, 1975). 
18 W.O. Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels, two volumes (London: Frank Cass, 1976) voL 1, p. 2 
19 Gustav Meyer, Friedrich Engels (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969) and Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 
20 Robert Tucker, Introduction to The Marx and Engels Reader, ed., Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1978) p. xxxviii 
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The People's Courts 
Investigating the "People's Courts" in the Soviet Union as an example of an 
attempt to incorporate some characteristics prescribed by Marx and Engels presents a 
host of difficulties. The divergence of ideologies of the different phases of Soviet 
history makes classification of the Soviet Union quite difficult. Its history can be 
divided into roughly 5 phases: (1) the initial period (1917-1918); (2) the Civil War 
(1918-1920); (3) The New Economic Programme (N.E.P. 1921-1928), where small-scale 
capitalism was reintroduced into the economy; (4) Stalinism (1928-1952);21 and (5) 
post-Stalinism (1952-1991). Each of these historical phases had distinct ideologies. 
The Bolsheviks' initial attempts at directly implementing Marxist principles ended 
soon with the appearance of "war communism".22 N.E.P. was categorised by Lenin 
as a "retreat", in part brought about by the failure of revolution in the West. Also 
evident during N.E.P. was the consolidation of power in the hands of the party 
rather than the workers.23 Stalin's ideology, founded on the complete 
empowerment of the State to work towards "socialist" aims, fundamentally altered 
the course of the initial years of the revolution; an alteration that would affect the 
U.5.S.R. until its demise. Gordon B. Smith sums up the impact of Stalin well: 
More than any other figure, Stalin was the architect of the Soviet political system. He 
shaped the massive bureaucratic apparatus to bring the economy under his command. He 
transformed the Party from a diverse array of more-or-Iess free-thinking leftist 
intellectuals into a tightly controlled and monolithic force, subservient to his wilL He 
destroyed the "rural mentality" of the Russian peasant through collectivization. He 
harnessed Virtually every resource in his headlong drive to develop and modernize the 
Soviet Union ... If Stalin is immortalized as larger than life, it's because he seems larger 
than life ... 24 
The principles behind the People's Courts, at least at the early stages (1917-
1920), strongly attempted to adhere to Marxist ideology. They did not, however, 
21 While most historians place the consolidation of Stalin's power at this date (the beginning of the 
first Five Year Plan), it should be noted that the effects of Stalin's move towards power could be 
felt as early as 1924. 
22 Even the initial stages of the Russian revolution were not classified as "socialist" by some. Russia, 
they argued, was too underdeveloped to sustain a socialist revolution. Ivo Lapenna makes a 
compelling argument in this regard, see "Marxism and the Soviet Constitutions" in Conflict 
Studies, No. 106 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979) pp. 1-2l. 
23 R.W. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law (London: Croom Helm, 1980) p. 59 
24 Gordon Smith, Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) p. 36 
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progress towards the communist regulatory system envisioned by Marx and Engels. 
The introduction of N.E.P. seems a natural stopping point for the analysis of the 
People's Courts for the purpose of theoretically examining the results of a practical 
excursion into putting theory into practice. 
The influence of Lenin on the shaping of the ideology and structure of the 
U.S.S.R. is so pervasive that an examination of the People's Courts without 
exploring Lenin's theory of law during the transition period and communism 
would be remiss. The first section of the chapter is dedicated to the legal concepts of 
Lenin. 
The second part of the chapter focuses on the structure, operation, 
development and problems of the workings of the People's Courts. Interesting 
enough, little research has been conducted with regard to these courts, especially in 
the early period.25 Research regarding these early local courts involves a great deal 
of original work, especially in the use of a rather obscure law journal of the early 
Soviet Union, Proletarskaia revolutsiia i pravo, from which much material of the 
description of the courts and their problems comes. 
The third section of the chapter is dedicated to analysis. When the example of 
the People's Court is contrasted with the theoretical goals outlined by Marx and 
Engels, deeper theoretical questions regarding a system of regulation arise. It is 
through the analysis of this example that these issues are clarified and brought to 
the forefront. 
The Theorists 
The history of legal theory in the U.5.S.R. has rather clearly delineated stages. 
It is generally accepted that from 1917-1928, legal philosophy centred on the thought 
that law was a bourgeois phenomenon that was to gradually wither away as the 
25 John Hazard's research on the People's Courts, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1960) excepted. 
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U.5.5.R. progressed towards communism.26 So pervasive was this feeling that the 
legal institutions and courts were in constant preparedness to shut down; and 
indeed some of them did.27 The leading theoretical figure of this time period was 
E.B. Pashukanis. Even in the modern West he is acknowledged as "[t]he only man 
who has made a real contribution towards a materialist philosophy of law"28 and is 
described as being "virtually the only revolutionary socialist to give us a Marxist 
analysis of the phenomenon of law."29 Much of this chapter is occupied with an in-
depth exploration of Pashukanis's work. Also examined are P.I. Stuchka, 
instrumental in his work in the Commissariat of Justice, and M.A. Reisner, who 
presents a slightly different approach in his vision of "communist law". This 
chapter is not concerned with these authors' views of Soviet legal development, but 
rather with their analysis of the essence of "law" and what the ramifications of their 
arguments would be for the future of law under communism. Similar to the 
chapter on Marx and Engels, its purpose is not to critique their concept of law (the 
critical literature is referenced in footnotes), but rather accept the premises of their 
arguments and proceed to their descriptions of the future of law. Despite the 
strategic and ideological upheavals of this period of Soviet history in regards to 
transition period strategies, the theoretical notions of communism are largely 
unaffected and provide fruitful material for a more detailed concept of communist 
regulation. 
26 Historians often divide Soviet legal philosophy into two broad periods: 1917-1936/37, when the 
"withering away" thesis prevailed and post 1936-37, when the withering away thesis became 
incompatible with Stalin's demand for the centralisation of power of the State and law. Others 
suggest the addition of a middle period (1928-1936/37) where the move towards an empowered 
state was beginning to become evident. I am inclined to agree with the more specific periods. See 
Tay and Kamenka, "Beyond the French Revolution: Communist Socialism and the Concept of 
Law", pp. 125-126 note 15 and Hazard, Introduction to Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans., Hugh 
Babb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951) p. xix. For a short history of Soviet legal 
theory see Huskey, "From Legal Nihilism to Pravovoe Gosudarstvo" in Toward the "Rule of 
Law" in Russia? pp. 23-42. 
27 See Sharlet, "Pashukanis and the Withering Away of Law in the U.S.S.R.", pp. 169-188. 
28 Arthur, "Towards a Materialist Theory of Law" in Critique 7 (Winter, 1976/77) p. 31 
29 Peter Binns, "Law and Marxism" in Capital and Class, Issue 10 (Spring, 1980) p. 100 
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After 1928 (the start of the Five Year Plans), Stalin's drive to consolidate 
power began to take full effect. Stalin's re-definition of socialism and the goals of 
the Soviet Union naturally altered perceptions of the legal situation. Key to this 
change was Stalin's emphasis on "socialism in one country", which gave him the 
theoretical justification for actually increasing state power in order to protect the 
U.S.S.R. against the capitalist encirclement. Concomitantly, with the assertion that 
the Soviet State was to become stronger, so then was the role of law increased. 
With the implementation of the Five Year Plans, an accompanying increase 
in the need for centralised planning and hence centralised bureaucracy occurred. 
Law became a crucial element in carrying out state objectives. At this point, the 
withering away thesis was completely contradictory to Stalinism,3D and Stalin's legal 
theorist, Vyshinskii, "replaced"31 Pashukanis as the Soviet legal theorist.32 
Vyshinskii's work, The Law of the Soviet State (1938) laid the foundation for 
the Soviet legal system. Law was redefined as a positive tool of the state to shape 
Soviet society. In Vyshinskii's words: 
Stalin's teaching is that the withering away of the state will come not through a 
weakening of the state authority but through its maximum intensification, which is 
necessary to finish off the remnants of the dying classes and to organize against capitalist 
encirclement which is now far from being-and will not soon be-destroyed ... 
... constantly by reinforcing the socialist state and law by every means ... the toilers 
of our country will guarantee the building of the communist society and the triumph of 
communism. 33 
Accordingly, law is defined as: 
... the totality (a) of the rules of conduct expressing the will of the dominant class and 
established in legal order, and (b) of customs and rules of community life sanctioned by state 
30 W ojciech Sadurski wrote an extremely illuminating article on the transformation of Marxism by 
Stalin and its effect on Soviet legal theory, see "Marxism and legal positivism" in Essays in 
Legal Theory, ed., D.J. Galligan (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1984) pp. 187-246. See 
also Rudolph Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1945). 
31 Pashukanis was shot in 1937. 
32 Huskey writes an interesting article regarding the struggle between the 'legal nihilists' and 
Vyshinskii; see "Vyshinskii, Krylenko, and the Shaping of the Soviet Legal Order" in Slavic 
Review, VoL 46, No.1 (Spring, 1987) pp. 414-428. Also interesting is Lon Fuller's "Pashukanis 
and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory" in Michigan Law 
Review, Vol. 47 (1949) pp. 1157-1165 and Rudolph Schlesinger, "Recent Developments in Soviet 
Legal Theory" in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 4 (December, 1942) pp. 21-38. 
33 Andrei Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State, trans., Hugh Babb (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1961)p.62 
authority-their application being guarantied by the compulsive force of the state in order 
to guard, secure, and develop social relationships and social orders advantageous and 
agreeable to the dominant class.34 
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Despite Vyshinskii's denunciation after de-Stalinisation for his role in the 
purge trials, the principles set down in his work remained in operation through 
much of Soviet history.35 A majority of the legal literature after this point, became a 
justifying philosophy for the role law was to play in Soviet society. 
There are two rather obvious exclusions in regards to a theory of socialist law. 
One is the Italian socialist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) whose most influential 
works were written in prison (1929-1935) and are often referred to as The Prison 
Notebooks, and Karl Renner36 (1870-1950), an Austrian Marxist that wrote the well- ! J 
recognised work Institutions of Private Law and their Social Function. 
Gramsci's significant contribution towards a Marxist theory of law stems from 
his acknowledgement that law is not only a repressive instrument of the state, but 
also serves to unify public values. The dichotomy has been labelled the "coercion" 
vs "consent" argument in Marxist debates. The seed of Gramsci's two-fold approach 
can be found in his conception of hegemony. For Gramsci, the development of 
production forces established an historical basis for the formation of social classes. 
Members of these classes became aware that their interests corresponded with each 
other's on an economic leveL He explains that the development of class 
consciousness eventually evolves into an awareness "that one's own corporate 
interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of 
the purely economic class and can and must become the interests of other 
subordinate groups toO."37 Thus these ideologically transformed groups compete 
and conflict until "only one of them ... tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to 
propagate itself throughout society-bringing about not only a unison of economic 
34 Ibid., p. 50 
35 See Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture" and Boiter, "Law and Religion in the Soviet 
Union" in The American Journal of Comparative Law, VoL 25 (1987) pp. 414-428, esp. plOD. 
36 Also published under Kamer, Rudolf Springer and Josef Hammer. 
37 Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971) p. 181 
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and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions 
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and 
thus creating a hegemony of a fundamental social group ... "38 In capitalism, not only 
does the ruling class maintain economic domination through a coercive apparatus, 
but also attempts to create moral unity. Law, therefore, reflects these two roles: 
The general activity of law (which is wider than purely state and governmental activity 
and also includes the activity involved in directing civil society, in those zones which the 
technicians of law call legally neutral-i.e. in morality and custom generally) serves to 
understand the ethical problem better, in a concrete sense. In practice, this problem is the 
correspondence I spontaneously and freely accepted' between the acts and the admissions of 
each individual, between the conduct of each individual and the ends which society sets 
itself as necessary-a correspondence which is coercive in the sphere of positive law ... and 
is spontaneous and free (more strictly ethical) in those zones in which 'coercion' is not a 
state affair but is effected by public opinion, moral climate.39 
Although his description of the role of law is grounded in materialism (in that 
formation of classes arose from production relations), he is praised for his shift away 
from "mechanical materialism" in that, for him, law is not only a coercive arm of 
the state but also aids in creating a moral milieu that is more-or-less not forcefully 
propagated. 
As interesting as this position and the various reactions to it are,40 the gist of 
Gramsci's work focuses on an interpretation of law in capitalism, which falls outside 
the general aim of this thesis. His contribution, however, is worth noting. 
Renner's work41 primarily focuses on the role of law during the transition 
period. For him, revolution would occur through institutional reform, Richard 
Kinsey describes Renner's position: 
38 Ibid., pp. 181-182 
39 Ibid., pp. 195-196 
40 See Sumner, Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory oj Ideology and Law, pp. 
256-263; John Hoffman's The Gramscian Challenge (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984) which 
focuses specifically on the "coercion and consent" issue in Marxist theory; Perry Anderson's "The 
Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", New Left Review, No. 100 (November, 1976-January, 1977) pp. 
5-78; Hunt's "Dichotomy and Contradiction in the Sociology of Law" in Marxism and Law, pp. 74-
97, sp. 86-88 and Eugene Genovese's "The Hegemonic Function of the Law" in the same volume, pp. 
279-294, sp. 279-280. For Gramsci's original writings An Antonio Gramsci Reader, ed., David 
Forgacs (New York: Schocken Books, 1988) is quite useful. 
41 Karl Renner, The Institutions oj Private Law and their Social Function (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1976, c1949) 
Revolution which can obtain only at the level of political institutions-the economic 
substratum knows evolution only-will in the transition to socialism take the form of a legal 
revolution in which there occurs a cognitive re-appropriation and normative re-ordering of 
the social relations of production. It is a revolution of re-form.42 
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Renner regarded the legal form as essentially neutral and believed it could be 
utilised to shape whichever particular social order that emerged from the mode of 
production. Thus legal institutions, as well as others, are vehicles to be used to 
achieve social transformation. The function of law differed from its form; and 
indeed, law could perform a socialist function.43 
He argued that eventually private law-whose function was rooted in private 
property-would give way to public law, which represents the collective interest of 
society. To some degree, this was already occurring in capitalism: 
Regulations relating to the normal working day, factory inspection, and protection of 
working women and children are institutions of public law which increasingly supplement 
institutions of private law .. .In the end the relations of labour are as to nine parts regulated 
by public law, and the field of private law is restricted to the remaining tenth ... 
... Elements of a new order have been developed within the framework of the old 
society.44 
Renner used the example of the joint stock company to further emphasise the 
gradual shift from private to public law. He argued that the superfluous role of the 
capitalist was revealed by the fact that managers operate and utilise companies. The 
capitalist merely has the title to the surplus value produced by the company. For 
Renner, this represented a step in the direction of coordinated and collectivised 
organisation of economic resources-in other words, a progression towards 
socialism. Once public interests, protected by the state, superseded the interests of a 
handful of individuals (capitalists), society via already existing institutions, could be 
transformed to a socialist one. Managers would work for the whole of society rather 
than a small group of capitalists; yet the form of joint stock companies would 
remain fundamentally the same. 
42 Richard Kinsey, "Karl Renner and Socialist Legality" in Legality, Ideology and The State, ed., 
David Sugarman (London: Academic Press, 1983) p. 21 
43 This is in direct opposition to Pashukanis' position. 
44 Renner, "The Development of the Law" from The Institutions of Private Law and their Social 
Function in Austro-Marxism, trans. and eds., Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978) pp. 273-274 
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The fact that Renner treats the legal form as inherently neutral and that the 
content of the law is determined solely by its function places him outside of 
traditional Marxist theory. Paul Hirst comments that the methodology of The 
Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions "is ... not drawn like 
Pashukanis' from the general body of Marxist theory. Renner adopted the formalist 
legal philosophy dominant in central Europe at the time."45 This, combined with 
the fact that Renner was most concerned with the transition period, places him on 
the outskirts of this thesis. As with Gramsci, however, Renner's contribution 
towards a viable transition strategy is worth mention.46 
The chapter closes with an analysis of the contributions of the chosen authors 
with regard to a more defined concept of regulation. 
Theoretical Synthesis 
The purpose of this chapter is not critically to compare theorists examined in 
previous chapters (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stuchka, Pashukanis and Reisner), nor to 
expound upon their differences. As the title indicates, a discussion of the 
similarities in the description of communist regulation takes place. Despite obvious 
theoretical differences, a remarkably coherent portrait of communist regulation can 
be extracted from the works of these theorists. 
The chapter then proceeds to address some gaps in the theoretical description 
of regulation and to explain more fully the key theoretical elements involved with 
it. Some discussion of basic socialist tenets which directly affect regulation occur, but 
only to the extent that their concepts are theoretically clarified in order to further 
explain key notions of regulation in communism. 
45 On Law and Ideology, p. 122. For a discussion of the differences between Renner and Marx see Kinsey, 
"Karl Renner and Socialist Legality", pp. 12-42. 
46 For comments on Renner and law see Hirst, On Law and Ideology, esp. pp. 122-126; Sumner, Reading 
Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law, pp. 248-249, 253-260 
passim; and Peter Robson, "Renner Revisited" in Perspectives in Jurisprudence, ed., Elspeth 
Attwooll (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press, 1977) pp. 221-236. 
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Lastly, some problems with the theory of regulation are discussed and 
grounds for a model of regulation are established. 
The work of this chapter, and indeed all subsequent chapters, are completely 
theoretically constructed by myself (save for the summation of points at its 
beginning). Explanations and discussions should not be attributed directly to the 
theorists studied, although they do take place within a framework derived from 
these theorists. 
Towards a Model 
This chapter addresses the structural components of a regulatory system in 
communism. Previous chapters focused on the theoretical basis of regulation, and 
while structural components were mentioned they were not discussed 
methodically. 
Once the structural elements are clarified, it becomes possible to construct a 
summary of what is meant by regulation. Though the summary draws from all 
previous material, it does not reiterate the logical connection between various 
points. 
To abate the completely speculative nature of such a model, I draw on a 
concrete example of social organisation based on socialist production relations and 
administrative institutions. Curiously enough, the Israeli kibbutz fits many of the 
major characteristics described in the model. There are some important differences, 
however, which are discussed in the chapter. The purpose of this particular 
example is to examine the effects of socialist administrative structures and social 
relations with regard to conflict. Whilst there is much material on kibbutz life, one 
particular study gives a detailed-enough analysis of relations in operation on a 
particular kibbutz to evaluate some of the theorists' claims. While the results of 
such an evaluation cannot be considered at all conclusive, they do cause pause for 
thought. 
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Conclusion 
With a full theoretical explanation of regulation, its meaning and structure, it 
now becomes possible to assess whether such a system can be considered "law". The 
theorists examined defined law in such a way that precluded regulation in 
communism from ever being considered a legal phenomenon. If a more general 
definition of law were considered, however, it might be possible that regulation 
could be considered law. Several arguments are examined in this regard. The first 
seeks to divorce the component of coercion from law and concludes that law can be 
defined by its institutional source. The second, returning to the kibbutz example, 
seeks to answer whether institutional sources of law would have to be formal 
"legal" institutions and questions whether other institutions might not have legal 
power. The third attempts to define law as the process of decision-making in a 
democratic society. All of these arguments pose alternative definitions of law that 
should be considered before answering whether regulation can be considered law. 
After the classification of regulation is settled, whether or not it merits a 
"separate" jurisprudence is discussed. 
THE GOAL 
Despite the divergence between the two branches of the study of socialism and 
law, there are several common factors. Both branches recognise that the U.5.S.R. 
(both historically and theoretically) had some relevance to the development of a 
socialist theory based on Marxism. Both acknowledge that legal systems in countries 
like the Soviet Union are different from Western legal systems (if only slightly). 
Both are categorised under the paradigm of socialist law. These similarities, 
however, have bred more confusion than definition. Those that accept that the 
U.S.S.R. was socialist throughout its history and analyse the Soviet legal system in 
terms of Western principles of law, completely ignore Marx's basic critique of 
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capitalist legal phenomena (especially in terms of rights and the rule of law). The 
error is, in part, rectified by those that assess the Soviet Union within the general 
framework of Marxism (rather than liberalism). They, however, tend to regard the 
U.5.S.R. as an actual development of Marxist principles. Given the textual 
descriptions of socialism and communism presented by Marx, it is clear that U.5.5.R. 
strayed from a socialist path quite early on. Those that accept this conclusion have 
made great strides in clarifying a Marxist perspective of law, but have failed to 
address what type of regulation could possibly replace it or why regulation would 
not be needed. The authors that accept the fact that some regulation would be 
needed, and that the system that was operating in the modern U .S.S.R. was 
incompatible with Marxist principles, call for a redefinition of law to: (1) protect 
those rights that seemed to be flagrantly absent in the Soviet system-namely civil 
rights and non-political legal institutions; and (2) protect those rights which seem to 
be absent in capitalism-namely economic security and quality of life minimum 
requirements. The latter position seems to have gained much authority recently. 
This position, however, is subject to the same criticism as the first group, namely, 
given the traditional Marxist antagonism towards law, can a "new" definition of law 
be defended against Marx's original critique of legality (and in this case "rights")? At 
the same time, how can opponents to law in socialism maintain their position 
without any explanation of what will replace law? 
Christine Sypnowich, author of The Concept of Socialist Law writes: " ... they 
[Marxists] have been unable to make any further contributions to legal theory. They 
do not consider the role law might play in a post-capitalist society, and a socialist 
jurisprudence is virtually non-existent."47 This thesis seeks to alleviate the problem 
posed by theoretically constructing a regulatory system in communism compatible 
with the principles outlined by Marx, Engels and subsequent theorists on the subject 
of law and socialism. After such a regulatory system has been defined and discussed, 
47 Christine Sypnowich, The Concept of Socialist Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p. 2 
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it can be ascertained whether such a system can be considered law, and whether it 
merits a "separate" jurisprudence. 
The overall goal of this thesis is to address the current lacuna existing in the 
literature of "socialist law" created by the fact that a full exploration of a regulatory 
system in communism within the boundaries of principles established by Marx and 
Engels has not been made. In this way, the thesis contributes in original form to the 
field of jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER ONE-MARX AND ENGELS 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the literature that pertains to a Marxist theory of law has examined 
Marx and Engels in terms of their views of law in a capitalist state. Relatively few 
sections of their work deal directly with the notion of law in post-capitalist society. 
Once communism is reached, law in itself, like the state, will "wither away". 
Evident in the writings of Marx and Engels, however, are implications of a system of 
regulation which will exist in communism. Whether or not this regulation can be 
considered law will be explored through the entire thesis. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the works of Marx and Engels and extract from them passages 
relevant to establishing at least a rough outline for a theory of socialist regulation, as 
well as some indications as to what the function of this regulation might be, its 
nature and how it is formed. 
Much is involved in trying to grasp the general picture of post-capitalist 
regulation. Marx and Engels sought to analyse society in a completely integrated 
sense, making it difficult to discuss one social phenomenon, such as law, apart from 
other social phenomena, such as economic status. Although a full inquiry into their 
analysis of social structure is prohibited by space, their general philosophy regarding 
the basis of capitalist social organisation and its transformation into socialism must 
be discussed to some degree to elicit a sense of which direction a system of regulation 
must take. When elements relevant to law and regulation are assembled, even in 
brief, it becomes evident that the sense of regulation that emerges from their more 
general theory of social relationships is complex and demands further explanation. 
The first part of this chapter deals with Marx and Engels' general views of social 
organisation, and the second examines the significance of these views with regard to 
the regulation issue. 
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THE BASIS 
When examining social phenomena, Marx tried, as Hugh Collins aptly points 
out in his book Marxism and Law, to take what was labelled a "social" science and 
make it "scientific" in constitution} On this basis, Marx sought to examine society 
through direct observation and thus founded his analysis on what he termed 
concrete experience: 
The concrete is concrete, because it is the sum of many determinations, and therefore a unity 
of diversity. Hence the concrete appears in thinking as a process of summarization, as a 
result, not as a starting point, although the concrete is the actual starting point and hence 
also the starting point of perception and conception.2 
In social terms, this concrete form manifested itself in the material conditions 
of life, the basis of which is work. Marx argues that the one unassailable constant in 
all human societies (including future ones) is that people must work in order to 
survive. "Work is the eternal natural condition of human existence. The process of 
labour is nothing but work itself, viewed at the moment of its creative activity. 
Hence the universal features of the labour process are independent of every specific 
social development."3 Work, then, is the fundamental element in human existence 
and is not specific to any particular society. 
Marx asserts that work is intrinsically social, that is, has involved a system 
that is outside of yet inclusive of individual effort. Persons interact with and are a 
part of a social system that provides for their means of survival. The basis of all 
societies, then, is how work is SOcially organised, or in other words, economics. 
Since all work is social, the economic sphere is defined in terms of social relations. 
All other social phenomena are based, to some degree, on the social relations which 
arise from specific economic conditions, or more simply the method of production. 
The evolution of social relations can therefore be traced through the development 
of the mode of production over time. 
1 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) pp. 4-5 
2 Karl Marx, Texts on Method, trans./ed., T. Carver (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975) pp. 72-73 
3 Marx, Capital Volume I (New York: Penguin Books, 1979) p. 998 
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History, then, has movement. The "progressive" element (as opposed to 
random movement) stems from the process of dialectics and the theory of 
materialism. In a philosophical sense, dialectics embody a method of logic that 
allows advancement through the resolution of contraries. Materialism applies this 
logic to concrete reality, which for Marx, was the mode of production. Through this 
method, internal contradictions of a system (and hence relations) are made 
manifest, and by the natural4 progress of history, these contradictions seek 
resolution: (when speaking of dialectics): 
[It is] Reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, 
and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one 
another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature.5 
And to relate this concept to human history: 
It is the reflection of the actual development going on in the world of nature and of human 
history in obedience to dialectical forms.6 
As various production methods and social forces develop, so does knowledge-both 
technical (scientific) and social (in the form of consciousness). The greater the 
knowledge that is achieved, the more humans can utilise natural forces for their 
own ends and the freer society is? In the process of acquiring knowledge, in the first 
instant of the forces of nature, and at later stages of the social forces generated by the 
mode of production, contradictions are resolved until a final phase is reached where 
persons in a society are in control over the social forces generated by the economic 
system and use them in total for their own ends (communism). History thus has 
progressive stages, passing from primitive and slave-owning societies, through 
feudalism, capitalism to a transitional period that leads to eventual communism. 
At the apex of each stage of development, the social forces are in such a state of 
4 Natural is used with no political or legal implications. 
5 Engels, Dialectics of Nature, trans., C. Dutt (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954) p. 280 
6 Engels, Letter to Schmidt in Marx and Engels Selected Correspondence, trans., 1. Lasker, ed., S. 
Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965, 2nd ed.) p. 439 
7 Obviously this summation is vastly simplified and discussions abound as to whether this progress is 
inevitable, or whether one day complete "knowledge" or "freedom" will exist; but for a general 
account this will suffice. 
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contradiction that revolution occurs and the next phase begins. The process of 
history then, is a record of peoples' struggle with the social forces that bind them. 
The struggle proceeds until people control these social forces and can harness their 
power, thus creating a unity between individuals and economic forces. 
Although the mode of production is the impetus of history and the basis for 
all social relations, other elements also playa role. These Marx sums up as the 
"superstructure". The superstructural components-politics, philosophy, law, 
ideology, etc.- contribute to social relations and how they are perceived and 
categorised. It is important to stress that the relationship of the substructure to the 
superstructure cannot be characterised as strictly deterministic. The process of 
historical development is dialectical: an event (cause) in a given moment of history 
may generate changes (effect) that may alter the original basis (cause) of the first 
event in a future moment of history. Hence, development in the superstructure 
may alter the substructure even though the superstructure is determined by the 
substructure. In a given moment of history, social relations are determined by the 
mode of production. History, however, is always in motion. Capitalist relations 
may prevail now, yet political and legal struggles develop the knowledge that leads 
to the advent of socialism, which will eventually causes a metamorphosis in the 
substructure. Engels summarises this dialectical relationship: 
It is not that economic conditions are the sole active cause and everything else mere passive 
effect. Rather there is interaction on the basis of a prevailing economic necessity in the last 
instance ... Hence there is not ... an automatic effect produced by economic conditions; rather 
men make their history themselves, but in a given milieu which conditions them; they do 
this on the basis of pre-existing relations, amongst which the economic are decisive in the 
last instance, though they may be influenced by other relations, political and 
ideological...8 
The perception of one's social circumstance, that is consciousness, which is affected 
by superstructural phenomena (including law), does not always coincide with actual 
concrete circumstances. This, in essence, is Marx's notion of "false consciousness". 
8 Engels, Letter to Borgius in Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, etc., 1956, etc.) voL 39, p. 206 in Gerard 
Bekerman, Marx and Engels: A Conceptual Concordance, trans., T. Carver (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1983) p. 71 
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The identification of labour as the sole constant in historical development, 
the process of dialectics as the impetus of history, the theory of materialism and the 
recognition of the complex substructure / superstructure relationship are basic tenets 
of Marx that must be taken into account when analysing elements of social 
structure. Discussion of how these elements affect Engels and Marx's notion of 
regulation necessitates further explanation of capitalist legal relationships and how 
these relationships will be altered by a socialist revolution. 
Legal and economic relations in capitalism 
According to Marx and Engels, the systemic contradictions in capitalism stem 
from the social forces generated from the capitalist mode of production which was 
designed to produce profit, contrasted with the aim of society which is to provide for 
human need. The social relations ariSing from profit-driving mechanisms procured 
what Marx labelled commodity fetishism and were described in terms of 
"atomisation" and "isolation". 
In capitalism, society is a conglomeration of commodity owners. 
Commodities embody the abstract quality of value in that they can be exchanged for 
other commodities in defined quantity, regardless of varying use-values. This value 
is realised via the act of exchange; an act which does not occur as a property of 
commodities themselves. Exchange requires the external volition of commodity 
owners. Simultaneously, individuals engaged in production also relate to each 
other as values and become commodities themselves (by selling their labour 
power). When functioning in this society humans assume the role of objects 
(commodities) and also agents of free will but only in association with things (i.e. 
via commodities). Through these categories we are universalised and objectified; 
we are commodities and exert our will via commodities-in essence commodity 
fetishism. The notion of this equivalence appears in fully developed form in 
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advanced capitalism, which unifies all of society through exchange and its 
corresponding relations. 
In this state of affairs, we are both objects (sellers of labour time) and subjects 
(bearers of free will). Our social relationships, therefore, reflect both an objective 
status and a subjective one. Marx asserts that the subjective role is characterised in 
civil society and indeed mirrors our role in production. We, as commodities, are 
equalised and objectified through the act of exchange. We, as members of civil 
society, are equalised and objectified through our categorisation as possessors of free 
will; equalised because our wills have equal effect, objectified because we exert our 
wills through commodities. When an act of exchange occurs, there is assumed a 
relation between two equal free wills (contract); and the ramifications of the 
effectuation of free will entails certain rights and obligations. In our subjective role, 
we therefore become bearers of equal rights (equal wills). 
Commodity exchange represents the equalisation of all forms of labour in the 
abstract notion of value. The social condition accompanying the development of 
the commodity form is depicted as the total abstract unification of the alienated 
working society: a society whose individuals are possessors of independent, equal 
and free egoistic wills and hence bearers of certain rights and obligations. These 
individual free wills are abstractly united in the ideological notion of civil society. 
Law, then, assumes the ideological role of an objective, independent force operating 
to ensure individual rights, and enforce obligations, protected by a state whose duty 
is to provide for the If common interests". 
Marx and Engels saw a fundamental contradiction between the 
characterisation of social producers as individuals, and unequal persons possessing 
equal rights. Since individuals are, in reality, not equal (i.e. one owns property, one 
does not; one is a manager, one is a worker; one is smarter, one produces more than 
another, etc.), the only way this equality could be achieved was in the abstract. Law 
may operate in the abstract as an objective criterion by which to regulate society, but 
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in reality, individuals are not equal, nor can they be viewed as isolated individuals 
without regard to their differentiated roles in production. In reality, individuals' 
wills, rights and obligations are not equal but are affected by their positions in the 
economic structure, as well as their differences as human beings. The abstract role of 
law as an objective system of evaluation contradicts its actual function, which 
according to Marx and Engels, is to maintain the capitalist power structure. 
Marx contrasted the role of individuals in the political (civil) realm and in the 
production process to elucidate the contradiction of capitalist social relations in 
general. He portrays individuals as leading a "twofold life", that of a private 
producer who "regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and 
becomes the plaything of alien powers/'9 and that of a member of the state, where 
s/he is regarded as a "the imaginary member of an illusory sovereignty, is deprived 
of his real individual life and endowed with unreal universality."10 For Marx, the 
contrast between economic and political is nonsensical for neither embodies a 
notion of community in reality. They both serve to preserve the categorisation of 
individuals as isolated, egoistic beings. The argument is connected intricately with 
Marx's perception of rights. 
He turns to the French, whom he credits with discovering rights, for 
enumeration. "Rights" were classified by the French in terms of the droits de 
l'homme (rights of man) and the droits du citoyen (rights of the citizen). For Marx, 
this separation reflects the divided role of the individual perceived as an isolated 
individual (droits de l'homme) and in the political capacity (droits du citoyen). The 
rights of the isolated individual generally ordain freedom of conscience.!l Beliefs 
are separated from the realm of the state, which is the culmination of the political 
essence of society. A person's conscience is considered to be an individual 
endeavour. 
9 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 154 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 161 
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The rights of citizens, however, stipulate rights of individuals as part of a 
political community. These rights are specified as the right to "equality, liberty, 
security and property."12 Marx discusses each. "Liberty," he writes, " .. .is the right to 
do everything that harms no one else. The limits within which anyone can act 
without harming someone else are defined by law ... "13 Marx asserts that the right is 
based on the assumption that human actions are strictly determined by the 
individual. He opines: "the right of man to liberty is based not on the association of 
man with man, but on separation of man from man."14 
The right of property specifies that individuals can enjoy or dispose of their 
property (goods, income, "the fruits of his labour and industry") as each sees fiUs 
Again, Marx avers, the right of property appears to have nothing to do with 
community. In fact, it allows individuals to dispose of property "without regard to 
other men, (and) independent of society."16 
Security, Marx summarises, is the claim to the protection of these rightsP 
The sole purpose of the state, as stipulated in the 1791 constitution, then becomes 
the express protection of the rights of all its citizens: "The aim of all political 
association is the preservation of ... rights."18 Given Marx's assertion that property 
and liberty apply to isolated individuals, security simply furthers egoism by ensuring 
it.19 In the same sense, the right to equality, which prescribes that all are the same 
12 From the French Constitution of 1793: Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen: Article 2: uCes 
droits du citoyen ... sont: l'egalite, la liberte, la surete, la propriete." Ibid., p. 162. Marx's 
citations from the 1793 Constitution were taken from P.J.B. Buchez and P.e. Roux, Histoire 
Parlementaire de la Revolution franr;aise (Paris, 1837) vol. 31 [as specified in footnote 25, written 
by Velta Pospelova in UNotes", Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 592] 
13 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 162 
14 Ibid. 
15 (1793) Article 16: uLe droit de propriete est celui qui appartient a tout citoyen de jouir et de disposer fL 
son gre de ses biens, de ses revenus, du fruit de son travail et de son industrie." Ibid., p. 163. 
16 Ibid. 
17 (1793) Article 8: uLa surete consiste dans la protection accordee pae la societe a chacun de ses membres 
pour la conservation de sa personne, de ses droits et de ses proprietes," Ibid. 
18 uLe but de toute association politique est la conservation des droits ... de l'homme," Ibid., p. 164 
19 Ibid., pp. 163-164 
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before the law,2o translates in Marx's words to the right of each person to be regarded 
to the same extent as a "self-sufficient monad."21 
Marx concludes that no rights go beyond the egoistic human acting in 
isolation. "Political rights" hence becomes a contradiction in terms. This 
contradiction is made manifest by the fact that rights cease when they threaten 
"public good" (e.g. "Freedom of the press should not be permitted when it endangers 
public liberty.")22 Marx articulates the blatant ideological contradiction: 
The right of man to liberty ceases to be a right as soon as it comes into conflict with 
political life, whereas in theory, political life is only the guarantee of human rights ... 23 
How are we connected as members of society if both economic and political 
rights are individual phenomena? Marx answers that we can be connected only 
through law, which governs relations between citizens. Thus in the economic 
realm of society we are individual producers and politically we are juridic persons.24 
Marx contrasts the above ideological perception to material conditions. In 
terms of conscience being an individual activity, Marx argues that, by nature, 
conscience is social because it is conditioned by the surrounding environment. 
Individuals cannot be placed in a vacuum. In terms of the rights of citizens, labour 
is a social activity; therefore we are connected through production. The "right to 
property" is actually a societal right to use resources to provide for needs-a 
situation impossible in capitalism. The bourgeois right to property applies only to 
those who own property. Security, then, only defends property owners. Freedom, 
in these terms, becomes the liberty of property owners to ignore societal needs. The 
state assumes the role of the protector of property owners. Equality is relegated to 
20 (1795) Article 3: "L'egalite consiste en ce que la loi est la meme pour tous, sont qu'elle protege, soit 
qU'eZZe punisse.," Ibid., p. 163. Marx's citations from the 1795 Constitution were taken from P.J.B. 
Buchez and P.e. Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Revolution franr;aise (Paris, 1837) vol. 36 [as 
specified in footnote 26, in "Notes", Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 593] 
21 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 163 
22 "La liberte de la presse ne doit pas etre permise lorsqu'elle compromet la liberte publique," Ibid., p. 
165 quoted by Marx from Robespierre jeune, Histoire parlementaire de la Revolution franr;aise par 
Bouchen et Roux, vol. 28, p. 159 
23 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 165 
24 Ibid., pp. 167-168 
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the abstract, because, in actuality, we are not equal (especially in that we all do not 
own property). The false division between political and economic resides in the 
contradiction of the perception of individuals as egoistic and separate entities who 
in fact operate in a completely social capacity.25 
The highest form law can achieve in capitalism is formal, institutional 
equality: a form that is abstract in nature. Similarly, "rights" cannot evolve beyond 
formalised politics. Marx did say of political emancipation, however, "True, it is not 
the final form of human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human 
emancipation within the hitherto existing world order."26 
Capitalist society may regard law as fulfilling the role of objectively 
maintaining order and resolving disputes. It fulfils this role by treating individuals 
as bearers of individual, equal rights, and concurrent obligations. However, 
according to the philosophy of materialism, relations, including legal, proceed from 
production relations. Law thus reflects capitalist production relations in that it 
directly embodies our roles as independent economic agents-isolated agents with 
free will which entails both rights and obligations. Capitalist production relations in 
themselves, however are contradictory. Individuals do not operate in isolation and 
are not equal. In reality, law itself reflects this contradiction for, whilst it maintains 
the false notion that it regulates objectively, in reality it perpetuates the 
contradiction present in economic relations. Law actually performs the role of 
reasserting the "right" of property owners over non-property owners, to reduce it to 
its simplest form. In the broad sense, law will protect production relations that are 
based on procuring capital, the core of which is private property. 
Proceeding from the above arguments, law, in essence, cannot exist in 
socialism because the production relations that allow an objective abstract force that 
deals with citizens as isolated and equal individuals cannot arise amidst socialist 
25 At the root of all this is the theory of commodity fetishism: a link best explained by Pashukanis. It 
will be covered in Chapter three. 
26 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 3, p. 155 
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production relations where there is no fundamental contradiction between 
individual and social roles. If law is to fulfil the role of "social regulator" in 
actuality, then production relations have to actually be social and if they were, then 
law in the capitalist form simply could not exist. What happens to legal relations 
when social relations proceed from an economic system whose only goal is to 
provide for human need? How will social relations change under a socialist 
economic system? 
Legal and economic relations in socialism 
Marx affirms that if individuals are operating actually as communal beings (in 
that they own, operate and control production), then the distinct category of 
"political", is superfluous. Consequently, the separate category of "juridic" also 
becomes unnecessary. Political and economic relations are one and the basis for 
contradiction is goneP Only when citizens control their material and social 
environment can true "rights"-in essence, emancipation-be achieved,28 but they 
will no longer assume the form of "law". The question as to what form rights will 
assume was not discussed at length by Marx and Engels directly.29 They did, 
however, describe the changes in social relations that would occur in the transition 
to capitalism. Contributions to the legal debate can be found in these discussions. 
Structurally, Marx and Engels integrally linked law with the state. The state 
essentially uses law to maintain power. State and law are wedded in this way to the 
capitalist class. Both state and law are part of the superstructure, the characteristics 
and foundation of which lie with the substructure. As was discussed previously, 
legal relations as well as all social relations proceed from the material conditions of 
life manifested in the mode of production. "Political, legal, philosophical, religious, 
27 A vast simplification. Pashukanis, again, explains this in more depth. See Chapter three. 
28 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 168 
29 This question is fundamental to the regulation question and shall be discussed at great length 
through this thesis. Marx and Engels, however, did not directly write about the form regulation 
would assume. Perhaps this is why their is so much controversy in the debate over "socialist 
law" . 
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literary, artistic development, etc. rest on the economic base."30 It is commonly held 
that Marx and Engels dismissed law, as well as the state, as a coercive function to 
maintain the power of the ruling class. Hence, once a socialist state had arisen, the 
need for both state and law would be simply non-existent. 
Some of the most stringent arguments against the need for law in socialism 
arise from Marx and Engels' discussions of the abolition of the state. The most 
damaging passage of this nature is the oft cited quotation which reads: 
... the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of the 
process of production. The state is not' abolished'. It dies out.31 
And further: 
Marx and I. .. have held the view that one of the final results of the future proletarian 
revolution will be the gradual dissolution and ultimate disappearance of that political 
[my emphasis] organisation called the state.32 
Indeed Marx states even more directly in Preface to A Contribution to Critique of 
Political Economy that, once the economic foundation of capitalism is destroyed, the 
superstructure will cease to exist.33 
The above would seem clearly to indicate the absence of state and law in 
socialism. What Engels and Marx convey, however, is that the state will not endure 
as a political organ. The state is replaced34 by the administration of things. Logically, 
if the superstructure is based on the substructure, and the substructure is defined by 
the mode of production, when that particular substructure is eradicated so will be 
the corresponding superstructure. Thus elements of the superstructure do not 
"disappear", but their specific forms do. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Engels, Anti-Duhring in Marx and Engels Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987) 
vol. 25, p. 268. The last line of the quote is often translated as "withers away" as in the separate 
work, Anti-Duhring (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969). The German version [in Werke, vol. 
20, p. 262] reads "Er stirb ab." The verb absterben literally means to die off or away. 
32 Engels, Letter to Van Patten in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two volumes (Moscow: Foreign 
Language Publishing House, 1951) vol. 1, pp. 340-341 
33 Marx, Contribution to Critique of Political Economy in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two 
volumes, vol. 1, p. 503 
34 "An die Stelle der Regierung uber Personentritt die Verwaltung von Sachen und die Lietung von 
Produktionsprozessen." [Engels, Anti-Duhring in Werke, vol. 20, p. 262] The verb (Stelle) treten 
means supersede, take the place of. 
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The fact that Marx and Engels imply the possibility of a form of law in 
socialism raises interesting questions as to what this concept of law might involve. 
They portray capitalist law as a coercive tool to maintain power, as a manifestation 
of egOistic wills, as a process of political justice. All of these definitions of law would 
be irrelevant given socialist production relations. Since analysis of law in capitalism 
is prevalent throughout their works, it is rather difficult to fathom what role law 
outside of a bourgeois society might play. Examining a passage that refers to the 
need for some regulation provides enlightenment (whilst referring to socialism): 
Justice concerned with criminal cases ceases of itself, that dealing with civil cases, which 
are almost all rooted in the property relations or at least in such relations as arise from the 
situation of social war likewise disappear, conflicts can then be only rare exceptions ... and 
will easily be settled by arbitrators ... It is infinitely easier to maintain peace than to keep 
war within certain limits so it is vastly more easy to administer a communist community 
rather than a competitive one.35 
The passage indisputably establishes the possibility of conflict in socialism and 
a need for arbitration. It also suggests a definition of the function of a regulatory 
system: that is "to maintain peace and administer a community." Further 
descriptions of law in socialism confirm the above points to a greater degree: 
In order to protect itself [capitalism] against crime, against direct acts of violence, society 
requires an extensive, complicated system of administration and judicial bodies which 
requires an immense labour force. In communist society this would likewise be vastly 
simplified, and precisely because-strange as it may sound-precisely because the 
administrative body in this society would have to manage not merely individual aspects of 
social life, but the whole of social life, in all its various activities, in all its aspects.36 
Engels illustrates here that the need for some regulation still remains. He 
does not allege that the system of administration and judicial bodies would be 
abolished, but simplified.37 As exemplified above, administration and arbitration 
are required. The mutual exclusivity of capitalist and socialist production relations, 
35 Engels, Speeches in Elberfeld in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 4, pp. 248-249. Especially 
important for my argument is the line " ... conflicts can then be only rare exceptions ... and will 
easily be settled by arbitrators .. "; the German version reads virtually the same " ... Streitigkeiten 
(quarrels, squabbles) konnen dann nur seltne Ausnahmen sein, wo sie jetzt die naturliche Folge der 
allgemeinen Feindschaft sind, und werden leicht sich durch Schiedsrichter schlichten lassen 
(literally allowed to arbitrate)." [Werke, voL 2, p. 542] 
36 Engels, Speeches in Elberfeld in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 4, pp. 248 
37 "In der kommunistischen Gesellschaft wurde sich auch dies unendlich vereinfachen (simplified) ... " 
[Engels, Zwei Reden in Elberfeld I in Werke, voL 2, p. 541] 
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however, preclude any correlation between administration and state, and law and 
arbitration. The term "socialist law" then becomes a conceptual problem. Law, a 
product of capitalist social relations, is incorporated in bourgeois political ideology. 
The state is often referred to as "nothing but a machine for the oppression of one 
class by another."38 The state would not assume a coercive, political form, but rather 
would be transformed into an administration39 which in essence, can be describe as 
an organising body whose function entails the management of society. Indeed, one 
could not even use the term, state, without confusion. Similarly, regulation does 
not operate in the capacity of law in maintaining capitalist production relations, yet 
there is a definite need for the task of arbitration. 
How might a socialist production method influence the conditions 
surrounding the arbitration process? Engels wrote in Anti-Duhring an illuminating 
passage regarding the nature of relations in socialism: 
So long as the really working population were so much occupied with their necessary labour 
that they had no time left for the looking after the common affairs of society-the 
direction of labours, affairs of state, legal matters, art, science, etc.-so long was it 
necessary that there should constantly exist a special class freed from actual labour to 
manage these affairs; and this class never failed, for its own advantage, to impose a 
greater and greater burden of labour on the working masses. Only the immense increase of 
the productive forces attained by modem industry has made it possible to distribute labour 
among all members of society without exception, and thereby to limit the labour time of 
each individual member to such an extent that all have enough free time left to take part 
in the general-both theoretical and practical-affairs of society. It is only now therefore, 
that every ruling and exploiting class has become superfluous and indeed a hindrance to 
social development and it is only now, too, that it will be inexorably abolished, however 
much it may be in possession of direct force.40 
Engels indicates that there will no longer be a separate juridical body; rather, 
matters would be attended to by all and they would have the time to fulfil this duty. 
Likewise, the state, a separate antagonistic political body, will be superseded by public 
power. Marx and Engels explain: "When in the course of development, class 
distinctions have disappeared and all production has been concentrated in the hands 
38 Engels, Introduction to Civil War in France in Marx and Engels Selected Works in one volume 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973) p. 258 
39 For an interesting discussion on this point see Hal Draper's "The Death of the State in Marx and 
Engels" in The Socialist Register, eds., R. Miliband. and J. Saville (London: The Merlin Press, 
1970) pp. 281-307. 
40 Engels, Anti-Dilhring in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 25, p. 169 
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of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political 
character [myemphasis]."41 A concordant view was published in an article in the 
International Herald in 1872: "there will be no longer any government or state 
power, distinct from society itself."42 Engels defines the abolition of the state as "the 
future conversion of political rule over men into an administration of things and a 
direction of the process of production."43 In other words, the language of these 
passages suggests that juridical and political power are absorbed (slightly different 
from "abolished") by the populace itself. Society, as a whole, discharges 
administrative and "legal" functions. 
Under these social conditions, the concepts 'political' and 'juridical', as defined 
by Marx and Engels, become irrelevant. It is beyond doubt, however, that the two 
writers acknowledged a requirement for administration and arbitration. For clarity, 
it would seem obvious that law should be used when speaking of capitalism and 
regulation when speaking of communism. 
The advent of communist production creates a situation where the social 
relations categorised in the substructure and the superstructure in capitalism (such 
as legal relations, political rights, etc.) no longer exist as contradictory and 
antagonistic forces. The nature of these affairs, however, will fundamentally differ 
from those in capitalism. Marx stresses that although the "old society is pregnant 
with the new", no element from the bourgeois superstructure can be "adapted" 
directly to socialism. Marx explains quite eloquently why this is the case: 
41 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two volumes, voL 1, p. 
34. In German: "Sind im Laufe der Entwicklung die Klassenunterschiede verschwunden und ist 
alle Produktion in den Hiinden der assoziierten Individuen (association of individuals) 
konzentriert, so verliert (lose, forfeit, let slip) die offentliche Gewalt den politischen 
Charakter." [Werke, voL 4, p. 482] 
42 Marx, International Herald (London) 15 June, 1872 as cited in Marx and Engels: A Conceptual 
Concordance, p. 114 
43 Engels, Anti-Duhring in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 25, p. 247. Also in Engels, Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two volumes, voL 2, p. 113. The 
citation in the German version of Anti-Diihring: " ... so ist doch die iiberfilhrung (transference, 
conversion) der politischen Regierung uber Menschen in eine Verwaltung von Dingen und eine 
Leitung von Produktionsprozessen ... " [Werke, vol. 20, p. 241] 
Society is not based on the law, that is legal fiction, rather law must be based on society; it 
must be the expression of society's rommon interests and needs, as they arise from the 
various material methods of production, against the arbitrariness of the single individual. 
The Code Napoleon which I have in my hand did not produce modem bourgeois society. 
Bourgeois society ... merely finds its legal relations expressed in the Code. As soon as it ro 
longer corresponds to social relationships it is worth no more than the paper it is written on. 
You cannot make old laws the foundation of the new social development any more than 
these old laws created the old social conditions.44 
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As the above passage spells out, legal codes and systems are malleable, and adjust to 
the material conditions which generate the social relations on which they rely. 
Marx and Engels indicate that, in the event of communism, the power to enforce 
regulations does not emanate from a separate political body, but from the 
community as a cohesive whole. Under these conditions the contradiction between 
"individual" and "civil" vanishes, for when production is socialised and citizens are 
no longer operating under the principles of commodity fetishism there is no need 
for dichotomous sets of rights ("rights of man" and "rights of citizen"); nor is there a 
need for the concept of "juridic" person for the conditions that necessitated law as a 
tool to govern between isolated, atomistic individuals are no longer present-
citizens, in actuality, are unified. 
Thus in communism the situation arises where citizens are unified through 
production relations, yet conflict is still present. Although communism removes 
the potential antagonism between individuals and the social forces that govern 
them, or more pertinent to this discussion, law and society, there still is a need for 
regulation. The situation is not contradictory, but can be understood through 
dialectical logic. As Engels explains: 
... every organised being is every moment the same and not the same ... every organised being 
is always itself, yet something other than itself. 
Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis, 
positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed, and that despite all 
their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate.45 
44 Marx, Speech in His Defense in Werke, voL 6, p. 245 in David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and 
Thought (London: The Macmillan, 1973) p. 215 
45 Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two volumes, voL 2, 
p.121 
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Since materialism dictates that our thoughts can only conceive of what exists 
in reality (and within an historical epoch), it is impossible to deduce what relations, 
including the relation of arbitration, would entail in communism.46 Following this 
logic, any attempt at concrete analysis of social relations in communism would 
amount to the same sort of intellectual exercise involved in surmising capitalist 
relations in feudalism. Social relations do not proceed from supposition, but actual 
material conditions themselves.47 It is for this reason that Marx and Engels were 
notoriously silent on the structure of the "new" society, in regulation and other 
realms. On the other hand, they maintained that certain elements (e.g. developed 
working class consciousness or advanced technological production methods) would 
most probably be present in socialism for they had developed already in capitalism. 
The continuing maturation of these elements would actually necessitate revolution. 
From this basis, Marx and Engels provide much discussion regarding the type of 
society socialism might bring into being: 
With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done 
away with, and simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer. Anarchy in 
social production is replaced by systematic, definite organisation. The struggle for 
individual existence disappears. Then for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally 
marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions 
of existence into really human ones. The whole sphere of the conditions of life which 
environ man, and which have hitherto ruled man, now comes under the dominion and 
control of man, who for the first time becomes the real, conscious lord of nature, because he 
has now become master of his own social organisation. The laws of his own social action, 
hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating him, 
will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him. Man's own social 
organisation, hitherto confronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now 
becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objective forces that have 
hitherto governed history pass under the control of man himself. Only from that time will 
man himself, with full consciousness, make his own history-only from the time will the 
social causes set in movement by him have, in the main and in a constantly growing 
measure, the results intended by him. It is the humanity's leap from the kingdom of 
necessity into the kingdom of freedom.48 
The passage reiterates the point that social forces, though antagonistic in 
capitalism, would be transformed to the cooperative forces that would form the next 
46 This question has lead to huge amounts of speculation of left-wing jurisprudence thinkers. It is, 
however, only informed speculation. Much of Chapter four is dedicated to this type of 
speculation. 
47 In fact, it was for this reason that Marx and Engels criticized the Social Utopians. 
48 Engels, Anti-Duhring in Marx and Engels Collected Works, vol. 25, p. 270 
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society. Similarly, although humans are bound by necessity, they nevertheless 
harness nature by first discovering and then utilising scientific laws to progress 
technologically (and hence improve the means for meeting their needs). In this 
way, social forces can be released from antagonism and unified into the goal of 
furthering freedom. This unity of purpose allows social relations to grow on a 
cooperative level rather than conflict on an antagonistic one. Can complete control 
over natural and social forces (essentially, perfect knowledge) be attained? Engels 
asserts it cannot: He argues, if "at any time the development of mankind such a 
final, conclusive system of the interconnections within the world-physical as well 
as historical-were brought about, this would mean that human knowledge had 
reached its limit, and, from the moment when society had been brought in 
accordance with that system, further historical development would be cut short-
which would be an absurd idea, sheer nonsense." 49 
He reasons that there is a contradiction between the "endless progressive 
development of humanity" which impels us to search for greater knowledge (to 
facilitate control over natural and social forces) and the realisation that perfect 
knowledge is unattainable. "Life is therefore a contradiction which is present in 
things and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and resolves itself; 
as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an end, and death steps in ... "50 
Engels concludes: 
A system of natural and historical knowledge, embracing everything, and final for all time, 
is a contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning. This law, indeed, by ro 
means excludes, but on the contrary, includes, the idea that systemic knowledge of the 
external universe can make giant strides from age to age.51 
The label of communism as "the end of history" clearly does not indicate the 
completion of human development, but rather a cessation to antagonistic social 
forces. From a materialist perspective, there can be no improvement on an 
49 Ibid., p. 135 
50 Ibid., p. 145 
51 Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific in Marx and Engels Selected Works in two volumes, vol. 2, 
p.122 
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economic system designed solely to fulfil human needs for it is in this environment 
that class antagonism disintegrates, and social forces become unified in purpose. In 
this light, communism is merely the "last phase of history". At this stage, 
development proceeds from new production relations. One organisational method 
might meet a goal better than another, and the possibility of change and 
improvement is ever-present. As knowledge increases society advances. Unless 
knowledge becomes perfect, and Engels indicated that it cannot, society will 
constantly change, progress and grow. History, in this sense, will not "stop". In 
terms of arbitration, if society cannot advance to the point of perfection, a potential 
for conflict is always present. 
As previously discussed, the role of arbitration would involve conflict 
resolution and Engels referred to a "maintaining of peace." The details, however, 
are unspecified. Neither Marx nor Engels identifies the source of differences and 
consequently the content of regulations is not addressed. We do have, however, 
several indications from the analysis of capitalism of what regulations would not be. 
Marx and Engels' critique of the capitalist penal system indicates that regulation 
would be non-coercive: 
A penal theory which at the same time sees in the criminal the man can do so only in 
abstraction, in imagination precisely because punishment, coercion is contrary to human 
conduct. 52 
Consequentially, punishment would become unnecessary: 
... crime must not be punished in the individual but the anti-social sources of crime must 
be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope for the vital manifestation of hi s 
being. If man is shaped by his environment his environment must be made human. If 
man is social by nature, he will develop his true nature only in society, and the power of 
his nature must be measured not by the power of the separate individual but by the 
power of society.53 
The notion that society is responsible as a whole for the conduct of its members 
precludes punishment of individuals as a consequence of conflict. Engels 
mentioned directly that the point of arbitration is to resolve conflicts. Punishment 
52 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 4, p. 179 
53 Ibid., pp. 130-131 
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does not resolve the cause of conflicts (although it may control its effects). The only 
way to alter the cause of conflicts is to change the social arrangements that brought 
them about. When the above passages are taken in context, it is apparent that Marx 
and Engels were discussing "crimes" as defined in capitalism, a majority of which 
pertained to breaches of a code based on capitalist relations involving primarily 
questions of private property. Is society, however, responsible for all conflict? Or, 
do individuals bear some responsibility for their actions? The thrust of their answer 
to this question takes into account the whole of the discussion thus far: society and 
individuals cannot be considered independent of each other. Individual 
responsibility occurs in social form; that is, if conflict is present, individuals are 
responsible for resolving the conflict by changing the social situation which created 
it. One set of responsibility cannot be divided from the other. Therefore, in 
socialism, individuals have responSibility for their own actions through the power 
of social organisation. In capitalism, individuals do not have this power-which is 
why the entire dichotomy between "individual" and "society" has developed and 
why capitalist law takes the form of individual juridic persons. To understand the 
ramifications of this position on regulation, other elements of Marx and Engels' 
position on the social condition must be explored. 
FURTHER CLARIFICATION 
Introduction 
In order comprehend more fully the characteristics of the regulation system 
Marx and Engels described, a further exploration of their analYSis of the human 
condition is required. Obviously volumes could be written (indeed they have been) 
on this very broad subject. I have selected several issues most pertinent to the legal 
question: (1) human nature; (2) free will; (3) authority; and (4) democracy. 
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The variety of these topics is striking and indicates that the legal question for 
Marx and Engels did not concern a separate area, but one that incorporated a myriad 
of other aspects of social organisation. Michel Villey writes of Marx: 
Marx reintegrated law into the whole of reality; for law is not a being in itself (Le. a closed 
universe of norms), but a function within a whole. Law cannot be thought of in independence 
of that which first gives it meaning, and so cannot be cut loose from the relationships in the 
world: from the struggle of men banded together against nature and thus, in the first 
instance, from economics.54 
Taking the function of arbitration as the resolution of conflicts, we can see 
why other larger issues might be important. If, for instance, human nature was 
"inherently evil", then conflicts would appear to be inevitable and would suggest 
that an outside force was necessary to suppress this evil. If, however, human 
nature was perceived as "inherently good", conflicts at one point or another might 
disappear. Leaving aside the absolute categorisations of human nature as basically 
"good" or "evil", if we surmise that certain aspects of the human character, say, for 
instance, both violent behaviour and sympathy, were permanent characteristics of 
the human condition, then potential for violent confrontation would always exist 
yet simultaneously a reduction of conflicts through sympathetic understanding 
would always be a possibility. With such a variety of views regarding human 
nature available, it is important to establish Marx and Engels' views on this topic. 
Similarly, the issue of free will is of paramount importance as regards the 
possibility of conflict. Can humans control their actions? To what degree can they 
achieve this control? The question directly relates to the enquiry about human 
nature. If the possibility for violent behaviour is inherent yet we have the capacity 
to exercise free wilt then there is a potential for non-violent behaviour under any 
circumstances. Conflicts, therefore, would not necessarily involve violence. The 
position would suit Marx and Engels well; however, they do not advance this 
viewpoint. In fact, their arguments against free will add an interesting perspective 
to the notion of authority. 
54 Michel Villey, liThe Philosophy of Law in the Communist World" in Marxism, Communism and 
Western Society, ed., C.D. Kerning (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973) vol. 5, p. 141 
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Authority can be related to a resolution of conflicts in the immediate sense: 
the arbitrator can be assumed to have authority over the two disputing parties 
involved. However, Marx and Engels do not regard authority in this manner. In 
essence, they classify authority as what is demanded by the circumstances of a given 
situation. For instance, if walking in the desert water is needed. The fact that water 
is required cannot be determined by choice. Circumstances do, however, involve 
decision-making as well. In the above example, for instance, such issues of how 
much water should be brought, what method should be used to carry it, etc., do 
involve choice. How we make these decisions leads us to the fifth topic, democracy. 
The specifics of the decision process involved in arbitration are absent in the 
works of Marx and Engels. They do, however, provide a basis for a general 
decision-making process that will be useful for later discussions55 of how a 
communist regulation system might work. 
As stipulated in the general introduction, no attempt is made here to defend 
these arguments or respond to the plethora of critiques directed at particular topics. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to sketch a broad framework of related issues that 
will place discussions of socialist regulation in perspective. 
Human nature 
It is often commented that Marx's idealised conception of human nature 
presented in the Philosophical Manuscripts and other earlier writings is 
incompatible with the theory of materialism.56 There are also many authors who, 
while they acknowledge a difference in attitude, agree that some of Marx's idealistic 
views could be incorporated to some degree in materialismP The dichotomy 
between the 'humanist' perspective and the 'scientific' approach of Marx has been a 
constant source of academic debate. 58 It should be pointed out that Marx and Engels 
55 See Chapter four. 
56 E.g. Althusser, Sydney Hook, Daniel Bell, Lewis Feuer 
57 E.g. Calvez, Tucker, McLellan, Felscher, Harrington, A vineri 
58 Tom Bottomore stated the debate in these terms in Modern Interpretations of Marx (Oxford: Basil 
46 
were writing over a lifetime where personal and political experience changed them 
and their theories. It is unreasonable to assume that a logical and progressive 
argument should appear throughout the entirety of their work.59 Researchers often 
use materials for rational arguments that perhaps were not obviously meant for 
that purpose. For instance, although political and philosophical points were 
discussed in letters, it cannot be assumed that these letters were ever meant to stand 
up to any academic scrutiny. One can take certain pieces of writing into account for 
clarification, but not really for argumentation. Those that posit the classification of 
Marx as a humanist would have much supportive material available.60 Others that 
accuse Marx of presenting a purely moral argument, despite his rhetoric against 
bourgeois morality, would also have many passages from which to cite. 61 There is a 
difference, however, between moral indignation (of which there was much) and 
moral argument. 
Marx and Engels envisioned a "human" as an overall rounded individual 
interested in intellectual pursuits, the affairs of society, physical exercise and 
creative work. For them a society that encouraged the quest for knowledge and 
experience through direct control over and participation in all facets of society was a 
"superior" form of social organisation. They firmly believed that such a system 
would allow the rational capacity of humans to develop fully and would free 
Blackwell, 1981) which is a collection of essays discussing this dichotomy. The great variety of 
contributors include: Jiirgen Habermas, Svetozar Stojanovic, Agnes Heller, Louis Althusser, Rudolf 
Hilferding and Maurice Godelier. Also interesting and from a slightly different approach is the 
collection of essays in Marx's Socialism, ed., Shlomo Avineri (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1973). 
All contributors incorporate (as opposed to ignore) Marx's earlier writings while formulating 
their conclusions regarding Marx's prescriptions for socialism. Contributors include: Robert 
Tucker, Donald Hodges, Daniel Bell, Gerald Cohen and Ralph Miliband. 
59 This assumption also discounts the fact that they were distinct writers, as discussed in the 
introduction. 
60 One of the most widely read authors, Eric Fromm, makes the humanist argument in Marx's Concept of 
Man (New York: Ungar Press, 1961). 
61 An in depth discussion of Marx and his problems with morality, especially in terms of justice and 
rights and the means/ end question, can be found in Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985). Also interesting is a collection of essays in Socialism and Morality, eds., 
David McLellan and Sean Sayers (London: The Macmillan, 1990). Roy Edgley responds to some of 
Lukes' point in the essay titled "Marxism, Morality and Mr. Lukes" found on pages 21-41 in the 
afore mentioned work. 
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emotional needs from material wants. The arguments put forth in the earlier 
works of Marx (most notably" Alienated Labour" in the Philosophical Manuscripts) 
and the vehemence of his and Engels' disgust towards capitalism for creating a 
"non-human" environment (prevalent throughout their entire works) certainly 
lends credence to the humanist interpretation. 
Yet their style of argument, especially in later works, did not rely on the 
humanist approach. They made one simple assumption: that humans need to 
work to live. Other than this, in the scheme of materialism, "human nature" was 
an abstract idea only. The "nature" of our being is determined by the social 
relations in which we are engaged, which, in turn are conditioned by the mode of 
production. Social forces and individual forces are directly linked in this way. As 
Marx explains: 
The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature 
of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode 
of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical 
existence of individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a 
definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals 
express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore coincides with their production, 
both what they produce and how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends (Il 
the material conditions determining their production.62 
From a Marxist perspective, it is impossible to think of individuals outside of their 
social relations without venturing into the realm of pure abstraction. This was 
Marx and Engels' fundamental criticism of theories that specified the individual as 
the isolated starting point.63 
Marx and Engels may have had a preconceived notion of what was a ''better 
human";64 but their conceptual argument (as opposed to opinion) proceeded from 
the physical observation that there were contradictions between the roles citizens 
62 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: N.P, 1968) p. 31 in Karl Marx: His Life and 
Thought, p. 145 
63 Which is one reason they were dismissive of the bulk of bourgeois legal theories. 
64 E.g. one that can "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after 
dinner" in Marx, The German Ideology in Selected Writings, ed., David McLellan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977) p. 169. It is most clear throughout the German Ideology that Marx 
believed that humans freed from the division of labour would pursue a wide variety of interests. 
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assumed in the political realm and those in the economic realm. Until these 
contradictions were resolved, the form that human nature took was an alienated 
form: not because capitalism was inhuman (which they constantly asserted it was 
through the form of moral rhetoric), but because the form was contradictory (an 
argument Marx and Engels expose in their major works on materialism).65 
Admittedly, Engels and more so Marx did not adhere to the distinction 
between ideological rhetoric and argument as clearly as I have implied; and for this 
reason many of their arguments lend themselves to ambiguity.66 This ambiguity, 
however, should not detract from the purpose of materialism in the broad sense, 
which is to examine, through dialectics, how the development of society (and hence 
"state" and "law") has proceeded and why it would lead to socialism. It is evident in 
the theory of materialism that human nature is malleable and depends on social 
relations conditioned by one's role in the mode of production.67 
If human behaviour is tied to social conditions (as opposed to "human 
nature") directly, then "crime" is not inherent in human conduct, but a product of 
social conditions. If we are to have control over our behaviour, then we must have 
control over our social environment. The recognition that conflict is possible in 
communism, however, suggests that this control is somewhat incomplete. The 
dialectical concept of freedom resolves this apparent inconsistency. 
65 Most notably Marx's Capital and Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 
66 Norman Geras in a fine article titled "On Marx and Justice" in New Left Review, No. 150 
(Marchi April, 1985) makes the argument that while Marx claims that the moral phenomenon of 
"justice" will vanish in socialism, he nevertheless is espousing a just society. 
67 This point becomes especially important in discussions of arbitration, where human conduct is most 
relevant. The "norms" surrounding "correct" human behaviour are dependent on social relations 
incorporated in the method of production. While Marx and Engels indicate this argument, other 
theorists (most notably Pashukanis) clarify their position to a great extent. This will be 
discussed in much detail in Chapter three--The Theorists. For now it is only necessary to: (1) 
acknowledge the ambiguity in the works of Marx and Engels; and (2) assert that despite these 
ambiguities, materialism dictates that human nature is malleable, and is reliant on 
environmental conditions (i.e. mode of production). 
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Freedom 
Marx and Engels posit that if humans are to be truly free, they must be free in 
the material sense, i.e. have direct management of providing for their needs. If they 
do not, than they can be free only in the political sense. Therefore, abstract power, 
such as that guaranteed by law, constitutions, civil rights, etc. are merely that. 
People have power in a theoretical sense to be protected from this or that, but they 
have no real power actually to mould their environment and ensure their quality of 
life.68 It lOgically follows that once we have this power, as in communism, then we 
will have complete control over our environment, and hence our behaviour. This 
is not the case, however. 
While we may direct the production process, we cannot determine our 
needs.69 For instance the human body requires food. By an act of will, we produce 
food. This production in turn, requires work. Whilst we cannot control the 
requiSite of work, we can dictate the method in which we work. Concomitantly, the 
method itself demands certain actions. Dialectically speaking, an act of will stems 
from a need and in turn creates another need, which can be met by an act of will, 
which creates another need, etc. As Engels explains in Anti-Duhring: 
Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws,7o but in the 
knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them 
work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to laws of external nature and 
to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves-two classes of 
laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. 
Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with 
knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man's judgement is in relation to a definite 
question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgement will be 
determined ... 71 
The freedom that Marx and Engels referred to is associated directly with 
knowledge, knowledge of natural and social forces. The more knowledge humans 
68 Marx/Engels, Holy Family in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 4, pp. 130-131 
69 Agnes Heller dedicates The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison and Busby, 1976) to exploring 
what Marx implies by needs. At this point, it is only important to recognise the general point 
that certain needs are inevitably entailed in being human. Non-controversial (for the most 
part!), is the physical need of food. 
70 Engels is referring to laws active in nature (e.g. the laws of physics, the "law" that animals must eat 
to live and work to eat, etc.). 
71 Engels, Anti-Duhring in Marx and Engels Collected Works, voL 25, p. 105 
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gain, the more they utilise physical and social forces for their own benefit. At the 
same time, if material conditions are at such a stage of development where citizens 
can have more control over scientific and social forces then it becomes necessary 
that we do have control over them (hence the impetus for revolution). For Marx 
and Engels this idea of necessity embodies a certain notion of authority. 
Authority 
Marx and Engels' views on authority are best illustrated through their debates 
with the anarchists/2 and with Bakunin in particular. The anarchists designated 
authority, directly represented in capitalism by the state, as the main ill of society.73 
Marx and Engels, on the other hand, asserted that the prime cause of malaise in the 
social system was the phenomenon of capital (and consequently capitalists); and 
with the disappearance of capital the state would be rendered useless.74 
Both Marx and Engels maintained that a certain amount of authority was 
integral to any form of production. In On Authority, Engels poses the question, 
"Will authority have disappeared or will it only have changed its form" after 
instruments of labour have become the collective property of the workers?75 He 
responds by pointing out the fact that machinery requires maintenance in order "to 
avoid accidents." Regardless of the process of decision-making involved (e.g. 
dictatorial or democratic) in assigning these responsibilities, these duties must be 
fulfilled if the machines are to run. He uses further examples of running ships, 
train stations, cotton mills, etc.-all cases where procedure has been established out 
of necessity and it must be followed. Authority, in this sense, is unavoidable: 
72 Such as Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin. Paul Thomas's Karl Marx and the Anarchists (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) explores in depth Marx's disputes with the anarchists 
(primarily those named in this footnote). 
73 To be more specific, the anarchists regarded the state as an immoral authority. Social authority, 
referred to in general as social pressure, they argue, is of a qualitatively different character. 
Robert Nozick in his well-known work, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 
1974) explores the concept of a moral state. 
74 Best expressed by Engels in his letter to Theodor Cuno, January 24, 1872. 
75 Engels, On Authority in The Marx and Engels Reader, ed., Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1978) p. 731 
We have thus seen that, on the one hand, a certain authority, no matter how delegated, 
and, on the other hand, a certain subordination, are things which, independently of all 
social organisation, are imposed on us together with the material conditions under which 
we produce and make products circulate?6 
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The qualification that this subordination should only be dictated by necessity 
then follows: 
If the autonomists confined themselves to saying that the social organisation of the future 
would restrict authority solely to the limits with which the conditions of production render 
it inevitable, we could understand each other; but they are blind to all the facts that make 
things necessary and they passionately fight the word.77 
The vehemence with which Marx and Engels criticised Bakunin for 
revolving social revolution around the destruction of all authority, show their 
acceptance and recognition of the requirement for organisation and decision-
making. It is the nature of these institutional practices that will be transformed. 
The previously discussed differences between political power and social power 
become extremely important: 
Why do the anti-authoritarians not confine themselves to crying out against political 
authority, the state? All socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it 
political authority will disappear ... that is, that public functions will lose their political 
character and be transformed into simple administrative functions of watching over the 
true interests of society.78 
The perpetual element of authority requires a method for administration. If 
the method is not political in form but social, it remains to be asked, how is a social 
form of decision-making characterised? 
Democracy 
Combining the previous discussion of the relationship between free-will and 
necessity with the above conclusions regarding authority creates the following 
situation: (1) society has certain needs (which are not in its control) that must be 
met; (2) it operates a production system that is in its control; (3) there are certain 
demands this production system requires for its self-perpetuation (e.g. the running 
76 Ibid., p. 732 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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of transport, etc.) that are beyond society's control; (4) decisions (which are in 
society's control) must be made as to how to meet the needs of society and the 
demands of the production system. There is an administrative organisation to fulfil 
this function. As exemplified earlier, the power of this administrative organ is not 
political but social. 
Can this social power be labelled democratic? It is doubtful. As should be 
evident by now, the terms used in capitalism do not carry the same meaning as in 
socialism. Marx's disdain of the concept of "the People's State" evidences his 
mistrust of "democracy". Even if workers gained political power in a country, the 
state would still not be socialist until the production process was placed in their 
hands. "Democratic" in this sense would only indicate a political abstract power, not 
an actual power. For this reason, despite Marx's support of some democratic 
principles, and his communal notions, it would be confusing to label him 
"democratic". Nevertheless, certain prescriptions for decision-making in the future 
society have democratic resemblances. It should be kept in mind, however, that 
"democratic" as used in these passages assume a meaning different from that In 
capitalism. Marx and Engels describe "democratic" control in communism as 
"social" control. 
Again Marx and Engels' battles with the anarchists brings to light important 
implications of their notion of "social" control. They were accused by Bakunin of 
advocating a severely authoritarian state, justified by historical materialism, where 
all would be subjugated to the will of the workers-summarised well in the catch 
phrase" dictatorship of the proletariat". Several points must be noted here. First of 
all, by the time material conditions are ripe enough for revolution, a majority of the 
society would be workers. In the case where significant membership of other classes 
(e.g. the peasants) still prevails, Marx explains that: (1) the revolution will fail due to 
active opposition; or (2) the revolution will succeed by bringing the peasantry into 
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the proletarian ranks.79 The future society becomes classless because everyone is a 
worker, " ... with labour emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and 
productive labour ceases to be a class attribute."80 "Dictatorship of the proletariat" 
becomes an incongruous concept if the entire society is proletarian.81 Secondly, it is 
of paramount importance that the workers, themselves, as a whole, are responsible 
for revolution: 
The emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class themselves. 
We cannot therefore co-operate with people who openly state that the workers are too 
uneducated to emancipate themselves ... 82 
Here, Marx was criticising the Blanquists83 who operated on the basis that a small 
number of well-organised and committed revolutionaries could seize power and 
retain control until "they succeeded in sweeping the mass of people into the 
revolution and ranging them around the small band of leaders."84 Further in the 
passage Marx exhorts the working class to "on the one hand do away with all the old 
repressive machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard 
itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, 
subject to recall at any moment."85 
"Dictatorship of the proletariat" was used to describe the Paris Commune 
which Marx and Engels acclaimed because "every position, be it administrative, 
judicial or educational, was filled by universal suffrage of the people and was subject 
to immediate recall by the same people."86 The notion of universal suffrage and the 
79 Marx, After the Revolution in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 543 
80 Marx, The Civil War in France in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 635 
81 Issues of the transition period will be discussed in Chapter two. 
82 Marx, Circular Letter to Bebel, Liebknecht, Bracke, and others in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 555 
83 Name after socialist Auguste Louis Blanqui (1805-1891) who advocated that a small number of 
disciplined revolutionary conspirators could take power. The group would assume dictatorial 
powers to establish socialist production associations under its guidance and train the masses until 
citizens were able to manage the economy to meet their own ends. 
84 Marx, The Civil War in France in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 627 
85 Ibid. 
86 Engels, Introduction to Civil War in France in Werke, vol. 17 p. 624 as cited in Michael Harrington's 
Socialism (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972) p. 51 
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potential for recall are hardly characteristics of a "dictatorship" in the political sense 
of the word. The same attributes were praised in the Commune judiciary: 
The judicial functionaries were to be divested of that sham independence which had but 
served to mask their object subserviency to all succeeding governments to which, in turn, 
they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of the public servants, 
magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and revocable.87 
Perhaps more convincing than these extracts from The Civil War in France, 
which was for the most part an ode to the Commune, were Marx's writings of mock 
conversations with Bakunin titled After the Revolution. The dialogue is quite 
revealing: 
Bakunin: There are about forty million Germans. Will all forty millions really be 
members of the government?" 
Marx: Certainly, because the thing starts with self-government of the township. 
Bakunin: This dilemma has a simple solution in the Marxists' theory. By popular 
administration they understand administration of the people by means of a small number of 
representatives elected by the people. 
Marx: The ass! This is democratic nonsense, political windbaggery! Elections are a 
political form .... The character of these elections depends not on these designations but m 
the economic foundations, on the economic ties of the voters amongst one another, and from 
the moment these functions cease being political (1) no governmental functions any longer 
exist; (2) the distribution of general functions takes on a business character and involves ro 
domination; (3) elections completely lose their present political character.88 
The key elements of the conversation revolve around the concept that 
authority, though necessary, will not be "dominating" beyond the procedural 
necessity of organiSing production. Positions of "administration" lose political 
character in that there is no inherent power differentiation between "administrator" 
and "voter". This relationship arises when the mode of production is directly 
responsive to the actions and needs of citizens. As a result, an administrator does 
not have power over an individual, but rather facilitates society's demands. The 
"authority" of an administrator stems from the need of social organisation rather 
than the element of force used to maintain state power in capitalism. 
Given the prescriptions of social power, what might the content of socialist 
regulations be? Most bourgeois laws would become irrelevant: 
87 Marx, Civil War in France in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 632 
88 Marx, After the Revolution in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 545 
From the moment when private ownership of movable property developed, all societies of 
which this private ownership existed had to have this moral injunction in common: Thou 
shalt not steaL Does this injunction thereby become an eternal moral injunction? By ro 
means. In a society in which all motives for stealing have been done away with in which 
therefore at the very most only lunatics would ever steal, how the preacher of morals 
would be laughed at who tried solemnly to proclaim the eternal truth: Thou shalt not 
stea1.89 
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Marx and Engels contend through much of their work that if men are treated as 
criminals, they will act as criminals; and if these circumstances are removed, then 
most crime disappears.9o All property laws, tax laws, etc. would be rendered 
extraneous. Engels also implies in the above excerpt that those values once deemed 
"immoral", or more pertinently "criminal", are by no means eternal, but 
conditional. But what of the "resolution of minor conflicts"? What might these 
minor conflicts (Streitigkeiten) be? What is their source? How should they be 
handled? Unfortunately, Marx and Engels fell silent in this area.91 Their specificity 
ended in the general acknowledgement that minor conflicts would occur whatever 
the mode of production. They did provide, however, a unique theoretical basis for 
post-capitalist regulation. 
SUMMARY 
The crux of Marx and Engels position on law rests with their analysis of the 
perpetuation of economic relations throughout all forms of social organisation. The 
contradiction embodied in capitalist production relations as reflected in the 
phenomenon of commodity fetishism is reflected directly in law. Such relations 
create a false dichotomy between "individual" and "society" and equalise all 
humans-a situation quantified legally in the notion of a juridic person. At the root 
of the concept of juridic person is the idea that all individuals have free will and are 
equal. With the dramatic transformation of production relations, the concept of law 
89 Engels, Anti-Duhring in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 726 
90 The theme was prevalent throughout much of their works, but was stated most succinctly by Engels in 
The Conditions of the Working Class in England. (specifically in Marx and Engels Collected 
Works, voL 4, pp. 411-412, 424-427, passim). 
91 Other theorists, however, did not. This will be discussed in more depth later. 
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in the capitalist sense is made irrelevant (hence Engels' use of the term arbitration). 
The dichotomy between individual and society dissolves and eliminates the need 
for the concept "juridic person". Under such conditions, the quantification of 
people as "equal" ceases; for people are only falsely equal in capitalist society in an 
abstract sense. Law cannot regulate objectively, for in reality one individual can not 
be measured against another in a quantitative sense, as occurs in capitalism via 
rights and obligations. The resolution of conflicts then, does not involve 
determining the rights or obligations of one individual against another, but rather 
involves a social resolution of a discordant situation. In such circumstances, 
punishment is ineffective for it does not resolve the situation that created the 
conflict and therefore becomes irrelevant in a system of regulation which aims at 
eradicating conflict. 
The identification of crime or conflict as a completely social phenomenon 
must be considered fully to grasp the meaning of the theoretical difference between 
law and regulation. The argument that Marx and Engels present indicates that 
responsibility for conflict is assumed by individuals via their ability to control their 
social environment, at least as far as necessity allows. Since individuals do not have 
this power in capitalism, a system of regulation whose purpose is strictly conflict 
resolution cannot exist under the capitalist mode of production. The fact that 
regulation emerges as a social phenomenon directly reflects communist economic 
production relations which are also completely socialised. What occurs in 
capitalism, embodied in the form of commodity fetishism, is that law operates 
under the same fetishised relations as production. Put in extremely simple form, 
production relations are individualised (that is, sets of rights and obligations are 
determined between two individuals of equal rights and wills in a given situation, 
the basis of which is contract). In reality, however, production relations are social, a 
fact recognised only through the act of exchange and only through commodities. As 
Marx puts it, "things" then reflect social relations and individuals are perceived as 
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"things" (commodity fetishism). The contradiction creates a false dichotomy 
between "individual" and "society" whose only reconciliation can take place in the 
legal arena where individuals are objectified (hence the reflection of people as 
things) through abstract equality which takes the form of individual rights and 
obligations. Legal decisions determine which set of rights and obligations prevail at 
a given time. Given that, according to Marx and Engels, actual relations are not 
equal, and laws enforce rights and obligations which are in fact not equal but are 
designed to protect capitalist economic relations that are based on private property, 
the purpose of law, in principle, becomes to reinforce production relations rather 
than resolve conflicts. 
Suggestions of exactly how a communist regulation system might work are 
scarce, though a few general prescriptions emerge from descriptions of other 
elements of the future society. Marx and Engels indicate that authority will lose its 
political character in that there will be no decision-making bodies apart from society 
itself. While functions may be differentiated according to purpose, the power to 
enforce decisions do not emanate from a "state" or in the legal sense a "court", but 
rather from all members of society. The impetus for obligation stems from necessity 
rather than force, hence the differentiation between" authority" and "power". 
It is also assumed that the relative abundance of socialism brought about by 
coordinated production priorities designed solely to meet the needs of society will 
reduce vastly required labour time and that people would actually have time to 
participate in societal affairs. The bureaucratisation in capitalism would be vastly 
simplified as the need for codified law would decrease, and perhaps actually 
disappear altogether. The types of institutions that might arise would be purely 
social, meaning that one individual would not have power over another, but rather 
roles would be determined in a strictly organisational sense based on the necessities 
of a given situation. 
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The notion of freedom presented is not one based on individual rights and 
obligations exerted in an abstract political realm, nor does it rely on enforced 
"protection" of these rights, but it is rather based on individual development of 
knowledge via participation in an organised whole. As the level of technology 
increases with production demands, the depth of knowledge obtained will provide 
the basis for a continual increase in human potential. The actual knowledge and 
education attained from these experiences, creates a public realisation to a greater 
and greater degree that social cohesion and cooperation is necessary for individual 
development. 
It is assumed that the types of conflict that would arise from a society at this 
stage of development would not be ones of severe social disruptiveness. 
Presumably, as human potential develops, the need for law in the "control" sense of 
the word dissipates. It is doubtful whether the need for arbitration would entirely 
disappear (then history would be at an end); what Marx and Engels indicate is that 
the severity of conflict would be vastly reduced and the method for its resolution 
completely different than its legal counterpart in capitalism. 
At the heart of this difference is their concept of social as opposed to political 
power. Social power embodies the concept that citizens must control economic 
forces and they shall do so in a completely associative manner, commonly described 
as "democratic". The use of the word "democratic" is highly confusing however. 
Though Marx and Engels praise the Paris Commune for direct elections and recall 
options, it must be noted that democracy still indicates a political form, meaning 
that at some point or another one individual has power over another. What Marx 
and Engels emphasise, however, is that individuals can operate in organisational 
capacities without having power over each other. Such organisational roles are 
determined by the needs of society itself and managed by the coordination and 
cooperation of those involved. This notion is the basis of the concept of 
administration as opposed to state and regulation as opposed to law. 
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There is a multitude of extremely contentious theoretical points, ideas and 
concepts that proceed from the above framework which will be discussed and 
developed more fully in the following chapters. What is evident is that Marx and 
Engels provide a rich theoretical basis for communist regulation. They were not at 
all specific, however, as to how the above theoretical notions regarding regulation 
might be actualised and what structural form they might assume. Such an 
endeavour was for others to attempt. 
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CHAPTER TWO-THE PEOPLE'S COURTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1875, Marx declared, "Between capitalist and communist society lies the 
period of the revolutionary transformation of the one to the other."l In October 
1917, Lenin proclaimed that Russia was embarking on this "revolutionary 
transformation" commonly known as the transition period.2 During this interval 
of socialist development, the workers were to seize the means of production and 
organise themselves into administrative bodies. A proletarian state, often referred 
to as "the dictatorship of the proletariat", would remain until all vestiges of 
capitalism had been "swept away". When production and distribution were 
operating on socialist principles, the state would become futile and accordingly "die 
out". [aussterben] 
Marx and Engels wrote little about this particular stage of history. Marx did 
stress that transformation from capitalism to communism could not happen 
immediately: 
What we are dealing with here is a communist society not as it emerges on its own 
foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus in 
every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birth-
marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.3 
He also describes the transition period economically, explaining that, despite the 
seizing of the means of production process and its reorganisation in accordance with 
communist production principles, a bourgeois distribution method (commodity 
exchange) would prevail for a period of time. A certain amount of labour time 
would be exchanged for a certain amount of products. He stipulates, though, that 
form and content have changed. No one can give anything but labour time and 
cannot receive or own anything but products for consumption. "In spite of this 
1 Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme in Marx and Engels Collected Works (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1975) voL 24, p. 95 
2 To avoid confusion that was discussed in the general introduction, "socialism" will be used when 
referring to the transition period. "Communism" depicts the fully developed society. 
3 Marx, p. 85 
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advance, this equal right is still constantly encumbered by a bourgeois limitations."4 
Marx argues that only when equal products are not given for equal labour will 
communism evolve. Humans have different abilities and needs that simply cannot 
be quantified, hence any principle of equality would be contradictory. Only when 
society operates on what Marx labels as the "right of inequality," epitomised by the 
well-known maxim "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs",5 can it be deemed communist.6 
In terms of this thesis, which focuses primarily on a theory of regulation in 
advanced socialism (communism), the transition period might appear to be of little 
interest. After all, developments in the transition period would still be affected by 
bourgeois economic principles. This situation would indicate that some sort of law 
would arise, but like economics, one different in form and content. Nevertheless, 
this "law" would not be communist regulation either, and hence appears to be out 
of the scope of this discussion. What is intriguing about the transition period in 
terms of law were the institutions (the People's Courts) that were created to carry out 
justice and the reasoning behind these institutions. In essence, the principles 
behind the People's Courts attempted to actualise the Marxist concepts of a fully 
participatory regulatory structure. Examining the goals of these institutions and 
analysing the problems and complications in their establishment and function 
provide a fruitful concrete example of an effort to put theory into practice. 
The use of such an example, however, is not without attendant difficulties. 
The relationship of the Soviet experiment, in all its various stages, to Marx's 
theories is a highly contentious issue both presently and historically. Some assert 
that Marx has little to do with the former Soviet Union while others maintain that 
Marxist theory and the Soviet Union are integrally linked. Despite the 
multitudinous debates revolving around the topic one point is rather clear. Russia 
4 Ibid., p. 86 
5 Ibid., p. 87 
6 Marx implied also the condition of abundance. The specific line is "all the springs of common wealth 
flow more abundantly." Ibid. 
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was the first nation to carry forth societal restructuring (both economic and social) 
based on Marxist theory. For this reason it should not be excluded from forays into 
Marxism (such as this thesis). At the same time, however, developments in the 
Soviet Union should not necessarily be regarded as direct results of Marxist theory 
put into practice; and it is here where the difficulty of fitting the Soviet experiment 
into the Marxist paradigm becomes most evident. Whilst the People's Courts 
provide a unique historical example, it remains to be seen whether this particular 
historical example is all that relevant to the general theoretical framework outlined 
in Chapter one with regard to regulation. At best the example might show the 
merits or demerits of such a position, at worst it might confuse rather than elucidate 
Marx's position. In either case, analysis of the experiment of the People's Courts will 
bring to the forefront further questions that must be explored in the conduct of an 
inquiry into a theory of communist regulation, and for this purpose it is a valuable 
exercise. 
Although the People's Courts operated as institutions throughout the history 
of the Soviet Union, it is most valuable to examine them in their early years of 
operation (1918-1920). There are several reasons for this. First, and most obvious, is 
the natural historic break occurring at the time of the initiation of the New 
Economic Policy (N.E.P.) in 1921. At this point, revolutionary goals had changed 
and a "strategic retreat" [strategicheskoe otstuplenie] was in effect? While the "early 
period" of the revolution (1917-1920) sought to implement socialism as fast as 
possible, N.E.P. was designed to help the Soviet Union recover from the Civil War 
(1918-1920) through economic rejuvenation via the reintroduction of limited 
capitalism. Second, during the very early stage of the revolution, development of 
such local institutions as the People's Courts were relatively "free".8 The chaos of 
organising a country as large as Russia and the disorderly effects of revolution itself 
7 Lenin V. I., Doklad na II Vserossiiskom S"ezde Politprosvetov, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (Moskva: 
Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974) tom 44, p. 158 [2nd Congress of Political Education 
Departments in Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974) voL 33, p. 63] 
8 Batsell, Walter, Soviet Rule in Russia (London: The Macmillan Company, 1929) p. 585 
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placed much initiative in the hands of the populace initially. Third, the People's 
Courts, for the most part, were decentralised and largely left to their own 
development until the beginning of the New Economic Policy at which time they 
were firmly under Communist Party contro1.9 Fourth, 1922 witnessed the 
promulgation of the formal codification of "Soviet Law" operating under an 
economic system of limited capitalism. The reintroduction of capitalism, the vast 
centralisation of the government, and the firm establishment of the party apparatus 
in place by the end of 1922 propelled the Soviet Union further away from conditions 
favourable to socialist development in the Marxist sense. Historians and Marxist 
scholars debate whether or not the Russian revolution was a "socialist" one even at 
its inception. It cannot be denied, however, that at least at the beginning, the 
Bolsheviks actively tried to implement socialism on economic and social levels. 
During N .E.P., however, the direction of development was drastically changed. For 
the purpose of using the People's Courts as an example to explore further the 
theoretical concepts of regulation outlined in Chapter one, a brief examination of 
their early years provides ample opportunity to elicit further theoretical questions 
that should be addressed. 
It is impossible to analyse the experiment of the People's Courts without at 
least brief discussion of Lenin's theory of law. Prior to Stuchka's work A General 
Doctrine of Law (1921), there was no comprehensive work in legal theory. Lenin 
was the first to clarify some of Marx and Engels' more general pronouncements on 
law. Whilst they maintained that a capitalist notion of law would have no place in 
communism, they did not discuss the role of law in the transition period. It can be 
surmised safely that with the acknowledgement that a state (albeit a proletarian one) 
was required, then so would be law. Lenin began to fill this theoretical gap. Because 
of his position, he immensely affected the guiding principles behind the activities of 
9 Schapiro, Communist Party of The Soviet Union, (London: Methuen, 1966) p. 264. See also, "The 
Machine of Justice--The Pro curacy and The Courts" in Smolensk Under Soviet Rule by Merle 
Fainsod (London: The Macmillan Company, 1955) pp. 174-192. 
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the first courts.10 Without at least a general understanding of Lenin's basic tenets, 
interpretations of the legal situation would be incomplete. 
Exploration of the establishment and proceedings of the People's Courts in the 
early stage of the revolution (1917-1920) has revealed that little research has been 
conducted in this area.11 Whilst there are no concrete reasons for such an exclusion 
there are several possibilities. The formation of the nation was disrupted severely 
by the Civil War of which much has been written.12 It is possible that the enormous 
events that occurred during the Civil War have historically obscured the 
functioning of the local People's Courts. Another possibility might involve the 
existence of the Cheka and Revolutionary Tribunals-the Bolshevik arms of "red 
terror". In October of 1917, the second Congress of Soviets abolished the death 
penalty. It was reintroduced officially in June of 1918.13 As Lenin stated: 
" ... revoliutsioner, kotoryi ne khochet litsemerit', ne mozhet otkazat'sia ot smertno 
kazni. Ne bylo ni odnoi revoliutsii i epokhi grazhdanskoi vozny, v kotopykh n e 
bylo by rasstrelov."14 In December of 1917, The Vecheka (Cheka) (All-Russian 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage) was 
created and endowed with the powers of search and arrest.15 In February of 1918 
these powers were extended to summary trial and passing of sentence, including the 
10 Ivo Lapenna writes: "During the six years of Lenin's rule nothing important in the field of law was 
ever enacted without his direct participation, approval or at least tacit consent." in "Lenin, Law 
and Legality", Lenin The Man, the Theorist, the Leader, eds., L. Schapiro and P. Reddaway 
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1967) p. 249. 
11 With the exception of John Hazard's excellent piece of research, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). 
12 For an in-depth history of the Civil War years see W. Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1989) or Evan Mawdsley's The Russian Civil War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987). 
Also interesting is Geoffrey Swain's The Origins of the Russian Civil War (London: Longman 
Group, 1996). 
13 H.C. d'Encausse, Lenin, trans., Valence Ionescu (New York: Longman, 1982) p. 95 
14 ... a revolutionary who does not want to play the part of a hypocrite cannot renounce capital 
punishment. There has never been one revolution or epoch of civil war in which there were not 
shootings. Lenin, V Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov Rabochikh, Krest'ianskikh, Soldatskikh i 
Krasnoarmeiskikh Deputatov in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 36, p. 503 [Fifth All-Russia 
Congress of Soviets in Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 519] 
15 A well-researched book titled The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 
by George Leggett covers the development of the organisation in depth. Richard Pipes in the 
section titled "The Red Terror" in The Russian Revolution (London: Collins Harvill, 1990) vol. 1, 
pp. 789-840 presents an interesting and researched argument regarding Lenin and the use of terror. 
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death penalty, despite the official law against it.16 Because of these powers, the 
Cheka was deemed an "extra-judicial" body. The Revolutionary Tribunals, which 
also could mete out the death penalty, were established in November of 1917 to 
pursue counterrevolutionary or "political crimes". Such crimes included anything 
that was considered harmful to the state and covered a vast array of economic 
activities such as racketeering, theft, speculation and purchases from the black 
market (in many cases, the only way people could survive, including Communist 
Party members)P The majority of sections on law and order in the histories of the 
early stages of the revolution focus on these organisations rather than the People's 
Courts, most probably because their dealings caused the most outrage both inside 
and outside of Russia, and also the fact that they were charged with handling the 
most serious of crimes (namely counterrevolution).18 Although the existence of 
these institutions affected the operation of the People's Courts to some degree (and 
this will be discussed in the "Analysis" section of this chapter), the People's Courts 
did operate quite independently within their own realm of jurisdiction-primarily 
the daily affairs of a locality. It is these institutions that tried to accommodate a 
notion of an associative "legal" institution outlined in Chapter one. 
THE LEGAL CONCEPTS OF LENIN 
Law in communism 
By far the clearest account of Lenin's view of law in communism is found in 
The State and Revolution. It resembles Marx and Engels' views to a large degree. 
16 Leggett, p. 32 
17 Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, trans., Peter Sedgwick (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 
115. Victor Serge was an anarchist revolutionary who joined the Bolsheviks in 1919. He was 
eventually driven out of Russia and was exiled to Mexico. 
18 E.g.: Sheila Fitzpatrick's The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); The 
October Revolution (London: Constable, 1979) by Roy Medvedev, trans., George Saunders; The 
Russian Revolution (London: Collins Harvill, 1990) and Legalised Lawlessness: Soviet 
Revolutionary Justice (London: London Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1986) 
by Richard Pipes; John Keep's The Russian Revolution (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976) 
and William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 in two volumes (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1954). 
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Lenin states quite succinctly that the point at which a society is communist is when 
social inequality disappears.19 He argues that social inequality is a result of capitalist 
production relations. When labour does not have to be quantified and equalised in 
commodity form, the familiar communist precept of taking what one needs and 
giving according to one's abilities can evolve. The economic condition which 
allows such a development rejects capitalist distribution methods which are still in 
effect during the transition period. The social organisation which accompanies the 
economic transformation focuses on the development of an administration (as 
opposed to a state). In order to progress towards an administration, Lenin argues 
that the functions of the civil service must be transformed into simple operations of 
control " ... kotorye dostupny, podsil'ny gromadnomu bol'shinstvu naseleniia ... "20 
The training for all to take part in the administration of the state occurs in 
advanced capitalist societies and includes such factors as universal literacy and 
organisation and management skills developed in industries like railways, big 
factories, large-scale commerce and banking.21 
Given this state of affairs, that it is in the scope of each individual to perform 
administrative functions of the state (and hence law), institutions become a method 
for participation. The organs for these various tasks are based in democracy, but not 
a political democracy. Lenin, in concordance with Marx, distinguishes between a 
democratic state and a state of democracy: 
No, democracy is not identical with the subordination of the minority to the majority. 
Democracy is a state which recognises the subordination of the minority to the majority, 
i.e., an organisation for the systematic use of force by one class against another. 
We set ourselves the ultimate aim of abolishing the state, i.e., all organised and 
systematic violence, all use of violence against people in generaL..the need for violence 
against people in general, for the subordination of one man to another, and of one section of 
the population to another, will vanish altogether since people will become accustomed to 
19 Lenin, Gosudarstvo i Revoliutsiia in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 33, pp. 93-96 [State and 
Revolution in Selected Works in Three Volumes (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977) vol. 2, pp. 
306-308] 
20 ... which is intelligible and within the ability of the vast majority of the population ... Ibid., p. 78 [po 
294] 
21 Ibid., p. 100 [po 311] 
observing the elementary conditions of social life without violence and without 
subordination. "22 
A few pages later Lenin continues this line of thought: 
Only then will a truly complete democracy become possible and become realised, a 
democracy without any exceptions whatever ... people will gradually become accustomed to 
observing the elementary rules of social intercourse that have been known for centuries and 
repeated for thousands of years in all copy-book maxims. They will become accustomed to 
observing them without force, without coercion, without subordination, without the special 
apparatus for coercion called the state.23 
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The above passages demonstrate the dialectics of social development. Once 
people are actually engaged in and have control over society as a whole, the 
necessity of certain actions is learned through direct experience via trial and error. It 
is imperative that each and every individual actually commits these mistakes and 
lives through the consequences of them in order that the results illuminated during 
these experiments become internalised. The rules of conduct, become, as Lenin says, 
"habit", by virtue of the individual recognition of the necessity of them. 
As Marx and Engels, Lenin believed that crime is largely caused by the chaotic 
and abstract social relations that capitalism produces.24 During socialism these 
relations are "righted" and as contradictions are eventually resolved, the level of 
crime decreases. Then "the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of 
the community will very soon become a habit."25 
Will crime, or more apropos, infractions of social rules, completely disappear? 
Lenin, as Engels, indicates otherwise: 
Lastly, only commmUsm makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is nobody to be 
suppressed-"nobody" in the sense of a class, of a systematic struggle against a definite 
section of the population. We are not utopians, and do not in the least deny the possibility 
and inevitability of excesses on the part of individual persons, or the need to stop such 
excesses. In the first place, however, no such special machine, no special apparatus of 
suppression, is needed for this; this will be done by the armed people themselves, as simply 
and as readily as any crowd of civilised people, even in modern society, interferes to put a 
stop to a scuffle or to prevent a woman from being assaulted.26 
22 Ibid., p. 83 [pp. 297-298] 
23 Ibid., p. 89 [pp. 302-3 03] 
24 Ibid., p. 90 [po 304] 
25 Ibid., p. 102 [po 313] 
26 Ibid., p. 91 [po 304] 
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Lenin goes on to claim that as the social causes of these excesses dissipate, the 
seriousness of the infractions will steadily diminish. 
Bukharin and Preobrazhenskii in the ABC of Communism describe the role 
of the People's Courts after the state dies out, much in the spirit of Lenin, Marx and 
Engels: "Pravda, sud togda izmenit svoi kharakter}7 postepenno, po mere 
otmiraniia gosudarstva, on budet prevrashchat'sia v organ vyrazheniia 
obshchestvennogo mnenia, priblizhaias'k kharakteru tovarishcheskogo suda, 
resheniia kotorogo ne privodiatsia v ispolnenie nasil'stvennym putem, a imeiut 
lish' moral'noe znachenie. ,,28 
The elements of associative, non-coercive public power, simplicity of 
procedural structure, social cohesion and internalisation of necessary rules 
characterise Lenin's vision of communist regulation. It resembles Marx and Engels' 
descriptions to a large degree. He, like them, is silent as to the exact state of affairs in 
communism, or as to precisely when this stage of social development will appear. 
These facts, Lenin states, "my ne znaem, i znat' ne m a z h e m.,,29 With the above 
goals in mind, Lenin and the Bolshevik Party focused on the immediate task of 
reformation of the courts. 
Conceptual foundations of law in the transition period 
The administration of the courts was left, for the most part, in the hands of 
the Commissariat of Justice.3o Lenin, however, had definite ideas as to the function 
of law and its supporting ideology during the transition period.31 
27 It is true that the court will change its character; (as opposed to its role in the transition period.) 
28 gradually, as the state dies off, it will turn into an organ expressing social opinion approaching the 
character of a comrade court, decisions will not be accompanied by the use of force, and will have 
only moral significance. N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhenskii, Azbuka Kommunizma (Peterburg: 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1920) p. 177 
29 we do not know and to know is impossible. Lenin, Gosudarstvo i Revoliutsiia, p. 96 [State and 
Revolution, p. 308] 
30 Created on October 26 (November 8), 1917. See Lenin, Postanovlenie ob Obrazovanii Rabochego i 
Krest'ianskogo Pravitel'stva in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 35, pp. 28-29 ["DeCision to Form 
the Workers and Peasants' Government", Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets, in Collected 
Works, vol. 26, pp. 262-263]. 
31 Piers Beirne and Alan Hunt, "Law and the Constitution of Soviet Society: The Case of Comrade 
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As discussed earlier, Lenin maintained emphatically that the transition 
period was not a stateless society. It contained class antagonisms and required the 
use of external force (that is, of one class against another; in this case, the proletarian 
class against the bourgeois class). Because Russia was still a state, the transition 
period would not be a time span devoid of law: 
.. .if we are not to indulge in utopianism, we must not think that having overthrown 
capitalism people will at once learn to work for society without any rules oj law. Besides, 
the abolition of capitalism does not immediately create the economic prerequisites for such 
a change.32 
Despite the retention of a bourgeois-based law (one of class antagonism and force), 
there were distinct differences between proletarian law and bourgeois law. These 
distinctions lie primarily in the areas of: (1) the property basis; (2) its class nature; (3) 
its institutional structure. 
Law in capitalism arises from relations created by private property; law in 
socialism arises from public property. From a premise of social ownership, law 
would not apply to atomised individuals, but would engage society as a whole. 
Crime becomes not a violation of individual rights, but a violation of the entire 
community.33 (For instance, if a thief stole bread from a shop, it is not the 
shopkeeper that would be violated, but the entire community whose bread it 
actually was.) 
The class nature of proletarian law reflects Lenin's view on the state and 
democracy as well. Law would no longer be used by the minority against the 
majority, but rather the majority against the minority. The class element in law was 
extremely important for several reasons. First, Lenin had faith in the consciousness 
of the worker, but complete mistrust of the bourgeois consciousness that still 
retained a predisposition towards capitalist values. In socialist legal terms, 
bourgeois consciousness was inadequate to carry out socialist justice. Second, the 
.. 
Lenin" in Law & Society Review, VoL 22, No.3 (1988) pp. 595-598 
32 Lenin, Gosudarstvo i Revoliutsiia, p. 95 [State and Revolution, p. 307] 
33 This became extremely interesting in later criminal codes when "the people" became synonymous 
with "the state" and hence theft, as well as other violations, became a "crime against the state". 
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bourgeoisie were class enemies and under the dictatorship of the proletariat were to 
be /I smashed./I In bourgeois legal terms, these /I class enemies" had no formal 
rights;34 hence the laws prohibiting freedom of the press, participation in most 
elections and prohibition of all political parties that embraced bourgeois 
philosophy.35 The proletariat could administer any measures (including death) it 
thought necessary to repress recalcitrant bourgeois elements.36 Jurists who operated 
under the former government were allowed only a restricted role in the new court 
system. 
Structurally, Lenin sought to: (1) simplify the leg:al process, hence eliminating 
the need for specialists in law; and (2) require all citizens to participate in the legal 
process. Lenin observed of bourgeOis law that legal personnel (bureaucrats) were a 
separate body /Iv otorvannykh ot mass, v staiashchikh, nad massami.,,37 In order to 
reunify legal institutions with the populace, communities were instructed to 
organise and manage the courts themselves. With a simplified legal process and 
simplified civil relations with the demise of private property rights, it was hoped 
self-regulating courts would be possible. 
Lenin attempted to fulfil participation goals through the functions of the 
soviets and the local courts. The soviets were to be a training ground for the great 
mass of people to learn how to govern in all areas. The courts were the institutions 
where the populace would acquire the skills to grapple with legal problems. It was 
only through practical experience, rather than passive instruction, that knowledge 
and skills of adjudication could be discovered. The requirement of all to participate 
was absolutely necessary for this reason: 
All citizens must take part in the work of the courts and in the government of the country. It 
is important for us to draw literally all working people into the government of the state. It 
is a task of tremendous difficulty. But socialism cannot be implemented by a minority, by 
34 Lenin, Sed'moi Ekstrennyi S"ezd KK.P. (B) in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 36, pp. 73-74 [Seventh 
Congress of the KC.P. (B.) in Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 155] 
35 Later on these included most parties that were not Bolshevik, even though they were leftists. 
36 This was the main justification for the actions of the Cheka and Revolutionary Tribunals. 
37 alienated from the masses and standing above the masses. Lenin, Gosudarstvo i Revoliutsiia, p. 115 
[State and Revolution, p. 323] 
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the Party. It can be implemented only by tens of millions when they have learned to do it 
themselves?8 
mE PEOPLE'S39 COURTS (1917-1920) 
Structural reorganisation 
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The first decree on the judicature on November 22 (December 5), 191740 
sought to create a condition in which simplification could be attained, and class 
power and democratic participation could function. It called for the abolition of all 
existing courts and their related offices (court investigators, procurator's 
surveillance, and official and private counsellors at law).41 Former judges were to be 
replaced by a judge (permanent) elected42 from the district. At first, they were to be 
chosen by the soviet until they could be selected by direct democratic suffrage.43 The 
post of people's assessor, whose weight of opinion was equal to that of the judge, 
was to be created. Two assessors were to be chosen from citizens of the district 
involved. Appointments were temporary and the soviets were to draw up lists of 
assessors and arrange for a schedule of attendance. The army was instructed to 
proceed with similar changes.44 
The decree stipulated that initial criminal investigation was to be carried out 
by local judges, whose actions would then be subject to approval by a full local 
38 Lenin, Sed'moi Ekstrennyi S"ezd RK.P. (B) in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 36, p. 53 [Seventh 
Congress of the RC.P. (B.) in Collected Works, vol. 27, p. 135] 
39 The first decree (December, 1917, new calendar) referred to these courts as local courts; the second 
decree (February, 1918, new calendar) labelled them as People's Courts. Local courts and People's 
Courts are used interchangeably. 
40 "Dekret 0 Sude" in Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1957) 
tom 1, pp. 124-126. For an abridged collection of significant legal documents in English see Soviet 
Government: A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies edited by Mervyn Matthews 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1974) and First Decrees of Soviet Power, compiled by Yuri Akhapkin 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970). 
41 "Dekret 0 Sude" in Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti, tom 1, p. 124, art. 1 
42 Former jurists were allowed to be elected to the courts, but the bourgeois class was not allowed to 
vote. 
43 Direct democratic suffrage was never installed. Judges were elected by the local soviets until 1948, 
RW. Makepeace, Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law (London: Croom Helm, 1980) p. 67. 
44 "Dekret 0 Sude", p. 124, art. 2 
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court.45 Also, preliminary prosecution and defence investigations, and the duties of 
civil attorneys, were to be performed "vse ne oporochennye grazhdane oboego pola, 
pol'zuiushchesia grazhdanskimi pravami." 46 Special revolutionary tribunals to try 
counter-revolutionary actions (acts of pillage, sabotage, mercantilism, etc.) were 
established. They were to comprise of a chairman and six alternate assessors elected 
by the soviets.47 The decree also instructed courts to abide by the laws of the 
overthrown government as long as they have not been revoked by revolutionary 
decrees and line protivorechat revoliutsionnoi sovesti i revoliutsionnomu 
pravosoznanie."48 
Lenin's prescriptions for a simplified, participative, class-based court are 
directly evident in the first decree, which virtually eradicated the old court system. 
Although former legal personnel were allowed to stand for election, the likelihood 
of their return was much reduced by the fact that bourgeois class members could not 
vote. The measure was designed to ensure a peasant / proletarian prevalence in the 
legal structure. Bourgeois influence was reduced further by the large role the soviets 
played in the initial establishment of the courts (e.g. judges were to be chosen by 
soviets until elections, and that they supervised the selection of people's assessors). 
There are no detailed procedures or maxims (except decrees)49 other than the 
advice to the judges (and assessors) to "rukovoditvovat'sia sotsialisticheskim 
pravosoznaniem, otmetaia zakony svergnutykh pravitel'stv."50 Court participants 
had little to guide them,51 which in effect, empowered them greatly. Not only could 
judges determine the nature and gravity of a crime, but they could directly control 
45 Ibid., p. 125, art. 3 
46 by all upstanding citizens of both sexes who enjoy civil rights. Ibid. 
47 Ibid., pp. 125-126, art. 8 
48 do not contradict revolutionary conscience and a revolutionary sense of justice. Ibid., p. 125, art. 5 
49 Decrees were numerous (950 during the first 9 months of the revolution, Beirne and Hunt, "Law and 
the Constitution of Soviet Society: The Case of Comrade Lenin", p. 588), but relatively small 
compared to the volumes of codified laws inherited from the old regime. 
50 be guided by the socialist sense of justice, rejecting the laws of overthrown governments. Lenin, 
Pervyi Abzats Punkta Program my 0 Sude Proekt Programmy R.K.P. (B) in Polnoe Sobranie 
Sochinenii, tom 38, p. 115 [Draft Programme of the R.c.P. (B.) in Collected Works, vol. 29, p. 131] 
51 The first detailed codification of law did not appear until 1922. 
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investigation procedures. They were at complete liberty to use whichever old codes 
seemed appropriate (unless they directly contradicted decrees), and had freedom to 
determine punishment. It was thought that the people's assessors, who were not 
under the judges authority, would intervene if procedures or results seemed 
inadequate or wrong. The absence of restriction on who could run for the position 
of people's assessor and the limited term52 of this office were aimed at discouraging 
any notions of "professional jurists" and reducing the possibilities of corruption. 
The most striking feature of the new system was the reliance on 
"revolutionary conscience (sovest)" .53 It was envisioned that citizens could 
adequately handle legal situations through consensus without depending on formal 
codes or procedures. The People's Courts were not to be regarded as repressive or 
antagonistic institutions, but ones that would aid in the solution of the problems of 
day-to-day life. The removal of "counter-revolutionary" crimes from the 
jurisdiction of the People's Courts54 paved the way for an absence of government 
interference in local matters. 
The tasks of the People's Courts fell into two basic categories one of 
education55 and one of discipline.56 Discipline focused on: (1) strict accounting and 
strict control; (2) maintenance of labour laws (" «Kto ne rabotaet, tot pust' ne est'»-
vot prakticheskaia zapoved' sotsializma.,,);57 (3) solution of general disputes 
(disturbing the peace, citizens' complaints, etc.). These functions of the court 
coincided with Lenin's requirements for the infant stages of socialist productive 
mechanisms (accountability, control of distribution and production and the "purge" 
52 Term length was to be determined by the soviets. 
53 Also referred to as revolutionary or socialist consciousness (soznanie) (a term which became most 
prevalent in the writings of Soviet legal theorists). 
54 These matters were to be handled by the Revolutionary Tribunals and later the Cheka. 
55 See Lenin, Tretii Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 37, p. 270 [Third 
All-Russia Congress of Soviets in Collected Works, vol. 26, p. 464]. 
56 See Lenin, Variant Stat'i «Ocherednye Zadachi Sovetskoi Vlasti» in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 
tom 36, pp. 162-164 [The Immediate Tasks in Collected Works, vol. 27, pp. 217-218]. 
57 "Who does not work, will not eat" -here is the practical commandment of socialism. Lenin, Kak 
Organizovat' Sorevnovanie? in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 35, p. 203 [How to Organise 
Competition? in Collected Works, voL 26, p. 414] 
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of the bourgeois notion of earning money other than from labour).58 Discipline 
could also involve ruthless suppression (e.g. shooting) of anti-proletarian 
behaviour (such as pillage, withholding food, sabotage, trading on the black market, 
refusing to work, speculation and profiteering). Although these cases were for the 
Revolutionary Tribunals and the Cheka primarily, obvious breaches could be 
responded to by any member of the proletariat.59 
The educational aspect had a dual purpose. First, by participating in the legal 
system all would become aware of the problems of society and all would be engaged 
in trying to resolve these difficulties. This notion reflects Lenin's concept of 
regulation in a communist society, where all would "become accustomed" to rules 
of society. Habit would be derived from direct experience and individual realisation 
of what was necessary; and then perpetuated by continued practice. The content of 
laws would evolve out of this universal and participative experience. Due to the 
experience being personal, the impetus to follow the law would be an internal one 
and eventually non-coercive compliance would evolve. 
The second element of education involved encouraging socialist behaviour 
in a popUlation where capitalist principles and habits were still prevalent.60 Lenin 
described how the character of those raised under capitalism would not change 
immediately. The population in Russia was still "culturally backward", and its 
transformation would be a painstaking and long process, but one that would be 
progressive in essence. The objective of punishment of a non-class crime61 (i.e. 
58 These requirements became desperate ones during the Civil War, where food shortages and lack of 
goods were chronic. 
59 This was more typical in the first month of power when the People's Courts were not assembled, or in 
places where even after the Decree their actual creation was delayed. 
60 Re peasants: Lenin, VI Vserossiiskii Chrezbychainyi S"ezd Sovetov in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 
tom 37, pp. 141-142 [Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in Collected Works, voL 
28, p. 141]; re: petty bourgeoisie (small commodity producers): Lenin, Detskaia Bolezn' «Levizny» 
v Kommunizme in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 41, pp. 26-28 ["Left-Wing Communism": An 
Infantile Disorder in Collected Works, voL 31, pp. 44-45]. 
61 Excluding matters of the Cheka or Revolution Tribunals. 
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disturbing the peace) was, then, to have the worker reflect upon his/her error and 
contemplate why it was wrong and how it affected society.62 
The operation of the early courts 
Even after the first decree on the courts was published, their formation in 
different areas took some time. By the beginning of 1918 local courts were in 
evidence in the more central areas of Russia, and by the end of March they were 
operating in the distant regions under control by the new government.63 Before the 
first decree local authorities had established "revolutionary people's courts", 
"investigation committees", or "revolutionary tribunals."64 The spirit of these 
"courts" is captured well by G. Ovchinkin's description of "The First Soviet Court", a 
spirit that would carry over to the People's Courts after their official creation. I cite it 
here at length: 
October 25 [November 7],1917 
In Moscow, the bolsheviks have seized power. The autocracy has been crushed. In our 
village, Ramenskoe, the policemen were arrested as early as March 1917; the police chief 
vanished; the village elder, who had held the office for twelve years as a protege of the 
territorial administrator and was known among the peasants as 'the dog', was driven out. 
The territorial administrator, himself a drunkard and debauchee, ran away heaven knows 
where, and Isafiev, the examining magistrate, also went into hiding. But behold, not so 
long ago these scoundrels were handling all the peasants' cases in our locality. Decisions 
over matters of life and death of every peasant and worker rested with them alone. 
Land administration, the last bastion of capitalism and Kerenskii's forces, held out 
until October 25, 1917, when the people put it to rout. A soviet was elected-a soviet 
composed of local workers, peasants, and several bolsheviks. 
A plant committee was organised at the factory, and also red guards, a trade union, 
and a soldiers' section. Finally, a revolutionary committee was formed; but there was ro 
court. 
As the first step, one had to take a look at the judicial legacy of the autocratic 
regime. There were heaps of unfinished cases that had accumulated over the years. 
We turned to the judgement docket and did not find a single decision in favor of a 
worker or a peasant. Everyone held either for the local landlord, Count Prozorovskii, or for 
the tradesmen. More than one hundred of the pending cases involved either peasants 
caught cutting wood in the count's 7,OOO-acre forest or damage done by their cattle to his 
1,000 acres of inundated meadows. 
I glanced at these cases and thought, well, the count is no more and the traders have 
vanished. Who will press these matters? So, I picked up that pile and shoved it into the 
stove. The stove had not been burning too well. Secretary Sergeev, one of the local hands, 
62 This element of "self-criticism" was to playa huge role in the Stalin trials. 
63 S. Ivanov, "Sudebnye Organy" in Istoria sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava, 1917-1920, ed., A. P. 
Kositsin (Moscow: n.p., 1968) pp. 190-191 
64 M. Kozhevnikov, Istoriia sovetskogo suda (Moscow: n.p., 1957) p. 15 
saw the cases on fire and darted to save them. I held him back and tried to set him at ease, 
but he was terrified. While we two were kicking up a row, the papers went up in smoke. 
We opened the archives and found many more judgements, their writing still 
unfaded: A peasant was sentenced to receive twenty-five blows for non-payment of rent. A 
youth to be whipped for refusal to obey his parents and for fighting in the village. 
These were no longer of any use. Only a memory remained ... 
Then, the people began to sense a weakening of authority. There was no one to be 
afraid of: no police chief, no territorial administrator. The soviet was packed with their 
chums. The young in the villages became noisy and unruly and committed thefts. 
Complaints of rowdyism reached the soviet. The executive committee, the plant 
committee, the trade union, and the workers' and soldiers' sections. A detachment of red 
guards was trained for the occasion. An announcement was sent through the village soviet 
to reach all the people. 
The accused were summoned to appear before the soviet. The youngsters-four of 
them, twenty-five years old, former front-line soldiers of the tsarist army, at present from 
the village of Dergaevo. They were advised of being charged with rowdyism, more 
specifically, with drunkenness and breaking up a play enacted by a group of party youths-
and told that the court would examine the charge. The accused maintained that, as of that 
time, there was no decree establishing a judiciary and that, therefore, the court had ro 
basis in law. But when the chairman of the court explained that all power had been vested 
in the local soviets and that offences of this kind were not to be left unpunished, and, 
moreover, drew their attention to the presence of the red guard detachment, the accused 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. After questioning the accused and the witnesses, 
the court sentenced each of the former to deprivation of freedom for two weeks. They were 
to begin to serve their term immediately. 
Long resounded the applause of the workers and peasants in attendance. They left 
very much satisfied with the judgement of the court and conceded that the Soviet power 
knew how to protect the people from thieves and ruffians. They decided to support the 
Soviet authorities with all their might. As for the young people, they long remembered 
the first Soviet trial in Ramenskoe as a lesson to ruffians.65 
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The are several noticeable elements in the above passage. The description 
poignantly portrays the ambience of the society just after the revolution. The class 
bias of the law was illuminated for many by Bolshevik propaganda, and by the fact 
that citizens were not only allowed, but encouraged, to investigate and completely 
take over realms that were previously relegated to the chosen few (in this example 
to the legal personnel). It also displays the wariness of individuals at the total 
dissolution and destruction of a system they had lived under their entire lives. 
More importantly, the passage shows a recognition that some law and order was 
necessary, and that with the destruction of the old system and norms, new ones 
would arise. This task of reformulation was not for legal specialists, but for the 
community as a whole. 
65 G. Ovchinkin, "Kak proshel pervyi sud v Bronnitskom uezde Moskovskoi gubemii", Proletarskii sud, 
1927 no. 19-20, p. 40 as found in Zile, Ideas and Forces in Soviet Legal History, pp. 93-95. 
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Records from the Viborg city ward (in Petrograd) also provide interesting 
examples of the activities of these pre-decree 1/ courts": 
It was the first meeting of the revolutionary tribunal66 of the Viborg city ward [in 
Petrograd]. The ... hall was filled with spectators ... eager to know what kind of court it was 
going to be ... Everybody was convinced that now there would be real justice and not as 
before ... 
The judges, consisting of workmen and soldiers, took their places. One could see they 
were excited, for they recognized their responsibility. 
The defendants were brought in. A number of Red Guards showed them politely to 
their seats and offered them cigarettes. They smoked and chatted. How different from the 
old court! 
One of the judges ... addressed the assembly, explained ... the underlying ideas of the 
court, and invited those present to help the judges ... Then the chief judge ... said: "The 
procedure [of the court] will be as follows: Each side will state its case, then the audience 
will be allowed to take a hand, two for and two against conviction" ... 
The first man up [for trial] was the soldier-militiaman, Beliaev, accused of firing 
off his rifle while intoxicated. When asked to explain, he ... said: "Comrades, it is true 
that I was drunk, and it is possible that I fired the gun, but I do not know. I swear it will 
never happen again." 
The chairman called for someone in the audience to say something for th e 
prosecution. After a pause two men came forward and pointed out the harm that a man 
could do with a gun in these exciting days and demanded that the accused be pUnished. 
When the judge asked for someone to come to the defence of the accused, no one 
offered his services ... But finally one workman asked to be permitted to say a word ... He 
argued that "the misfortune of the poor soldier might come to any of us" ... and recommended 
that he be acquitted but be dismissed from the militia. The audience approved with 
exclamations of "That's right; that's fair!" After a brief consultation the chairman 
announced that Beliaev was to be set free and dismissed from the militia, but he warned 
the soldier that if he ever did that again he would be severely punished. After hearing 
the decision of the judge, Beliaev turned to the public and said, "Thank you humbly, 
comrades," and walked out ... 
Great interest was aroused by the case of a thief called Vaska, the Red-haired. He 
was caught with a burglar's outfit and seven keys-"One to my trunk, one to my mother's 
and ... from other trunks ... 
"You have served a term before?" 
"Yes, for stealing." 
There was a titter in the audience, but Vaska paid no attention and proceeded: "I 
stole until the revolution but since--never." 
It was a clear case. One of the judges recommended forced labor ... The audience 
approved and suggested a full year. Vaska was not without friends. Someone urged a 
milder sentence, but this did not meet with public favor ... In the end he was sentenced to 
hard labor for a year with the understanding if he behaved himself his term might be 
shortened ... 
The next case was that of two waiters in a hoteL.who concealed and sold strong 
drink. They were fined three hundred rubles each, the money to go to a fund for those who 
suffered in the war against Kerensky ... 67 
66 Note: the local courts were called tribunals before they were renamed to People's Courts. Hence, the 
passage is not referring to the Revolutionary Tribunals established for counter-revolutionary 
crimes. 
67 Izvestiia, No. 219, November 21 (December 4), 1917, p. 2., as cited in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918, Documents and Materials (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1934) pp. 289-290 
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The element of consensus is evident in the above cases, as is the complete 
lack of "professionalism". Citizens assumed the roles of "prosecution" and 
"defence", as well as the function of "jury". The ideal of "popular courts" was 
transformed into reality during these initial weeks of the revolution. The 
promulgation of Decree No.1 on the courts did not alter substantially the essence of 
the above proceedings. Those involved in the Commissariat of Justice, however, 
were far from unanimous in their embracement of an unregulated court.68 
Opinions differed as to how free of formalities the law should be or to what 
degree the courts should be cleansed of legal experts from the previous regime. 
Questions of the capability of the masses to carry out this "evolution of law" were 
prevalent in policy debates. Steinberg maintained that the law provided not only 
guidance to citizens, but also to the government. His main concern was that while 
the freedom of procedure and decision-making allowed much creativity, it also 
permitted abuse. He advocated a standard of procedure to which legal bodies could 
be held accountable. The demand exacerbated his theoretical difference with the 
Bolsheviks. If the people controlled the soviets, and also the courts, to whom 
would the legal bodies be accountable? To advocate such a position suggested that 
law was autonomous and carried some sort of moral weight outside of the 
circumstances within which it was born. Philosophically, for the Bolsheviks, there 
was no division of power. For Steinberg, who was a Left Socialist-Revolutionary 
(SR) and not a Bolshevik, this theoretical problem was minimal. His attack was 
mainly aimed at combating actions of the Cheka, which were not regulated at all.69 
Stuchka, a major influence on the first decree on the courts, expressed doubts 
regarding the capability of the People's Courts. He argued that while the local courts 
68 Major influences in the Commissariat during this time were 1. N. Steinberg, Commissar of Justice from 
December, 1917 to March, 1918. He was a left Socialist-Revolutionary (SR) and left the 
government after the signing of Brest-Litovsk; P. 1. Stuchka (Commissar from March-August, 
1918); D.L Kurskii (Commissar from August, 1918-1928); E. B. Pashukanis who was one of three 
permanent members of a 7-man presidium that oversaw organisation and administration of the 
Moscow local courts. He was later to become director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and 
Law; and N.V. Krylenko, who was later to serve as Commissar after Kurskii. 
69 N. V. Krylenko, Sudoustroistvo R.F.S.F.R. (Moscow: n.p., 1923) pp. 36-37 
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could easily handle simple cases (as in "The First Soviet Court"), perhaps some 
expertise was needed in more complicated matters. He proposed pre-revolutionary 
judges should be temporarily retained in the event that their experience was 
required (hence the clause in the first decree that at least allowed judges to 
participate if they were so elected). Kurskii, on the other hand, was annoyed at the 
demand for legal specialists and thought that the local courts could manage any 
cases, regardless of their complexities?O 
This debate was manifested in the question of the District Courts. These 
courts, created in the second decree of the courts (15 February, 1918), were designed 
to hear cases that went beyond the authority of local People's Courts.71 There were 
to be three permanent judges (elected and subject to recall by the soviet) and four 
people's assessors (chosen from a list of people submitted by the soviet), with 
criminal cases requiring twelve people's assessors.72 The laws of the old code were 
still valid unless annulled by decree or claimed to be against socialist legal 
consciousness?3 The second decree also contained small steps towards formalising 
legal procedure in that it provided guide-lines for the use of advocates in both 
prosecution and defence,74 instructions for preliminary investigations/5 and further 
guidance to people's assessors?6 A regional court (cassation court) was instituted to 
handle complaints against District Court decisions (no formal appeal was 
permitted)?7 The regional cassation court personnel were to be elected from 
permanent members of the district courts (hence subject to recall by the sovietf8 and 
could reverse decisions which violated form or were clearly unjust?9 A "Supreme 
70 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, pp. 4 and 10 
71 "Dekret 0 Sude No.2" in Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti, tom I, p. 466, art. 1 
72 Ibid., pp. 466-467, art. 2 
73 Ibid., pp. 468-469, art. 8 
74 Ibid., pp. 471-472, Part Seven, arts. 23-28 
75 Ibid., p. 471, arts. 21-22 
76 Ibid., p. 472, arts. 29-30 
77 The court could annul previous decisions, but not conduct are-triaL 
78 "Dekret 0 Sude No.2", p. 467, art. 4 
79 Ibid., p. 468, art. 5 
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Supervisory Authority" was created to ensure uniformity of reviews and 
evaluations.8o These cassational courts, however, were never created.81 
Kurskii, who became Commissar of Justice after the passing of the second 
decree (under Steinberg), claimed that many judges in the District Courts were 
legally trained in the old code, which was resented by personnel of the local courts 
in the provinces. The antagonism towards the District Courts, both from local court 
personnel and Kurskii grew to such an extent their jurisdiction was reduced in the 
third decree (July 20, 1918), and eventually phased out in the People's Court Act 
{November 30, 1918).82 
During the first few months of the People's Courts there was clearly a tension 
between the desire to place justice in the hands of the people and also a slight 
reluctance to forgo any sort of formal procedural restraint. The first three decrees 
show a move towards preserving the freedom of decision while defining loosely the 
procedure and personnel with which to render it. Judges themselves were actually 
calling for procedural guidance especially in complicated criminal cases.83 The goal 
was to keep procedure as least formal as possible, but defined enough to instruct 
judges and people's assessors when needed.84 
The notion of decision-making with minimal but some procedural guidance 
was the backbone of the most comprehensive juristic act promulgated until this 
point, the People's Court Act of 1918.85 This Act formalised the notion that the 
People's Courts were to be the only courts dealing with all non-political matters. 
Unlike before, this Act forbade any reference to the old codes. If no decrees were 
enacted to instruct judges in a particular case, they were to be guided solely by their 
80 Ibid., art. 6 
81 Krylenko, Sudoustroistvo KF.S.F.K, p. 58 
82 Kozhevnikov, Istoriia sovetskogo suda, p. 75 
83 Ibid., p. 25 
84 The result of this request was a document of instruction on court procedure to local People's Courts on 
July 23, 1918 titled "Instruktsiia ob organizatsii i deistvii mestnykh narodnykh sudov" (this is 
not the same as Decree No.3 on the courts passed on July 20,1918 titled, "Dekret No.3"). Ibid., p. 
37 
85 "Polozhenie V. Ts. 1. K. 0 Narodnom Sude R.F.S.F.R./1 in Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti (1968), tom 4, pp. 
97-110 
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socialist sense of justice (sotsialisticheskoe pravosoznanie).86 A college of defenders, 
accusers and representatives (in effect a bar) was founded formally.87 These 
positions were salaried and treated as civil service jobs. Bar personnel were not to 
act in private interest of their clients, but more to assist judges in discovering "the 
truth". Judges were still to function as "managers" of the trial, and were allowed to 
question freely all parties (including the advocates). 
Freedom of judges in matters of punishment was maintained.88 They were 
even allowed to change the punitive measures stipulated in post-revolutionary 
decrees as long as they explained their reasoning in detai1.89 Investigation 
committees were officially established to aid the local People's Courts (anyone with 
political rights could be nominated for the investigation committees; this 
requirement of course excluded the bourgeoisie and political prisoners).90 The 
selection procedures for judges became more defined. List of eligible91 judges were 
to be compiled by the executive committee of the borough soviet in the cities, and 
the village soviets in the country; subject to approval by the entire soviet.92 Some 
specialisation was introduced formally. For criminal cases of a serious matter 
(murder, rape, robbery, counterfeiting, bribery, etc.) there was to be one professional 
judge93 and six lay judges/4 while civil cases and lesser crimes retained the one 
86 Ibid., p. 101, art. 22 
87 Ibid., pp. 103-104, arts. 40-49. Representatives were guaranteed in more serious crimes (art. 43, p. 
104). In other cases they could be denied (art. 34, p. 103). 
88 For a discussion on punishment versus" correction" in the case of crimes such as "speculation", petty 
theft, etc., see L. A. Savrasov, "Prestuplenie i nakazanie v tekushchii perekhodnyi period" in 
Proletarskaia revolutsiia i pravo, No. 5-6 (1-15 October, 1918) pp. 21-26; and for a response to 
Savrasov's article see la. Berman, "Nakazanie iIi ispravlenie" in Proletarskaia revolutsiia i 
pravo, No. 8-10 (15 November-IS December, 1918) pp. 46-5l. 
89 "Polozhenie V. Ts. 1. K. 0 Narodnom Sude RF.5.F.R", p. 101, art. 23 
90 Ibid., p. 102, art. 31 
91 A person was selected to be a judge if s/he had political rights, if s/he had experience in proletarian 
organisation or had practical experience in the post. Ibid., pp. 99-100, art. 12 
92 Ibid., p. 100, art. 13 
93 A professional judge was elected permanently to the post. S /he did not require any legal experience 
necessarily. 
94 Note: Lay judges are people's assessors. "Polozhenie V. Ts. 1. K. 0 Narodnom Sude RF.S.F.R", p. 98, 
art. 7 
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judge two assessors of the first decree.95 The equal say of lay judges was preserved 
and a minority opinion could be noted in the record.96 A reviewing committee was 
brought into being on the provincial level, and in the cities of Moscow and 
Petrograd.97 The judges on the review committee were to be elected by a meeting of 
the judges in the district; and the selection was to be approved by the executive 
committee of the provincial soviet. A decision could be set aside for incorrect 
application of decrees, violation of procedure, incomplete investigation or if the 
decision was a clear injustice.98 Any party taking part in the proceedings could bring 
a complaint against a decision, as could the executive committee of the local 
soviet.99 
The goals of simplicity, mass participation and freedom of judges seemed to 
have prevailed in this Act. Although mechanisms for direct Bolshevik influence 
on the courts were in place,100 at this time, courts were relatively independent of 
central government contro1.101 It should be noted, however, that, if so desired, the 
Bolsheviks had a large potential to influence the court system. After the a decision 
of a local court had been set aside by a borough soviet, the jurist Pashukanis (as a 
member of the Presidium to oversee Moscow courts) campaigned successfully to 
pass a resolution in May of 1918 that stated the courts must have separate and 
exclusive authority in matters of jurisdiction.102 The jurists' awareness of the 
potential for political coercion in the local courts forced local soviet committees, at 
least, to have to go through the proper procedure (via the review boards) in order to 
question decisions. 
95 Ibid., pp. 98-99, art. 8 
96 This was stated previously in art. 38 of the instruction, "Instruktsiia ob organizatii i deistvii 
mectnykh narodnykh sudov", July 23, 1918, Krylenko, Sudoustroistvo R.F.S.F.R., p. 226 
97 "Polozhenie V. Ts. 1. K. 0 Narodnom Sude RF.S.F.R", p. 108, art. 81 
98 Ibid., p. 109, arts. 90-92 
99 Ibid., p. 107, art. 75 (note) 
100 Soviets, which were gradually succumbing to direct Bolshevik control, elected judges, drew lists of 
people's assessors and had the right to question decisions. 
101 The fact that the Cheka and Revolutionary Tribunals acted as the government's "legal arm" aided 
this independence. 
102 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, p. 17 
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The requirement to relinquish all references to the old codes was a 
remarkable feature of the Act. The emphasis on the desire for a entirely "new" law 
to evolve required a creative approach to problem solving. It was still hoped that 
resolutions would be thought fair by all those involved (including the criminals) 
without necessity of legal justification, but through internal recognition that the 
court's prescription was a "just" solution. Presumably, this internal conviction 
would be generated by social consciousness. Since this same sense of revolutionary 
consciousness was employed by the court to arrive at decisions, antagonism between 
the court and the defendant would be reduced. Theoretically, the source of 
authority, both in obligation to obey the court, and the method in which decisions 
were reached, sprang from the same origins.103 This sense of consensus, then, 
includes not only the jurists, but the defendants as well. Jurists strove to tap into 
the idea of an ever-developing sense of proletarian justice in the belief that from the 
mistakes and reckoning of these errors, a new form and content of law would 
emerge. 
Early decision-making 
Within this framework, what kind of decisions did the first year of the 
People's Courts bring? It is interesting to examine a few actual cases. Case A: Citizen 
Smirnov, a landlord, was accused of paying a 13-year-old girl to have sexual 
relations with him. There were no witnesses, but through medical examination 
and testimony the court found him guilty of personal harm and depriving society of 
a worker healthy in mind and body. His punishment was public censure and 
payment of court costS.104 
Case B: An intoxicated Red Army soldier, Poliakovich, had murdered a fellow 
intoxicated soldier. Poliakovich pleaded guilty but claimed that he was provoked 
103 As opposed to capitalist law, which was direct domination imposed by a separate, antagonistic 
body. 
104 D. Kurskii, "Iz praktiki narodnogo suda," Proletarskaia revolutsiia i pravo, No.11 (January, 1919) 
p.29 
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and pleaded for leniency. The provocation was never proved, but the judges 
ascertained that the killing was unplanned and happened as a result of 
drunkenness. Poliakovich was sentenced to five years deprivation of freedom. The 
decision was justified by the belief that such an incident between two comrade 
soldiers was inexcusable. 105 
Case C: A house owner, Makarov, accused one Piniagin of attempted robbery. 
He was discovered to be an idealistic anarchist and was found with a bomb and 
revolver on his person. The court decided that it was not proved that Piniagin had 
desired to better himself at the expense of another (robbery), nor was it proved that 
the weapons found on him were to be used against another person. Piniagin had 
explained that he went to Makarov to requisition a room. The court found this 
requisition to be unauthorised and he was sentenced to 6 months' deprivation of 
freedom, 3.5 of which had already been served.l06 
Case D: Comrade Batov had embezzled 21,953 rubles. He admitted his guilt 
and three witnesses also testified against him. The court decided that Batov was not 
in any exceptional circumstances but that he had not committed the act deliberately. 
They concluded that he embezzled due to a weak will common to people of his age 
and disposition. Batov appeared to be generally a good citizen with 25 years of 
labour service. The court also concluded that Batov needed to be punished so as not 
to set a bad precedent for other proletarians. He was sentenced to a year's 
deprivation of freedom, with time held before trial counted as already served.l07 
Case E: A 15-year-old boy, Nesterenko brought a suit against the Southeast 
Railway Company for 10,000 rubles. Nesterenko was waiting for a train and went to 
pick some flowers. He heard the train whistle, ran back to the station and jumped 
onto a step of one of the cars. The train had already begun to move and the 
conductor struck him in the chest to remove him. Nesterenko fell and the wheel of 
105 Ibid., pp. 30-31 
106 Ibid., pp. 31-32 
107 Ibid., pp. 32-33 
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a car smashed his foot. At the trial, the representative of the railway wanted to wait 
for further medical examination as to whether Nesterenko could work. The judges 
already possessed medical testimony that the boy was in shock and had lost his 
capacity to work and the onset of hysteria had reduced his mental capacities by one-
third. The judges rejected any more medical expert testimony, declaring that they 
could see the youth was not fit for any type of employment and ordered the railway 
to pay support wages to the youth from the day of the accident until his death or 
until a social insurance system was introduced.108 
These examples are interesting in several respects. Personal and 
environmental circumstances figured heavily in verdicts and sentencing (Batov, the 
embezzler, the mental state of Nesterenko). The element of "injury to society" is 
prevalent in cases involving personal harm (e.g. "loss of a worker" as a social crime 
in the case of the abuse of the 13-year-old girl). Sentences tended to be rather 
lenient, except in cases where what was considered a gross breach of socialist 
consciousness took place (as in the case of the Red Army soldiers). 
The historian Speranskii described the decisions of the courts in general as 
follows. The judges preferred to take into account the circumstances of each 
individual case, keeping in mind the eventual return of the criminal to sOciety.109 
Lay judges were strict especially on elected officials who were convicted of bribery or 
had committed crimes, distillers of illegal alcohol (especially wealthy peasants, or 
those who stole grain to make alcohol), or those who seemed to be wealthy in 
general. They were more lenient towards those in poor circumstances, even in 
crimes such as murderYo 
The class character of the court did not mean necessarily that all cases were 
decided in favour of the proletarian or the poor peasant. Although the urge to 
favour the workers was strong, the professional judge of the Moscow court reported, 
108 Ibid., pp. 33-34 
109 Speranskii, "Narodnye zasedateli (Lichnye vpechatleniia)" Proletarskaia revolutsiia i pravo, 
No. 5-6 (October 1-15, 1918) p. 29 
110 Ibid., p. 28 
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in the first six months of his practice, that "there was not a case where this primitive 
view of the class character of the court had triumphed."Ill 
Not all reports of "people's justice" were favourable, especially in the early 
months after the revolution. These incidents were recorded in Svoboda Rossii, No. 
38, May 30, 1918: 
The following "penal code" was formulated in the village of Lubny, Lebediansky Uezd, 
Tambov Gubernia: 
"If one strikes another fellow, the sufferer shall strike the offender ten times. If one 
strikes another fellow causing thereby a wound or a broken bone, the offender shall be 
deprived of life." 
Such is the brief code of law. For its enforcement a revolutionary court was elected. 
Soon two thieves were brought to trial. They were condemned to death. One was killed 
outright. They broke his head ... and ribs ... and threw him naked on the highway ... The 
other thief began to cry aloud and implore that a priest be sent to him for confession and 
communion. The priest and the reader who arrived on the scene pleaded with the mob and 
secured a pardon for the condemned. The death sentence was commuted and twenty-five 
blows by a rod were substituted (Novoe Slovo, No. 20, February 21, 1918) . 
.. .In Seraoulsky Uezd a peasant woman, aided by her paramour, killed her 
husband. The people's court sentenced the man to death and the woman to be buried alive. 
A grave was dug; the body of the dead paramour was placed in first and on top they put the 
woman bound and alive. An arshin [a Russian unit of measure equalling 28 in./71cm] of 
earth was already on her but she still continued to cry "Help, little fathers." (Delo 
Naroda, No. 10, April 28, 1918)Y2 
M. M. Isaev describes incidents from newspaper clippings in the spring of 
1918. Red Guards seized robbers, shot them on the spot and tossed their bodies into 
the Ekaterina Canal. Three robbers who threw a bomb were seized by a mob, two 
were killed and the third severely injured. Arson suspects in a village were seized 
and slain before the entire village. After the killing, the bodies were burned and the 
property of the parents of the suspects were pillaged. One peasant who stole food 
was thrown from a roof onto the tines of a pitchfork. Another thief was quartered 
and decapitated. By order of a local soviet four peasants suspected of thievery were 
burned at the stake (one of them a woman in the advanced stages of pregnancy)y3 
Isaev mentions perpetrators of these incidents as the Red Guard and the local soviet, 
but there is also evidence of brutal mob justice. 
111 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, p. 17 
112 Bunyan and Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, pp. 290-291 
113 M.M. Isaev, Obshchaia chast' ugolovnogo prava RSFSR (Leningrad: n.p., 1925) pp. 62-64 in Zile, 
Ideas and Forces in Soviet Legal History, p. 91-92. 
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Steinberg in his memoir, In the Workshop of the Revolution, states that 
incidents of mob justice occurred only early in the history of the revolution. 
The violent events, however, must be viewed and judged in fairness. They had been 
impulsive acts of the anonymous masses, that is to say, they had definitely not been 
organized by anyone. In the outbreaks of political lynch-mob justice the masses, long 
enslaved and corrupted by oppressive regimes, gave rebellious expression to their pent-up 
spirit of protest. Such outbursts of the peoples wrath often took cruel forms, which must 
never be hushed up or ignored. But these paroxysms never lasted, precisely because they 
were spontaneous. In stormy, short convulsions the people gratified their impulses of 
rage-and then came to their senses. Within a little while, feelings of friendship, 
comradeship and solidarity gained the ascendantY4 
He claims that most reports of atrocities committed after the first few months of the 
revolution were committed by the soviets or the Cheka,115 and the people 
themselves were not as harsh as these stories portray. By the statistics of the 
People's Courts, Steinberg seems to have been right. In fact, the leniency of the 
People's Courts (and also of the Revolutionary Tribunals!116) aroused the ire of 
Kurskii and more so Leninp7 Out of 12,037 cases analysed by Cherliunchakevich in 
the first half of 1918, 32% were acquitted and 7% were released from punishment. 
Of the 61% of the remaining cases,25% were sentenced to prison, 15% were under 
arrest, 54% were fined, 4% were reprimanded and 2% were sentenced to other kinds 
of punishment (such as public censure)Y8 In 1919, out of 61,128 judgements on 
non-political crimes that were analysed by Kurskii, 35% were imprisoned (75% of 
which were under conditions of probation), 8% sentenced to socially necessary 
labour (without imprisonment), 4% were fined, 10% received other punishments 
(e.g. admonition) and 43% were acquitted. Seventy-five per cent of the cases were 
property related. The Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, whose sole responsibility 
was treason, sentenced more prisoners to serve jail time than to deathY9 In 1920, 
114 Steinberg, In the Workshop of the Revolution, p. 141 
115 Ibid., pp. 152-156,226-227 (note). For an objective analysis of the Cheka death toll see Leggett, The 
Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, pp. 463-468 (Appendix C). 
116 Richard Pipes, Legalised Lawlessness: Soviet Revolutionary Justice, p. 10 
117 See Lenin, Variant Stat'i «Ocherednye Zadachi Sovetskoi Vlasti» in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 
tom 36, pp. 162-164 [The Immediate Tasks in Collected Works, vol. 27, pp. 217-218]. 
118 H. Cherliunchakevich, "Karatel'naia Praktika Mestnykh Narodnykh Sudov v Tsifrakh", 
Proletarskaia revolutsiia i pravo, No. 8-10 (15 November-IS December, 1918) p. 64 
119 Figures are from Kurskii, Soviet Justice (Moscow: n.p., 1919) in Rudolf Schlesinger'S Soviet Legal 
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acquittals were over or near 50% in 8 major provinces.12o The Revolutionary 
Tribunals, according to a report in January of 1919, had only sentenced 14 defendants 
out of 4,483 to death.121 
Moves towards centralisation 
The section titled "Jurisprudence" of The Party Programme of 1919 reads as 
follows: 
Proletarian democracy, taking power into its own hands and finally abolishing the 
organs of supremacy of the bourgeoisie-the former courts of justice-has replaced the 
formula of bourgeois democracy: "judges elected by the people" by the class slogan: "judges 
elected from the workers and only by the workers" and has applied the latter in the 
organization of the law courts, having extended equal rights to both sexes, both in the 
election of judges and in the exercise of the function of judges. 
In order to attract the broadest masses of the proletariat and poor peasantry to take 
part in the administration of justice, a system of constantly changing, temporary judges-
jurors is introduced in the law courts and the mass workers' organizations, the trade unions, 
etc., must be attracted to compile lists of such prospective judges-jurors .. 
The Soviet government has replaced the former endless series of courts of justice 
with their various divisions, by a very simplified, uniform system of people's courts 
accessible to the population, and free of all red tape. 
The Soviet power, abolishing all the laws of the overthrown governments, ordered 
the judges elected by the soviets to carry out the will of the proletariat in compliance with 
its decrees and in cases of absence or incompleteness of such decrees to be guided by socialist 
conscience. 
Constructed on such a basis, the courts of justice have already led to a fundamental 
alteration of the character of pUnishment, introducing suspended sentences on a wide scale, 
applying public censure as a form of punishment by obligatory labour with the retention of 
freedom, turning prisons into institutions for training, and applying the principle of 
comradely tribunals. 
The R.K.P. [Russian Cornmunist Party] in order to assist the further development of 
the courts of justice along these lines, must strive to induce all workers without exception to 
Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truben, 1945) p. 72 
120 The provinces in which Communist judges were in the minority had the highest acquittal rate. 
Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, p. 96 
121 Pipes, Legalised Lawlessness: Soviet Revolutionary Justice, p. 10 Interestingly, in 1918, 90% of the 
Revolutionary Tribunals' staff were Bolshevik Party members (Pipes, The Russian Revolution, p. 
799). An interesting example of the leniency of the Revolutionary Tribunals can be found in The 
History of the October Revolution, eds., P.V. Sobolev, Y. G. Gimpelson, G.A. Trukan and F.V. 
Chubayevsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966): "Revolutionary Tribunals, noted at first for 
extreme leniency in their verdicts, had to be convened to combat counter-revolutionary activities 
and sabotage. An example of the clemency displayed by these tribunals can be seen in the trial of 
the former Countess Panina, who had, whilst occupying a position of responsibility in the 
Provisional Government, appropriated a large sum of money and used it to finance a counter-
revolutionary sabotage ring. The bourgeois press raised a great clamour at her arrest and trial, 
calling her a martyr and a victim of the Bolsheviks; the hall where the tribunal sat could not 
accommodate all those who wished to attend; but Countess Panina was only condemned to I censure 
by society', and ordered to return the money she had misappropriated." p. 282. 
perform judicial duties and finally replace the system of punishment by measures of an 
educational character .122 
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It is clear from the early decrees of the People's Courts123 that jurists were 
attempting to effectuate the goals summarised above. Even before Decree No.1, the 
soviets created courts which operated with the understanding that direct 
involvement of the citizens of a community was essential to the new system of law. 
Derivations of solutions relied on general consensus of those participating 
(including defendants). Though structuring the system to some extent, the initial 
decrees, which culminated in the People's Court Act of 1918, sought to preserve 
simplification, the freedom of judges and people's assessors, and participation of the 
masses. It was expected that the experience of regulating a country would create a 
sense of cohesion and further expand the governing power of the populace. The 
statistics Kurskii examined in 1919 support the claim that a "fundamental alteration 
of the character of punishment" was being implemented, in that the judges 
considered the background of defendants (as in Batov) while evaluating the 
seriousness of their crimes. These environmental considerations influenced penal 
measures. The courts were generally lenient, and imprisonment was hoped to be 
phased out by such tactics as public censure. 
Despite the intent of the Party Programme, the leniency and lack of 
uniformity of decisions and sentencing in the courts precipitated a move towards 
centralisation. Tendencies towards centralisation had materialised by the time 
People's Court Act of 1920 (21 October) was passed.124 The rights of judges to mitigate 
sentences or renounce sentences dictated by decrees were reducedPs Judges also had 
to justify their sentences in greater depth, including information such as the age, 
122 K.P.S.S. v Rezoliutsiiakh i Resheniiakh S"ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov Ts. K. (Moskva: 
Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1983) tom 2, p. 8 [translated in Resolutions and Decisions of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed., Robert McNeal (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1974) vol. 2, p. 63] 
123 Up to the People's Court Act of 1918. 
124 "Polozhenie V. Ts. 1. K. 0 Narodnom Sude RF.5.F.R (1920)" in Dekrety Sovetskoi Vlasti (1983), 
tom 11, pp. 81-93 
125 Ibid., p. 85, art. 23 
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education, profession and the Communist Party status of the sentencee.126 The Act 
also allowed more control over the courts by the soviet executive committee (such 
as determining the number of courts needed in an area).127 Professionalisation of 
court personnel such as prosecutors and advocates was also mandated.128 
In a separate instruction, "special sessions" of the People's Courts were 
instigated to deal with the more political crimes that had been transferred to local 
courts from the Revolutionary Tribunals and the Cheka. It was thought the local 
judges were not able to handle these matters in that they were too lenient in dealing 
with class crimes due to lack of political maturity.129 
Kurskii still wanted simplicity and freedom in decision-making on the one 
hand, but also some degree of uniformity and control on the other. He was also 
concerned with the education aspects of the courts. Popular participation via the lay 
judges was still preserved130 in the hopes that mass participation would increase 
socialist awareness. Without it, he writes " ... nevozmozhno uglublenie sredi 
politicheski otstalykh sloev naseleniia proletarskogo pravosoznanie 
oznakomlenniia ikh s novym sovetskim pravom, dekretirovannym Raboche-
Krest'ianskim Pravitel'stvom.,,131 The pressures that were to bring about further 
centralisation came from the changing circumstances of party politics and a shift in 
economic policy. 
Further centralisation: the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) 
N.E.P. policies were designed to encourage small-scale capital to mollify a 
population which had been stripped of private earning capacities, yet was under a 
126 Ibid., p. 90, art. 75 
127 Ibid., p. 82, art. 3 
128 Ibid., p. 90, art. 75 and Instruktsiia ob Organizatsii ob Vineniia i Zashchity na Sude (23 November, 
1920) in Krylenko, Sudoustroistvo R.F.S.F.R., pp. 274-276 
129 Vsem Otdelom Iustitsii i Sovetom Narodnykh Sudei (16 September, 1920) in Krylenko, pp. 273-274 
130 "Polozhenie V. Ts. I. K. 0 Narodnom Sude R.F.5.F.R. (1920)", p. 84, arts. 16-20 
131 .. .it is impossible to deepen the proletarian sense of justice in those politically backward and 
acquaint them with the new soviet laws decreed by the Workers'-Peasants' Government. 
Instruktsiia 0 Poriadke Sostavleniia Spisokov Narodnykh Zasedatel'ei (6 November, 1920) in 
Krylenko, Sudoustroistvo R.F.S.F.R., p. 276 
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government that could not provide for it. The reintroduction of small-scale 
capitalism132 (and consequently capitalist relations) created a need for more 
centralised control by the state and party, for according to Lenin, N.E.P. was a 
theoretical step backwards, and the capitalist elements that would accompany its 
implementation needed to be kept under strict control. 
The drive for centralisation affected all aspects of Soviet government 
structure: the soviets, the party133 and the courts. Lenin perceived that a 
consolidated, systematic approach in controlling capitalist elements was demanded 
to ensure the success of N.E.P. He declared that the courts must maintain their class 
nature,134 and they must be unified in approach, achieved essentially through state 
(party) control. This desire was clearly explained in a piece by Lenin called '''Dual' 
Subordination135 and Legality": 
I therefore propose that the Central Committee should reject 'dual' subordination in this 
matter, establish the subordination of all local procurators solely to the central authority, 
and allow the procurator to retain the right and duty to challenge the legality of any 
decision or order passed by the local authorities with the proviso, however, that he shall 
have no right to suspend such decisions; he shall only have the right to bring them before 
the courts.136 
The increase in complexities of civil relations (due to the revival of private property 
and the notion of contract) also implied for Lenin a need for state (party) 
132 Peasants were still required to give their produce to the government, but could also sell excess 
produce on the market. Craftsmen as well could sell their products as long as they did not hire 
labour. 
133 Party factions were disbanded in 1921 to guarantee a cohesive party. Lenin, X S"ezd R.K.P (B) in 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 43, p. 91 [Tenth Congress of the R.c.P. (B.) in Collected Works, 
voL 32, p. 243] 
The maintenance of "strict and unified party discipline" was one of the guiding principles of the 
party. The point is extremely relevant to those historians that argue that the situation Lenin 
created led directly to Stalinism. See Leonard Schapiro's Communist Party of The Soviet Union, 
specifically p. 270; Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Lenin (London: W. H. Allen, 1964) 
specifically p. 631; Adam Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks (London: Martin Seeker and 
Warburg,1966) specifically p. vii. For an argument against this position see Beirne and Hunt, 
"Law and the Constitution of Soviet Society: The Case of Comrade Lenin", pp. 595-598. 
134 Lenin, XI S"ezd R.K.P.(B) in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (1975), tom 45, p. 120 [Eleventh Congress of 
the R.c.P. (B.) in Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 313] 
135 Dual subordination was the idea that the local authorities (i.e. soviets) would be answerable to 
central authorities, but central authorities would respect local authorities in terms of each 
location's individual circumstances. 
136 Lenin, 0 «Dvoinom» Nodchinenii i Zakonnosti in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 45, p. 201 
["Dual" Subordination and Legality in Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 367] 
intervention. 
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He exhorted leaders "ne vypustit' 1Z svoikh ruk maleishei 
vozmozhnosti rasshirit' vmeshatel'stvo gosudarstva v «grazhdanskie» 
otnosheniia. ,,137 
Edward Carr describes the legal atmosphere during N.E.P.: 
Centralization of authority was accompanied by a gradual modification of current 
attitudes to law. The Marxist concept of law as an instrument of class rules, destined 
eventually to wither away with the state, and in the meanwhile to be administered 
with special indulgence for workers and peasants, was silently abandoned. The market 
practices of N.E.P. demanded the development of strict enforcement of civil law. The 
maintenance of law and order under the label of "revolutionary legality" became a major 
objective. Initial emphasis on the reformatory rather than the punitive aspects of penal 
policy faded away. These changes reflected the growing economic and political 
tension. 138 
The demand for centralisation and uniformity led to the passing of the first 
Criminal Code (June 1922) and Civil Code (October 1922); as well as codes for 
procedure (Criminal, May 1922; Civil, July 1923). Unlike before, the judges were not 
allowed to depart from prescribed punishment for those crimes deemed threatening 
to Soviet society.139 Most of the judges for the "special sessions" of the People's 
Courts were Communist Party members.140 By 1923, all decisions made by the courts 
were subject to review by the Commissariat of Justice, 141 which was firmly 
controlled by the Communist Party.142 People's Courts were subject to the scrutiny 
of the regional/circuit courts, and at the highest levet the supreme court of the 
region.143 The court system was gradually becoming hierarchical, bureaucratic, 
137 not to let slip out of our hands the least possibility to expand government intervention in "civil" 
relations. Lenin, Pis'mo D. 1. Kurskomu s Zamechaniiami Na Proekt Grazhdanskogo Kodeksa (28 
February, 1922) in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (1974), tom 44, p. 412 [Letter to D.1. Kurskii With 
Notes on the Draft Civil Code in Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 203] 
138 E. H. Carr, The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979) p. 121 
139 Pipes, Legalised Lawlessness: Soviet Revolutionary Justice, pp. 19-20 
140 Hazard, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society, p. 145 
141 Ibid., p. 133 
142 Schapiro, Communist Party of The Soviet Union, p. 264. Schapiro describes the evolution of party 
control over the courts in the section titled "Control Over the Provinces, Army and Legal 
Machines", pp. 252-266, especially 262-266. SchapirO asserts the party was in firm control of all 
social institutions in 1923. See also, "The Machine of Justice--The Procuracy and The Courts" in 
Smolensk Under Soviet Rule by Merle Fainsod (London: The Macmillan Company, 1955) pp. 174-
192. For a well-researched article on the influence of local politicians on the functioning of courts, 
see Peter Solomon, "Local Political Power and Soviet Criminal Justice, 1922-41", Soviet Studies, 
Vol. 37, No.3 (July, 1985) pp. 305-329. 
143 Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia, pp. 585-587 
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controlled by the party and centralised despite attempts to maintain some 
independence of action. 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Whilst the People's Courts provide fascinating, and uncharted, grounds for a 
discussion on the problems facing legal institutions in a socialist transition period, 
they are most useful in this thesis to evaluate certain theoretical precepts outlined 
by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Indeed, it is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness of 
these institutions in a transition period when what they are being transformed to is 
unclear. Lenin's theory of law in communism is consistent with Marx and Engels 
vision. There are, however, deeper theoretical questions that arise that are not fully 
explained by Marx, Engels or Lenin. These concerns are brought to the forefront 
when the People's Courts are contrasted with the initial theoretical goals thus far 
outlined. 
A brief summary of these theoretical principles facilitates the framework 
within which the discussion of the People's Courts takes place. The basis of Marx's 
position, and one that is restated by Lenin, rests with description of law as an 
outcome of economic relations. In essence, the existence of the "juridic person" and 
the abstract role of law as an enforcer of rights and obligations among persons of 
equal wills depends on production relations that are embodied in capitalism. In 
socialism (communism), production relations are "socialised", meaning that the 
popUlace, as a whole, has control over production and uses productive forces to 
produce for its needs. The political form of state power is replaced by the associative 
authority of an administration. At this point, institutions lose their "political" 
character. While some authority is needed for organisational purposes, this 
authority does not take the form of power of one individual over another 
individual, but rather individuals become cooperatively engaged in a mutually 
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beneficial process. Thus, the use of force is absent, since no one has power over 
another. Compliance becomes "internal" and occurs as a direct result of 
participative decision-making (Lenin described this process as development of 
"socialist consciousness"). Through exerting control over production and how it is 
organised, people become empowered to control their social environment, and 
hence are empowered to address conflict in that environment by negotiating 
changes in social relationships. This distinction between social power and political 
power is at the heart of the difference between "state" and "administration" and 
consequently "law" and "regulation". 
It is obvious that the People's Courts fell short of these theoretical objectives; 
after all, Russia was a nascent socialist nation, not an advanced one. Examining 
exactly how and why they succeeded, or did not succeed, brings to focus some 
quintessential theoretical issues. Based on the above summary, analysis of the 
People's Courts will be narrowed to the following topics: (1) economic conditions 
and legal relations; (2) public control over production and its effects on the courts; 
(3) the institutional nature of the People's Courts: political vs administrative; (4) the 
role of force; (5) social vs political power. 
Economic conditions and legal relations 
The first decrees of power issued by the Bolsheviks economically sought to 
nationalise all major industry and declare land and natural resources to be state 
(public) resources.144 Such steps virtually eliminated private property. Politically, 
the Bolsheviks sought to give the responsibilities of government to the soviets.145 
The soviets were meant to be the "training ground" for the working class to begin 
144 The gist of Bolshevik aims before the Civil War is summarised in Lenin, Deklaratsiia Prav 
Trudiashchegosia i Ekspluatiruemogo Naroda in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 35, pp. 221-223 
[The Declaration of Rights of the Working And Exploited People in Collected Works, voL 26, pp. 
423-425] 
145 Hence the declaration that the soviets had taken power-see UK Grazhdanam Rossii", Istoriia 
Sovetskoi Konstitutsii v Dokumentakh 1917-1956 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Iuridicheskoi 
Literatury, 1957) pp. 41-42. 
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organising production and its accompanying social relations.146 Nationalisation of 
resources was only a first step, however, and as predicted by Marx, a bourgeois 
distribution method (commodity exchange) would prevail for a period of time. 
Money still operated as the medium of exchange and labour time was still a 
measure for the amount of money one received. Put simply, labour time was still 
directly exchangeable for products. 
Theoretically, since a capitalist distribution method was still in effect, the legal 
category of "juridic persons" would still be present and presumably, law would exist 
in that it would enforce production relations in the concrete situation, and would 
render which individual rights and obligations prevailed in a given situation in the 
ideological form. 
Despite the major structural changes sustained by the courts, theoretically 
they still incorporated elements of a capitalist legal structure. The proclaimed goal of 
the Bolshevik government was to establish a workers' state. The goals of such a 
state would be to base economy along proletarian lines. Such an economy would 
produce for need rather than profit, and hence be under the control of the 
proletarian class rather than the bourgeois class. Production relations, then, would 
reflect needs-based values and incorporate "proletariat power". 
Did the People's courts enforce these principles? From the survey of decisions 
made they did to a great degree. Crimes of theft were treated quite harshly 
(reflecting the value that one is stealing from society rather than another 
individual). Crime regarding lack of work was treated harshly. Enforcement of the 
labour laws were stringent. Eradicating bourgeois values was a prime goal of the 
courts. Proletarians were instructed to use their "socialist sense of justice" 
(sotsialisticheskoe pravosoznanie) to determine the outcome of cases. Despite the 
146 See Lenin, Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia i Renegat Kautskii in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 37, pp. 
101-110 and Tretii Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov, tom 35, 277 [Lenin, Proletarian Revolution and 
Renegade Kautsky in Collected Works, vol. 28, pp. 104-112; Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets 
in Collected Works, vol. 26, p. 469]. 
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fact that the values procured by a proletarian law are different in content from 
capitalist ones, the form of law is the same in that it reinforces production relations. 
Although production priorities were geared to be under state control, 
presumably to produce for need rather than profit, distribution was firmly along 
capitalist lines. Workers, in essence, were still commodities in that they could 
"exchange" labour power for things. Did such a situation create the ideological form 
of "juridic" persons in that an individual represented certain rights and obligations? 
Much like in capitalism, individuals still represented certain rights and 
obligations, and similarly to capitalist courts, the aim of the People's Court was to 
determine what rights had been "violated" and what the compensation 
(punishment) was to be. For instance, in the case of Nesterenko and the Southeast 
Railway Company, the company was held responsible for personal damages to 
Nesterenko. Smirnov who had paid to have sex with a thirteen year-old girl, had to 
pay court costs. Despite the fact that the judges often mentioned the wrong to 
society (such as the loss of a productive worker) decisions were still based on the 
concept of individuals as bearers of certain rights and obligations, and the role of law 
was to determine the outcome of clashes of these individual interests. Even though 
the background of individuals weighed heavily in the outcome of their 
punishments, the central issue of the courts was to determine the culpability of an 
individual based on rights and responSibilities-however those rights and 
responsibilities may have been redefined by the government or "socialist 
consciousness" . 
Control over production 
The above depicts a radically restructured judicature that nevertheless is 
theoretically linked to capitalist legal structures. Such a depiction calls into question 
whether citizens were really in control of the production process. If they were not, 
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the requisite impetus to transform political power into social authority was missing, 
and hence institutions, such as the People's Courts would retain political attributes. 
In one way the question is straight forward. The People's Courts were 
political institutions by virtue of the declaration that the revolutionary society still 
existed in political form and that class power was still characteristic of both 
production and social relations. In essence, there was still a state apparatus. Thus 
the questioned should be slightly modified: over the period examined (1917-1920), 
was the direction of transformation heading towards control of the production 
process by citizens? And consequently, how did this trend affect the People's 
Courts? 
The question of whether or not the nascent socialist Russia was heading 
towards the establishment of citizen control of production forces is fraught with 
difficulty. Whilst the answer historically became clearer in later years, initially the 
question of exactly how much faith the Bolshevik leadership had in the 
proclamation "all power to the soviets" is difficult to assess. It is clear that Lenin 
was convinced the revolution could not succeed in the long term without the 
power of the masses. Nevertheless, it is also clear that he had doubts as to whether 
workers and peasants were actually competent to run a country.147 Lenin indicated 
that the masses should participate as fully as possible in the new society, but they 
were to do so under the guidance of the party. This "guidance" became increasingly 
147 Lenin argued that revolutions can not be created but must have concrete conditions that allow them 
to come to fruition. See Sed'moi Ekstrennyu S"Ezd R.K.P.(B) in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 
36, pp. 52-54 [Seventh Congress of the R.c.P. (B.) in Collected Works, voL, 27pp. 135-136]. Some 
historians (e.g. d'Encausse) doubt Lenin's reliance on the masses. What is more appropriate to 
conclude is that Lenin thought the country was too backward for soviet power to work properly. 
See: Lenin, Luchshe Men'she, Da Luchshe in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (1975), tom 45, p. 390 
[Better Fewer, But Better in Collected Works, voL 33, p. 488]; Kak Organizovat Sorevnovanie in 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (1974), tom 35, pp. 198-199 [How to Organise Competition? in 
Collected Works, voL 26, p. 409]; VI Vserossiiskii Chrezvychainy i S"ezd Sovetov in Polnoe 
Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 37, p. 140 [Extraordinary Sixth All-Russia Congress of Soviets in 
Collected Works, voL 28, p. 139] 
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strict through the Civil War years, and more pervasive during N.E.P. Citizens 
gradually lost power rather than gained it.148 
Part of the reason Russia's citizenry may have been "incompetent" to run the 
country is that Russia was hardly a prime candidate for revolution:149 (1) Russia was 
not industrialised at the time and only 18% of the population was urban;150 (2) the 
country was, for the most part, illiterate; (3) the population had not developed 
under bourgeois institutions (an evolution which was necessary in both for the 
procurement of technical skills and the cultivation of worker consciousness). Part 
of Lenin's answer to the Menshevik and SOcialist-Revolutionary arguments151 was 
148 Lenin best summed the role of the party in his Speech at the Conference of Education Workers. See 
Rech' Na Vserossiiskom Soveshchanii Politprosvetov in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 41, p. 
403 [Collected Works, vol. 31, pp. 367-368]. See also Detskaia Bolezn' «Levizny» v Kommunizme 
in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 41, pp. 3-104 ["Left-Wing Communism": An Infantile Disorder 
in Collected Works, vol. 31, pp. 17-117]. 
Lenin believed that centralisation was indispensable for proper production and distribution 
(which was still under bourgeois terms) to be maintained. Only after workers had learned the 
technical aspects of running an industry under the guidance of the party were they to take power. 
Interestingly, the number of workers and Bolsheviks that were knowledgeable in areas of 
management and technical expertise was so low that the "specialist", though bourgeois, had to 
be retained; and were even given "bonuses", strictly by the token that they were so necessary to 
development and were willing to work for the Bolsheviks. Lenin, Proekt Programmy RK.P.(B) in 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 38, pp. 97-99 [Draft Programme of the RC.P. (B) in Collected 
Works, vol. 29, pp. 113-114] 
149 Marx and Engels stressed that consciousness must be achieved through praxis, and that much of this 
growth would occur in capitalism. [Marx, Preface to Critique of the Gotha Programme in Marx and 
Engels: A Conceptual Concordance, trans., T. Carver (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983) p. 154] 
150 d'Encausse, Lenin, p. 3 
151 The crux of the situation for the left was whether a socialist revolution was actually possible in 
Russia at the time of the Bolshevik takeover. Within Russia, the debate took place between 
three major parties, that of the Mensheviks, the Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) and the 
Bolsheviks. All parties held the belief that Russia first had to pass through a bourgeois 
revolution before a socialist revolution could become viable. For Lenin, the first 1917 revolution in 
February was a bourgeois one, and hence when the time became ripe, the Bolshevik seizure of 
power was indeed a socialist revolution. The Mensheviks, however, claimed that after this 
bourgeois revolution had occurred a period of capitalist development would need to ensue. 
The SRs' primary concern was agricultural reform. Socialisation of land, a phrase that sought 
to emphasise the fact that the land was owned by no one, became the central theme of their 
programme. Land use could take any form-private individuals, families, collectives-but it was 
envisioned that the peasants would discover (non-coercively) the advantages of collectivisation 
and would organise themselves along these lines eventually. The SRs hoped to avoid any sense of 
private property all-together, considering it possible to circumvent the "petty bourgeois" stage of 
development in Marxist terms. Socialism, therefore, would evolve (over a substantial period of 
time) out of agrarian reform. 
The theoretical and tactical debates of the Mensheviks and the party history during the 
revolution are well covered in a book by Vladimir Brovkin titled The Mensheviks After October 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Also useful is The Mensheviks, by Leopold Haimson 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974). 
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that revolution in Russia would spark revolution in the West,152 where institutions, 
class consciousness, and other elements necessary for popular take over would be 
more developed than the "backwards" Russia.153 Revolution did not occur in the 
West, however, and its possibility grew more indefinite as Russia struggled through 
the Civil War. 
Regardless of the reasons for a lack of development of actual "worker 
control", by 1922 it was quite evident that the decisions that affected the course of the 
country were made by a handful of individuals and carried out under strict 
Communist Party supervision. 
Oliver Henry Radkey has written several useful books on the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
examining theoretical developments, debates and splits in the party, and their responses to the 
early stages of Bolshevik rule. See The Sickle Under the Hammer (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963) and The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1962). 
152 Marx and Engels themselves felt that a revolution in Russia could incite revolution in the West: "If 
the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that the 
two complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the 
starting point for communist development." Marx and Engels, Preface to the Second Russian 
Edition of the Manifesto of the Communist Part in Marx and Engels Collected Works (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1989) vol. 24, p. 426. Marx also suggests in a letter of March 8,1881 to Vera 
Zasuliich (a Russian revolutionary) that the obshchina (rural community /village) "is the 
fulcrum of social regeneration", but that it would have to be freed of "the deleterious influences 
which are assailing it from all sides." in Marx and Engels Collected Works (Moscow) vol. 24, p. 
370-371 (quotes on 371). Passages such as these have added confusion to the histOrically 
developmental approach of class struggle embraced by Marx and Engels. It is quite clear, 
however, that a peasant revolution would perhaps only be useful to inciting revolution in 
developed countries. Adam Ulam points out that these passages were written at a time where 
revolutionary fervour was far more pervasive in Russia than in the West. (Ulam, Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, esp. pp. 442-443). Engels, in response to the revolutionary Tkachov who believed 
that capitalism could be "skipped" because of the communal nature of the obshchina, states that 
" ... a man who says that this revolution can be more easily carried out in a country where, 
although there is no proletariat, there is no bourgeois either, only proves that he has still to 
learn the ABC of socialism." Engels, On Social Relations in Russia in Refugee Literature (Part 
V), Marx and Engels Collected Works (Moscow) vol. 24, p. 40. This passage affirms the argument 
(most prevalent in Capital and The Communist Manifesto) the two had been making their entire 
lives, that capitalist development was necessary to the advent of socialism. There is no 
indication that Marx or Engels embraced the idea of an isolated peasant revolution leading to 
socialism. Makepeace discusses this in Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law, pp. 39-55. 
Another relevant text by Marx and Engels is The Russian Menace to Europe, eds., P.W. Blackstock 
and B.F. Haselitz (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952). 
153 Lenin thought revolution in the West would place Russia again in a ''backward'' state. See Lenin, 
Detskaia Bolezn' «Levizny» v Kommunizme in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 41, p. 3 ["Left-
Wing Communism": An Infantile Disorder in Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 21]. He was dependant 
on the West for final success of the revolution. See Lenin, Tretii Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov in 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 35, p. 271 [Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in Collected 
Works, vol. 26, p. 465]. 
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The institutional nature of the People's Courts: political vs administrative 
Accordingly, the effects on the People's Courts reflected a decrease in popular, 
direct control propelling the courts further away from the concept of a "non-
political" institution. Initially, complete freedom was given to the operation of 
these courts. Gradually, however, terms of punishment and formalisation of 
procedure decided by the Commissariat of Justice (not by the courts themselves) 
became more defined. Instructions were given to use one's socialist consciousness; 
but increasingly, the party determined what socialist consciousness entailed, to the 
point that a full codification of law was promulgated in 1922. 
The masses were to learn from the experience of running the courts. Yet as 
early as 1919, Stuchka stated that "I do not deny that the People's Court need 
theoretical guidance". He continues, "A great task confronts us-to liberate 
proletarian consciousness from bourgeois thought, and to provide the proletariat 
with a general educational understanding."154 The "us" invariably refers to the 
"vanguard" or the party. To receive education is a far different task than that of 
learning from mistakes.155 The attitude that the people must be "led" signifies a 
notion of state that is superior to the people it governs and thus has power "over" 
them. 
Hierarchical power is directly observable in the courts themselves. From 
their inception, they had three people (a judge and two people's assessors) that had 
final authority. It should be noted that these judges often encouraged participation 
and input from all those present. Also, the judges themselves came from the 
general population and "anyone" could serve as one. Increasingly, however, court 
154 Stuchka, Proletarian Law (1919) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, eds. and trans., 
Piers Beirne, Peter Maggs and Robert Sharlet (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988) p. 9 
155 In his work, Revolution and Revolutionary Legality written in 1930 the necessary role of the party 
as a guiding force both in legal statutes and economic policy, and the need for centralisation, is 
heavily emphasised. No mention of mass participation--except through the local Communist 
soviets- occurs. Laws become something that must be popularised, expressing the lack of the role 
of the populace in law enforcement. 
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staff became more specialised and procedures became more rigid as the power 
structure of the court itself became more defined. 
The role of force 
The political nature of the People's Courts is further observable via the 
element of force associated with their development. As Ovchinkin's description of 
the first soviet court exemplifies, the presence of the red guard leant legitimacy, or at 
least enforceability, to the early decisions of the courts. While it is a possibility that 
citizens eventually would have respected the court's authority of their own accord, 
history did not demonstrate such a development. It is worth mentioning, however, 
that given peaceful, stable evolution it is possible that the courts may have become 
less reliant on force. Part of the emphasis of the People's Courts was to replace more 
traditional forms of punishment, such as imprisonment or physical penalties, with 
alternative, more "social" punishments such as public censure; and the courts were, 
for the most part, lenient in their recommendations. Despite the goal of replacing 
punishment, however, the party leadership, in particular Lenin, was actually 
disturbed at the leniency of the courts and actively encouraged the courts to be more 
severe.156 In his mind, the courts were not promoting revolutionary discipline and 
were not strict enough in punishing class enemies. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the People's Courts by 1920 were relatively 
more independent and less centralised than all other institutions of the 
government.157 The autonomy of local courts was mainly due to the existence of the 
Cheka and the Revolutionary Tribunals, which attended to most of the complaints 
Lenin had of the People's Courts. Through these institutions, Lenin could maintain 
the use of unchecked force without directly interfering with the local courts. 
156 See Lenin, Variant Stat'i «Ocherednye Zadachi Sovetskoi Vlasti» in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 
tom 36, pp. 162-164 [The Immediate Tasks in Collected Works, vol. 27, pp. 217-218]. 
157 Batsell, Soviet Rule in Russia, p. 585 
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The role of the Cheka and Revolutionary Tribunals did influence the general 
operations of the court, in large part through their affect on society in general. The 
primary function of these institutions was to carry out class warfare, and to do so 
quite ruthlessly. 
Members of the Cheka were selected from the party. Cadres for this purpose 
were at first chosen selectively. Lenin wanted to get" good communists" that would 
not abuse power but be ruthless enough to carry out a "class war". Unfortunately, 
trusted party members were too few in number and subsequent recruitment for the 
Cheka relied on psychological disposition. Victor Serge describes them: 
The temperaments that devoted themselves to this task of 'internal defence' were those 
characterised by suspicion, embitterment, harshness, and sadism ... the chekas ineVitably 
consisted of perverted men tending to see conspiracy everywhere and to live in the midst of 
perpetual conspiracy themselves.158 
And despite personal interventions by Dzerzhinskii, Zinoviev, Lenin etc. at the 
behest of acquaintances (e.g. Maxim Gorkii, Victor Serge), many extravagances went 
unchecked and unnoticed. 
In theory, the Cheka was to spread terror only among a minority of the 
population (class enemies)-a minority that deserved brutal suppression in the eyes 
of the Bolsheviks. However, the difference between a peasant stealing bread to eat 
or a peasant stealing bread to "speculate" lost all clarity when the Cheka could shoot 
both justifiably. Adding to the confusion was the scope of interpretation that was 
allowed under the term "counter-revolutionary" .159 This could include anything 
from conspiracy to overthrow the Bolsheviks to sluggishness in snow removal.160 
158 Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, p. 80 
159 See James Bunyan's Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia: April-December, 1918, 
Documents and Materials (New York: Octagon Books, 1976) pp. 553-554. 
160 Decree of February 15, 1919 "On Repression of Persons Who Sabotage the Removal of Snow from 
Railway Tracks": The Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defence, at its February 15 session, 
having heard discussion exempting from mobilization all persons who live within 20 versts [ca. 
20 kilometres] of a railway line, decrees: 
To instruct Sklianskii, Markov, Petrovskii, and Dzerzhinsky immediately to arrest several 
members of the executive committees and committees of the poor in those areas in which the 
progress of snow removal has been entirely unsatisfactory. In the same localities, they are to 
take hostages from among peasants so that, if the snow is not removed, they [i.e., the hostages] be 
shot. A report on action taken, with information about the number of persons arrested is due 
within a week." from Decree of the Council of Defence, February 15, 1919, "On Application and 
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The difference between a proletarian who was not quite conscious enough and a 
class enemy was by no means apparent. 
Also, there was no defined process to determine guilt: "We do not require 
evidence of guilt against an exploiter of other men's labour, or a counter-
revolutionary; it is sufficient to determine his social standing or his political 
physiognomy, in order to apply administrative measures to him, as a class enemy of 
the proletariat and of communism."161 
Steinberg was concerned that the Bolshevik revolution was dictated by science 
(historical materialism). The Bolsheviks used this to justify terror-the means 
justifies the ends at whatever costs.162 The socialist revolution for Steinberg (and 
indeed many others) was to be one not only as a prescript of materialism but one of 
moral necessity as well; which included freedom from inhumane punishment of 
any kind.163 Lenin, however, was adamant in the need for terror that was dictated by 
revolutionary necessity; a necessity defined by material circumstances. The 
backward masses who were not able to understand this could not get in the 
revolution's way (hence Steinberg's point that Lenin was not a person but a 
"machinist servicing the engine of history"l64). 
The Cheka and the Revolutionary Tribunals were the institutions of the 
party, and the population had no recourse against them.165 It can be argued, as it was 
by Lenin, that these were trying times and these measures were absolutely necessary 
Repression to Persons Who Sabotage the Removal of Snow from Railway Tracks," in Dekrety 
sovetskoi vlasti, vol. 4. Moscow, 1968, pp. 626-627 as cited in Zigurds Zile, Ideas and Forces in 
Soviet Legal History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 9l. 
161 Instruksiia iuridicheskomu otdelu, undated, top secret document in the B. 1. Nicolaevsky Collection, 
Hoover Institution, Stanford cited in Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, p. 115 
162 Angelica Balabanoff, Impressions of Lenin, trans., Isotta Cesari (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1964) p. 149 
163 His theory is explained in full in LN. Steinberg, "Five Types of Russian Revolutionists" in In the 
Workshop of the Revolution (New York: Rinehart, 1953) pp. 195-217. 
164 Ibid., p. 201 
165 Lapenna, "Lenin, Law and Legality", p. 254 
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to maintain socialism)66 Regardless of the reasoning, the use of terror adversely 
affected the population.167 The historian Roy Medvedev writes: 
In general, one could say without great exaggeration that by the early summer of 
1918 the Bolsheviks had lost much of the confidence they earlier won among the 
peasants ... artisans ... and even a section of the industrial workers.168 
In February of 1918 alone there were 118 peasant uprisings as well as severe worker 
disaffection.169 
The use of terror and extra-judicial agencies continued into the N.E.P. period 
(and beyond).170 Lenin complained in a letter to Commissariat of Justice, Kurskii 
(February 20, 1922) that there was no recognition of the militant role to be played by 
the Commissariat of Justice. He instructed Kurskii that the Commissariat of Justice 
must playa more militant role in repressing exploiters of N.E.P. and other political 
enemies. He exhorted Kurskii to use whatever means necessary, including 
execution, to maintain strict central control of the economic and political 
apparatus}71 "Sud dolzhen ne ustranit' terror-,"172 Lenin writes, " ... a obosnovat' i 
uzakonit' ego prinsipial'no ... " 173 
166 Interestingly, during the Civil War many Mensheviks, SRs and anarchists fought on the side of the 
Bolsheviks despite the fact that opposition parties were outlawed and many members were 
already in prison. There were also peasant and worker uprisings during this time. Depending on 
the nature of the disturbance, various parties would adopt various tactics. When it came to 
White collaboration, however, most parties would support the Reds. On the Mensheviks and the 
Social-Revolutionaries, see Brovkin, The Mensheviks After October, especially pp. 256-293. For 
support of Anarchists against the Whites see L. Trotskii, Stalinism and Bolshevism in Essential 
Works of Socialism, ed., Irving Howe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976) p. 368 and 
Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, pp. 309-311. 
167 Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, p. 421 
168 Medvedev, The October Revolution, p. 150 
169 Tony Cliff, Lenin (4 volumes) (London: Pluto Press, 1975-1979) vol. 4, p. 130. 
170 By January, 1922 the Cheka had disbanded and was replaced by a new organisation, the G.P.v. 
(gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie-State Political Administration) was created 
(January of 1922). Initially the powers of the G.P.v. were restricted, but these restrictions were 
short-lived. By August, 1922, the G.P.U., like the Cheka, was again equipped with extra-
judicial power. (Leggett, The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police, pp. 346-347) 
171 Lenin, 0 Zadachakh Narkomiusta v Usloviiakh Novoi Ekonomicheskoi Politiki, Pis'mo D.l. 
Kurskomu in Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, tom 44, pp. 396-7 [not found in English translation] 
172 The courts must not eliminate terror-
173 ... but substantiate it and legalise it in principle. Lenin, Pis'mo D. l. Kurskomu (17 May, 1922) in 
Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (1975), tom 45, p. 190 [Letter to D.l. Kurskii in Collected Works, vol. 
33, p. 358] 
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From these descriptions, it can be surmised that the government was, in fact, 
"above" and "external" to the population and used physical violence to rule the 
country. Whilst the People's Courts, especially in the early period, were not directly 
involved in systematic terror, an atmosphere of fear prevailed. Decisions 
emanating from the People's Courts had the enforceability of the Commissariat of 
Justice under the Bolshevik government. A clear power structure existed, and one 
that used "terror" as an element of control-an element that was present through 
much of Soviet history. 
Social vs political power 
As has become evident throughout this discussion, whatever the aims of the 
Bolsheviks had been, by the time of N.E.P. development toward direct control of the 
society by the populace was not occurring. 
The People's Courts were a fascinating experiment that was passed over by 
many legal historians due to the fact that it seemed Bolshevik Russia was lawless. 
Much of Western outrage (e.g. Richard Pipes, Legalised Lawlessness) was due to the 
fact that there was no "due process" of law nor was the common legal 
commandment of nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege174 in effect. It was believed 
that common sense (i.e. "socialist consciousness") would determine most solutions 
to everyday problems, and that eventually there would be no need for 
imprisonment or monetary fines. It was thought that through participative 
management of society, a developed sense of cohesion and cooperation would 
develop and conflict would not take the form of individual rights and obligations, 
but rather a social form of conflict would evolve; a form that required "solution" 
rather than "punishment" as a result of a disruptive situation. Lenin emphasised 
that progress towards social power would corne about from the development of 
"socialist consciousness". 
174 No crime, no punishment without law. 
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Increasingly, however, the party defined "socialist consciousness", as opposed 
to the development coming from the experience of mass participation itself. By 
placing the initiative of legal workers under the supervision of the state (and in the 
final analysis the party), the prime motive for a participative legal system was 
removed: that is, citizens did not have the power to implement lessons learned 
through direct participation. The situation directly reflects relations that were 
present in production. The workers did not have direct control over production. If 
the responsibility for production is removed from workers, the prerequisite for the 
development of social power is missing. 
Also, the existence of "extra-judicial" bodies was detrimental to the operation 
of the People's Courts. It was difficult for the populace to feel in charge of justice 
when a member of the Cheka could shoot them at wilL 
Gradually, the expansion of centralisation allowed control over the decisions 
of the soviets, and via the soviets over the decisions of the People's Courts. The 
soviets became alienated from the people, which by the end of the Civil War and 
perhaps before, were now seen as organs of Bolshevik control rather than 
participative institutions.175 
The notion of a development towards social power was undermined by the 
growing lack of economic and social control by the populace, the effects of terror and 
the political structure of a state that procured a programme of strict party control, 
including the use of violence over its own workers.176 
Theoretical implications 
Despite the radical restructuring of the courts and the theoretical aims behind 
the People's Courts, they remained firmly institutions of law in the Marxist sense. 
The theory proposed by Marx, Engels and Lenin suggests that because capitalist 
175 "The party committee began to emerge as the dominant local authority after the Civil War, with 
the soviet falling into a secondary role ... " Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, p. 95 
176 Ulam, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, p. 215 
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elements of production were still present in the economic structure, so would 
capitalist legal elements still be present in the realm of law. Such elements are 
readily observable in the People's Courts: the courts still produced decisions through 
the evaluation of an individual's rights and obligations (however these rights and 
obligations may have been redefined), punishment was still a factor, political rather 
than social power remained and coercion was still a component in the enforcement 
of these decisions. The court structure itself progressed towards the structure of 
capitalist courts. This progress was marked through increased prescribed structure 
of personnet specialisation of those serving in the courts, more stringent control 
over the decisions of judgement, consistency of sentencing, and finally full 
codification of the law. 
The theoretical principles so far outlined may suggest why the People's Courts 
were not institutions of regulation. These principles, however, are not necessarily 
proved by the example of these courts. Whilst one explanation for the fact that the 
courts still resembled capitalist courts is the presence of capitalist exchange relations, 
other explanations might exist. For instance, it could be suggested that evaluating 
rights and responsibilities when conflict occurs is the function of law in any society. 
In order to evaluate such a claim the economic link to law must be discussed more 
fully to understand exactly how a transformation in economics would effect the 
legal institution. Unfortunately, the People's Courts never operated under the 
circumstances that would allow them to progress towards regulation. Thus the 
answer to this question must be sought theoretically. 
Once the economic nature of the law is more fully explained, other questions 
of import can be addressed. As was evident in the analysis of the People's Courts, 
the question of direct control was of great import. Without it, theoretically, 
institutions will remain political and social power will not develop. The theoretical 
explanation of social authority is fairly clear-that no one will have power over 
another. Its ramifications, however, are less clear. If no one is to have power, will 
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the decisions of arbitration and administrative institutions be enforceable? If they 
are not, then what is the exact purpose of regulatory institutions? 
Marx and Engels indicate that the element of the necessity of social cohesion 
created by the production system will cause people to cooperate. Given that Soviet 
Russia did not have communist production relations, it is difficult to assess whether 
this would really be the case. Lenin emphasised that the skills and necessary 
behaviour required to run a communist society would be acquired through direct 
participation in building one. Once this "necessary behaviour" was learned, people 
would follow rules from "habit" and coercion would be unnecessary. Because of the 
role of force both within the operation of the courts and outside of it, and the 
development towards central rather than participative control such a claim is also 
difficult to assess. If coercion is to have no role in communist society, further 
theoretical exploration of the notion of obligation is demanded. 
Once these elements are more fully explored, perhaps a clearer picture of what 
regulation entails, and what is exactly meant by conflict resolution in a communist 
society will emerge. 
A note on the People's Courts and the transition period 
The People's Courts provide a valuable example in evaluating the political 
strategy of the Bolsheviks during the early part of the revolution. They also provide 
an opportunity to discuss the circumstances of Russian society at the time, and the 
ramifications of the various elements that played a part in the direction Soviet 
Russia was to take. Fascinating as these opportunities may be, this scope of 
discussion is beyond the purpose of this thesis. 
It is important to note, however, that the rift in the field of "socialist law" 
discussed in the Introduction came about as a result of Russia's socialist experiment. 
While the courts did resemble their capitalist counterparts to some degree, there 
were also significant differences. The courts, at first, rejected any notion of 
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specialisation; rights and obligations were redefined along proletarian lines; the 
courts were defined by Lenin as political institutions which should carry out class 
warfare; and separation of powers was not a theoretical concern. 
Given these differences, much of the literature on "socialist law" focuses on 
the development of these institutions throughout Soviet history and has grown to 
include other "socialist" nations (most notably Chinal77). Thus the study of 
"socialist law" has oft assumed the meaning of examination of institutions in 
various "socialist" countries and discussions have focused both on a comparative 
level (the differences between "socialist" and "Western" legal institutions) and on a 
theoretical level, which has mostly involved a discussion of the state's justification 
of these institutions. While this type of study of "socialist law" is extremely 
valuable, it does not address the question of regulation-what is meant by it and 
how it might theoretically work. Such discussions are also notoriously absent in 
what was referred to in the Introduction as the branch of scholars that is concerned 
primarily with the theory presented by Marx and Engels and which usually 
disassociates the Soviet experience from this paradigm of study. Interestingly, the 
example of the People's Courts also provides material for discussing exactly why the 
Soviet experiment cannot be considered a "socialist experiment" in the Marxist 
sense.178 This task, however tempting, is also beyond the focus of this thesis. 
177 E.g.: Victor Li's Law Without Lawyers (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); Justice and Politics in 
People's China: Legal Order or Continuing Revolution (New York: Academic Press, 1982) by James 
Brady; and Phillip Chen's Law and Justice (New York: Dunellen Publishing, 1978). 
178 Lenin used Marx to justify his use of terror; a justification that is unacceptable to some leftist 
scholars. Robert Payne writes "He called himself a Marxist, but in fact he hammered and bent 
Marx to his own will, using Marx whenever it was necessary and jettisoning him whenever it 
served his purpose. He was closer to the medieval autocrats than to Marx." The Life and De at h 
of Lenin. A less harsh, though similar evaluation can be found in Angelica Balabanoff's book 
Impressions of Lenin. (She knew Lenin personally and left Soviet Russia because of the terror 
tactics.) 
There is material for both the democratic and violence-oriented interpretation of Marx's 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Saul Padover writes: 'Both the democratic socialists ... and the 
totalitarian communists have interpreted Marx to suit their own purposes .. .such varied 
interpretations have been made possible by Marx's own ambiguities, exaggerations, impreciSions, 
and lacunae." in Marx, On Revolution, trans., Saul Padover (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1971) 
p. xxix. 
Marx and Engels did proclaim that the bourgeois class would not give up power without a 
struggle, hence the need for violence. [Marx and Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party in 
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Whilst the example of the People's Courts provides ample research material 
in areas that are relatively unexplored, the primary use of them in this thesis is to 
draw attention to theoretical elements that need further attention if the theory of 
communist regulation is to be taken seriously. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
Marx and Engels Collected Works (Moscow) vol. 6, p. 519] Marx also indicated that perhaps in a 
very developed country such as America or England, the transformation to socialism could happen 
peacefully. [Marx, The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution in The Marx and Engels Reader, 
ed., Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) p. 523] It is clear, however, that Marx 
considered a vast majority of the population would be directly involved in a socialist revolution: 
" . .it [social revolution] is possible only where the industrial proletariat, together with 
capitalist production, occupies at least a substantial place in the mass of the people." in Marx, 
After the Revolution in The Marx and Engels Reader, p. 544. 
He also explicitly warns against the proletariat losing power to its own leadership, hence his 
recommendations for complete universal suffrage and the power of recall. Ivo Lapenna makes a 
strong argument against Lenin's use of Marx in this respect in "Marxism and the Soviet 
Constitutions" in Conflict Studies No., 106 (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979) 
especially, pp. 2-6. He writes in "Lenin, Law and Legality", "But what in fact does 'dictatorship 
of the proletariat' signify? In the theory of Marx and Engels, it certainly does not mean the 
dictatorship of one man, nor of a small organised group of persons, nor has it all the meaning 
which is usually given to the word 'dictatorship'. According to Marxism, 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat' is not the reverse of 'democracy', but the reverse of 'dictatorship of the bourgeoisie'." 
He goes on to say, "For Lenin, 'dictatorship', in fact, means direct violence whenever necessary." 
in Lenin The Man, the Theorist, the Leader, p. 242 and 243 respectively. Also interesting in this 
collection is J.e. Rees's "Lenin and Marxism", pp. 87-105 which addresses the Blanquist 
accusation. See also Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Vision of Communism: A Reconstruction", Critique 
No.8 (Summer, 1977) p. 15. 
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socialist legal literature-either involving the study of socialist nations or the 
theory of Marx and Engels-has been diverted from such an exploration. 
The theoretical questions emerging from the experiment of the People's 
Courts revolve around: (1) the exact nature of the legal-economic relationship; (2) a 
clearer definition of social vs political organisation; (3) and a more thorough 
theoretical explanation of a process of "conflict resolution" not based on rights and 
obligations and lacking coercion as an enforcement mechanism. Since the courts 
did not progress in a society that was moving towards communism and regulation, 
the path of inquiry leads away from historical analysis and returns to theoretical 
hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE-THE THEORISTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the first works of jurisprudence appeared during a time period that 
was characterised as a retreat to limited capitalism (N.E.P.), they were still written on 
the theoretical assumption that law would eventually "wither away". This 
particular period was short-lived (1921-1927),1 but produced works that greatly 
contributed to the development of a theory of communist regulation. 
The 1920s was a comparatively open and creative period for society under the 
Bolshevik regime. Despite the push towards centralisation and the government's 
continued use of repressive measures, legal debate was extremely active and frank.2 
At the end of N.E.P. and the beginning of the first Five Year Plan (1928), Stalin 
consolidated power fully. It is widely recognised that "freedom of debate" after 1928 
was severely restricted.3 The nature of Soviet scholarship under Stalin was 
transformed; less emphasis was placed on individual works and an atmosphere of 
"collective scholarship" prevailed. Stalin's influence on academia was pervasive. 
In the words of Robert Sharlet: 
The source of authOrity for much of the work that ensued increasingly became the many 
expressions of Stalin's interpretation of Bolshevik history, class struggle and revisionism ... 
Last, but not least, the language and vocabulary in the 1920's had been rich, open-ended and 
diverse, and varied tremendously with the personal preferences of the individual author; 
this gave way to a standardized and simplified style of prose devoid of any nuance and 
ambiguity, and which was very much in keeping with the new theoretical content which 
comprised official textbooks on the theory of state and law.4 
It also became evident at this time that the "withering away" thesis was 
contradictory to Stalin's political programme. Legal theorists assumed the transition 
1 Some historians place this date at 1937. See the Introduction, "The Theorists". 
2 Eugene Huskey, "From Legal Nihilism to Pravovoe Gosudarstvo" in Toward the "Rule of Law" in 
Russia? ed., Donald Barry (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) pp. 26-27 and M. Jaworskyj, 
Introduction to "Intellectualism in the 20's" in Soviet Political Thought, ed. and trans., M. 
Jaworskyj (Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967) p. 51 
3 Michael Villey, "The Philosophy of Law in the Communist Wodds" in Marxism, Communism and 
Western Society, ed., CD. Kerning (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973) vol. 5, p. 144; and also 
M. Jaworskyj, Introduction to "Stalinist Authoritarianism" in Soviet Political Thought, pp. 277-
278. 
4 E.B. Pashukanis, Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Selected Writings on Marxism 
and Law by Piers Beirne, et al. (London: Academic Press, 1980) p. 274 
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period was to be one of constant progressive growth towards a decrease of the role of 
the state and of law. This assertion stood in direct contradiction to Stalin's 
conception of the growing role of the state and its centralisation. The retreat from 
N.E.P. and the embarkation on the first Five Year Plan marked a significant shift in 
the economy towards massive centralisation. This revolution was to be a 
"revolution from above", one that would place economic initiative in the hands of 
the state (the Communist Party). The development of this policy did not mesh well 
with claims that the state and concomitantly law would assume a decreasing 
position in socialist society. Stalin's re-definition of socialism led to the need for a 
centralised state and legal apparatus. While the re-definition of law did not 
officially occur until 1938 with the publication of Vyshinskii's The Law of the Soviet 
State, the "withering away" thesis came under attack even before the initiation of 
the first Five Year Plan (1928).5 
As 1921 witnessed the publication of the first work on jurisprudence and 1928 
marked the start of a major theoretical shift away from the "withering away" thesis6 
and a move towards "collective scholarship", the period between 1921-1927 is the 
most fruitful to survey for the purpose of theoretical exploration. This chapter 
examines the major works of jurisprudence from 1921-1927 with the aim of further 
delineating a theoretical position with regard to regulation in communism. 
Consequently, specific questions regarding law during the transition period are not 
5 See Tay and Kamenka, "Beyond the French Revolution: Communist Socialism and the Concept of 
Law", pp. 125-126 note 15 and Hazard, Introduction to Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans., Hugh 
Babb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951) p. xix. For a short history of Soviet legal 
theory see Huskey, "From Legal Nihilism to Pravovoe Gosudarstvo" in Toward the "Rule of 
Law" in Russia? pp. 23-42. 
Pashukanis began to address some initial criticism in his piece, The Marxist Theory of Law and 
the Construction of Socialism which was published in 1927. 
6 The question of whether subsequent Soviet work in legal theory represented a "reversion to bourgeois 
ideology", however interesting, is quite beyond the scope of this thesis. It is clear that most legal 
theory post-I928 focuses on the role of the State and law during the transition period. Many 
scholars that examine Soviet law make the claim that it is the same as bourgeois law and any 
proposed differences are simply pure rhetoric. [Most notably Harold J. Berman, Justice in the 
U.S.S.R.: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963)] 
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discussed, nor are questions regarding the development of Soviet legal theory.7 The 
purpose of this chapter is not to critique the works presented,8 but rather examine 
them for further contributions to a theory of regulation. 
Undoubtedly, E. B. Pashukanis9 is the most influential post-Marx legal 
theoretician and his work The Theory of Law and Marxism (1924) is still regarded by 
many as the text on Marxist legal theory. The first Soviet work on jurisprudence (A 
General Doctrine of Law) however, was produced by P. 1. Stuchka10 in 1921. 
7 As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis will examine no more Soviet theorists in depth due to 
the exclusive focus of legal theorists from Stalin and beyond on law in the transition period. 
Works dedicated primarily to regulation in a communist society (as opposed to the transition 
period) were not produced (though they may have been written) during the Soviet period. 
Although the claim that law would wither away was always maintained, there was a marked 
decrease in any works analysing law in and of itself. It can also be argued that the Soviet Union 
never fully recovered from the academic stultification of Stalinism. Even after Khrushchev's 
Secret Speech and his attempts to "open" Soviet society, it is doubtful that academics were free 
to produce theoretical works that would fundamentally question the authority of the state. 
8 The critical literature is noted in the footnotes. 
9 Pashukanis served as a People's Judge in Moscow, was a member of the presidium of the Moscow 
Soviet of People's Judges and the Appeals Tribunal attached to the All-Union Central Executive 
Committee of the Party. He worked in the Commissariat of Justice from 1920-1924. He then 
transferred to the Communist Academy and became vice-president of the Academy in 1927. He 
also served as director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law. In 1936, he was appointed 
Deputy Commissar of Justice of the U.S.S.R Pashukanis disappeared in 1937. His fate was 
unknown for some time, but it has now been established that he was shot shortly after his arrest. 
[Biographical information taken from Hazard, p. xxv and Kamenka and Tay, pp. 72-73 and Chris 
Arthur, Introduction to E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, trans., Barbara Einhorn (London: Ink 
Links, 1978) p. 10 and Robert Sharlet, "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture" in Stalinism, ed., 
Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977) p. 169]. 
Pashukanis's most influential work was The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1924). Other 
theoretical works include The Marxist Theory of Law and the Construction of Socialism (1927), 
Economics and Legal Regulation (1929), The Marxist Theory of State and Law (1931), and State 
and Law Under Socialism (1936). Several English translations of Pashukanis's works are quite 
good, notably Piers Beirne, et al., Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law and Law 
and Marxism, trans., Barbara Einhorn. See also in Russian Uchenie 0 gosudarstve i prave 
(Moscow, 1932) and Izbrannye proizvedeniia po obshchei teorii prava i gosudarstva (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1980). 
10 Stuchka was an active revolutionary from the 1880's. He served as Commissar of Justice from March-
August, 1918, and then took a leading part in the Latvian Revolt. He also served as Deputy 
Commissar of Justice, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the RF.S.F.R and played an organising 
role in the legal theory section of the Communist Academy (this institute became the Institution 
of Soviet Construction and Law of the Communist Academy in 1929, then changed again in 1937 to 
the Academy of Sciences of the U.s.S.R). [Biographical information taken from John Hazard, 
Introduction to Soviet Legal Philosophy, trans., Hugh Babb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1951) pp. xxii-xxv and Eugene Kamenka and Alice Ehr-soon Tay, "The Life and 
Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist", Problems of Communism, Vol. 19, No.1 (January-February, 1970) 
p. 73]. His main theoretical works include A General Doctrine of Law (1921), The Marxist 
Concept of Law (1922), Notes on the Class Theory of Law (1922), Culture and Law (1922), In 
Defence of the Revolutionary Marxist Concept of Class Law (1923), Materialist or Idealist 
Concept of Law? (1923), Legal Relationships and The State (1925-1927), The State (1925-1927), 
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Although the two authors often criticised one another, their basic analyses were 
similar in many respects.11 Although there were other notable writers during N.E.P. 
(such as Krylenko and Kurskii), it was Stuchka, and more so Pashukanis, who laid 
the foundation for a socialist school of legal theory. Stuchka's fundamental role in 
the early development of the court system and his continued work on the practical 
tasks of the early Soviet legal system placed him in an obvious position to generate a 
theory of law. Although his writings possess the insight of the lessons learned from 
practical problem solving, it was Pashukanis who was to become the authority in 
the theoretical realm. Pashukanis placed more emphasis on a logically cohesive 
theory than Stuchka; his thoughts on the matter bore the training of a philosopher 
rather than a lawyer. Pashukanis's The Theory of Law and Marxism (1924)12 became 
the essential juridic work during his period of influence.13 
Another theorist of the time, M.A. Reisner,14 also deserves examination. His 
emphasis on legal consciousness and the intuitive nature of proletarian law was a 
clear break from the thoughts of Stuchka and Pashukanis.15 Although his work 
never received wide recognition and was criticised vehemently by Stuchka, 
and Revolutionary Legal Perspectives (1929). The best collected English translation of Stuchka's 
works is Piers Beirne, Peter Maggs and Robert Sharlet's Selected Writings of Soviet Law and 
Marxism (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1988). 
11 And in fact their similarities became even more evident after Pashukanis's replacement by 
Vyshinskii (1937) as the cornerstone of Soviet legal thought. For a brief commentary on their 
differences see Robert Sharlet and Piers Beirne, "Pashukanis and Socialist Legality" in Marxism 
and Law, eds., Piers Beirne and Richard Quinney (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982) pp. 318-
320. 
12 Ronnie Warrington points out that the General Theory II always remained a preliminary draft" due 
to the turmoil of the time; but that lithe limitations of Pashukanis's work do not vitiate his 
whole enterprise." "Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory" in Legality, Ideology and The 
State, ed., David Sugarman (London: Academic Press, 1983) p. 44. [This article is also found in 
International Journal of The Sociology of Law, Vol. 9, No.1 (February, 1981) pp. 1-22.] 
13 Although Pashukanis's sphere of influence lasted until 1937, he first came under attack in the late 
20's and began to recant some of his theories as early as 1930. 
14 Reisner served as Chief of the Section for Legislative Drafting under the Commissariat of Justice 
until the Civil War. His work examined in this thesis, Law, Our Law, Foreign Law, General 
Law, was published in 1925. He suffered under the label of idealist for his attachment to the 
theory of the known idealist Petrazhitskii most evident in his work The Theory of 
Petrazhitskii: Marxism and Social Ideology (published in 1908). It is for this label that he was 
not taken as seriously as some of his comrades. [Biographical information taken from Hazard, 
pp. xxv-xxvi] 
15 Other theorists in the intuitive camp were la. Berman, M. Rezunov and A. Popov, to name the more 
familiar ones. 
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Pashukanis and Vyshinskii, he nevertheless posed a plausible variant of a Marxist 
analysis of law. 
STUCHKA16 
Stuchka's analysis law begins with Marxist class theory.17 In capitalism, classes 
are locked in a struggle of interests. The interests of the working class are in direct 
conflict with the interests of the ruling, bourgeois class. Stuchka uses the example of 
the profiteer who wishes to lower working wages contrasted to workers who desire 
an increase in wages.18 In more general terms, it is in the interest of the bourgeois 
class to control production for the procurement of profit, where as the interest of the 
working class lies in control over production to procure control over living 
conditions. These interests, however, are not simply determined by the free will of 
every individual, but conditioned by the mode of production. It is here that Marx 
made a decisive radical contribution towards SOciology. As Marx states himself, 
many bourgeois historians recognised society in terms of class interests.19 It was 
distinctively Marxist, however, to root these interests in the mode of production 
itself. The relationship between will (class interest) and the concrete circumstances 
(mode of production) is dialectical; that is, will can effectuate changes in the mode of 
production, but only within the boundaries of the particular historical periods. 
Capitalist production can change only so much. Once these options are eliminated, 
revolution must occur for further development. Marx also established that the 
"conflict of interest" could only be resolved in socialism because of the contradictory 
position of the bourgeoisie, who need the working class for profit, yet at the same 
16 For a brief summary and background of Stuchka's work, see Robert Sharlet, et al., "P.L Stuchka and 
Soviet Law", Revolution and Law, ed., Piers Beirne (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990) pp. 45-60. See 
also his life and work (in Latvian) P. Dauge, P. Stucka Dzive un Darbs (Riga: Latvijas valsts 
izdevnieciba, 1958). 
17 Stuchka's emphasis on class can be found throughout his works. The clearest view of his general 
concepts of class are set out in A General Doctrine of Law (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1921). 
English translation in Soviet Legal Philosophy, pp. 42-52. 
18 Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law (1921) in Soviet Legal Philosophy, p. 45 
19 Marx, K., (specific work uncited) quoted by Stuchka, Ibid., p. 42 
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time seeks to destroy it. For this reason resolution of class interests in capitalism 
was not possible.2o Law in the class theory is a tool to protect the dominant class 
interest via state coercion. Specific laws are codified in statutes. 
Within the Marxist class theory, Stuchka framed his discussion of law in 
three sets of terms: (1) form and content;21 (2) subjective and objective aspects;22 and 
(3) reality and consciousness.23 All of these terminological approaches revolve 
around the notion of base and superstructure.24 Stuchka describes the 
superstructure as a mirror reflecting the actual relations occurring in society. "Real" 
relations are those which are dictated by the process of production (referred to as the 
base). For instance, when a borrower incurs a debt s/he is obligated to repay the debt, 
not necessarily due to the presence of a statute codifying that obligation (although a 
statute regulating this exchange is invariably present), but rather because of the 
nature of the situation itself. In a society organised along capitalist lines, value and 
labour are measured in things (commodities) and capital (profit) is the key 
20 The class theory is highly debatable, as is my quick summary of it. However, it is not our duty here 
to analyse its merits or demerits, but rather to accept it as a starting point for Stuchka's theory of 
law. 
21 The form and content analysis is present through most of Stuchka's theoretical works, the most direct 
explicatory passage is found in Stuchka, Materialist or Idealist Concept of Law? (1923) in 
Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 72-73. In original, "Materialisticheskoe iIi 
idealisticheskoe ponimanie prava," Pod znamenen Marksizma, 1923, No.1, 160-178 (entire 
work). 
22 References to the objective / subjective arguments are found in Stuchka, The Marxist Concept of Law 
(1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 27-29, original "Marksistkoe 
ponimanie prava," Kommunisticheskaia revolutsiia, 1922, No. 13-14; Notes on the Class Theory 
of Law (1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 45-46, original "Zametki 0 
klassovoi teorii prava," Sovietskoe pravo, 1922, No.3, pp. 3-18 (in total); The State (1925-27) in 
Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 144-145, 151-152 and passim, original 
"Gosudarstvo," Entsiklopediia gosudarstva i prava (Moscow, 3 vols., 1925-1927) voL 1, p. 655. A 
general discussion is found in Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law (1921) in Soviet Legal 
Philosophy, pp. 22-24, 29-34, esp. p. 3l. 
23 The clearest discussion of the description of consciousness as opposed to concrete circumstances and 
how these are related to form and content can be found in Stuchka's Notes on the Class Theory of 
Law (1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 48-52. 
24 The base / superstructure analysis appears virtually in all of Stuchka's theoretical works, the most 
concentrated passages can be found in Notes on the Class Theory of Law (1922) in Selected 
Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 47-50, In Defense of the Revolutionary Marxist Concept 
of Class Law (1923) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 81-88, in original "V 
zashchitu revoliutsionno-marksistogo poniatiia klassovogo prava," Vestnik sotsialisticheskoi 
akademii, 3 (1923) pp. 159-169 (in total), and Law (1925-27) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law 
and Marxism, pp. 149-50, in original "Pravo," Entsiklopediia gosudarstvo i prava, voL 3, pp. 415-
30 (in total). 
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motivator in production organisation. This situation of the obligation to repay 
debts arises out of what is prioritised in the economic sphere. Stuchka cites Marx at 
length on this point in his Materialist or Idealist Concept of Law. It is useful to 
repeat the quote here: 
In order that these objects may enter into relation with each other as commodities, their 
guardians must place themselves in relation to one another, as persons whose will resides in 
those objects, and must behave in such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity 
of the other, and part with his own, except by means of an act done by mutual consent. They 
must, therefore, mutually recognize in each other the rights of private proprietors. This 
juridical relation, which thus expresses itself in a contract, whether such a contract be part 
of a developed legal system or not, is a relation between two wills, and is but the reflex of 
the real economic relation between the two [original emphasis]. It is this economic relation 
that determines the subject matter comprised in each such juridical act.25 
The reflection (superstructure) of these relations is embodied in "law" (statute). 
Stuchka warns, however, that the basel superstructure relationship is not 
strictly hierarchical, but dialectic. Laws do not only rely on the mode of production. 
Laws can in turn create an active force to regulate and induce changes in economic 
relations; for instance, laws decreasing working hours. This active force is used to 
perpetuate the aims of the dominant class.26 On one hand, there is active will 
effectuating change through the coercive force of the dominant class 
(superstructure), on the other this power is limited by the scope of the concrete 
economic situation (base) which cannot be completdy altered by sheer will. For 
example, laws regulating universal public ownership of land could not arise in 
capitalism. This dialectical relationship between base and superstructure is summed 
up by one of the most famous quotations of Marx: "Men make their own history, 
but they do not make it just as they please."27 It must be stressed here that from a 
25 Marx, K., Capital (1867, voL 1, p. 84) as cited in Stuchka Materialist or Idealist Concept of Law? 
(1923) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 72. 
26 A decrease in working hours may seem contrary to capitalist interest. However, it is in the interest 
of the ruling class to compromise at times to avoid direct confrontation with the working class. In 
this way, the working class can achieve better circumstances in capitalism, but again only to a 
certain extent. This line of thinking relates to Marx and Engels's discussion on how political 
rights are the highest the working class can achieve in capitalism. 
27 Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in The Marx and Engels Reader, ed., Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978) p. 595 
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Marxist perspective will is not completely free. 28 Any theory of law proceeding from 
that assumption has a false or abstract basis. 
Stuchka's treatment of form and content arises from the base / superstructure 
model. He explains that a Marxist approach to law assumes the content of law 
evolves from actual social relations (the base). The form (superstructure) that the 
expression of these relations takes is the statutes, the will of the dominant class 
upheld by a coercive state apparatus. He contrasts this approach to the bourgeois 
one which in effect reverses form and content. Content becomes not actual social 
relations but (1) statutes themselves (formalist); (2) an immutable a priori principle 
(natural law, whether based on reason, God or the inalienable rights of man); or (3) 
the totality of norms (expressed in statute) of a given society (positivist, 
normativist). 
The sin bourgeois theorists commit is that, by focusing only on the form of 
law (totality of norms, statute), the actual content of law, social relations, is ignored. 
Whilst equality may prevail in form, for instance, in the notion of contract (between 
two mutually consenting equal wills), in actual relations (content) people are not 
equaL "Mutual consent" is impossible, for example, when a manager contracts with 
a worker, for the economic power basis of these two parties is completely unequal. 
The only way this notion of mutual consent could take place is in completely 
abstract terms (which is what occurs when primacy is placed on form rather than 
content). For bourgeois law, "economic inequality is completely irrelevant."29 
The subjective and objective approach follows much the same path as the 
form and content argument. The objective element is not, as bourgeois theory 
states, the "due process of law", and the subjective element the particular case to 
which this is applied, but rather the reverse. The particular cases are the objective 
content (they are the relations taking place), whereas the legal system (the will of the 
28 A good discussion of this appears in Stuchka's The Marxist Concept of Law in Selected Writings of 
Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 30-3l. 
29 Stuchka, Legal Relationship (1925-27) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 155, 
original "Pravootnoshenie," Entsiklopediia gosudarstva i prava, voL 3, pp. 440-446 (in total). 
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dominant class codified in statues and enforced by coercion) is the subjective 
element. Stuchka makes the point by citing Marx: "what is the use of an 
unprejudiced judicial decision if the law is prejudiced ?"30 (The law is prejudice 
because, as defined in the class theory, the legal apparatus protects the over-all 
interests of the ruling class.) 
Stuchka speaks of the bourgeois perception of a totality of norms (reflected in 
a given set of statutes) as being the objective definition of relations; hence, actual 
relations adhere to them. In reality, norms arise from the economic situation of 
commodity fetishism; that is people are equal only in pure abstraction (due to the 
state of alienation). 
The reality/consciousness arguments use similar logic. Reality (content) is 
what is actual relations, law is the consciousness of what is perceived as actual 
relations (form). Bourgeois theories take the superstructure, the consciousness, as 
the reality and virtually ignore the economic base. While Stuchka acknowledges 
that bourgeois theorists from the sociological school had at least recognised the role 
of economics and interests,31 he asserts there are still major differences between a 
sociological school of law and a Marxist one. The former fails to recognise 
conflicting interests as class interests, and that these interests are irreconcilable (in 
the capitalist environment). Writers from this genre also fail to recognise that 
interests are not completely products of free will but are determined in the last 
instant by an individual's position in the classes engaged in struggle within the 
concrete boundaries of the economic system. 
Legal consciousness does not always match real social situations. In bourgeois 
theory, "norms" become part of the abstract realm, for they have no identifiable 
basis in the actual social relations in a class society. The failings of a bourgeois legal 
system lies in the contradiction between legal ideology (consciousness) and actual 
30 Marx, uncited, as found in Stuchka, The Marxist Concept of Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law 
and Marxism, p. 25 
31 Notably Jhering (Ihering), who states that society is a conglomerate of conflicting economic interests, 
and law's role is to resolve or at least stabilise those interests. 
121 
relations. For instance, the idea of "mutual contract" ignores the innate difference 
in the economic power structure between labourer and employer. Similarly, the 
concept of "equality before the law" neglects the social fact that the law protects 
property owners, and that most citizens do not possess property. "Due process" then 
becomes a formula for equality which fails to consider the inherent unequal 
positions of participants in the system.32 
In summary, Stuchka defines law as an order of social relations (content, 
objective, real) in which the determinate element is the interest of the ruling class.33 
The form (subjective, consciousness) that this takes is that of sanctioned norms 
expressed in statutes (by the coercive state) which preserve and regulate these class 
relations. 
From this framework, law in the transition period retains basic elements of 
bourgeois law-the society remains a class society, law still reflects the will of the 
dominant class, and this will is enforced by a coercive state power. The transition 
period law differs in two major ways, however: (1) its social base (content) reflects 
social relations created by principles of common property (mutuality) rather than 
private property (individuality); and (2) it protects the proletarian class interest (to 
produce a classless society) rather than bourgeois class interest (to procure profit). As 
a result, there are changes in the specific form that these relationships take (statute). 
It is important to remember that when Stuchka discusses class will-in the 
case of the transition period, the proletarian goal of a classless SOciety-he is 
referring to a will that is conditioned by economic circumstances. It is accepted as 
fact that production is a social process (therefore a theory based on individuality 
would not work), and that common ownership is the only non-contradictory 
production form. The goal of the working class to create a classless society is not 
chosen by the working class, it arises out of historical necessity. What is in the 
realm of class will is to further this process (socialism) or impede it (a retreat to 
32 Marx makes these similar arguments in On The Jewish Question (see Chapter one). 
33 Stuchka, The Marxist Concept of Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 22 
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capitalism). Because classes still exist in the transition period, and there is still a 
coercive state apparatus, there is still law. Statutes, however, will manifest a 
protection of public ownership rather than private property. 
By Stuchka's own definition, law, which relies on coercive protection of class 
interest, will not exist in communism. The question then becomes paramount: in 
communist social relations, what form does law take? None in the modern sense of 
law, for there is no dominant class will that needs to be enforced by the state (indeed 
there is no state). Stuchka declares: 
We may speak of the proletarian law itself only as the law of the transition period, of the 
period of the proletarian dictatorship ... Alternatively, we may speak of law in the 
socialist society [post-transition], using an entire new meaning of the word [my emphasis]. 
With the elimination of the state as an oppressive mechanism in the hands of one class or 
another, social relations and the social order will be regulated not by coercion, but by the 
conscious good will of the working people, i.e., of the whole new society.34 
The paragraph indicates that regulation supersedes law. While Stuchka often 
refers to the withering away of law, he does not indicate that, with it, all sense of 
regulation will cease. The "conscious good will of the people" replaces the 
phenomenon of law. Stuchka hints that law becomes entirely new in meaning. 
Does this mean that it disappears? 
What might help us answer this question is to examine Stuchka's analysis of 
pre-class society, specifically primitive communism. If a form of law existed in pre-
class society, than logically there can be one in post-class society. Stuchka avoids this 
question: 
Law, like the state, its authority and justice, can only have a class nature in a class society. 
The debatable academic question of whether law existed in pre-class society and whether 
it will exist in post-class society, I leave untouched.35 
Stuchka emphasises that law assumes his definitional characteristics in class 
society; what of regulation in pre-class society? He does address this question to an 
extent in A General Doctrine of Law. In the section titled "Social Relationships and 
34 Stuchka, Proletarian Law (1919) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 9, original, 
"Proletarskoe pravo," Oktiabr'skii perevorot i diktatura proletariata: Sbornik statei (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1919) pp. 210-220 (in total). 
35 Stuchka, Notes on the Class Theory of Law (1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, 
p.53 
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the Law", he discusses the fact that the gentes (clan unions) possessed no knowledge 
of private property and lived in primitive communism. He describes this society as 
not only preserving the individual, but as also preserving the gens, the blood 
kinship. He continues: 
In this gens-union there is a certain plan of economy-although it be a weakly organized 
plan-and there is also a division of labor: but there is no law .. .In their mutual 
relationships, the kinsfolk are guided by mores (habits) and by customs.36 
Stuchka then describes these mores as "only the technical modes which are 
suggested by experience and instinct."37 He accuses Reisner of equating custom and 
law in this type of society: 
But to confuse every 'custom' (i.e., that which is usually done) and 'habit' (that which has 
turned into something familiar) with law, as with a concept connected with inequality, is 
obviously wrong.38 
Stuchka does cite, however, Professor Akhelis in a footnote which reads: "In 
the primordial (primitive) stage of development, law and custom-Cor more 
accurately "mores": Sitte) in general coincide."39 Is this sort of merging of 
law / custom similar to regulation by "the conscious good will of workers"? While 
similar, there is an important difference. In Marxist terms the consciousness of 
people in communism is at a much higher level (through historical development) 
than that of primitive communism. These "technical modes of experience and 
instinct" become a far more encompassing experience. Social custom becomes 
something not blindly followed, but actively developed. Stuchka suggests this when 
he discusses why one must feel obligated to proletarian law: 
... the concessionary laws of the revolutionary government are obligatory both "externally" 
and "internally" ("not by fear, but by conscience"); from its internal side, it must be based 
largely on revolutionary legal consciousness (persuasion, and not just coercion).40 
This development of consciousness will lead to a new culture; culture 
according to proletarian priorities (rather than bourgeois ones). He states: 
36 Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law (1921) in Soviet Legal Philosophy, p. 33 
37 Ibid. 
38 Stuchka, In Defence of the Revolutionary Marxist Concept of Class Law (1923) in Selected Writings 
of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 87 
39 Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law in Soviet Legal Philosophy, p. 33, note 26. 
40 Stuchka, Notes on the Class Theory of Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 54 
For us law and culture are not identical concepts. The conquests of culture will survive the 
transition into the future society (of course, not in 'pure' i.e., in current form), but law will 
not survive the transition: it must 'wither away'. The culture of the future is a new way of 
life, new habits, without any legal coercion.41 
124 
The idea of social habit evolves directly from proletarian law. The transition period 
was expected to progress towards a "definite revolutionary moment when a new 
class consciously comes forth asserting claim to authority and to its new law, law 
(entering the consciousness of human beings and becoming second nature thereof) 
is carried out in actual practice in the vast majority of cases without constraint of 
any sort." 42 
Proletarian law was to become second nature through the development of 
consciousness in the masses. As discussed above, in the consciousness / reality 
model, consciousness is the reflection of social relations. In the socialist revolution, 
the withering away of bourgeois law was possible because the means of production 
had been revolutionised. In the broader Marxist picture, the inherent contradictions 
of social citizens existing as isolated individuals when economic production was 
actually a social operation, would be corrected in a socialist production method. Due 
to the actually socialised means of production, social relations would be accurately 
reflected in law (hence the eventual disappearance of the need for law in statute 
form and eventually coercion). Consciousness and actual relations would "match" 
and the need for law would wither away or, more precisely, consciousness and 
reality would be one. For Stuchka (and others), the first step, socialisation of 
economic productive production, had occurred. There can, however, exist a "lag-
time" between a change in social relations and a change in legal consciousness. He 
explains: 
This transitional period requires a special law of the transition period-partly because 
this system does not change in one stroke and partly because the old, traditional order 
continues to exist in consciousness.43 
41 Stuchka, Culture and Law (1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 199, in original 
"Kul'tura i pravo," Revoliutsiia prava, No.2, 1928, pp. 15-20 (in total) 
42 Stuchka, A General Doctrine of Law in Soviet Legal Philosophy, p. 53 
43 Stuchka, The Marxist Concept of Law (1922) in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 11 
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Stuchka, as well as others, assumed that social relations would be simplified 
once a communally operated mode of production was introduced.44 This 
Simplification would facilitate change in that many laws would become 
unnecessary. Bureaucratisation and codification in the transition period were to be 
reduced to such a degree that the average citizen could participate in the legal 
system. Simplified relations would allow the direct participation in administrative 
matters by the broad masses so essential to the development of consciousness.45 
Citizens would learn first hand the needs and demands of a legal order and would 
respond with innovation. liThe proletarian revolution demands creativity. It had 
to be bold in destructive work and in the law creation role."46 In 1922, Stuchka 
suggested that proletarian legal theory itself was only a delayed reaction to the actual 
situation: 
The history of our understanding of law after the October Revolution has shown us that 
life was more clever than the theorists, and that theory only found post factum the 
correct motivation and formulation of the basic answer to the fact that all law in class 
society is class law in the interest of the ruling class, i.e., the class in power. It follows 
that in the future we must maintain a proximity between the revolutionary theory of la w 
and the bearer of the revolution, the broad masses.47 
Summary 
Stuchka presents a basically clear, but nonetheless rather general portrait of 
regulation in the future society. It would be non-coercive and necessary rules would 
become habit. This development would occur via direct mass participation in the 
current transition period, and by party / state-guided education until consciousness 
(culture) was developed to such a degree where coercion and law became 
unnecessary.48 The development of consciousness was to reflect the progress of the 
socialisation of production means, though perhaps not in exact linear fashion. 
44 Stuchka mentions the importance of the simplification of law in many works; one of the most 
condensed discussions is found in Revolutionary Legal Perspectives (1929), in Selected Writings of 
Soviet Law and Marxism, pp. 201-205 in original "Revoliutsionno-pravovye perspektivy", 
Revoliutsiia prava, No. 2 (March-April, 1929). 
45 Ibid., p. 203 
46 Stuchka, The Marxist Concept of Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 11 
47 Stuchka, Notes on the Class Theory of Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 53 
48 Stuchka, Proletarian Law in Selected Writings of Soviet Law and Marxism, p. 15 
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Much of Stuchka's material is directly from Marx and involves the transition 
period far more than regulation in communism. His distinction lies primarily 
with his development of Marxist class theory into a theory of law, and his focus on 
law as a system of relations. He was really the first to attempt a coherent Marxist 
theory of law. These arguments were later to be attacked by Vyshinskii and others 
(largely due to his disregard for law as an actual original source of regulations rather 
than a protector of economic relations49). Pashukanis, however, claims that while 
Stuchka was correct in focusing on the class basis of law, he failed to explore the 
legal form far enough. 
P ASHUKANIS50 
By far the most significant work of Pashukanis is his The General Theory of 
Law, which first appeared in 1924.51 It is a work that has gained much attention in 
the West, and it had considerable impact on Soviet legal practices and theory during 
N.E.P. and the first two Five Year Plans.52 Until the 1930's, law school academics and 
practising jurists adhered to the thesis laid out in 1924. Pashukanis came under 
major attack and underwent his first session of "self-criticism" in 1930.53 Much of 
Pashukanis's subsequent work was obviously written under political pressure,54 and 
it is difficult to establish whether the eventual changes he made to his general 
49 Such interpretation was needed to implement party policy from above. 
50 By far Robert Sharlet has done the most extensive work on Pashukanis. See Pashukanis and the 
Commodity Exchange Theory of Law, 1924-1930: A Study in Soviet Marxist Legal Thought, PhD 
thesis, Indiana University, 1968; "Pashukanis and the Rise of Soviet Marxist Jurisprudence" in 
Soviet Union, Vol. 1, Part 2 (1974) pp. 103-121 as well as articles mentioned throughout this 
section. 
51 Subsequent editions appeared in 1926 and 1927 with minor revisions. For a translation of the third 
edition see Soviet Legal Philosophy. 
52 For an assessment of Pashukanis's impact on the development of legal theory in the U.5.5.R. see 
Robert Sharlet's "Pashukanis and the Withering Away of Law in the U.S.S.R." in Cultural 
Revolution in Russia 1928-1931, ed., Sheila Fitzpatrick (Ontario: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 
1978) pp. 169-188. For his impact on the West see Arthur, pp. 9-31 and Peter Binns, "Law and 
Marxism" in Capital and Class, Issue 10 (Spring, 1980) pp. 100-113. 
53 See Rudolph Schlesinger, "Recent Developments in Soviet Legal Theory" in The Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 4 (December, 1942) p. 25. 
54 Piers Beirne, and Richard Quinney, "Law and Socialist Construction" in Marxism and Law, eds., 
Piers Beirne and Richard Quinney (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1982) p. 303. See also Steve 
Redhead, "Marxist Theory, The Rule of Law and Socialism", pp. 338-339 in the same volume. 
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theory were actual logical reconsiderations or acts of political survival.55 
Accordingly, I rely heavily on The General Theory as a representation of the 
thoughts and theoretical tendencies of Pashukanis. Pashukanis's later works are for 
the most part not discussed.56 
The general theory 
For Pashukanis, previous works on a Marxist theory of law produced only " 
a history of economic forms with a more or less weak legal colouring, or a history of 
institutions, but by no means a general theory of law."57 While materialists had 
correctly embraced a definition of law founded on the struggle of class interests as 
opposed to abstract ideals of objectivity and equality, he concluded that "many 
comrades" made the erroneous assumption that they had established a "Marxist 
theory of law." Pashukanis criticised Stuchka in particular for focusing purely on 
the "the class content of the historical development of legal regulation in 
comparison with the logical and dialectical development of the form itself."58 
55 Such attempts were unsuccessful as he was executed in 1937. In regards to Pashukanis's rehabilitation 
see Hazard, "Pashukanis is No Traitor" in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 51, No.2 
(April, 1957) pp. 385-388, esp. p. 386. 
56 Any scholar interested in Pashukanis should read his later writings. Taken in context, they provide 
a clear testimony to the political influence of the Soviet regime during the time. They also 
address some specific problems of the transition period and form a gateway from the "withering 
away" thesis to the foundations of later Soviet legal theory. Pashukanis is not only of 
fundamental use for his more detailed account of the regulative means of the classless society, but 
also as an example of the effects of Stalinism. Throughout his works both a change in rhetoric 
and language, and a transformation from academic debate to political unity is evident. Robert 
Sharlet points out that this forced synthesis can be seen in the trend towards collective 
scholarship rather than individual theorising. (Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and 
Law, pp. 273-274) 
His notable later works include The Marxist Theory of Law and the Construction of Socialism 
(1927) in Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, pp. 198-199; Economics and Legal 
Regulation (1929) in Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, pp. 237-272, in original 
"Ekonomika i pravovoe regulirovanie", Revolutsiia prava (1929), No.4, pp. 12-32 and No.5, pp. 
20-37; The Marxist Theory of State and Law (1931) in Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism 
and Law, pp. 9-44 in Pashukanis, (ed.), Uchenie 0 gosudarstve i prave (1932), Partiinoe Izd., 
Moscow; and "State and Law under Socialism" (1936) in Pashukanis: Selected Writings on 
Marxism and Law, pp. 348-361 in original "Gosudarstvo i pravo pri sotsializme", Sovetskoe 
gosudarstvo (1936) No.3, pp. 3-1l. 
57 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism in Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, p. 
42: original (in total) Obshchaia teoriia prava i marksizm: Opyt kritiki osnovnykh 
iuridicheskikh poniatii (1924), Sotsialisticheskoi Akademii, Moscow, 1st edition. 
58 Ibid., p. 125 note 3 
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Pashukanis's goal, therefore, was not to analyse law in its specific form and 
content in different stages of history,59 but to examine the form of law itself. He 
attempted to go beyond the, by then well-established, doctrine that law stemmed 
from economically-based social relations by defining exactly what a legal relation 
was and analysing why one social relation was legal and another not.60 
His methodology revolves around historical materialism, which in essence 
dictates that a full analysis of law (or any other category) cannot take place unless 
that particular form is in a state of deterioration (such as capitalist production 
relations). Following Marxist economic arguments, Pashukanis asserts that just as 
capitalism had reached its "peak" (if it had not, a socialist revolution would have 
been impossible) and historical circumstances now allowed full analysis of capitalist 
forms (such as value, exchange, commodity, etc.), so law had similarly reached its 
fully developed form. Through concrete social relations, history reveals what forms 
are, and by studying both the concrete relations (base, economics) and the 
abstractions which explain them (superstructure, ideology), one can deduce the 
essential form of law. 
Pashukanis agreed with Stuchka's definition of law in capitalism and 
socialism. He did not dispute that the socialist legal form is qualitatively different 
from that of capitalism (in that a law based on social property instead of private 
property would give rise to different statutes which would protect proletarian class 
interests rather than bourgeois ones); nor did he contest that law reflects class 
interests and that those interests are guaranteed by a coercive state. They also 
concurred on the matter of the eventual "disappearance" of law. For Stuchka, this 
disappearance represented the absence of classes in general, but for Pashukanis the 
withering away of law was a matter of the withering away of the commodity form.61 
59 As regards this he accepted Stuchka's general definitions for the phenomenon of law in that content 
is material relations and form is the body of normative statutes reflecting the interests of the 
ruling class which are coercively protected by the state. 
60 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 42 
61 For a critique of this position see Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) 
pp.108-111. 
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Pashukanis carried the class argument back to its roots-economics. For him, the 
definitions of law hitherto put forward by Marxist legal theorists lacked depth and 
historical perspective, for they characterised law only in terms of class interests and, 
therefore, reduced the importance of the fact that class interests are social relations 
which are determined by the mode of production. 
Hence Pashukanis makes economy his starting point: "Man as a social 
producer is the assumption from which economic theory proceeds. The general 
theory of law must proceed from the same basic assumption."62 Since historically, 
law had reached its fully developed form in capitalism, Pashukanis focused on the 
evolution of the most developed stage of capitalist economy, commodity exchange. 
From this economic base, he extracted the corresponding social relations and 
explained how the evolution of law mirrored the development of commodity 
fetishism and the social relations it entailed. 
Commodity fetishism and its social relations63 
Pashukanis begins with Marx's theory of commodity fetishism. In brief, 
economic individuals function as both commodity owners and commodity 
producers. Society, in economic terms, is thus an aggregate of commodity owners 
62 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 67 
63 For a discussion of Pashukanis's conception of social relations and law and his roots in the German 
theorists Jellinek and Laband see S. Dobrin's "Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism" in Law 
Quarterly Review, No. 52 (July, 1936) pp. 402-424, esp. pp. 408-419. Issac Balbus uses 
Pashukanis's commodity form theory to defend his position on the relative autonomy of the law 
in his article "Commodity Form and Legal Form" in The Sociology of Law, eds., Charles Reasons 
and Robert Rich (Toronto: Butterworth, 1978) pp. 73-90. The article originally appeared in Law 
& Society Review, Vol. 2 (1977) pp. 571-588. See also Bernard Edelman's Ownership of the Image 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). Edelman uses Pashukanis's commodity theory to 
develop his own Marxist analysis of law. For a critique of the economism in Pashukanis see Colin 
Sumner's Reading Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law 
(London: Academic Press, 1979) esp. Chapter 8, "The Ideological Composition of Law", esp. pp. 
249-253 and passim. Kamenka and Tay interestingly compare Pashukanis's views of law as a 
"product of commercial relations" to T6nnies' Gelleschaft (the society based on commerce) and 
Weber's notion of the legal-rational quantification of qualitative relations in Kamenka and 
Tay's "The Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist", pp. 77-78. For a general defence of 
Pashukanis's position see Bob Jessup, "On Recent Marxist Theories of Law, the State, and 
Juridico-Political Ideology" in International Journal of the Sociology of Law, Vol. 8, No.4 
(November, 1980) pp. 15-368, esp. 343-351. 
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and producers. Individuals inter-relate to each other via commodities through the 
act of exchange. Exchange is not a property of commodities themselves, but rather 
requires the external volition of commodity owners. Simultaneously, individuals 
producing commodities become commodities themselves (by selling their labour 
power). Thus, commodities in capitalism assume an abstract quality of value 
regardless of their use values for they assume a social role of relating one individual 
to another. Individuals in capitalism assume the role of commodities by the sale of 
their labour and also exert their will through commodities via the act of exchange. 
Individuals are then equalised through commodities (things) and become 
objectified. Commodities then perform a social role while individuals become 
"things" in that we are essentially universalised and objectified-we are 
commodities and exert our will via commodities. This is in essence commodity 
fetishism.64 
In reality, however, humans are social producers. The contradiction of social 
producers acting as things is reflected in the categorisation of our roles in civil 
society. In economic terms, we are equalised and objectified through the act of 
exchange. As members of civil society we are equalised and objectified through our 
categorisation as possessors of free will; equalised in that our wills theoretically 
have equal effect, objectified because we exert our wills through commodities. In 
legal terms, when an act of exchange occurs, there is assumed a relation between two 
equal free wills (contract); and the ramifications of the effectuation of free will 
entails certain rights and obligations. Weare therefore categorised as bearers of 
equal rights and concomitant obligations, which is the basis of the capitalist juridic 
form. Pashukanis thus linked the commodity form directly to the development of 
the category "juridic person". 
To summarise, exchange equalises all forms of labour through the abstract 
notion of value embodied in commodities. The social condition accompanying the 
64 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, pp. 75-77 
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development of the commodity form is depicted as an abstract unification of 
individuals who posses independent, equal, free and egoistic wills which bear 
certain rights and obligations (juridic persons). These individual free wills are 
abstractly united in the ideological notion of civil society. Law assumes the 
ideological role of an objective, independent force operating to ensure individual 
rights and enforce obligations, protected by a state whose duty is to provide for the 
"common interests" . Pashukanis, as most Marxists, saw a fundamental 
contradiction between the characterisation of social producers as individuals, and 
unequal persons possessing equal rights. Since individuals are, in reality, not equal 
(i.e. one owned property, one did not; one is a manager, one is a worker; one is 
smarter, one produces more than another, etc.), the only way this equality could be 
achieved was in the abstract. Pashukanis refers to the universalisation of 
individuals through commodity exchange and through the concordant ideological 
categorisation of "juridic persons" as equivalence. The notion of equivalence 
appeared in fully developed form only in advanced capitalism. While the exchange 
of goods and the development of rights occurred long before capitalism, only 
developed capitalism unifies all of society in a universally abstract form through 
exchange and its corresponding relations. 
Pashukanis acknowledged that rights existed before developed capitalism, but 
not in a universally abstract form. He uses examples of feudal rights, which referred 
to certain privileges of specific groups. These privileges did not apply to all in an 
abstract universal way, but were differentiated by social roles (e.g. estate owners in 
comparable estates, or of guild participants in like guilds).65 Similarly, while 
exchange existed before capitalism, it was only in capitalism that exchange takes 
place in the universal abstract form of "value". All commodities become "equal" 
(including labour) in that a certain amount of them may be universally exchanged 
for a certain amount of something else (regardless of use value). This equivalence 
65 Ibid., pp. 79-80 
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also takes place in exchange relations,66 all become "equal" in that they have 
perceived equal rights and free wills. In reality, however, commodities are not 
"equal", nor do persons possess equal rights or free will. The essence of the 
phenomenon of equivalence in social relations is the basis for Pashukanis's 
approach towards law. Contract, then, becomes the kernel of the legal relation. 
Only with the full development of bourgeois relations did law obtain an abstract character. 
Each man became a man in general, all labour was equated with socially useful labour in 
general, every subject became an abstract legal subject. Simultaneously, the nonn also 
assumed the logically perfected form of the abstract general law. 
Thus the legal subject is the abstract commodity owner elevated to the heavens. His 
will-will understood in a legal sense-has its real basis in the wish to alienate in 
acquisition and acquire in alienation. For this desire to be realized it is necessary that the 
desires of commodity owners be directed to one another. Legally this relationships is 
expressed as a contract or an agreement of independent wills. Therefore, contract is one of 
the central concepts of law.67 
The legal relation 
Law, for Stuchka, was not a specific relation but one of a general system of 
relations that perpetuates the interests of the ruling class. Pashukanis criticised this 
approach for portraying social relations and law in general as indistinguishable.68 
Pashukanis posed the question: what makes a social relation "legal"? He 
indicated that exchange relations in general were not necessarily legal; and that laws 
regulating contract are not generated by objective norms:69 
If not a single debtor repaid a debt, then the corresponding rule would have to be regarded 
as actually non-existent and if we wanted nevertheless to affirm its existence we would 
have to fetishize this norm in some way . 
... Law as an objective social phenomenon cannot be exhausted by a nonn or rule, 
whether written or unwritten. A nonn as such, i.e. in its logical content, either is directly 
derived from existing relationships already or, if it is published as statutory law, then it 
presents itself only as a symptom by which one may assess, with some degree of probability, 
the likely emergence of the corresponding relationships in the near future?O 
66 The thrust of the argument lies with Marx's analysis of civil society (On the Jewish Question) and 
the development of commodity fetishism (Capital). 
67 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism in Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism 
and Law, pp. 81-82 
68 Ibid., pp. 61-62 
69 "In material reality a relationship has primacy over a norm," Ibid., p. 63 
70 Ibid. 
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It is clear from this passage that a contract-type relation preceded the legal 
category of "contract". And while the argument is made that the necessary 
ideological reflection of actual contract relations was the perception of equal 
individuals possessing free will, as is demanded by commodity fetishism, we are 
still nevertheless missing the "legal" element in the contract relation. 
Law as a resolution of conflicts 
As we have seen, a prerequisite for the legal relation is that we must be 
ideologically categorised as atomised individuals possessing equal rights. 
Pashukanis asserted that without an objectified force classifying humans as such 
(arising, of course, from the economic conditions of exchange), these relations 
simply would not be legal. He makes two arguments to this extent. The first 
appeared in his critique of Karner (Karl Renner). He argued that Renner erred 
when assuming that legal property is the mere fact of the power of person A over 
object N. Pashukanis contends that this is not a legal quality, the relation is a factual 
one.71 This is a simple point of logic, if one has power over an object (property) then 
it is not a social relationship; and no notion of contract is involved. Since the social 
element is absent, the relationship is not a legal one. The case then arises that only 
when A's possession of object N conflicts with the interests of person B, is a 
possibility of a legal relation established. 
He states, "The basic assumption of legal relation is thus the opposition of 
private interests."72 In a fully developed legal form, this conflict is reflected in an 
individual as a bearer of rights: "the a priori assumptions of legal thought are 
clothed in the flesh and blood of two disputing parties, defending their own 
'rights' ... "73 
71 Ibid., p. 84 
72 Ibid., p. 60 
73 Ibid., p. 59 
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Pashukanis then proceeds to describe how conflicts of this nature arise. Three 
ideological elements allow exchange in capitalism to take place: the party must be 
egoist, must possess free will, all human personalities must be equal.74 First, since 
production is a social phenomena, man cannot be an egoist. Second, our will is not 
free. "People enter these relationships not because they have consciously chosen to 
do so, but because the conditions of production necessitate it."75 Third, all 
personalities are not equal. Yet in order for exchange to occur, we must be 
categorised as such. If exchange did not exist in commodity form, that is if 
production relations resolved the contradiction between egoist and social actor, free 
will and necessity and equality and inequality then a conflict of the above nature 
could not exist: 
We can imagine so extreme a situation as when-except for the two parties entering the 
relationship-no other third force exists capable of establishing a nonn and guaranteeing 
its observation (for instance some contract between the Varangians and the Greeks): the 
relationship remains even here. But one merely needs to imagine the disappearance of a 
party, i.e. of the subject as the bearer of a distinct autonomous interest, and the very 
possibility of a relationship also disappears?6 
Logically, this would indicate that law did not (and would not) exist in any 
non-capitalist societies where the concept of universal bearers of rights was absent. 
Pashukanis argues, however, that historically law appears in various stages of 
development. For instance, in primitive societies it is in embryonic form and is 
barely distinguishable from what he terms as neighbouring spheres (mores, 
religion)?7 In feudal society because notions of rights (privileges) in no way reflect a 
notion of "universal" rights for each and every individual; and society had not 
developed universal exchange, the contrast between public and private were all but 
hidden in feudal forms of law. The contradiction between an individual 
conceptualised as a private person and as a member of political society found in 
capitalism was absent. Hence law was not fully developed?8 
74 Ibid., p. 102 
75 Ibid., p. 51 
76 Ibid., pp. 64-65 
77 Similar to Stuchka's allusion to primitive society. 
78 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, pp. 44-45 
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It is here we arrive at the crux of Pashukanis's entire argument. In order for a 
relation to be legal it must reflect a conflict of private interests; without the category 
of individual private interests represented in rights, the category of law disappears. 
Law, in its ideologically mature form, classifies man as: (1) equal; (2) possessing free 
will and rights; and (3) an egoistic individual. The concrete relations that produced 
this superstructure is the process of exchange where: (1) all commodities are equal in 
terms of abstract value; (2) all labour becomes socially useful labour; and (3) all 
individuals are equal.79 Law historically arose because of the contradiction between 
the perception of individuals as isolated beings who are equal and possess free will 
and the concrete reality of individuals as social beings, unequal and responding to 
necessities created by the act of living (directly reflected in the mode of production). 
While ideologically individuals are egoistic and isolated, their interests are 
really sociaL "Free and equal commodity owners meeting in the market place are 
free and equal only in the abstract relationship between buyer and seller. In actual 
life they are tied to each other by many relationships of dependence."80 The 
dynamics of capitalist relations cause class conflict rather than a clash of individual 
private interests. Law in the abstract realm becomes a standard for arbitration 
between clashes of individual interests. In the concrete realm it is the protection of 
the subjective interests of the ruling class enforced by the state. 
79 Bob Fine criticises Pashukanis for epitomising legal relationships in the process of exchange rather 
than production in "Law and class" in Capitalism and the Rule of Law, eds., Bob Fine, et al. 
(London: Hutchinson, 1979) pp. 29-45, esp. 33-37 and also Democracy and the Rule of Law (London: 
Pluto Press, 1984) pp. 155-169. Also Paul Q. Hirst, On Law and Ideology (New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1979) pp. 106-122 for a summary of Pashukanis's argument and pp. 153-176 for a critique. 
Along similar lines see also Sol Picciotto, "The theory of the state, class struggle and the rule of 
law" in Capitalism and the Rule of Law, p. 170 and Warrington's "Pashukanis and the 
Commodity Form Theory" in Legality, Ideology and The State, pp. 51-53. Warrington also 
criticises Pashukanis on other points, namely that his theory of commodity and law only applies 
to petty commodity production (pp. 53-54); he excludes coercion from his definition of law (pp. 54-
55); legal systems have tried to address imbalances in social relations, e.g. in landlord/tenant 
relations (pp. 55-57); he misinterprets Marx (pp. 57-58); and Pashukanis argues for a penal system 
when he appears to be advocating its abolishment (pp. 61-62). For a response to Warrington see 
Alan Norrie, "Pashukanis and the 'Commodity Form Theory': A Reply to Warrington" in 
International Journal of Sociology, Vol. 10, No.4 (November, 1982) pp. 419-437. 
80 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 98 
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Law and the state 
Pashukanis questions how, if the state arises from class struggle and the 
ruling class is in power, it is that the state appears "above" society as an objective 
force? Ideological forms can indeed mask concrete forms but, nevertheless, real 
social situations lie at their foundation. The ideological form of objectivity relies 
upon the abstract notion that wills are free. If they are not regarded as free, then the 
entire foundation of the "free and equal market place" is undermined. State 
authority must appear as "collective will" because otherwise it is a blatant 
contradiction of free will. Authority is thus expressed in the objective legal norm.81 
norm: 
The categorisation of individuals distinguishes a legal norm from any other 
... the norm itself, as a prescription of what is required, constitutes the elements of morality, 
aesthetics and technology as much as law. 
The legal order is distinguished from every other social order in that it comprises 
isolated, private subjects. A nonn of law acquires differentia specifica ... because it 
presupposes a person endowed with a right and actively asserting it.82 
According to Pashukanis, bourgeois jurists focus solely on the independent parties 
represented in court, and ignore economic relations.83 They omit the concrete 
relations that produce the corresponding superstructure, and consequently ignore 
the fact that equality does not exist in social reality: 
The personality of the proletarian is 'in principle equal' to the personality of a capitalist; 
this finds its expression in the fact of the 'free' contract of employment. But for the 
proletarian this very 'material freedom' means the possibility of quietly dying of 
starvation.84 
In accordance with Marxist legal theorists of this time, Pashukanis asserts that 
all bourgeois legal theory falls into two large categories, that of natural law and that 
of positive law (normativists, formalists, functionalists, etc.). Both types of theorists 
analyse law only from an abstract perspective. The natural lawyers wrongly 
envision law as a perpetual form of regulation whose norms stem not from social 
81 Ibid., pp. 94-96 
82 Ibid., p. 72 
83 Ibid., p. 67 
84 Ibid., p. 105 
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relation, but some a priori source (nature, God). He praises the positivist approach 
which at least acknowledges an abstract connection between the norm and the 
society from which it arose. The positivists, however, mistakenly classify the 
totality of norms as an II objective" force. In reality, Pashukanis argues, the actual 
relation of two parties is the objective element, not the norm which categorises it. 
For this reason, "law as a totality of norms is no more than a lifeless abstraction" .85 
Pashukanis's antagonism toward the normative/formalist school (e.g. Kelsen) 
resembles Stuchka's claim: namely that it is a method of formal logic completely 
divorced from reality. Similarly, the psychological school reduces law to individual 
perceptions, ignoring any real relations that give rise to it.86 
Since bourgeois jurists formulated definitions of law only on the 
superstructural level, they arrived at a definition of law which required an objective 
source for adjudication. This source was encompassed in the state and legal 
institutions. Coercion by the state, therefore became legitimised as enforcing 
objective norms. These norms, however, actually emanate from the unequal and 
alienated relations of economic subjects. In reality, objective norms were not being 
reinforced, but the production relations themselves. Theories of punishment, 
therefore, encompassed the principle of equivalence as well. 
Equivalence and punishment 
Pashukanis maintains that, historically, the eqUivalence principle in 
punishment evolved with the practice of retribution.87 He asserts that, although 
retribution existed long before capitalism, only in commodity fetishism is the 
principle of equivalence realised to its fullest degree.88 
85 Ibid., p. 62 
86 Ibid., p. 57 
87 Ibid., pp. 111-112 
88 Recall that only in capitalism is society in a state where individuals are universally and abstractly 
equal (as opposed to secularised as in feudalism). 
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Pashukanis depicts crime in two aspects: (1) the harm done to the victim; and 
(2) the breach of a norm. It is easy to see the principle of equivalence in the first case, 
but what of the latter? He classifies "the breach of norms" as the abstract violation 
of public interest. Therefore, punishment is meted out according to the harm done 
to the individual victim and the general public. This dual nature of punishment 
reflects the dual nature of capitalist society: namely isolated individuals placed in an 
abstract whole.89 
The process of retribution contradicts the goal of punishment: that of 
protecting society. 
Imagine for a minute that the court is actually occupied only with the consideration of how 
to change the conditions of life of a given person-in order to protect society from him-and 
the very meaning of the word punishment evaporates.90 
Pashukanis points out that in modern criminal law, responsibility is a key 
factor; punishment is heaviest for pre-meditated intent, less heavy for negligent 
actions and lenient towards those who bear no responsibility (e.g. insane people). 
He suggest that if punishment is replaced with Behandlung ("method of 
influence"), a legally neutral medical-pedagogical concept, very different results are 
reached. The "criminals" with no sense of responsibility would require the most 
attention. Punishment seeks to determine the proportional compensation rather 
than the corresponding measures taken towards the goal of protecting society. 
Proportional payment for crimes occurs in two forms, that of monetary 
remuneration and that of loss of freedom, but they are both equalised in terms of 
labour time (in the case of money, the loss of the labour time expended earning 
money; and in terms of deprivation of freedom, denial of labour time in general). 
Under circumstances where this universal measure of equivalence is absent, 
punishment ceases to be legal. 
The criminal answers for the crime with his freedom which is proportional to the gravity 
of what he has done. This idea of responsibility is unnecessary when punishment is 
89 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 117 
90 Ibid., p. 117 
liberated from the character of equivalence; and when no remnant of this remains, 
punishment ceases to be punishment in the legal sense of the word.91 
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Although some bourgeois jurists have recognised the contradiction between 
imprisonment and fines and the goal of protection of society, they cannot change 
the material circumstances from which punishment arose: 
... the contradiction between the rational goal of the protection of society-or the re-
education of the criminal-and the principle of equivalence of punishment, exists not in 
textbooks and theories but in life itself, in judicial practice, in the social structure itself. 
Similarly, the contradiction between the fact of the bond of social labour as such, and the 
inconvenient form of expression of this fact in the value of commodities, exists not in theory, 
and not in books, but in social practice itself.92 
Principles of crime and punishment, as well as ideologies of law arise from 
commodity fetishism; in this economic system, law, crime and punishment can 
only be defined in terms of equivalence.93 In order to alter them, one must alter 
material conditions. 
Law in socialism 
The primary goal of the socialist revolution was to change the mode of 
production and consequentially the accompanying social relations. As has been 
stated, theorists realised that there would be a delay before "the old ways" were 
completely changed. Pashukanis was no exception. 
Marx assumed that during the transition period human relations would be 
limited by the "narrow horizons of bourgeois laws". Pashukanis interprets this 
statement to mean that in socialism the means of production will be owned by the 
proletariat and there will be no exchange of products for profit. Hence products will 
not be in commodity form. Labour will not be embodied in individual 
commodities but will produce for society as a whole.94 Distribution of these goods, 
nevertheless, will still be determined by labour contribution. The equivalence 
91 Ibid., p. 119 
92 Ibid., p. 121 
93 Peter Young critiques Pashukanis's arguments on punishment in "Punishment and Social 
Organisation" in Essays in Law and Society, eds., Zenon Bankowski and Geoff Mungham (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) pp. 114-118. 
94 See Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme. 
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principle will still permeate social relations as long as products are distributed in 
direct proportion to labour time. 
Since social relations initially will correspond to the distribution principle of 
commodity exchange (equivalence), law exists in bourgeois form in socialism. In 
the final stage of communism, however, labour time is not exchanged directly for 
an equal amount of another form of labour (products), but the old adage of working 
to one's ability and receiving what one needs evolves. At this stage, the form of 
equivalence desists and consequently, the legal form vanishes. 
Once the form of the equivalent relationship exists, this means that the form of law exists, 
that the form of public, i.e. state authority exists, which therefore remains for a period 
even when classes no longer exist. The complete withering away of state and law will be 
accomplished, in Marx's opinion, only when 'labour has ceased to be a means of life and has 
become life's prime want', when productive forces have expanded with the all-round 
development of the individual, when everyone labours voluntarily in accordance with his 
own abilities, or, as Lenin says, 'when the individual does not calculate with the 
heartlessness of a Shylock whether he has worked half an hour longer than anyone else', in 
a word, when the form of equivalent relations will be finally overcome.95 
By linking the development of rights and law to the emergence of the 
commodity form which embodies exchange relations and the principle of 
equivalence, Pashukanis shifts the emphasis of law from class interests to the 
commodity form itself. Once this conclusion was drawn, the belief in socialist law 
as a "new" form of law was an impossibility. He firmly made the claim that Soviet 
law was indeed of the same essence as bourgeois law, differing only in specific form 
and content. 
Since the mode of production enabling commodity fetishism was being 
eliminated in Russia, law was also in the processes of decay. As long as the principle 
of "equal labour for equal products" was still in operation, however, the legal form 
would endure. The total absence of the commodity form-both in production and 
distribution-will precipitate the disappearance of law. "The withering away of the 
categories of bourgeois law will under these conditions signify the withering away of 
95 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 47 
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law in general [my emphasis], i.e. the gradual disappearance of the juridic element 
in human relationships."96 
As products cease to be commodities, relations no longer assume a legal 
form.97 If there is no legal relation in communism, what form will regulation 
assume? 
Regulation in communism 
Pashukanis places the distinction between law and regulation in terms of 
technical rules. In general, technical rules reflect a unity of purpose and are derived 
from necessity, laws reflect a premise of opposition of interests. He uses the 
example of medical treatment. While "norms" are involved in the roles of the 
patient and the medical personnel, they are technical in nature, for both doctor and 
patient aspire towards recovery-which requires certain necessary measures; eve n 
to the point that coercion is used. 
But so long as this coercion is considered from the perspective of the same single purpose 
(both for rulers and ruled) [my emphasis], it remains solely a technically expedient act. 
Within these limits the content and rules is established by medical science and is altered 
by its progress. There is nothing here for the lawyer to do.98 
Pashukanis's differentiation between state /legal coercion and other types of 
authoritative regulation indicate the possibility for coercion in communism, 
although probably not termed as such. The key factor is a unity of purpose based on 
necessity. He also indicates that both parties must be in agreement to the goal and 
requisite necessary steps. In this case, authority is one of necessity (rather than 
force).99 Rules become the requirements to achieve an agreed upon goaL 
Pashukanis does imply, however, that coercion may be necessary in the event that 
society is threatened by a "dangerous member": 
Coercion, as a measure of defense, is an act of pure expediency and as such may be regulated 
by technical rules. These rules may be more or less complex depending upon whether the 
96 Ibid., p. 46 
97 Ibid., p. 55 
98 Ibid., p. 60 
99 Engels makes the same argument in "On Authority". See Chapter four. 
purpose is the mechanical elimination of a dangerous member of society, or his correction; 
but in any event these rules reflect clearly and simply the objective society has set itself.100 
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Coercion, in this sense, is not connected to the element of punishment, and 
implies agreement by all parties.101 "Force" is to be used only in the case of 
protection and does not involve the notion of retribution. He recognises that some 
progressive bourgeois criminologists portray crime as a "medical-pedagogical task" 
the solution of which does not require the jurist. He points out, though, that the 
actual transcendence to effectuate the elimination of judges and criminal codes 
cannot take place in capitalism for the necessary material relations are absent.102 
Pashukanis contends that social relations in communist production will be 
simplified: "Attempts to depict a social function as it really is, i.e. simply a social 
function, and a norm merely as an organising rule, mean the extinction of the legal 
form."103 We have seen that for Pashukanis the pivot point for a legal relation is 
the categorisation of an individual as an egoistic legal subject who posses certain 
rights and obligations. In order for a law to become a regulation this categorisation 
and the economic relations that produced it must be absent. Under these 
conditions, the legal conflict between individual and social evaporates.104 He 
illustrates this point in describing primitive societies as societies where only with 
difficulty can legal form be separated from normal social forms.lOS 
In a society where production priorities rely solely on need and not profit, 
relations revolve around a unity of purpose, not a struggle for private interests. The 
regulation necessary for production to continue will not assume an externally 
coercive form (the state), but will be a matter of technical expediency. 
100 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 124 
101 Pashukanis does not address what would happen in the event that the "dangerous member" would 
not agree to "mechanical elimination" from society (or to any other proposed course of action). 
This issue is discussed in Chapter four, COMPLEXmES OF REGULA TrON, Violence. 
102 For a critique of Pashukanis's penal theory see Warrington, pp. 62-63 and for a response see Norrie, 
pp.430-434. 
103 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 73 
104 Ibid., p. 74 
lOS Ibid., p. 44 
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Although it can be seen in Pashukanis's theory that socialist production 
relations would create a large amount of "unity of purpose" and therefore engage 
not conflict but technical expediency, there still remain areas where individual 
conflict would arise. It is also not clear exactly which social practices would become 
necessary to maintain cooperation to the degree that the society can function, nor, 
exactly, how social goals are to be determined. Of these issues, Pashukanis, as the 
others, speaks rarely. He does indicate, however, that conflicts are not necessarily 
legal matters; and a society that retains equivalence notions of law and all that it 
entails is compelled to preserve the category of law. 
Only proceeding on this basis is it possible to understand why a whole series of other social 
relationships assume a legal form. But therefore to conclude that courts or laws will 
always remain, or that even under maximum economic prosperity certain crimes against the 
person etc. will not disappear, is on the contrary to identify secondary and derivative 
elements as the main and basic.106 
What is important here is actual personal conflicts of interests are different 
from the ideological forms of private conflicts of interests and their resolution (law 
and the legal process). In capitalist society, real conflict was fought in terms of class 
conflict. Pashukanis emphasises that individual "rights" are an abstract concept-a 
notion that could only arise where in fact citizens were not individuals, but things 
operating in an environment where all were equalised. What is not abstract is the 
social bond in which humans engage during production. In communism, where 
ideology and concrete circumstance are not contradictory, individual rights solely as 
an abstract concept no longer exists. This point is made most clear by Pashukanis in 
his discussions of bourgeois morality. 
Morality107 
Pashukanis also relates bourgeois morality with commodity fetishism. 
" ... egoism, freedom and the supreme value of the personality, are inextricably 
bound up with each other, appearing as a totality to be the rational expression of one 
106 Ibid., p. 48 
107 Ibid., pp. 101-109 
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in the same social relationship."108 He connects the principle of equivalence to 
Kant's categorical imperative, in that it is strictly vindicated because of its 
universality. He explains that because the categorical imperative disregards any 
natural or organic ties between humans, moral law appears to be above individuals. 
When individuals have close emotional ties which erase the boundaries of the I, then the 
phenomenon of moral obligation may not occur. To understand this latter category it is 
necessary to proceed not from the organic connection which exists, for instance, between cow 
and the calf, or between the tribe and each of its members, but from the condition of 
alienation.109 
Ethics assumes the superstructural representation of commodity fetishism. 
Pashukanis suggests that ethics, like law, will lose its distinctiveness in socialist 
production relations. 
To eliminate the ambiguity of the ethical form would mean to effect the transition to a 
planned social economy, and this would mean to realize a system in which people can think 
and construct their relationships using simple and clear concepts such as harm and benefit. 
To eliminate the ambiguity of the ethical form in the most essential area (in the area of 
material social existence) means to destroy this form altogether.1l0 
The above would seem to indicate a penchant towards utilitarian principles. 
But for Pashukanis, this inclination is only a moral one in egoistic society. 
Measures of harm and benefit become practical rational solutions to given 
problems. Keeping in mind previous points of unity of purpose and agreement of 
method, utilitarianism really loses its distinctiveness. 
necessary are not moral choices.11l 
Actions that become 
As regulation transcends the legal form; consciousness transcends morality: 
If the conscious link to a class is in fact so powerful that the borders of the 'I' are, so to 
speak, erased, and the advantage of the class actually merges with personal advantage, 
then there is no sense in speaking of fulfilment of moral duty. In general, the phenomena of 
morality is then absent.112 
During the transition period, Pashukanis maintains that there will be a 
"proletarian morality" much as there is "proletarian law". The collective will exert 
108 Ibid., p. 102 
109 Ibid., p. 104 
110 Ibid., p. 105 
111 Andrew Fraser makes the point that Pashukanis ignores the moral content of consciousness in "The 
Legal Theory We Need Now", Socialist Review, Vol. 40, No.1 (July-October, 1978) pp. 154-159. 
112 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, p. 106 
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moral pressure on members in order to motivate them in their moral duty. But 
these duties are categorised as "moral" only in the absence of an external force (e.g. a 
statute). Pashukanis distinguishes morality / ethics from law in that morality 
requires an "inner obligation" whereas it is immaterial to bourgeois legality 
whether this internal obligation is present. As long as the law is not broken, the law 
is satisfied, regardless of internal deliberations. Therefore, bourgeois legal obligation 
does not necessarily require moral obligation.113 In the event that there is no law 
and no external motivating factor (force), Pashukanis points out that the category of 
"ethical" would lose its meaning. In a society where there only was internal 
obligation, the distinct category of "moral" would be superfluous.114 
Summary 
Pashukanis's arguments lead to the conclusion that the forms of 
morality flaw / custom/norm simply lose their separate character when the 
ideological need for abstract, equal individuals disappears. If, in concrete relations, 
rights become irrelevant, then it becomes unnecessary to have laws enforcing them. 
Add this to the fact that there is no external force and bourgeois jurisprudence 
becomes even more irrelevant. Pashukanis does indicate that the contents of some 
morals / laws / norms / customs may become rules if they are deemed necessary to 
social organisation. Regulation thus reflects the notion that rules are dictated by 
necessity. As to the further details of regulation, Pashukanis did not elaborate them. 
He did indicate, similar to the theorists examined thus far, that: (1) there will be no 
external force; and (2) no separate and objective body meting out punishment in a 
retributive sense; (3) conflict of class interests is replaced by unity of purpose; (4) 
113 Of course much of the pOSitivist debate focuses exactly on this problem. Attempts have been made 
to formulate some type of minimal qualifications on the legitimacy of law (notably Hart). 
Pashukanis is only referring here to law in operation. Once a law is established, it is immaterial 
why the law was obeyed, whether it be internal conviction or external force. 
114 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism, pp. 107-109 
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regulation does not assume a coercive role but one of necessary authority; and (5) 
personal conflicts are no longer expressed in legal form. 
The description of such a system stimulates a plethora of questions, but 
Pashukanis never reached the circumstances that demanded further development 
of these notions. In fact, elements of his theory posed major obstacles to the path 
along which the Soviet state was proceeding. 
The depth of analysis present in Pashukanis's The General Theory of Law, 
contributes greatly to Marx and Engels' initial arguments. By focusing purely on the 
legal relation as derived from economic ones, he elucidates clearly by derivation of 
the equivalence principle how the two are related through the theory of commodity 
fetishism. Because of his theoretical acumen and depth, he has gained wide 
recognition in the West as the Marxist legal theorist and few look beyond him for 
contributions in this area of study.l1S One other theorist, however, deserves 
examination. 
REISNER-AN ANOMALY 
M. A. Reisner reiterates many of the themes already explored in depth by 
Stuchka and Pashukanis. He does present, however, and interesting variation of 
the theoretical premise of the previous two writers in that he emphasises the 
intuitive quality of law and contends that because of this intuitive quality, law may 
be present in communism. The fact that he was willing to admit to the existence of 
law in communism (hence, to the perpetuity of law) earned him the title of idealist, 
and cast him out of the mainstream of legal thought at the time. His argument is, 
however, worth a brief examination. 
115 See previously mentioned articles such as: Arthur, Introduction to Law and Marxism; Fraser, "The 
Legal Theory We Need Now"; Beirne and Sharlet, "Pashukanis and Socialist Legality", 
Warrington, "Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory", Robert Sharlet's "Pashukanis and 
the Withering Away of Law in the U .S5.R.If 
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Reisner approaches law from the intuitive / psychological basis expressed by 
Petrazhitskii.116 Although by no means accepting Petrazhitskii's analysis, nor 
counting it as part of the revolutionary heritage, he accepts the premise that law is 
an experience and becomes incorporated in the /I emotional life of man," which, 
according to Reisner, largely develops from ideological forms that are derived from 
environmental conditions. Law, therefore, becomes not a product of rational 
discourse, but rather is subordinate completely to external circumstances that are 
beyond the control of any organisation. Positivistic classification reflects such a 
phenomenon only to a small degree. Because Petrazhitskii places law in the realm 
of individual experience, and individual experience depends on a host of 
circumstances (age, disposition, social environment), he reaches the conclusion that 
116 Alexander Peczenik sums up Petrazhitskii beautifully. I quote at length. (The variance in spelling 
is due to different transliteration methods.): 
Petrazycki's psychology was based on a new classification of psychical phenomena. Apart from 
feeling, knowing, and willing, there exist so-called impulsions. They are active-passive. An 
example is hunger: it is felt (passively), while at the same time one wants to eat (actively). 
Especially interesting are the so-called ethical impulsions, which are further divided into moral 
and legal ones. Moral impulsions consist of the "feeling" that one has a duty, combined with an 
active, let us say, "readiness" to do one's duty. Legal impulsions consist of the same "feeling" and 
"readiness", combined with the "feeling" that some one else has a right to the duty being done. If 
I feel that I ought to give a beggar a dime, this is a moral impulsion. If I feel that I ought to give 
my creditor one hundred dollars and that my creditor has a right to receive one hundred dollars, 
this is a legal impulsion. One can thus experience two kinds of legal impulsions: one's own rights 
in connection with another person's duties, or vice versa: one's own duties in connection with 
another person's rights . 
... Legal impulsions are the only legal phenomena upon which an adequate theory can be built. 
Therefore, a correct legal theory must be a psychological one. Petrazycki also infers a 
terminological conclusion from this: legal impulsions are the only real phenomena which may be 
called "the law" in the scientific meaning of the word. If the term "the law" is extended to 
apply to something else, for example, the statutes, then the term cannot be used in an adequate 
theory of law. 
Legal rules and norms are nothing more than "impulsive phantasmata" which serve to express 
legal impulsions without actually describing anything else. 
Legal impulsions can be studied and described by means of introspection. This implies that an 
observer can only study his own legal impulsions. With regard to the legal impulsions of others, 
he can offer an opinion only by means of analogy to his own . 
... The official "valid law" has the same psychical nature as the rules of games and various 
other social rules. The theory of the so-called valid law can thus be a part of the broader theory 
of the so-called attributively imperative impulsions, that is, the impulsions of rights and duties. 
Gangsters' impulsions concerning their "rights" in a gang, as well as children's impulsions 
concerning their "rights" in a game, are "law" by Petracycki's definition and should thus be 
studied within the same legal theory as the "official law" as understood by the lawyer. ["Leon 
Petrazycki and the Post-Realistic Jurisprudence" in Sociology and Jurisprudence of Leon 
Petrazycki (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975) pp. 83-84.] 
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law is not static, but malleable in form. As a Marxist, Reisner naturally dismisses 
the premise that law is the experience of an isolated individual, but embraces the 
notion that law might be a collective experience. He then proceeds from the 
premise that law is adaptable to the given circumstances of a particular group (from 
a Marxist perspective these groups are of course classes) and is directly embraced by 
the consciousness of this particular group. Thus Reisner's theory melds intuitive 
law with class law to arrive at intuitive class law. The existence of intuitive class 
law explains directly the notion of "revolutionary legal consciousness" that was 
used to such a great extent by revolutionary legal policy makers.117 
Reisner argues that law, in essence, exists even before any statutes may reflect 
such a reality (as was the case in the early days of Bolshevik power).118 Society is 
thus comprised of classes, who possess separate legal consciousnesses. 
The appearance of class society places a sharp imprint upon the legal structure. Law 
develops into the separate ideological systems of class groups, and thereafter each of them 
takes its own separate course. Accordingly as long ago as the division of society into feudal 
classes, we find the building of as many laws as there are feudal classes-and not the 
construction of a single law.H9 
Reisner then argues that as society evolved into the universality of capitalist 
production, so emerged a general legal order that incorporated varying principles 
arising from the classes of which it was comprised. For instance, Reisner suggests 
that the peasant law of communality can be seen in the structure of bourgeois 
economy via collective economic enterprises such as joint ventures. Similarly, 
Reisner claims the proletarian class already had class law under capitalism which 
can be reflected in the bourgeois superstructure in the form of labour legislation. 
Despite the amalgamation of separate class laws, the law of the dominant class 
overall prevails. He describes a situation of competing legal systems where the 
victor is whichever class is in power. Elements from all these legal systems, 
however, can be present to some degree in the general legal structure. 
117 Reisner, M.A., et al., Our Law, Foreign Law, General Law (1925) in Soviet Legal Philosophy, pp. 
83-86 
118 Ibid., p. 87 
119 Ibid., p. 95 
Under the cover of this natural law of the bourgeoisie, however, the development of a new 
grouping goes on, and even while private capital is still dominant, the proletariat creates 
its own class law, which is embodied to a certain extent in worker legislation. Thus the 
bourgeois legal order-under the covering of a single law of the bourgeoisi~mbraces en 
the one hand the remnants of the old class law of vast holdings of land and peasantry, and 
on the other hand the new law of the worker class which is coming to take the place of the 
bourgeoisie itself and its legal order.120 
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For Reisner, the socialist revolution occasioned the elevation of proletarian 
class law to the dominant position. Components of other class laws, namely the 
peasants and the bourgeoisie, are also incorporated to some degree in the proletarian 
general legal system. Thus he explains how the socialist legal order may retain 
some remnants of the bourgeois legal order. 
Reisner does affirm that there is a general definition of law that embodies all 
the varying types. First, the basis of law is economic: "Where there is no economy, 
there is no law ... "121 Class affiliation manifests itself through the roles of particular 
members in production. The relations generated here provide the groundwork for 
class consciousness to evolve. In this way he claims that, "law is the result of 
economic relationships -and in particular production relationships." 122 
Reisner firmly claims that law exists in all societies. He cites a passage from 
Marx stating that each form of production has its own set of social relations. If law is 
based on economic relations then law exists wherever there is economy; and where 
there is no economy there is no society.123 
Reisner seeks to further distinguish law from other ideological forms such as 
morality, philosophy, religion, etc. He states that what differentiates the legal form 
from other ideological forms rests with the fact that the legal ideology, as a 
component of the superstructure, reflects production relations in terms of inequality 
or equality (in essence, justice).124 He then proceeds along familiar Marxist lines 
explaining that with the evolution of the principle of equality came the 
120 Ibid., p. 96 
121 Ibid., p. 97 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., pp. 98-99 
124 Ibid., p. 103 
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development of law. He concurs with Pashukanis in that law reached its 
maturation with the apex of civil equality attained in capitalism. This civil equality, 
however, was a mirage. Economic disparity simply could not produce equality in 
reality. He argues that even in socialism this equality exists in terms of equal labour 
for equal products. In communism, however, individuality is fully reflected. He 
argues that for true equality to exist individuals must be "unequal." Only when 
society is at a stage when one works according to abilities and receives according to 
need, then equality in terms of individuality in reality exists. Hence the need for 
the superstructural definition of "equal" or "right" will vanish.125 
The third factor distinguishing legal relations from others is that it pertains to 
conflict. 
We have more than once already been capable of the conviction that the source of law and 
of legal regulation is the collision of interests embodied in a definite demand or importunity 
that is built upon an invocation of equality. Consequently, it is always a protest raised by a 
certain living social force which feels a pressure upon itself in the character of an 
injustice.126 
In short his definition of law entails four principles: (1) it is an ideological 
form that is intuitive in nature; (2) its roots are in economic relations; (3) it is 
couched in terms of inequality and equality; (4) it is manifested in terms of conflict. 
He then poses the question: "Does this mean that when the narrow horizon 
of bourgeois law is abandoned every sort of law will disappear as well?"127 The 
ideological form of law in communism may be "from each according to his abilities 
to each according to his needs." However, by its own definition, this will not 
actually be law. It is at this point that Reisner returns to the intuitive premise. Law 
is an ideological form, not a technical objective form describing relations, which 
means that it is internalised, and becomes part of a person's emotional make-up. 
Because it is ideological in form and subject to conscious considerations, it contains 
the potential of perversion and distinction from material circumstances. Put more 
125 Ibid., pp. 103-107 
126 Ibid., p. 108 
127 Ibid., pp. 107-108 
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simply, the reality of economic equality requires also a consciousness which 
embodies that principle. The process is an active one. An ideological form is 
therefore necessary to reinforce what bound the proletarian class together in the first 
place, namely that a collective production system that provides for the individual 
and unequal interests of person x, y, and z is in their individual best interest. The 
development of planned economy is guaranteed by the subjective realisation that it 
is in one's best interest. Since communist production methods eliminate the 
material preconditions for conflict, law will disappear in the objective sense. What 
is left, however, is the subjective realisation of why law is not necessary. 
Reisner does not provide a comprehensive theory of law; very little is 
mentioned of the role of law in the transition period, nor of what regulation might 
involve in communism. Even his small contribution to Marxist legal thought was 
ridiculed by Pashukanis and Stuchka. His critics focused primarily on the fact that 
his approach seemed encompassed by idealism; the importance he placed on 
ideology seemed contrary to materialism. From a Stalinist perspective, the 
acknowledgement of separate legal systems under Soviet authority directly 
threatened the monopolistic power of the state. 
Reisner does provide a distinct contribution to this field of legal study in that 
his primary focus is the relevance of the internalisation of law. Also, Reisner 
assigns fundamental (as opposed to secondary) importance to the development of a 
legal consciousness. Without an attitudinal maturation, the execution of the 
principle from each according to his abilities to each according to his needs is not 
possible. Without the complete internalisation of "law", the possibility of a society 
without "law" becomes remote. 
ANALYSIS 
The material surveyed in this chapter contributes much to a fuller picture of 
regulation both through direct exegesis and by enabling a more thorough theoretical 
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explanation of the operations of the People's Courts. A more comprehensive 
understanding of the notion of regulation, however, also draws attention to 
questions as yet unanswered. Thus the theorists provide both a deeper 
understanding of regulation and create a framework within which to address 
further theoretical issues. 
The People's Courts revisited 
Stuchka bases his entire model on Marx's notion of class conflict. The roots of 
class conflict proceed from a production structure that embodies a contradiction in 
purpose (namely producing profit and providing for need). As a result, classes 
become representative of opposing interests which leads to: (1) an ideological need 
for an "objective" mediator; and (2) the need for one class to dominate another. 
Within this analysis bourgeois law and proletarian law are cut from the same cloth. 
Classes are extinguished through a complete revolution of the process of production 
because the conflict of purpose present in capitalism ceases. At this point the need 
for law, as defined by Stuchka, no longer exists. 
Stuchka's rather basic explanation of the role and function of law can be 
observed directly in the People's Courts. While capitalist legal ideology may not 
portray courts as "class courts", Stuchka argues that in reality they are. The People's 
Courts were from inception conceived as class courts whose role was to rule society 
according to proletarian principles. Such a role directly mirrors the role of capitalist 
courts whose function is to sustain bourgeois values. 
Although essentially the same institution in nature, the proletarian courts 
differ significantly from capitalist ones in that their ideological content changes. 
While capitalist courts perform their legal functions within the concept of 
"objective mediator", the People's Courts initially sought to perform their functions 
within the purview of total class bias. In essence, the courts sought to dismantle the 
notion that people are equal, and in doing so tried to remove the dichotomy 
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between "concrete" and "abstract". Revealing the courts as what they actually are, 
mechanisms of class power, would allow concrete conditions to be reflected 
ideologically. 
The courts however, developed away from the premise people are not equal. 
Such a development is observed through the gradual formalisation of legal 
procedure. The courts became more centralised and unified in terms of sentencing, 
case investigation, court procedures and personnel. There was a concerted effort 
from the Commissar of Justice to make procedures and sentencing consistent so that 
like cases should be treated similarly. Such developments caused the People's 
Courts to resemble capitalist courts to a further degree by maintaining that people 
should be "equal" before the law. Stuchka's theory would suggest that because 
classes still existed and because production had not been completed revolutionised, 
capitalist legal ideology, such as the principle of equality, would still exist, despite 
initial ideological efforts to change it. Without the concrete economic circumstances 
to accompany ideological elements, the courts were bound to fail. Such an 
explanation was taken up by Pashukanis in more detailed form. 
Pashukanis' greatest contribution to a Marxist legal theory was his 
formulation of the equivalence principle. All citizens are equalised and objectified 
in the production process via the role they fulfil through things (commodities). 
This role is mirrored in civil society through the creation of the classification of 
"juridic person"-an isolated individual possessing equal rights and obligations. 
When these individual persons come into conflict, "law" is used to decide which set 
of rights and obligations "wins". Concomitantly, punishment takes the form of 
monetary compensation "paid" to the "winner". This compensation principle 
applies both to civil law-in the form of fines, and criminal law-usually in the 
form of lost labour time (incarceration). People thus become quantifiable in that 
their "crimes" are evaluated strictly in commodity form. The contradiction of the 
classification of citizens as individual economic agents while in reality production is 
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social is also reflected in the legal realm. Law's stated purpose, to resolve conflict, 
contradicts its actual purpose which is in essence to determine compensation. He 
points out that law often does not resolve the conflict merely compensates for the 
result of certain actions. Hence for Pashukanis, when capitalist exchange relations 
are completely eliminated, the need for law is also eliminated. 
Pashukanis admits that some bourgeois jurists recognise the treatment aspect 
of punishment, but he stipulates that as long as capitalist production relations still 
continue, punishment could only take the compensatory form. Any progress 
towards a treatment of criminals would have to be made in the environment of a 
new production system. Under a socialist production method capitalist economic 
relations would cease. If material survival did not proportionally correspond to 
labour time, as in communism, then the notion of compensation would become 
outdated. Treatment of the /I criminal" or the solution of disputes would become 
the goals of a regulatory system in such an environment. 
To provide an example to illustrate the difference between a compensatory 
system and a resolutory one: A man was riding a bicycle on a dangerous road. He 
was hit by a car. The driver was speeding, and faulty road construction made a quick 
stop difficult. Due to the structure of the road, visibility was severely impaired. He 
was hospitalised and the doctor declared he would be lucky if he ever walked again. 
The man was awarded $12,000 by the courts. This money did not even cover his 
medical costs. When asked what he thought was fair compensation, he answered 
while nothing would take away his suffering, at least medical costs should be 
covered. He was further asked that if he did not lose any material wealth by either 
lack of time at work or by payment of medical costs, then what would be fair 
compensation? He replied that he would be satisfied if the woman was 
reprimanded for speeding and, most importantly, the road was fixed.128 The two 
responses clearly exemplify the difference between compensatory and resolutory 
128 Personal interview, May, 1994. Name withheld for privacy. 
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approaches to conflicts. In the first instance, material compensation was the 
primary focus of the legal evaluation; whereas, without the precept of reparation, 
the repair of the road became the priority. 
Such an explanation sheds great light on the formation and development of 
the People's Courts. The courts were established in the transition period where 
capitalist distribution methods prevailed, thus law would still entail compensation. 
Pashukanis argues that it would be impossible for a legal system to break away from 
the equivalence principle as long as capitalist economic relations, either distributive 
or productive, remained. The Russian situation created an interesting problem: in 
one direction the People's Courts were trying to move towards conflict resolution; 
on the other hand, they were still entangled with compensation issues. 
This dichotomy led to some of the difficulties the leaders in the Ministry of 
Justice faced, such as Stuchka's early concern regarding the lack of training of those 
involved in the courts. Lenin (and Marx and Engels) claimed that the demise of 
capitalist social relations would drastically simplify the legal process.129 Stuchka 
agreed that the simplification of social relations (and consequently the law) was 
essential to a popularly controlled court. Until the time that socialist production 
relations actually had developed and been realised in the consciousness of the 
populace, he was reluctant to relinquish the powers of the court to the populace at 
large. If the sole purpose of the court, however, was to resolve conflicts (as opposed 
to deciding "fair" compensation), it can be argued that expertise may not be such a 
problem. For instance, the case of Nesterenko, where the railway was ordered to pay 
his wages until a social insurance system was introduced, would not arise as a legal 
matter under communist production relations. First of all, Nesterenko would 
sustain no material loss for his injury. The purpose of bringing the case before an 
arbitration institution would be only be to aid in negotiation or confrontation 
129 It must be remembered it was still "law" at this point. 
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between the attendant and Nesterenko. The laws regarding liability would be non-
existent, and hence would require no "lawyer" to have knowledge of them. 
Similarly, although Kurskii sought to preserve the freedom of the courts in 
dealing with citizen complaints, he was also disturbed by the lack of uniformity both 
in terms of punishment and decisions. Judges from different regions were 
prescribing widely-varying solutions for similar situations. It was thought that 
without more structure, the inconsistency problem would only increase. 
Inconsistency becomes a problem, however, primarily when compensation is 
involved. For instance in the case of the Red Guard, Poliakovich, who murdered 
another guard while drunk and whose punishment was 5 years imprisonment, it is 
assumed if the case was tried in another district under comparable circumstances, 
that 5 years imprisonment, rather than say 10, would be implemented. Because of 
the freedom of the judges, this was often not the case. Yet, if number of years 
imprisonment or the amount of fines was not an issue, than the uniformity factor 
may not be a major consideration. In the case of Poliakovich, if the goal was to 
ensure that such an incident would not recur, neither fines or incarceration would 
be applicable. The "solution" might involve treatment for the guard (if he had an 
alcohol problem), a promise that he would not carry firearms, a resignation from 
the post of guard (as in the case of Beliaev), etc. Assuming that all individuals are 
different, one set method or prescription for any given situation may not be 
required, and may even be disadvantageous. 
Despite the fact that the courts were designed for the purpose of conflict 
resolution, they were actually dealing more with compensation (a capitalist 
phenomenon). This created a complex and contradictory situation. Most thought 
that socialist relations would form quite soon after the revolution.130 The first 
major act curtailing some of the freedoms permitted earlier appeared in 1920, when 
leaders were beginning to acknowledge that Russia may perhaps be in the transition 
130 As reflected by Stuchka's wish to retain experts temporarily until social relations were fully 
developed. 
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period for quite some time. The recognition that capitalist economic distribution 
principles would be part of soviet society longer than initially considered, and the 
incorporation of small-scale profit schemes during N.E.P. made the initial designs of 
the People's Courts an anachronism, causing the major restructuring of the courts 
in 1922. Although the People's Courts initially may have been the prototype of the 
regulatory institutions of communism, the economic situation forced a 
reconstruction of the courts that caused them to resemble their Western 
counterparts more than a revolutionary organisation (e.g., formal codification, more 
stringent control on the decisions of judges, the push for consistency and 
regulation). 
If such an explanations for the theoretical development of the People's Courts 
is to be taken seriously, it is necessary to explore further theoretically some of the 
basic principles of regulation. Several issues arose at the end of Chapter two: (1) 
what is the exact nature of the relation between economy to law; (2) what would the 
purpose of a regulatory institution be in a society operating under "social" control; 
(3) if coercion is not to playa role, what is the nature of obligation? 
The economic link 
Whilst Marx, Engels and later Lenin clearly established the link between 
economic relations and legal ones, Pashukanis provided a more detailed 
explanation of their interaction. By relating the logical outcome of regarding 
citizens as quantifiable (via commodities), equal entities to the results of the legal 
process-punishment, an overall understanding emerges that the process of law is 
an economic process in itself. Once this point is acknowledged, it can be understood 
why a system of law which relies on capitalist economic principles cannot emerge 
under a production process that is not reliant on quantification of individuals in 
anyway. 
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Although "other" factors, such as morality, customs and social norms may 
influence the law, and to stress Reisner's point, play a large role in the foundation of 
personality and behaviour, these values may remain despite the fact that the legal 
form vanishes. Thus certain relationships that are viewed as "legal", such as 
marriage, may in the future not be regarded as "legal" despite the fact that the 
practice of marriage may continue. Individual conduct, then, ceases to be quantified 
through "law", "norm" or "moral" but rather all that is entailed in these various 
classifications is melded to form "consciousness". All the theorists emphasise that 
without irreconcilable differences in class consciousness (achieved through the 
development of a classless society), conflict will not assume economic form, and 
therefore, will not be a "legal" process. Pashukanis further explains that conflict 
ceases to be an economic form when it is not a result of private interests, private 
meaning the interest of individuals who are regarded as equal and isolated beings. 
Institutions of regulation operating within social power 
Little comes from the theorists in regard to the issue of actual future 
institutions of regulation, nor any further explanation of social power save for a few 
descriptions that are common to all, namely that relations will be simplified and 
problems will not be legal. Nevertheless, they all acknowledge conflicts will be 
present, but do not suggest ways in which they may be resolved within the 
parameter of social power. 
Pashukanis does stress that "technical rules" will arise from necessity, but 
does not explore how technical rules might be actually function in society (especially 
since they will not be enforced), or what their specific content might be. Implicit in 
his argument is the notion that necessity or mutual desire will dictate the content of 
technical rules as they reflect a "unity of purpose". Other than mentioning that 
society must be in agreement as to the goal of the rules, though, he does not 
mention how the goal is to be chosen, or discovered. Nor does he address 
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organisational decisions which might be matters of preference rather than necessity. 
While he adheres to Engels' distinction between authority and coercion, he does 
point out that if all members consent to coercive measures to achieve an agreed 
upon aim, it may be used. 
Obligation 
All three of the theorists surveyed assert that a consciousness developed 
through mutual experience will create a sense of "internal" obligation strong 
enough for social cooperation to be maintained. 
Stuchka, Reisner and Pashukanis (also Lenin) suggest that the content of rules 
arise from "habits" or "norms" that become necessary to the functioning of 
communist society. They argue that as citizens become more "trained" (by party 
members at first) in areas of social organisation, consciousness and knowledge will 
develop over time and thus people will recognise, of their own accord, the need for 
certain rules. It is implied, but not specifically stated, that the content of rules, since 
they are necessary steps towards a mutual goal, will be somewhat self-evident. 
Whilst obligation to follow these rules stems only from the active desire of 
individuals, ("internal" obligation), the need for them is determined by the 
demands of the social system. 
Reisner emphaSises that the essence of obligation lies with the fact that while 
law does not assume material form, the active realisation of its ideological function 
must be maintained. That is, if citizens are to follow rules, they must actively 
recognise the necessity of them via a social consciousness. 
A move towards definition 
Although each of the theorists offers various differences in the explanation of 
legal phenomena, they are cohesive, if somewhat incomplete, with regard to their 
notions of regulation in communism. The only major differences in the theoretical 
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premises of regulation seem to occur with Reisner's claim that law exists in any 
society and Pashukanis's claim that coercion might be used. 
In examining Reisner's argument, his starkly radical claim (from a Marxist 
view) is not as conflicting as it first appears. Reisner states that the basis of 
"communist law" (from each according to his ability to each according to his need) is 
by definition not law. Therefore, he states, law in a material sense, will not exist in 
communism. But, he argues, law in an ideological form will exist which translates 
to the active realisation of why law is not necessary. Neither Pashukanis or Stuchka 
would take issue with the outcome of Reisner's argument, that citizens must be 
conscious that cooperation is necessary, but only with the classification of 
consciousness as ideological legal form. Reisner does maintain that there will be no 
legal system in communism, a statement in complete concordance with Stuchka 
and Pashukanis. 
Pashukanis's claim that coercion might be necessary if all (including the 
recipient) agreed to its use undermines the notion of coercion which is defined as 
the use of power of individuals "over" other individuals. It is clear that coercion in 
this political sense is not Pashukanis's intention, especially in that an individual 
must agree to its use. Thus he clearly supports the claim of the other theorists, that 
coercion, in the political sense, will not be a factor in regulation. 
Evident in the survey of Reisner, Stuchka and Pashukanis is a fundamental 
commitment to an explanation of a Marxist position on law. While differences are 
manifested in the analytic explanation of what law is, a coherent, general picture 
emerges as to what regulation would entail: 
(1) Certain organisational Hrules" are necessary. Stuchka, Pashukanis and 
Reisner imply that these rules will emanate directly from the needs of society. 
With the elimination of irreconcilable class differences, rules will reflect, as 
Pashukanis directly states, necessary steps towards a unified goal. They would 
be devoid of any class interest (since there are no classes), and would not 
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incorporate the notion of conflict of rights and obligations, as laws currently 
do. 
(2) There will be no source of authority other than society itself (absence of the 
state and legal apparatus). Following Marx and Engels' arguments outlined in 
Chapter one, the theorists indicate that the state and law will be replaced by an 
administration whose sole purpose is organisational necessity. 
(3) Authority will not take a coercive form. Coercion generally ceases with 
the cessation of class conflict. For Stuchka and Reisner, the development of 
class consciousness replaces the need for external force. For them, only 
internal conviction will remain in this phase of economic development. 
Pashukanis carries this position one step further by asserting that with the 
disappearance of the equivalence principle, retribution (punishment) will 
cease as it only arose as a tool of compensation driven by the economic 
condition of commodity fetishism. While restraint might be necessary in 
some cases (for protection of SOciety), it will not take the form of retribution. 
(4) The source for obligation will be internal rather than external. With the 
absence of external source of power (namely the state and legal apparatus), 
obligation can only be internal. 
(5) Conflict will not assume a legal form. Whilst none of the theorists spoke 
at great length about the types of conflict that remain in communism, they 
imply that these will not assume legal form. Law represents a conflict of 
private interests manifested in the "juridic person" which derives definition 
from social relations determined by the mode of production (capitalism). 
When capitalist social relations are absent conflict does not assume a legal 
form. 
(6) Laws/customs/morals will lose their distinction. With the absence of 
external force, only internal obligation remains. Once the distinction is 
removed the necessity to differentiate between culture, custom and morality 
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will evaporate. Stuchka explains the transformation in terms of the 
development of a united class consciousness. Reisner describes the 
phenomenon as the internalisation of principles of conduct which in former 
societies assumed the content of law. Pashukanis stresses the historical 
development of the differentiation of these categories by tracing their roots to 
the continuing evolution of law. He argues that once the equivalence 
principle disappears with the cessation of the category "juridic person", there 
is no need to distinguish between "moral" and "legal". 
The elements provided by these writers fit well within the premises of Marx, 
Engels and Lenin with regard to regulation in communism. Important differences 
do emerge as to how regulation might develop. For Marx and Engels, historical 
progress was measured by the emergence of working class power to the point where 
communism was achieved. Direct control of society by the whole of the population 
was the end goal of social revolution. The "training" of the working class was to 
occur through the organisation and maintenance of revolution itself. Lenin, 
Pashukanis and Stuchka varied from Marx and Engels in that the party provided the 
"training" necessary to the proletariat and peasantry initially. Reisner stressed that 
consciousness, in effect, was developed throughout history and this consciousness 
was the deciding factor in the maintenance of communist regulation. These 
differences are extremely important with regard to the transition period and the 
path of development towards regulation in communism. For instance, 
methodologically there is a difference between "consciousness" which arises from 
direct practical experience and those which are derived from prescribed party 
strategies enforced on a population. Nevertheless, in terms of the characteristics of 
regulation itself all the theorists are generally agreed. 
Despite the general definitional consensus derived through theoretical survey 
and further defined through historical analysis, many key factors of regulation are 
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still not explained or explored. A general framework, however, is provided. It is 
within this framework that theoretical construction must take place. 
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CHAPTER FOUR-THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS 
SUMMATION 
Chapters one through three have surveyed relevant theories and historical 
evidence with regard to deciphering what kind of regulation would appear in 
communism, given the claim that law will "disappear". Through this survey, the 
scope of a socialist analysis of law has been explored, as well as some theoretical 
premises as to the future of society in terms of regulation. The thorough 
examination of this body of work has led to a concrete statement of a theoretical 
basis for regulation. It is useful to review conclusions thus far. 
Marx and Engels attributed the phenomena of law to the development of 
capitalist economic relations. Marx explained that through the process of 
commodity fetishism, human society had been falsely categorised into a sum of 
independent operating agents. In the legal sphere these agents are categorised as 
"juridic persons". In actuality, however, humans are not individual producers but 
social producers, and in essence there is no bifurcation between individual and 
social, but rather this dichotomy arises from production relations themselves. Put 
simply, the fundamental contradiction of a capitalist economic structure is that the 
economy functions with the aim of procuring of profit, whilst society operates on 
the premise of providing for need. This contradiction leads to fundamental class 
conflict which is the basis for the rift in social relations. The legal category of rights 
and concomitant obligations has proceeded from the fundamental characterisation 
of individuals operating as isolated agents with conflicting interests. Although 
ideologically the function of law may be to decide objectively which rights and 
obligations are maintained in a certain set of circumstances, in reality law protects 
the dominant capitalist ideology. This phenomenon is directly observable in the 
language of rights itself which elevates private property and private interests above 
all else. 
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In socialist production relations, the economic system is designed in total to 
produce for need. Thus class conflict is eliminated. Individuals are no longer 
categorised as independent agents operating in an economic sphere to provide for 
their own interests, but rather individuals provide for their own interests by 
operating within a coordinated whole. As a result, the category of juridic person is 
eliminated with the dissolution of the concept of individuals operating as 
independent agents with certain rights and obligations. The phenomenon of law 
"dies out" as its ideological role is eliminated in that, if individuals are not 
operating as autonomous individuals with sets of rights and obligations, there is no 
need for an "objective" entity to determine which sets of rights prevail in a given set 
of circumstances. In material relations the need for law evaporates because the 
economic base that led to the categorisation of individuals as isolated beings with 
free will has been transformed. What replaces the concept "juridic person" is a 
concept that categorises individuals as part of a whole. Thus individuals can really 
exert power only through social action (rather than isolated individual action). If 
individuals are actually to have this power they must control production. If this 
direct control is in place, conflict becomes a social problem to which a social solution 
must be found. Under these conditions, conceptualisation of people as individual 
bearers of rights and duties cannot emerge. 
Later theorists proceeded from this theoretical basis, as outlined by Marx and 
Engels. Pashukanis points out that punishment is a direct result of commodity 
fetishism. He makes the argument that punishment takes the form of 
compensation. Compensation assumes financial form in terms of fines or lost 
labour time (incarceration). Thus the law does not solve the problem, but merely 
determines compensation for the act of breaching rights or obligations. Once 
conflict is seen for what it actually is, a "social" problem, which can only happen 
when production relations are socialised, the compensation principle loses its 
foundation and cannot function. Thus in a socialised mode of production, 
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punishment will become irrelevant. Pashukanis then carries the argument further 
by indicating that retribution itself is an economic form, and, when things are no 
longer measured by the abstract value produced under conditions of commodity 
fetishism, the entire phenomenon of retribution becomes irrelevant. The process of 
law itself, then, is an economic process which directly embodies commodity 
fetishism. 
Stuchka emphasises Marxist class theory by stressing that when class conflict 
is eliminated, there is no need for a state and legal system backed by force-for there 
is no longer one class pressing an opposing set of interests on another. Under 
communist production methods, irreconcilable conflicts of interests are eliminated 
in that the economy is geared in total to providing for needs. 
Pashukanis stresses that when the class schism vanishes, the general direction 
of the production process is unified, in that it is geared towards solely producing for 
need. Rules emerge from the necessities of organisation. They are different in 
nature from laws. Engels explains that laws are, in essence, coercive, whereas rules 
are not. Because class domination must be maintained by political power, laws 
reflect the authoritative arm of the state. Rules, on the other hand, reflect 
organisational demands which arise by any process. The coercive state, then, is 
replaced by an administration whose function is only to organise rules; not to 
enforce them or derive them. 
As rules arise from necessity, their content cannot be decided on, per se. 
Some organisational decisions must be made, though, the contents of which are in 
the realm of choice. None of the theorists specified how these decisions were to be 
made or what their outcomes may be. They did stipulate, however, that the process 
must involve society as a whole. What the theorists describe as social power 
indicates that no individual is to have power fI over" another, either in making 
decisions or enforcing those decisions. 
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Through direct involvement of each individual in the derivation of 
decisions, the theorists argue that obligation will be "internal". Since there is no 
"external" source of obligation coercion becomes unnecessary. Reisner further 
stresses the internalisation of obligation by claiming that, in communism, internal 
recognition of the need for social cooperation is necessary in maintaining 
communist production relations. 
In this state of affairs, where production relations are socialised and the 
corresponding social relations have evolved, there is no dichotomy between the 
"moral" and "legal" realm or a differentiation between "norm", "law" or "custom". 
The source for obligation is the same in that it can only stem internally from 
individuals participating in an active whole. 
The theoretical basis above provides a plausible interpretation of the 
historical example of the Peoples' Courts. Despite the fact that official judicial policy 
exhorted the courts to proceed towards "social" resolution of disputes, economic and 
social conditions did not actually allow them to do so. This can be readily shown by 
the types of problems these courts faced, namely, accountability, consistency, 
predictability, due process, content of the law and level of expertise. As discussed in 
Chapter three, the root of these problems actually lies in determining compensation, 
or "fair punishment", not in trying to render a "solution" to the problem. The fact 
that capitalist distribution methods were still intact in the nascent socialism 
emerging in Russia precluded progress towards "social" resolution of problems as 
socialised production relations were not yet present. The point is further 
substantiated by the fact that when Soviet policy turned toward limited capitalism 
(N.E.P.) full codification of "socialist law" occurred. In this instance, not only were 
capitalist distribution methods in operation but, on a limited scale, so were capitalist 
production methods, causing the development of a full-blown court system much 
resembling its capitalist counter-parts despite varying content of statutes. The prime 
theoretical basis-that only when economic relations are revolutionised into 
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communist production relations can "social" solutions to conflict be sought-is 
supported by this historical example. 
Although the survey of theorists and historical example has educed the 
theoretical basis of a theory of regulation, many questions-both theoretical and 
structural-remain unanswered. At this point a certain amount of interpretation is 
needed to explain key elements of the theory. Even while remaining in the general 
framework thus far elicited, it would be unfair to attribute the following arguments 
to the theorists themselves. The remainder of this chapter, and in fact, the rest of 
the thesis, is strictly the interpretation of this basis by the author. 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATION 
There are several key theoretical elements of regulation unexplored or not 
fully explained by the theorists. The difficulty facing the teasing out of a full theory 
of regulation is that regulation by the above definition is intimately connected to the 
way society is organised as a whole. The theorists indicated that political power is to 
be replaced by social power observable in the transformation of the state to 
administration. The administration is described as an organisational institution 
devoid of political power. The decision-making process is represented by the phrase 
"direct control". The exact theoretical nature of an administration and direct control, 
however, is not discussed in any detail, although it is directly relevant to developing 
a theory of regulation. Therefore, a more thorough theoretical definition of "direct 
control" is required. 
Once the theoretical inferences of "direct control" have been discussed in 
more detail, other issues of social organisation that are directly relevant to 
regulation-namely coercion and obligation-must be described within this more 
detailed framework. Again once these elements have been more fully explored, the 
nature of conflicts and the process of conflict resolution can be examined in greater 
depth. 
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Certain practical, structural difficulties will no doubt come to the forefront 
during the following discussion. The purpose of this chapter, however, is to clarify 
and expand the core theoretical elements necessary to a viable theory of communist 
regulation. "Can such a system possibly work?" is quite a different question from "Is 
such a system theoretically possible?" The focus of this chapter is the latter. 
Structural suggestions shall only be offered in brief to illustrate theoretical points, 
and only where they are directly relevant to questions of regulation. 
Direct control 
The theorists assert that the essence of social power is direct control over the 
production process and the administrative process. Their basic theoretical 
definition of direct control is that no individual has power over another individual, 
and, consequently, decisions could only be made and enforced by each individual (as 
opposed to a designated group of individuals). 
In the economic process, direct control reflects the goal of producing for need. 
The premise of the critique of the capitalist legal system is that no two individuals 
can be regarded as "equal". Individuals are inherently different, reflected in their 
varying capabilities, needs and desires. In terms of production, Marx points out that 
only individuals themselves can define their "needs" (restricted of course by 
absolute physical necessities-food, water, shelter, etc.). What kind of shelter is 
needed, how much food, or what kind of "luxury" items one desires, can only be 
individually determined. The premise of communist production, then, is to allow 
individuals the control necessary to produce whatever they need or want. Under 
capitalism, production priorities are determined by the market) The basic premise 
of capitalist production is that "market mechanisms" determine how much of one 
commodity should be produced above another. The goal of a capitalist economy is 
to procure capital, especially in the form of profit. Thus businesses make decisions 
1 The question of whether the market is actually "controlled" as opposed to "free" will be left aside. 
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bearing in mind which choice will be more profitable than another. In needs-based 
production, society rationally chooses which products it wishes to produce. The goal 
of needs-based production is to provide for the needs (and desires)2 of the 
population to the highest degree possible. These needs can only be determined 
individually. For this reason, there can be no "external" element or institution-
such as a market mechanism maintained by a coercive state or a centralised body 
dictating the content of social needs-if social power is to be maintained. The initial 
step in construction of social power then, is that only individuals can determined 
their needs, wants, capabilities and desires. 
Whilst individuals may determine their needs, wants, capabilities and 
desires, they also have to fulfil them. To do this, society must be organised without 
compromising the initial economic premise that only individuals can determine 
their prime wants, and through a decision-making method that does not rely on the 
exertion of "power" of one individual over another. "Power" over an individual 
can occur both on an economic level and on a organisational one. In fact, the 
theorists point out that if individuals are controlled by the economic system (rather 
than the other way around), political power of one individual over another will 
occur as a necessary outcome of the production system. Given the language within 
which the theorists speak, the term "political" conveys the meaning of 
organisational power of one individual over another-typically represented in the 
form of the "state" or its associated bodies (courts, police, departments, etc.). When 
individuals control the economic system, however, and no one other than 
themselves are determining what their needs/ desires are, then the organisation of 
society does not necessarily have to be politicaL For this reason, "political 
organisation" is not used in the lexicon describing the future society because in the 
socialist tradition it implies a sense of coercion. Marx and Engels thus labelled the 
social organisation of communism an "administration". They suggest that an 
2 I proceed from the assumption that "needs" are not merely basic needs, but rather whatever is 
determined as "needs" at the time. 
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administration would differ from the state in that it would not be backed by 
coercion, nor would it represent the power of a class (whether proletarian or 
bourgeois) but, rather, it would be only a mechanism for organisation. The purpose 
of the administration would be to facilitate decision-making as opposed to actually 
making decisions, and these decisions would not be enforceable by coercion. As to 
who would actually make decisions, the theorists would answer, the whole of 
society. 
The first issue that needs clarification is the meaning of "facilitating" 
decisions as opposed to "making" decisions. The facilitation of decisions reflects an 
organisational mechanism for allowing individuals to procure a decision on a given 
issue. In current society such a job might be represented by the Elections 
Commission which counts votes on an initiative. The commission does not 
determine the content of the initiative, nor does it decide whether the initiative 
shall be passed. At the same time the commission is necessary for the 
organisational purpose of counting votes. Another example might be the 
chairperson of a task force. The chairpersons do not decide the issues of a task force, 
nor the outcomes of discussions, but rather they perform the necessary function of 
allowing discussion to continue in a productive and organised manner. It would be 
misleading to say the chairpersons or the commissioners had power "over" all 
individuals involved in the decision being procured, especially in that their actions 
do not actually produce any decisions. Similarly, an administration would perform 
tasks that aid in orderly rendering of the decisions, but would not actually m a k e 
decisions. 
Structurally it is difficult to imagine how all the decisions involved in 
running a society might be made so that no one person had power over another. 
The key point however, is that there is a theoretical difference between a body that 
makes decisions, and one that facilitates them. The prime goal of an institution 
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becomes how to organise individual requirements, not to decide what the 
requirements are. 
Needless to say, decisions will go well beyond the economic sphere. Not only 
do production priorities need to be decided, but literally the whole of social 
organisation. Since each individual must decide when to work and how much, 
what sort of clothes to wear and when, what products to produce, where to live, etc. 
the function of institutions clearly become the coordination of individual choices. 
Whilst the question of how such institutions might function immediately arises, it 
is only necessary at this point to accept the fact that theoretically that is what their 
roles are. 
Within the function of coordination of individual choices, there also arises 
the question of management of individual choices. It is at this point that it becomes 
necessary to distinguish between coordination and centralisation. An institution 
may function to organise choices which then may be carried out by individuals or 
groups of individuals. It does not, however, decide matters and then instructs (or 
forces) individuals. Such a system would be labelled "centralisation". Most socialist 
and former socialist countries operate under such a presumption.3 Coordination on 
the other hand, suggests that approaches are derived by individual cells and 
integrated to form an overall policy. In one case decision-making flows from the 
centralised and organised minority to the majority; in the other, from the 
sectionalised majority to the organisational minority. Coordination indicates that 
approaches are derived by individuals and integrated to form an overall policy. The 
theorists' emphasis on direct control by citizens and the absence of a state would 
clearly indicate that coordination rather than centralisation is required. 
3 Local management is one of the most distinctive (and efficacious) features of the Chinese social 
structure. See Harold Pepinsky, "Reliance on Formal Written Law and Freedom and Social 
Control in the United States and the People's Republic of China" in The Sociology of Law: A 
Conflict Perspective eds., Charles Reasons and Robert Rich (Toronto: Butterworth, 1978) pp. 281-
293. 
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Even if institutions only coordinate choices, the method of implementing 
decisions might also require coordination. Whether in deciding goals or the 
method of implementing those goals, it is clear that members of institutions would 
not be deciding goals or methods, but rather would provide an avenue for successful 
coalition of choices and methods of implementation. Using the example of 
committee chairpersons, they do exert some authority in conducting discussions. 
The results of those discussions, however, are beyond their power. Though it may 
be impossible to imagine how every individual may "participate", the distinction 
between political institutions and communist ones is theoretically clear. It might be 
useful, though, to discuss briefly how communist institutions might work to 
illustrate the notion of "facilitation" of decisions. 
The theoretical concept of an administration developed by the theorists 
indicates a system that is fully participatory and under local control, yet at the same 
time coordinated enough to provide general direction. Such a system may be 
labelled decentralised coordination. Whilst certain areas need not be coordinated at 
all, some areas, especially economic production, would require a certain amount of 
coordination. Two issues arise from such a position: one revolves around the 
possibility of full participation; the other revolves around the method of 
coordination. 
The desire for a more participatory society is not restricted to the theorists. 
Indeed, it has been a concern for conservatives, anarchists, liberals and socialists 
alike with regard to democratic structures.4 Many have reached the conclusion that 
full participation is simply unrealisable. Given the complexities of the modern 
world, the growing need for specialists and the sheer amount of information 
4 Much work has been done in regards to empowerment through increased democratic participation, for 
example: Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 
and Peter Bachrach and Aryeh Botwinick, Power and Empowerment (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992). See also: Edward Greenberg, "Industrial self-management and Political 
Attitudes" in American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No.1 (March, 1981) pp. 29-42; Frank 
Cunningham, Democratic Theory and Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 
and John Keane, Public Life and Late Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
174 
pertinent to informed decision-making, complete participatory decision-making is 
far beyond the scope of any practical programmes.5 
Any attempt at mitigating the requirement of complete participation, 
however, would severely undermine many of the theorists' key points in terms of 
successful non-coercive regulation. It would be damaging to assume the view that 
direct participation is "impractical" and other methods must be sought. 
The following are suggestions are intended only to demonstrate, in principle, 
that social organisation of an administration is not beyond all imagination. If they 
are even slightly plausible, the requirement of theoretical possibility is met. The 
function of institutions is to "gather" decisions and compile them in order to form 
some kind of policy. The problem is thus by nature broken down into two tasks. 
The first is the practical collection of data, the second is the derivation of policy from 
that data. 
In regard to collection of data, one possible solution might involve a system 
much like the internet. Populations could be broken down into sectors of say 150 
people. The sectors could then be coalesced into larger areas, for example quadrants, 
which incorporate four sectors. Quadrants can then be gathered into areas which 
cover say ten quadrants, and so on and so on. People could express their needs in 
computerised form to be sent to a main centre, at first sectors, then quadrants, then 
areas, etc. The duty of those manning the centres would be to manage the 
computers as the machines calculate how many shoes, tables, gallons of milk etc., 
are required in a given area as input is received. Eventually the lists will be 
coalesced until a "master list" is generated. While current computer programmes 
are limited in informational processing, it is not beyond reason to expect that they 
can be improved. Most problem equations can be broken into sub-equations. Data 
input can be staggered so as not to overload the system. Reducing production 
5 See especially Paul Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986) pp. 4-5, 
112-113. 
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questions into multiple sets of variables reduces the complexities of programming 
to a degree that might eventually be handled. 
Once data is gathered, policy formation decisions could be made in each 
sector. These decisions could then be relayed to the quadrants, and from the 
quadrants to the area. At each step the policy could be referred back to members 
until a decision is reached. For instance, say in sector five, 140 people desired 
individual cars and 10 people decided public transport should be developed to the 
point where they do not have to drive. Sector six decides that public transport 
should be so accessible that people will not need cars. In fact, only two people in this 
sector want cars. An obvious solution is to provide 142 cars and develop public 
transport. But say the information gathering committee indicates that for whatever 
reasons (environmental, relative scarcity) only 120 cars could be provided. This 
information could be relayed back to the individuals involved and each individual 
could choose what to do. Some individuals could voluntarily wait for their cars. 
The individuals could communicate (via e-mail, conference phone, teleconference) 
and try to negotiate a compromise. The problem could tried to be solved locally by 
car-sharing, or perhaps some other alternative. This decision could then be relayed 
back to the centre. Such a system of decision-making would involve providing 
information to individuals and using a method where individuals could negotiate 
solutions, most probably through compromise rather than consensus. 
The process may also work for "general" policy such as environmental 
matters. Say, for instance, the "master list" indicated that 106 trillion tons of white 
paper were needed. The information committee on environmental affairs 
estimated that the amount of trees needed for this amount of paper would 
dangerously reduce oxygen in the world environment. This information is sent 
back to the areas, quadrants, sectors, individuals. Individuals in sector 309 decided 
that they could reduce their paper use by one third (the sum total of what each or 
some individuals decided to sacrifice). Members of sector 415 relay there is nothing 
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they can do, they need the paper. Citizens of sector 660 question whether recycling 
would be an alternative. This information would then be sent back to the 
information committee on environmental affairs who would then evaluate 
whether the actions from individuals in various sectors took care of the problem. If 
they did not, the information committee would relay this information back to the 
sectors. Individuals in sectors, quadrants and areas thus negotiate until a some sort 
of solution arises. Thus instead of "market mechanisms" dictating production 
priorities and parameters within the goal of profit, individuals via mechanised 
input dictate production priorities and parameters directly. Much as production 
priorities "arise" from the supply and demand mechanism of the market, so do 
production priorities "arise" from the calculated input of individuals. 
Once a policy decision is reached, the fulfilment of its aims could occur in 
whatever manner is decided by local areas, or those responsible for carrying out 
tasks at a given time. Such an approach is readily understandable in areas that can 
obviously be considered under "local" control, such as local transportation 
schedules, work duties, litter control, snow removal, education, recreational team 
sports, community entertainment, etc. Larger implementation plans, however, 
might involve the situation where wood in what is now Africa is needed for 
production of tables in what is now Canada. After these tables were produced they 
would have to be transported to the persons that required them. For example, let us 
assume the method that was derived with regard to distribution was that every 50 
people or so in a geographical area would have "pick-up" stations. There could be a 
pick-up station for food, clothes, furniture, tools, etc. Most goods would be 
transported by air. It was decided that an airport would be built for every 200 
persons. From the airport the goods to each delivery station could be conveyed by 
underground conveyor belts built along the same lines as subway systems. 
It was calculated from computerised input that 5 million tables of type Z were 
needed and 120 million tables of type B were required. The production of these 
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tables required 175 million square feet of wood. Production mills, or perhaps 
synthetic wood factories, or satellite forests, were distributed in 3,000 areas around 
the globe (or space). Orders went to each factory in rotation. The current 
"production" committee, with the recent order would then contact the wood 
production mills in the order of rotation. For this shipment factories in what is 
now currently Canada, Timor and Benin were contacted via e-mail. The production 
committee at these stations would send the order to the table producing factories in 
current day Turkey, Eretria and Iceland. Local work committees in these areas 
would coordinate who was to fulfil these orders. After construction was completed 
they were loaded on cargo planes and distributed to the local stations that required 
them. 
In other words, with the removal of fiscal considerations, the mechanical 
systemic organisation of transporting goods and raw materials is decided mainly by 
matter of efficiency, expediency and necessity. 
The next question that arises is who is to send these orders, who is to make 
sure orders arrive and who is to carry out which tasks? Again such questions can be 
decided on a local level. (Or, given that we can already travel from New York to 
London in a hour, locality may not even play such a role.) 
It is obvious from above discussions on the decision-making process and 
production organisation that a vast number of "committees" and people to staff 
them would be necessary. If such tasks were divided among a huge population, it is 
conceivable that these committees would only demand a small time commitment 
from each individual. For instance, say one committee member of some sort is 
needed for every 30 people at all times. If each individual were to serve one day a 
month, the requirement would be satisfied. If each individual were to serve for two 
weeks, it would be approximately one year and four months before that same 
individual would have to serve again. This of course assumes that making orders, 
checking shipments, scheduling transport arrivals, etc. requires no skill that the 
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"average" person cannot handle. Given that these committees do not make 
decisions or enforce them, it is not beyond reason that organisational matters are 
within the capacity of a majority of individuals. (The issue of specialisation will be 
discussed in the section "DIFFICULTIES WITH NEEDS-BASED PRODUCTION", 
"How production is organised" in this chapter.) 
Of course suggestions such as the ones above presume universal education, 
access to information, universal computer access, future technologies and a vast 
array of other attendant problems to be sorted out. However, the purpose of this 
discussion is only to suggest how decisions might be made by each individual, and 
how institutions do not generate decisions but rather coordinate them. While such 
a process might be inordinately unwieldy, and perhaps inconceivable in our current 
historical frame of reference, it is, nevertheless, theoretically possible at some point 
in the future. 
As is demonstrated by above examples, policy is formulated from the input of 
diverse ideas and interests. At each level, compromise, as opposed to consensus, 
will most probably emerge. It is important to remember that each individual 
determines what his/her compromise is. Hence, a policy that is generated must take 
into account diverse ideas by virtue of its original source (individuals). Thus by 
necessity, policy must provide for its members. The better it provides for its 
members' choices, the higher degree members will willingly participate. The more 
people support the system, the better able it will be to provide for its members. Thus 
individual fulfilment of individual desires are directly linked to the economic 
production process. Such a direct link between effective "political" decision-making 
and an effective economic production is the essence of socialism. It is what is meant 
by "direct control" of resources and assertions that superstructure and base will not 
be bifurcated. If policy fails, so does the economy. Motivation to participate in the 
economic system is generated by the desire of individuals to fulfil their own policy, 
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or more specifically their "part" of the policy which is reflected through the process 
of compromise. 
This brings us to quite an important point. If the definition of 
"administration" intrinsically involves the economic production process, the 
theorists hostility to direct democracy becomes elucidated. Direct democracy is 
classified as a political phenomena because in involves the formulation of policy 
that may not be directly linked to the economy. The fact that "market forces" dictate 
economic priorities attests to this fact. Since the description of an administration is 
the description of a system where "politics" and "economics" are united, the basis 
for Marx's hostility to "direct democracy" (especially in the form of "peoples' states) 
becomes more defined. If policies are formulated by a select minority and 
"approved" by the general populace, the desires of each individual are not 
necessarily taken into account in the formation of the policy itself, which is the case 
if policy is determined through the process of compromise. Thus the nature of an 
administration reflects the concept of social power in that each individual acting 
together with others generates a coordinated effort and plan. The institution, then, 
is merely an organising body, not one that generates policy. 
Coercion and obligation 
If the administration does not actually make decisions, then the related 
function of enforcing decisions is also beyond its scope. Similar to making 
decisions, the enforcement of decisions lies with society as a whole. 
If no individual can have power over another, though, than how can 
decisions actually be enforced? The theorists assert that decisions can only be 
enforced internally. The theoretical point is that there is, in essence, no 
enforcement of decisions; hence the claim that such a society is "non-coercive". 
Given the above argument, the theorists' claim that there be no "external" source of 
obligation makes more sense. If there is no organisation making decisions, and if 
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no decisions are being enforced other than by individual or internal will, and hence 
logically there is no institution enforcing decisions, obligation can only come from 
individuals. 
This "internal" obligation, however, is not sheer desire, or "free will" but is 
driven in large part by necessity. If for instance, person A, Band C wants to eat rice, 
then by necessity rice must be planted, watered and reaped. Therefore, certain 
actions must occur due to necessity. The statement "rice must be watered twice a 
day" is an authoritative statement derived from the desire of growing rice. One 
would not necessarily label such a claim "law". The theorists have termed such 
necessities "rules". The theorists carry the argument quite a few steps further. Not 
only is it necessary to water rice twice daily, but it is necessary to have a human, or 
more accurately in a technological society, a mechanism for watering rice. It then 
becomes necessary that someone must build the mechanism for watering rice. This 
in turn creates a necessity to have someone to maintain the mechanism, which 
creates further tasks. Eventually it becomes necessary to have a method for 
organising the delegation of tasks to individuals. Whilst the above steps in 
capitalist society involve legal implications, the theorists make the argument that 
authoritative necessities and the correlative demands that emerge from them, are 
not in essence legal. Engels makes the argument most effectively in "On 
Authority." It is useful to repeat at this point. For clarity, rules reflect demands 
derived from necessities, and laws reflect promulgations by the state backed by 
coercion. (Note: the term, "rules" does not reflect any legal connotations present in 
the current context of modern jurisprudence.) 
Engels described the theoretical foundations for the necessity of "rules" in his 
work "On Authority". As discussed in the first chapter, Engels distinguishes 
"authority" from "force". He argues that a certain type of authority is required by 
sheer necessity. Pashukanis later takes up this theme in his descriptions of technical 
necessity. In both writers, the fact that law is derived from force and rules from 
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authority give "law" and "rule" one of their most distinguishing factors. Engels 
maintains that force can be applied when it is not necessary and can be completely 
externaL Authority (in Engels' sense of the word) is created by the necessity of the 
process itself. He uses the example of running a railroad station. There are certain 
tasks that must be fulfilled if this station is to function (e.g. train maintenance, 
scheduling, tracking, the gathering of necessary resources). Rules regarding this sort 
of operation are predetermined by the nature of the operation. The presence of such 
necessities intrinsically connects "rule" with "purpose". These type of regulations 
have no possibility of interpretation, caprice or malice. Contrarily, force does not 
necessarily have relation to whether or not an act is necessary; and hence it can be 
applied at the whim of some empowered individual or group. 
The difference between authority and force can be discerned easily in such a 
technical matter as the operation of a railroad station. It is more difficult, however, 
to conceptualise the difference between force and authority in regard to the 
functioning of society. In short, can one really compare the organisation of society 
with that of a railway? This is exactly what the theorists try to do. A starting point 
for any operation is the determination and recognition of its purpose. Rules are 
designed to fulfil that designated purpose. In the railroad example, the purpose is 
dearly recognisable. Trains are used for transport. The basic purpose of society, 
however, is not so identifiable. 
Marx makes the argument in terms of needs. It is a fact that humans need 
food, shelter and clothing and that these needs are socially met. The type of 
authority (rules) that would proceed from these needs would reflect that people are 
required to work and use their resources. Therefore, rules reflecting the necessity 
work are not in essence coercive (though they can be). In capitalism, however, the 
authority that dictates work is necessary is transformed into force. Pashukanis' 
specification of "unity of purpose" explains how. The goal of capitalism (to procure 
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profit) is contradictory to the purpose of economy (to satisfy needs).6 Force (law) is 
needed to maintain a system that contradicts its own purpose. 
In communism, now that the production forces are designed to meet social 
requirements directly, the purpose of society is unified and the necessity of force 
evaporates. Theoretically, only rules will emerge from this general unified purpose. 
The situation is obviously different from Engels' initial example of the railroad in 
that the running of society is far more complicated than the running of a railroad. 
The railroad has clearly defined and limited circumstances. Human society does so 
only in a very general sense-in that the purpose of the economy is to provide for 
needs. Though the need for social organisation is obvious, how this organisation 
occurs is not at all "determined". It is clear that humans need housing, but who is 
to build the houses, where are they to be erected, etc., is not. Such decisions are 
conditioned by rules (necessities) but are not rules in themselves. Rather, they may 
be termed administrative suggestions reflected in the previous use of the terms 
policies, tasks, decisions in the above discussions. These suggestions are proposed 
possible methods for meeting requirements. Which of the various methods prevail 
is directly up to the individuals involved. 
Placing the above argument in the context of previous discussions regarding 
deciSion-making, the following conclusion can be drawn. Certain requirements 
must be met for a production system to function in providing for the needs and 
desires of the populace. These necessary requirements have been referred to as 
rules. The obligation to perform these rules can only come from individuals 
themselves, conditioned by necessity. If individuals do not fulfil these rules, they 
are in essence rejecting the economic system and the system will fail. For instance, 
in a simple example, if the goal was to grow rice, the rule "rice must be watered" 
would, by necessity emerge. If individuals did not water the rice, they are in effect 
rejecting the initial goal of growing rice. The obligation to water rice comes from 
6 Even though in capitalism need satisfaction may occur as a side-effect. 
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the individuals' desire to grow rice. If the individuals do not want to grow rice, 
then there is no rule to water the rice and no need to fulfil it. Obligation to the goal, 
comes only from each individual, and consequently the rule to water the rice must 
be followed. This obligation, however, does not emanate solely from the free will of 
individuals, but is also conditioned by necessity. 
Other decisions, such as how to organise the task of watering the rice, reflect 
administrative suggestions. Obligation to follow these suggestions can only come 
from each individual, as each individual has determined their own role in 
performing tasks and there is no mechanism enforcing these decisions. Taking the 
previous example, 140 out of 150 in sector 78 chose to participate in growing rice. 
These 140 people divide the rice watering among them. In this case it happened to 
turn out that each individual was to water the rice two hours each month. If 4 of 
the 140 people had a change of heart and decided not to participate in rice watering, 
the fact that 8 more hours of watering per month were needed would be 
disseminated by the watering committee to the individuals in the sector. 
Negotiation would occur until the hours were met. Thus internal obligation 
reflects the fact that only each individual has the power to determine whether in 
fact an obligation exists. 
Despite the emphasis on internal obligation, Marx does stress that 
individuals are part of society and cannot be considered in isolation from that 
society. By definition, internal obligation contains a social element as well. The 
presence of social consciousness reflects the larger social environs. The theorists 
assumed that social consciousness would have a large effect on the actions of 
individuals. Hence if a certain action was causing disruption in the cooperative 
environment, the individual would endeavour to end the action, or at least resolve 
the discordant situation. The social consciousness cannot be enforced, however, and 
although cooperation is necessary for socialism to function, as pointed out in the 
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discussion of rules, the individual has sole power in adhering to a rule or 
suggestion. 
In sum, the responsibility for individual actions is in part determined by need 
which generates a social environment within which realm an individual can make 
a decision. In communism, where the actual interdependence and cooperation of 
humans to produce for needs is fully materialised in production relations, 
concordant social relations reflect interdependence and cooperation as well. 
Although obligation can only come from individuals, these individuals are 
inherently linked to a larger society completely dependent on cooperation. Thus 
individual responsibility incorporates social responsibility. 
Social cohesion and cooperation emerge as a necessity of an economic system 
producing for needs. As individuals participating within such a system there is an 
intrinsic authoritative (in Engels' use of the term) demand for social cooperation 
and cohesion. Individual decisions take place within this reference frame. Thus 
individual actions are measured against the social need for cohesion and 
cooperation generated by the demands of the economic system. Is this 
"authoritative demand" "external" to individuals in the theorists arguments? It is 
not primarily so, in that there is no element of coercion to "force" individuals to 
cooperate and respect the social fabric to ensure social cohesion other than need 
itself (without cooperation and cohesion the system would fail). Presumably, if 
individuals wanted the system to function, they would cooperate-at least to a 
general degree-because it is necessary. There is also the point that it is not only the 
choice of an individual in isolation to follow the decision, but the choice of an 
individual operating within a fully integrated social realm, and one that operates 
under economic conditions which necessitate cohesion and cooperation. The social 
environment, then, can be said to condition individual responses. In the final 
analysis, however, the individual only can determine what his/her obligations are. 
The essence of social power is that individuals must have direct control over 
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society; which indicates as discussed above, that each individual must be able to 
make decisions and must be the sole source of obligation. 
DIFFICULTIES WITH NEEDS-BASED PRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The literature is vast concerning both the theoretical and practical problems of 
socialism. For the most part, works dealing with socialism and legal philosophy 
leave the practicalities of the implementation of socialism aside? Nevertheless, 
some consideration of the basic tenets of socialism must be involved, especially with 
regard to the topic of social power. Similar to the above section, these discussions 
will be brief and only explored in so far as they directly relate to the law question and 
are necessary to theoretical developments. 
The very basis of social transformation relies on the theoretical possibility that 
an economy can actually be organised to produce for needs. Such an issue involves 
both practical questions, such as how will needs be calculated or whether abundance 
is possible, and theoretical ones, such as is "rational planning" theoretically possible. 
Practical questions will only be addressed so far as the theoretical possibility of 
socialism be established. If it cannot be, discussions of regulation are merely a 
mental exercise. 
Alec Nove in The Economics of Feasible Socialism Revisited, asserts that a 
"marketless" economy is essentially not feasible. Nove's discussion proceeds from 
numerous difficulties posed by a position that asserts the viability of a non-market 
economy. Nove doubts the socialist assumption of abundance and questions 
whether at all times all products and services in demand could be produced at what 
he labels "zero cost". He then posits that at some point "mutually exclusive 
7 E.g.: Tom Campbell, The Left and Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); Hugh Collins, 
Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); Bernard Edelman, Ownership of the Image, 
trans., Elizabeth Kingdom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); and Olufemi Taiwo, Legal 
Naturalism: A Marxist Theory of Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornel University Press, 1996). 
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choices" would have to be made.8 Marx, he argues, did not indicate how such 
allocation could take place without a market mechanism, the reason being that 
"Marx did not say that, under socialism, there would be no conflicts over allocation 
of scarce resources (oil, fish, iron ore, stockings, or whatever), but that these and 
other resources would not be scarce."9 
Nove also briefly refers to the fact that production at such a high level may 
not be environmentally sustainable.10 Given already developed technological 
possibilities, it is conceivable that "more" could be produced with "less" harm to the 
environment. At some point, however, there is a possibility that production 
demands, either because of environmental concerns, lack of a technological process 
to develop such means or simple scarcity (even if temporary) would require some 
prioritising. Even if one were to accept that abundance might be possible, there 
perhaps would be a time lag between when new demands arise and when the 
technological means to meet them develop. 
If needs are to be prioritised, Nove asks, how is value to be determined in an 
essentially valueless society? Who is to make priority decisions? How shall they be 
organised? How shall they be calculated?l1 F. A. Hayek in Road to Serfdom, 
suggests that such collective knowledge is impossible to ascertain given that the 
needs and desires of individuals are so varied.12 Economy, then must be 
decentralised indicating that some market mechanism is needed, hence a 
"marketless" production process is unattainable. Nove and Hayek assume that 
there will be a centralised body trying to calculate the incalculable. Thus the 
conclusion is that such a system is simply impossible 
Whilst Nove and Hayek assert that the answers to the above problems lie 
within some sort of market mechanism-capitalism in Hayek'S case, and a limited, 
8 Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism Revisited (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991) 
p.19 
9 Ibid., p. 18 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 23 
12 F. A. Hayek, The Road To Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) pp. 58-59 
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restricted market mechanism in Nove's,13-the theorists advocate replacement of 
the market by an administration based on institutions which do not make or 
enforce decisions. Rather than a centralised body making decisions, a de centralised 
system of organising decisions could develop. Such a system, they argue, would 
allow the greatest degree of fulfilment for the desires, both economic and otherwise, 
of individuals. 
The general meaning of such a statement has been explored during previous 
sections in this chapter. Some of Nove and Hayek's problems have already been 
addressed, such as priorities of production and basic needs calculations. The 
position can further be explained by discussing, briefly, Nove and Hayek's 
unaddressed problems with such a modeL These difficulties can be categorised 
under several headings: (1) straight forward concerns over abundance; (2) problems 
with how needs can be determined; and (3) problems with how to organise 
production. These problems, Nove and Hayek argue, are currently handled by 
market mechanisms. 
Nove proceeds from the assumption that "feasible" indicates suggested 
changes must occur in the next 50 years or so. "I should like instead to include my 
own definition of 'feasible socialism' the notion that it should be conceivable within 
the lifespan of one generation- say, in the next fifty years ... "14 Such a definition of 
"feasible" is far more restrictive than one of theoretical possibility at some future 
point in history. Nevertheless, points raised by Nove and Hayek in this area are 
well representative of concerns regarding the option (or non-option) of a marketless 
production method and should be, at least briefly, discussed. 
13 Nove, pp. 210-248 
14 Ibid., p. 13 
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Abundance 
Nove expresses straight forward concerns over the possibility of producing 
the amount of goods demanded by society given the large popUlation of the Earth.1S 
Whilst a full discussion of abundance is well beyond the scope of this thesis, it 
should be at least considered whether it may be possible at some point in the future. 
Nove draws attention to the fact that the population of the world is ever-increasing 
and much of that population is in poverty. He asks " ... have the 'limitless-resources' 
optimists ever tried to calculate the resource implications of China's millions eating 
as much meat as, say, even the East Europeans do today?"16 While calculations like 
these cannot be made with any sort of accuracy given the market restrictions on 
production of food (e.g., the poliCies that pay farmers not to grow, destruction of 
products to maintain prices and monetary restrictions regarding full development 
of technology), basic calculations can be made with present statistics to see if there is 
even a slight possibility of abundance at some point. Figures show that the 
assumption of abundance might not be so far-fetched. In 1990 the United States 
alone produced (in actuality, not potential) enough to provide 1.6 lbs. of corn, 1.7 lbs. 
of rice and half a pound of milk per week for every person in the world (using 1993 
population figures»)7 Such a diet would not meet the requirements of a "good" 
standard of living, but does suggest that perhaps at least feeding the world well is 
not beyond our potential technical grasp, as one country, under market restrictions, 
can currently at least nutritionally sustain the entire world. 
As Nove acknowledges "none of us knows what new discoveries will be 
made."18 It should be considered that such possibilities as genetic engineering, water 
management, mechanisation, plant breeding with regard to food production might 
increase out put. Abundant energy resources such as fusion might be developed to 
IS Ibid., pp. 18-19 
16 Ibid. 
17 Production figures taken from M.e. Hallberg, Policy for American Agriculture (Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1992) pp. 37-40. World population figures were cited from The World Almanac, 
ed., Robert Farnighetti (Mahwah, N. J.: World Almanac Books, 1993) p. 828. 
18 Nove, p. 19 
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the point of being able to be used effectively. On a broader scale, it is currently 
within our technological grasp to develop satellites that can produce products away 
from earth, and perhaps even provide an option as a place for people to live. 
Obviously such suggestions do not fall into Nove's definition of "feasible" if they 
are to occur in the next 50 years. They do, however, cause pause for thought in 
terms of eventual possibility. 
It should be pointed out as well that individuals, given their variety, will not 
all want the same things at the same time. Not all individuals will want to eat meat 
every night, or live in a mansion, or own a car. Given the huge variety of possible 
living styles and the increased possibility of pursuing them without economic 
repercussions (for instance, many people live in the city out of economic necessity), 
it may be the case that there will not arise one product that is "over-demanded". 
Even assuming the possibility of abundance, however, does not answer problems 
regarding how needs are to be calculated. 
The calculation of needs 
Hayek indicates that calculation of need by a certain body or institution is 
beyond reason given the variety of peoples' needs and the impossibility of 
perceiving a common good. He mentions in numerous works that individuals can 
only handle so much information and that it is literally impossible to consider all 
the information necessary to decisions that are made in capitalism by the market: 
The point which is so important is the basic fact that it is impossible for any man to survey 
more than a limited number of needs. Whether his interests center round his own physical 
needs, or whether he takes a warm interest in the welfare of every human being he knows, 
the ends about which he can be concerned will always be an infinitesimal fraction of the 
needs of all men. 19 
As pOinted out earlier in this chapter, one individual or group of individuals in a 
socialised production system are not required to calculate the entirety of need, but 
rather calculate their own needs. As previously suggested, these needs could be 
19 Hayek, p. 59 
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input by each individual and calculated by computer programs. The task of a 
"calculation committee" would be to monitor the computers. It is clear that Hayek 
has in mind centralisation rather than decentralised coordination. 
Nove's general point in this matter is that often needs simply cannot be 
calculated before production takes place.20 It is false, he argues, to assume that 
individuals can even know what they need or want beforehand. Given that this is 
the case, how can needs be assessed without a supply and demand mechanism? He 
asserts " ... there is no better way of enabling citizens to register their preferences than 
to allow them freely to spend their 'money' ... "21 
Though there may be certain sureties in the choices of goods individuals 
might want or need, Nove argues that some product choices, such as styles of shoes 
or cars, cannot be known in advance. Therefore, the entrepreneur takes a "risk" at 
producing a certain line of product and the market determines whether this choice 
was right. Is there a mechanism in communist administration would replace, in 
essence, "shopping"? 
With current technology, there is no reason that "choices" could not be 
developed before they are produced. As with shoe, dress or house deSigns, for 
example, patterns, prototypes and simulation models of products are developed 
before the products are actually mass produced. If these choices could be made pre-
viewable to consumers, in essence consumers could "shop" before products were 
produced. Such transactions are occurring via the internet and mail catalogues 
currently. Stores could also display a few items of each design so people may 
physically "see" it or try it on before they order it. The number of designs existing 
would be restricted only by the number of people who want to design things. There 
does not appear to be any a priori reason why such a method of "shopping" cannot 
occur. 
20 Nove, pp. 42-46 
21 Ibid., p. 59 
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How production is organised 
Nove's questions regarding the organisation of production focus on issues 
involved in industrial organisation of production facilities as well as questions 
regarding specialisation of division of labour.22 The area of general organisation has 
already been addressed. Specialisation and division of labour, however, require 
further explanation. 
Nove asserts that specialists will be needed, as well as some chain of 
command and that these two elements will bring effectively a "division of labour" 
and hence, by Marx's own arguments, create alienation in the work force. 23 Whilst 
"average" skills may be required in terms of some "management", others would 
require extraordinary skills or long-term training such as surgeons, loggers, 
computer programmers, etc. 
The issue of division of labour is quite complex. Although a full discussion 
of the topic is not possible, three areas should be briefly discussed: (1) to what degree 
specialisation might occur; (2) what is the nature of the manager / worker 
relationship; and (3) is socialist organisation of labour comparable to the division of 
labour in capitalism? 
As to the first point, Nove firmly rejects the notion that there will not be 
specialists. He cites Marx's famous passage in this regard: 
There is in this connection a famous quotation from Marx: a person 'will hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening and be a literary critic after 
dinner, without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman or critic.'24 
He clearly affirms that in the context of modernisation, such a formula is 
gibberish: 
But let us rewrite Marx's sentence as follows: 'Men will freely decide to repair aero-
engines in the morning, fill teeth in the early afternoon, drive a heavy lorry in the early 
evening and then go to cook dinners in a restaurant without being an aero-engine 
22 Ibid., pp. 33-55 
23 Ibid., pp. 50-59 
24 Ibid., p. 51 
maintenance artificer, dentist, lorry-driver, or cook.' Then it does look a trifle non-
sensical, does it not?25 
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While the first appearances of such a statement may seem ridiculous, it is not 
beyond all conception. Without monetary or social restrictions, professional 
training might become extremely accessible. Is it complete implaUSible that a person 
could be a driver, doctor and dentist? Training to be a doctor takes approximately 
eight years, five for dentistry and six months of heavy vehicle training-a total of 
13.5 years. Given an average forty-year work span, it is not beyond all 
comprehension that a person can indeed acquire several professions. And in fact, 
Nove admits that such capacity is actually possible.26 He argues, though, that at a 
given point in time there must be specialisation, a fact that Marx did not seem to 
acknowledge.27 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that specialisation would exist. Such 
a statement should be qualified however. Specialisation would exist completely in 
the realm of choice. Whether individuals would be more comfortable having one 
profession their entire lives, serving one "committee" that requires specialists or 
several, or choose to do "untrained" jobs will be decided by each individual without 
threat of economic repercussions. As explained before, however, individual 
response would occur within a social whole that may affect the outcome of 
individual choice. 
A "chain of command", as admitted by all the theorists, would be necessary in 
any production system. At a given point in time, someone must be responsible for a 
certain realm of activity. Whether these may be what is current day managers of 
facilities, or supervisors of work schedules-coordinated activity is necessary. The 
point that the theorists raise, however, is that while authority is needed to carry out 
plans, such tasks need not develop into a centralised political bodies. As discussed 
above, "managers" who have no power privileges in the current political sense, no 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., pp. 50-59 
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permanence, no direct control over resources, no economic benefit due to the fact 
they are managers and no systematic method to make or enforce decisions indicates 
that the "chain of command" is one that is informal, temporary and reflects 
organisational facilitation only. 
Under such conditions, would "alienation" necessarily flow from 
specialisation and authority? While the answer is not, by any means, clear cut, 
division of labour by force-whether economic or direct coercion-is of clearly 
different character than one based on individual choice operating within a milieu of 
social coordination. Far more important to establishing whether the above system 
could function is the question of whether the desires of individuals will meet the 
needs of society. In other words, if society needs two million doctors, but only 
500,000 individuals want to be doctors, will the system fail? Will individuals feel a 
greater responsibility to fulfil the demands of the system if they are not 
economically, or otherwise, forced to do so? 
Such questions are simply unanswerable. There is nothing in the above 
arguments, however, that suggests a system organised as such would never be 
possible. The number of needed professionals could be estimated much in the same 
method as needs could be calculated. These needs could be conveyed to society and 
individuals would then respond with a sense of choice and social responsibility. I 
propose that with the vast, and currently untapped, potential of human labour and 
capability, that there might be enough trained and willing people to allow a needs-
based economic system to function. There is nothing, theoretically, that indicates 
otherwise. 
Conclusion 
The gist of the argument against needs-based production focuses on the 
impossibility of replacing market mechanisms in determining which products to 
produce, how to produce them and with what urgency. It has been proposed that at 
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some point in history with the aid of technology and the development of 
institutions that provide an avenue for full participation, needs can be calculated 
and production and social organisation can occur in a coordinated, decentralised 
fashion. Such a system directly links the fulfilment of individual choices to the 
economic system via the process of compromise. In policy formation itself all needs 
must be taken into account. Theoretically, a policy could not emerge where needs 
are not met if not fully, in compromised form. 
Since policy takes into account all needs, individuals would most probably 
participate. The effectiveness of such a system would rely directly on whether the 
system is fulfilling its members. The greater the systems fulfils needs, the more 
society will partake. Taking into consideration that: (1) needs, through the aid of 
technology, could be calculated; (2) economic policy could theoretically emerge from 
the input of each individual; (3) the process directly links the fulfilment of 
individual choices to economic production; (4) motivation to partake in an effective 
economic process comes about as a result of this direct connection to policy 
formulation; it is conceivable that a market mechanism may not be intrinsically 
necessary to human society. 
While the above brief discussions of the possibility of needs-based production 
by no means meet Alec Nove's concept of feasible, nor does justice to the volumes 
of work produced by Nove and Hayek, they seek only to suggest that such a system 
might be theoretically possible. 
While many practical organisational questions are left unanswered, and 
further discussions of the possible issues in socialism are regrettably left untouched, 
it has been established that "direct control" and "needs-based production" may be 
theoretically possible at some point in history. The task then becomes to discuss the 
ramifications of such a system in terms of law. 
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REGULATION 
The basis of regulation revolves around the notion that institutions do not 
produce or enforce decisions, but that decisions are the results of the compilation of 
each individual's input. As pointed out, under such circumstances the policies and 
tasks derived through such a process are not binding in the traditional legal sense, 
but rather are adopted by individuals through a sense of internal obligation. 
Consequentially, these tasks and policies do not carry with them attendant 
expectations of rights and duties, thus the basis for law and legal enforcement is 
removed. Given the presence and role of social consciousness, however, it is 
evident that a kind of social norm might be generated by the administrative process. 
Also, the fact that necessity moulds policy to some degree reduces the role of 
individual choice, and lays basis for the establishment of rules. 
As was born out by the above discussions, rules reflect necessity. The 
outcome of such a rule is more a statement of fact than a method of delineating 
duties, or more generally, modes of conduct. The function of rules becomes to 
define the necessary parameters within which decisions will be made. For instance, 
when planning for agriculture, rules designate certain requisites that cannot be 
omitted if the system is to function. By virtue of. necessity, the plants must be 
watered if food is to grow. Who is to water the plants, in what manner and at what 
intervals is a matter of choice, and hence a matter to be "decided". While this 
concept is clear in such examples as "plants need water" or "aeroplanes need fuel", it 
is not so straight-forward in terms of social organisation. As a result, the rule that 
emerges directly from necessities generated by communist production methods is a 
very general one-that the social organisation must produce for need, and that, 
consequently, socially organised (cooperative) work is involved. How the system 
accomplishes this is in the realm of human choice. Thus in terms of social 
organisation, there is a tremendous amount of decisions to be made. Since the term 
"rules" define the reality within which decisions are made, the outcomes of 
196 
decisions have been labelled in the previous text "administrative suggestions" 
which include the terms "policies" and "tasks". Such outcomes are not legally 
binding, carry no notion of attendant rights and duties and are adopted only if so 
chosen by each individual. 
Social consciousness, however, suggests that individual choice is by no means 
devoid of social influence. The theorists argued that the power of social 
consciousness would be great, and implied that the communist citizen would feel 
extremely influenced by such consciousness. The implication is that social norms-
and very strong ones-would be generated. Such an implication merits caution, 
however. In current jurisprudence lexicon, the term "norm" carries with it a strong 
expectation of compliance and as a result, non-fulfilment of a norm is viable 
grounds for social criticism. As has been pointed out, though, while the social 
environment may highly condition individual choices, theoretically the individual 
still has the final authority not to comply, and this decision can have no 
repercussions other than, perhaps, a re-negotiation of policy. The aim is to have 
actions be free expressions of individuality, rather than be judged by any normative 
standards. Chris Arthur aptly warns that a principle in communism should not be 
taken to mean a: 
... principle enforced in order to realise 'justice and equality' even 'actual equality'-because 
it is not enforced at all. It is clear, that both' ability' and 'need' are to be determined by 
the possessor. . .it is clearly absurd to suppose that anybody could be accused of slacking, or 
of being greedy; rather all expressions of individuality will be just that-expressions of 
free subjectivity-not obedience to an objective norm.28 
For this reason, "social consciousness" as opposed to "norms" is a more apt term. 
On the other hand, it is a reasonable expectation that there will be the possibility of 
negative social reaction-especially if one individual's action stands out among 
many. While the results of communist social organisation might be successful in 
removing such judgmental reactions, it is a possibility that must be addressed. The 
theorists clearly indicate that social consciousness is not "external" to the 
28 Chris Arthur, "Towards a Materialist Theory of Law", Critique 7 (Winter, 1976/77) p. 41 
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individual. As previously pOinted out, this implies that society has no power 
(economic or political) to enforce its "norms". This diffusion of power is the 
grounds for regulation. Thus, even if an individual's action generates negative 
social response, the individual can still choose to do such an action, and society has 
no power to force him/her to stop. Obviously the theorists believed that most 
individuals would be very responsive to their social environment, or responsive 
enough to let the system function. Theoretically, however, it is quite clear that the 
final authority rests with the individual. How responsive individuals are to social 
pressure is a matter of personality. 
When speaking of organisation, then, the policies and tasks derived from a 
coordination of individual input produces only suggestions-suggestions which 
mayor may not work. While these suggestions by nature imply anticipated 
compliance, the expectation is weak and lacks a strong normative (in the traditional 
sense of the word) component. If a large majority do not comply, the policy must be 
greatly changed. If a minority do not comply, the policy must be fine-tuned. The 
results of not fulfilling a task, then, is a stimulus for social change rather than an 
action that merits "approval" or "disapproval". Although social disapproval may 
occur as a side-effect, the net result of non-compliance is a re-examination of policy 
and the generation of more suggestions. 
For the most part, discussion has centred around organisation of production 
and social tasks. Such an organisation has been labelled administration and usually 
has reflected the same focus as political or legislative institutions in capitalism. 
Also under the purview of regulation, however, is what has been previously 
referred to as arbitration.29 Given that the administrative institutions do not 
produce binding decisions (as they do not produce decisions at all), the goal of 
arbitration, contrary to its capitalist legal counterpart, is not to enforce decisions. 
Under the administrative description of the roles of institutions described above, 
29 As mentioned in the Preface, the term arbitration as used here does not imply its current legal usage. 
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what would the role of an arbitration institution entail? Its primary goal would be 
to facilitate the resolution of conflict. Since the institution has no innate power by 
virtue of its being an institution and no power to enforce decisions, its role would be 
restricted to managing negotiations between parties, if those parties desired. Such a 
function might involve suggesting a compromise to a given situation, facilitating 
the derivation of compromise on an issue, further explaining the nature of conflict 
and the root of the problems involved, providing a third party through which 
involved disputants could more easily communicate to each other or providing 
input from an agent outside of the dispute at hand. The outcomes of such a process, 
as is the case with administrative institutions, are suggestions. Administrative 
institutions facilitate derivation of suggested policies and tasks, arbitration 
institutions facilitate derivation of suggested resolutions. Both processes, though 
differentiated in goals, proceed from the same theoretical basis-that individuals are 
the sole source of power in society. 
The discussions above provided a general description of a society where: (1) 
individuals are highly integrated; (2) the need for cooperation and cohesion is 
fundamental to the fulfilment of individuals needs and wants; (3) there is virtually 
no "external" body deriving or enforcing decisions; and (4) no institutional 
mechanism to enforce a resolution of dispute (only a mechanism for facilitating 
resolution). Assuming such social organisation were possible, what sorts of conflicts 
would emerge? 
The nature of conflicts 
One obvious source of potential conflict comes with the performance of tasks. 
Even though each individual determines his /her tasks, it could be presumed that at 
one point some individuals will not perform their specific tasks at a given moment 
in time. Such non-performance is one possible area of conflict. 
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On another level, day-to-day human interaction and disagreement would 
probably produce some conflict. All of the theorists assert that socialised production 
would eliminate many sources of crime (property laws, business regulation, 
complex tax structures, etc.). There nevertheless appears to be a realm of personal 
discord that would not simply "disappear" even under the best of circumstances. 
Examples might include separating from one's partner, violent jealousy, envy that 
might result in assault. These situations are often labelled "crimes of passion." 
Another possible area of conflict can be categorised as a "clash of values". One 
section of the population may embrace certain values that are opposed to values of 
another sector. Some examples might include drug use, religion, sexual expression 
and a host of other possible daily conflicts that can be categorised as "social 
behaviour" . 
In sum, there are generally three areas where conflict may emerge: social 
organisation; personal disagreements and social behaviours. 
Conflict resolution 
All of the above possible conflicts are generally regulated in a capitalist society 
by certain areas of law, namely, civil, criminal and administrative law. The general 
structure that guides legal decisions relies on the concept of juridic persons which 
reflect that: (1) individuals have sets of enforceable rights and duties; (2) individuals 
are completely responsible for their own actions; (3) breaches of any of the laws in 
the above areas involves some sort of punishment (fines, incarceration). 
While social customs, norms and morality play a part in the capitalist legal 
system and some would argue in the formulation of the law itself,3D it is generally 
accepted that the source of laws is the state and those laws are enforced by coercion. 
The legislature is responsible for making the law, the judiciary becomes responsible 
for interpreting the law and rendering its decisions according to internally derived 
30 For an interesting discussion and examples of case law regarding this point see William Reynold's 
Judicial Process (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1991) esp. pp. 124-143. 
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legal principles. Theoretically all such action takes place with general input from 
society in some form of "democratic control" in the conventional sense. Thus legal 
rules and laws regulating organisations, personal conflict and social behaviour are 
objectively as possible enforced by a judicial mechanism. 
The theorists reject virtually all of the above premises. Individuals are not 
guaranteed rights through a state mechanism, but rather can all exercise "rights" 
through direct control over society. With such control only individuals can 
determine what their needs, obligations and requisite actions are (both emotively 
and economically). Individuals are by nature, however, not completely responsible 
for their actions for these actions must operate within the confines of the economic 
system and social structure, which is dependent on cooperation, and are in part 
decided by necessity. Thus individual action intrinsically is connected to the social 
environment. Punishment does not actually rectify a conflict situation, but merely 
compensates in monetary form (either by loss of labour time or fines) for the 
perceived infraction. There is no institution that reflects the duties of the judiciary 
in communism. 
Conflict resolution incorporates a entirely different set of principles. What 
emerges is a society with no enforceable mechanism for deriving what social 
behaviours are acceptable or not. There is no mechanism for enforcing one "right" 
or "duty" above another or for determining what social "needs" are. All become 
definable only by the individual, hence obliterating the legal concepts of rights, 
obligations and duties. Thus suggestions that emerge do not reflect enforceable 
principles, and do not intrinsically entail prescribed duties or rights. 
Under such conditions, "conflict" does not take the form of deciding which 
values, duties or rights prevail, indeed it cannot, but rather indicates that social 
cohesion is disrupted and a solution must be sought. The solutions to these 
problems would bring some degree of social growth, or at least, social change. 
Conflict, then, no longer represents a clash of competing rights and duties in which 
case a "winner" must be decided, but rather becomes a method for social adjustment 
and possible growth. 
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Such a theoretical claim and its implications are difficult to grasp without 
concrete examples. Whilst such examples inherently involve structural elements 
which condition the situations, such elements have only been mentioned briefly. 
For the purpose of clarifying how conflicts would assume a different form than in 
capitalism, it is necessary to accept the theoretical premises of the previous 
discussion. Namely, that decisions have been successfully negotiated from 
individual input through the use of facilitating institutions. 
The first area of possible conflict discussed involved social organisation. For 
example, individuals in a sector decided that garbage needed to be collected once a 
week. To accomplish this, all residents chose to contribute two hours per month to 
remove the garbage. It was Lila's turn to remove the garbage. Lila did not remove 
the garbage. Noticing that Lila did not remove the garbage, her neighbour, Larry, 
performed the task. In fact, this was the third time Larry removed the garbage for 
Lila. Larry did not want to continue doing Lila's designated task. 
Under capitalism this conflict could be dealt with both in the civil and judicial 
realm. Larry could talk to Lila and try to get her to take out the garbage. If Lila had a 
sense of social obligation, that is if Lila felt she had an obligation to take out the 
garbage, Larry could probably talk her into it. If she did not, or felt that she should 
not take out the garbage, Larry's attempt would probably fail. Larry could then 
report Lila's actions to the city. The city would then most probably fine Lila for not 
removing the garbage. If the fine did not work the city might even imprison Lila for 
a time. It is hoped that the threat of these actions would prevent Lila from shirking 
her duties again. 
If Lila did not feel obligated to remove the garbage, the consequences might be 
social disapproval (which could result in economic consequences) or legal 
retribution. Legally, Lila's sense of obligation is irrelevant. Since it is the law to take 
out the garbage, Lila has a legal obligation to do it. If she does not complete the task, 
she will be financially or physically punished. The effectiveness of the legal decision 
relies on whether the punishment is enough of a detriment to prevent Lila from 
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breaking the law. The possible outcome would be either that Lila removes the 
garbage or that Lila is punished. If Lila removes the garbage, the problem has been 
"resolved". If Lila does not remove the garbage, the problem has not been solved 
but it has been legally resolved through punishment. 
Under regulation, Larry cannot report to the city to have Lila fined or arrested, 
what are his alternatives? The reason why Lila does not complete her task becomes 
paramount. Since Lila herself decided to contribute two hours to garbage collection, 
presumably she would carry out her decision unless: (1) she had a change of heart; 
(2) she had some problem with doing her task even though she wanted to. Since 
she has continuously not completed her garbage service it can be assumed the 
problem is long-term rather than a one-time occurrence. In the first instance, Larry 
could confront Lila and she could inform him that she has had a change of heart 
and will not be removing garbage anymore. Larry (or Lila) then reports this decision 
to the sanitation committee who then informs the other 149 people in the sector 
that two hours more time for garbage removal is needed per month. Each 
individual contributes what they feel they can. Most probably, some individuals 
from the other 149 possible participants will assume the extra two hours, or some 
compromise will have to occur. This could involve other people approaching Lila 
and trying to get her to contribute to garbage duty (if they knew it was she who was 
not collecting the garbage); or perhaps slightly changing the policy where those two 
hours could actually be eliminated. 
In the second case, where Lila actually does want to complete her task but does 
not, the root of the problem must be discovered. Say, for instance, that Lila had a 
chronic time management problem, and she never was able to manage to complete 
garbage removal on time. Since Lila truly desires to change this behaviour, she 
could enlist Larry's help in telling her when to remove the garbage. She could go to 
an arbitration committee and ask for help from other members of the sector in 
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making sure she completes her tasks. If time management is causing her other 
problems in her life, she can enlist the help of a counsellor. 
The possible outcomes of the situation is that garbage policy will be re-
negotiated or Lila will change her behaviour if she desires. In either case the conflict 
for Larry has been resolved and the need for removing garbage fulfilled. 
In capitalism, both social factors and legal ones may play a role in the possible 
approaches to the problem. In the legal realm, it did not matter whether Lila 
considered removal of the garbage her obligation or not. The fact is that the law 
states that it was her duty, which she did not fulfil. The result was punishment. 
The element of whether the law embodied a social norm or not is immaterial as the 
outcome is the same whether the law is "dictated" or socially derived. Thus while 
Lila's obligation might be "internal", -if she accepted that she should remove the 
garbage and hence might feel "guilt"-it does not matter in a strict legal sense 
whether she felt guilty or not. The situation in capitalism involves a theoretically 
"external" obligation (law) and an "internal" one (Lila). The end result of the legal 
system was punishment, which resolved the situation legally, but may not have 
deterred Lila enough to change her behaviour, leaving the situation in actuality, 
unresolved in that Lila did not change her behaviour and garbage was not removed. 
The situation as described in communism is vastly different. If Lila feels that 
she has no obligation to participate in garbage removal, there is, in essence, no 
obligation. While society (in this case the sector) anticipates that Lila will contribute 
two hours because she indicated that she would, this expectation is not a duty (as 
duties can only be decided by individually determined obligation) and hence society 
cannot expect Lila to carry out garbage removal as a right. In theory, Lila's decision 
not to participate in garbage collection will not be judged, either institutionally or 
socially. Institutionally it cannot be judged given the power structure of 
communism. Socially it is argued that actions will become, as Chris Arthur puts it, 
"expressions of free subjectivity". Even in the event that negotiation over garbage 
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collection turned out to be very difficult and the sector did express resentment 
towards Lila for her change of heart, only Lila can determine her obligation as there 
is no social means to force Lila to change her behaviour if she does not desire to. It 
is clear the theorists would suggest in this case, that because of a heightened sense of 
the necessity of social cooperation, Lila, for the sake of social goals, probably would 
participate in garbage collection if her decision not to caused a lot of trouble, even if 
she did not desire to participate in this particular manner. Pashukanis implies, that 
if she did not, there might be "problem" and one that would have to be "treated". 
The key theoretical point is, however, that only Lila can decide whether or not she is 
obligated to do the task. She can only be "treated" for this "problem" if she desires it, 
as would be the case if she thought time management was a chronic problem of 
hers. The only influence society can exert is social disapproval, which might or 
might not result in Lila resuming her collection of garbage. Such individually 
determined obligation may be highly influenced by the rest of society (or in this case, 
the sector) if the theorists predictions of the development of social consciousness are 
correct; nevertheless the ultimate source of obligation is only the individual, albeit 
one that is integrally linked to a more connected whole. 
In capitalist legal structure a clear distinction can be seen between a "social" 
approach to the problem and a "legal" one demonstrating Marx's claim that society 
is falsely divided into the "civil" and "political" realms. If the "social" approach to 
the problem does not work, force is then used, which does not always result in 
"resolution" of the problem. The goal of such a justice system would appear to be to 
mete out punishment fairly, which is rather different from one to provide as many 
avenues as possible to resolve the problem. Indeed, in a capitalist legal system there 
is no guarantee the problem actually will be resolved (as is the case if Lila continues 
to not remove garbage, despite punishment). 
In regulation, if the situation is regarded as a conflict, something will change 
to actually resolve the core problem; either garbage policy will be re-negotiated or 
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Lila will change her behaviour willingly (for whatever reasons). In both cases 
garbage removal will occur and Larry's problem will be solved. There is no "legal" 
or "social" dichotomy. 
The second realm of conflict discussed involved "crimes of passion". Such 
conflicts are approached in capitalism in a variety of ways, some through criminal 
law others through civil law, or both. Let us use as an example a case of murder. 
Leon and Joe are deeply in love with the same woman. Leon accidentally witnesses 
Joe making love to the woman with whom he is in love. In a blind fit of rage, Leon 
kills Joe. In capitalism Leon would face criminal charges. The family of Joe would 
also have the option of filing a civil suit, if it could afford one, against Leon for a 
variety of damages (e.g., non-economic, punitive, etc.). At the criminal level Leon 
would most probably face jail time or possibly death; on the civil level, Leon most 
probably would have to pay compensation. 
Under regulation, the sector would have to decide whether Leon would kill 
again. The only way this could be determined would be if Leon felt remorse at his 
action.31 If he felt guilt, presumably he would not want to kill again, and would try 
various methods to try to control his "blind rage". If he were not remorseful, he 
would fall under the classification of psychopathy and would be clinically mentally 
ill.32 Pashukanis indicated that force might be used under the circumstances of 
"protection of society." Such a case seems to include the one above, in which case 
Joe's murder would not be one of a crime of passion, but rather a result of a 
mentally ill, violent person. Although such an issue is relevant and will be 
discussed subsequently,33 it is beyond the purview of "normal" conflicts and will be 
left aside for the moment. 
31 Bertell OIlman suggests that self-guilt will be at such a level that the community duty may be to 
console the offender. See "Marx's Vision of Communism: A Reconstruction" in Critique 8 (Summer, 
1977) p. 32. For comments on the minimum need for coordination see pp. 30-34. 
32 See Psychiatric Dictionary, ed., Robert Campbell, M.D. (London: Oxford University Press, 1981) p. 
507. 
33 See "COMPLEXITIES OF REGULATION", "Violence" in this chapter. 
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The aim of the legal system focuses primarily on determining the 
punishment of Leon which cannot have any affect on Joe. On the criminal level, 
Leon's jail term or death would not bring Joe back to life, and more importantly 
would not teach Leon how to control his rage. Whilst internment might remove 
Leon for a limited time from society (so he could not kill another, or rather kill 
another "free" citizen), he would still be a violent person upon leaving prison; and 
in fact, might even be more violent.34 Death would not resolve the problem, but 
rather ruthlessly eliminate its cause in this one particular case. On the civil level, 
"damages" would have no relevance in a society where a monetary system is not in 
operation. Both for the victim (who is dead) and the assaulter (who has 
uncontrollable rage) neither fines, jail time or death addresses the problem. The 
root cause of the murder, jealousy, is not ever addressed in the outcome of the legal 
process, though it may playa limited role in determining the criminal's sentence. 
In regulation, the approach to the situation would reflect the goal of 
preventing Leon from killing again by his own desire which would invariably focus 
on the root cause of the situation-jealousy, and its outcome-uncontrollable rage. 
It is important to note that despite the gravity of the situation, the source for 
obligation is the same, Leon. 
The third area of conflict involves patterns of conflicting social behaviour or 
values. In capitalism, social behaviour is regulated by social, economic and legal 
mechanisms. Socially, certain behaviours are not acceptable even though they are 
not legally enforceable and have no economic repercussions. An example of such a 
social behaviour is sending wishes to one's mother on Mother's day. It is SOcially 
expected that children should contact their mothers in some way on Mother's Day. 
A similar example can occur in non-governmental social institutions. For instance, 
if some one is devoutly religious s/he is expected to go to church. Neither of these 
34 See Thomas Mathiesen, Prison on Trial (London: Sage Publications, 1990) esp. p. 151; and for an 
examination of psychological stress in prison, Hans Toch, et al., Men in Crisis (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing, 1975). 
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examples are presently legally enforced. If son and daughters do not contact their 
mothers on Mother's Day and members do not go to church the only consequences 
they have to face stem from social, or institutional disapproval and self-guilt. 
Behaviour can also be controlled via statutes which explicitly make certain actions 
such as drug use or nudity punishable by law. In these situations, individuals may 
face social disapproval as well as legal consequences. Behaviour can also be 
controlled by the operating political and economic power structure. For instance, 
employees of a firm may be required to wear ties or dress nicely. Males may be 
expected to have short hair. Though there may be no law enforcing such dress codes 
(especially if such codes are not in the contract), and whilst social mores may not 
condemn casual dress or hair length, those that do not conform to the expectations 
of the firm may jeopardise their chances at obtaining a job or retaining employment 
at such a firm. 
In regulation, this differentiation does not exist. Individuals face 
consequences of certain behaviours only on a social level, as an individual 
functioning in the context of a cohesive integrated whole. Certain modes of 
behaviour in regulation cannot result in punishment or loss of economic 
opportunity. Nevertheless, certain behaviours may be disruptive to the social fabric. 
Such disruptions are handled in a capitalist system by the outlawing of certain 
actions, the threat of economic repercussions as well as social disapproval. In 
regulation only the latter may be a factor. Such situations would most probably 
require the generation of some sort of compromise. 
For example, Citizen Rastafarian moves into the neighbourhood where drug 
use is not common. It is part of his religion to smoke marijuana daily. Citizen 
Rasta grows his own marijuana and gives it to anyone who would like to use it. 
Citizen Mum has two children who constantly see Citizen Rasta smoking on his 
porch. Her children like Citizen Rasta and go to visit him often. She is nervous 
that he might offer them marijuana. Citizen Mum does not particularly care for 
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Citizen Rasta, and does not want herself or her children exposed to the drug in any 
way but Citizen Rasta smokes openly. 
In capitalism, the situation would be handled in several ways. If marijuana 
was against the law, Citizen Mum could call the police and Citizen Rasta could be 
arrested the result of which would be jail time or a fine. If marijuana was socially 
unacceptable to a high degree she could call Citizen Rasta's employer and report his 
marijuana use in the hopes of using the threat of his loss of work to reform his 
behaviour. She could also talk to him about her concerns and try to derive some 
solution. 
In regulation, only the third option would be open to her. They both could 
also go to arbitration to gain help in trying to resolve the situation. Citizen Rasta 
could make sure not to smoke in front of Citizen Mum's children. A certain park 
could be designated for the purpose of smoking marijuana. Citizen Rasta could 
construct a more protected area by his house that he could use. Citizen Rasta could 
move to an area where there were other Rastafarians or where marijuana use was 
more prevalent. Citizen Mum could move to another area. 
In a capitalist legal system, jail time might solve the immediate situation in 
that Citizen Mum would not witness his use of marijuana. It does not, however, 
address the larger problems of how two dichotomous social values can operate 
together in relative peace. The fining of Citizen Rasta would not guarantee either 
the immediate or long-term outcome, nor would the loss of Citizen Rasta's job. 
The theory of regulation suggests that given the social disruption caused by 
parties with opposite lifestyles, some sort of solution must be sought by virtue of the 
need to preserve the cooperation necessary for the social system (including the 
economy) to function. In this way a regulatory system does not proscribe certain 
behaviours, but rather tries to manage social discord. Thus obligation does not 
involve adherence to prescribed behaviours, but rather proceeds from individual 
choices made within an economic system that must maintain cooperation, even in 
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light of vast differences. In fact, with regard to the above example, if marijuana use 
in Citizen Rasta's immediate vicinity was wide-spread, the "problem" would not 
exist. 
General description 
While these examples are simple and their explanations equally so, such 
comparisons begin to elucidate the theoretical differences between regulation and 
law (as defined by the theorists). Whilst the law assumes objective form in 
determining the rights, duties and obligations of people, regulation relies on the 
principle that individuals are the ultimate authority. Lifestyles, needs, wants, work 
style, behaviour, sense of productivity and accomplishment, etc. can not be 
measured in any concrete way (e.g. economic rewards, institutional definition of 
rights and obligations). 
This raises interesting implications in terms of responsibility. If society has 
no mechanism for determining, evaluating and enforcing responsibility, how could 
it possibly function as a society? As explained previously by the theorists, 
individuals are not completely "free" in terms of their actions. Their actions take 
place within definitive economic and social relations. which are generally governed 
by the necessity of cooperation. Actions and goals are also conditioned by necessity 
itself (e.g., food must be produced). It is evident the theorists believed that this sense 
of cooperation, operating within the realm of necessity, this consciousness, would 
condition individual choices so that cooperation could still be maintained. If 
cooperation were not maintained to the degree that communism could function, 
then individuals would be making active choices which reject this goal. Thus, if it 
is desired to maintain communism, cooperation must be operative. 
The purpose of institutions of regulation cannot be to decide which sets of 
rights and duties prevail, as in essence there are no defined rights and duties. 
Individual actions involve both the individual and the rest of society. A conflict 
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involves either a change in the individual, a change in social organisation or both. 
For instance, with Citizen Rasta, he is not expected to stop smoking marijuana, nor 
is Citizen Mum expected to accept marijuana usage. There is no one individual 
responsible for this situation. The solution involves either a restructuring of their 
immediate social circumstances (relocation), or a compromise where both must 
change their behaviour in some way. Regulation focuses on the cause of the 
situation rather than the outcome of a situation.35 
Pashukanis states that in communism various concepts such as laws, social 
norms, culture or morals become unnecessary. Since the source of all authority is, 
in the final analysis, the individual operating in a cooperative whole; ethics, 
culture, law and social norms are melded, and lose distinction. This is not to say all 
moral, legal and social values will disappear. Indeed, through social consciousness 
many values which have developed through the history of human civilisation-in 
legal, social or moral form-might be carried through to socialism (hence Reisner's 
claim that in one way, law will not 1/ disappear"). Other practices might be weeded 
out. Their various forms, however, become unnecessary. 
It is apparent that the theorists considered the socialist human to be a vastly 
different creature from the capitalist one. The theorists imply that given the far 
healthier state of the society, conflict will not, for the most part, assume emotively 
dangerous levels (as in the case of Leon murdering Joe). They argue that if people 
are engaged in generally fulfilling work, are not suffering from any substantial 
economic difficulties, and feel a sense of parity with fellow members in a 
cooperative venture, that the conflicts would not be irreparably divisive, and would 
be approached with an eye to generating an acceptable resolution. 
35 Such a dichotomy manifests itself in current legal systems. In jury trials, lawyers often stress the 
cause of an accused's actions to ameliorate the possible consequences of that action. While such 
methods, so far, have not had direct affect on legally proscribed punishments, it does playa role 
in plea bargaining. The "legally insane" defence is an extreme example of an individual not being 
held responsible for actions at a given moment. Such considerations also come into play in 
determining premeditation. 
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The theorists also seem to imply that "social consciousness" will create a 
certain social unity in individually determined senses of social obligation, at least in 
basic ways (such as following policies that work, treating each other with respect). 
Such descriptions by the theorists have led to some rather odd conclusions that 
"social unity" implies "no diversity". Given that the premise of socialism is that no 
one is equal and authoritative values can only stem from individuals, such a 
statement hardly seems the case. What evolves is a social order that needs 
cooperation as desperately as a capitalist one needs individual competition. With 
this development of group inter-reliance, it is difficult to predict how diverse or 
similar human behaviour would be, especially given that choices would have no 
coercive or economically punitive repercussions.36 It is also impossible to know 
whether this diversity can be managed enough to produce a viable economic and 
social system. Only history might be able to answer such questions. There are a few 
difficulties, however, that should at least theoretically addressed. 
COMPLEXITIES OF REGULATION 
Despite the fact that individuals cannot be coerced into following policies, 
completing tasks or behaving in certain ways, the theorists stress that social 
consciousness will be more highly developed and individuals will thus be greatly 
influenced by their fully integrated social environment. Whilst it was discussed 
how this social consciousness was not external to the individual, the fact that it 
could be a persuasive force was also raised. Could such a force ever approach the 
theorists' definition of political power (power of one individual over another)? 
36 Current research suggests that socialisation greatly conditions human behaviour. See Robert Heiss 
and Judith Tourney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing, 1967) pp. 217-220. Also, Stanley Moore, et al., The Child's Political World (New 
York: Praeger Publishing, 1985) esp. pp. 134-137. Beatrice White and Carolyn Edwards, et al., 
conduct an interesting cross-cultural comparison of what affects children's behaviour with 
specific regard to gender. Although they do not state that cultural socialisation is the only factor 
in behaviour, they do stress its importance. See Children of Different Worlds (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1988) esp. pp. 267-279. 
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Though the theorist indicated that it could not, the issue should be discussed in 
more depth. 
Similarly, the theorists indicate that diverse individual choices will not be 
disruptive enough to destroy the social structure. Such a claim should be 
investigated more thoroughly. The question of whether compromise is always a 
possibility should be addressed; for if it is not, it is possible there are some situations 
that might involve coercion. 
Violence 
The examples presented above illustrate problems that might occur in 
everyday communist life many of which are legal issues today. What of more tragic 
"conflicts" such as murder, rape, or assault? As stated before, the theorists respond 
to this question by claiming that most violent crime is caused by the social 
conditions and coercive authoritarian structure produced by capitalism and that 
with the advent of socialist production relations, these crimes will simply not occur. 
The idea is well-represented in the school of critical criminology (some of 
which are Marxist based, some of which are not).37 William Chambliss in "Toward 
a Political Economy of Crime" argues that crime has become a "rational response of 
some social classes to the realities of their lives."38 Along these lines, Taylor, 
Walton and Young in The New Criminology39 maintain that the label "criminal" is 
strictly conditioned by the social environment in which it arises. "Crime," they 
37 For a survey of critical criminology see Radical Issues in Criminology, eds., P. Carlen and M. Collison 
(New Jersey: Barnes and Nobel Books, 1980); especially useful is Pat Carlen's "Radical 
Criminology, Penal Politics and the Rule of Law", pp. 7-24. See also Critical Criminology, eds., 
Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). For an 
analysis of class and crime see Richard Quinney, Class, State and Crime (New York: David 
McKay, 1977). For an overview and critique of the class factor in crime see Joseph Weis, "Social 
Class and Crime" in Positive Criminology, eds., Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987) pp. 71-90. For a critique of radical Criminology from a 
Marxist perspective see Paul Hirst, "Marx and Engels on law, crime and morality" in Economy and 
Society, Vol. I, No.1 (February, 1972) pp. 28-56. 
38 William Chambliss, "Toward a Political Economy of Crime" in The Sociology of Law: A Conflict 
Perspective, p. 209 
39 For the effects of these arguments on penology see Gordon Hawkins, "The new penology" in Law and 
Society, pp. 108-127. 
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argue, "is ever and always that behaviour seen to be problematic within the 
framework of those social arrangements: for crime to be abolished, then, those social 
arrangements must also be subject to fundamental change."40 They call for a society 
where "the facts of human diversity whether personal, organic or social, are not 
subject to the power to criminalize."41 Robert Brown sums up the conclusion of the 
New Criminologists: 
They believe that the sorts of behaviour which are made subject to the penalty of the 
criminal law in Western industrial societies are those that threaten the property rights and 
privileges of the power-holding groups ... Working-class offenders are treated as serious 
threats to the social order whereas middle-class criminals are treated as being mischievous. 
Thus it is no mystery, the indictment concludes, why criminals come to be thought of as 
predominantly young, working-class males.42 
Such arguments as these indicate that there is no essential "criminal" character, and 
with the radical social changes procured in communism, "criminals" will vanish. 
Supporting their claims are the psycholOgists who assert that violence is a 
learned behaviour. Though this school of thought does not make the connection to 
economics, they do assert that if children are raised in a violent environment, 
regardless of their economic standing, they will emulate adults and respond with 
violence in certain situations. Hence, if children are raised in a "non-violent" 
environment, violent response would be severely lowered.43 
Opposing the sociological view is the psychological or biopsychological 
approach to criminal behaviour. Hans Eysenck and Gisli Gudjonsson point out that 
while "victimless" crimes may be subjectively subordinate to the desires of the state, 
"victimful" crimes (resulting in direct injury to others) might be considered 
40 Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New Criminology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1973) p. 282 
41 Ibid., p. 282 
42 Robert Brown, "The new criminology" in Law and Society, p. 84 
43 See Wilfried Belschner, "Learning and Aggression" in The Human Making of Aggression, ed., 
Herbert Selg (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) pp. 61-103, d. p. 100. Also, John Gardner and 
Moira Gray, "Violence Towards Children", Developments in the Study of Criminal Behaviour 
(vol. 2), ed., Philip Feldman (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1982) pp. 1-43, esp. pp. 17-18,38. 
For an integrative approach to violence see Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, "The Sub-
culture of Violence" in The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency, eds., Marvin Wolfgang, et al. 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970) pp. 380-391. 
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"objective".44 They then explore this objective element of crime from a 
psychological perspective. Whilst accepting the premise that social conditions are 
not to be ignored, they stress that any social changes" can only influence conduct 
along psychological pathways and are hence subject to psychoanalysis." 45 
Approaching "victimful" crimes from a psychological basis, there does seem to be 
some evidence to suggest that biological, psychological and genetic factors play a role 
in criminal behaviour.46 Although their conclusions in no way assure that violent 
behaviour will continue in a non-violent environment, they do suggest that even 
in a society where aggression is severely discouraged, a potential might exist for 
violent behaviour. 
The regulation system seems ill-equipped to deal with some one who acts 
violently. There are several examples that might be expected to arise even in a 
cooperative environment. The first example would be one of mental illness, as was 
the case with Leon, who killed Joe out of rage, but was not remorseful (psychopath). 
A second could involve "random acts" of violence. For example, Citizen AK-47, for 
some unknown reason (even to himself) killed several people walking in the park. 
Whether the killings had a "motive" or not, problems would arise if there was a 
strong possibility that Leon or Citizen AK-47 would kill again. 
Pashukanis was the only one of the theorists to address this issue at all. He 
suggested that the "unity of purpose" principle is obvious in this case in that the 
survival of society's members is at stake. Hence coercion, most probably internment 
44 Hans Eysenck and Gisli Gudjonsson, The Causes and Cures of Criminality (New York: Plenum Press, 
1989) p. 2 
45 Ibid., p. 8 
46 Ibid., biological influence, pp. 109-140; genetic, pp. 91-108; psychological, pp. 17-89. See David 
Lykken, "Fearlessness" in Psychology Today, Vol. 16, No.9 (September, 1982) pp. 20-28 for a 
genetic vs environmental assessment of psychopathy. See Bill McGarvey, et al., "Rearing, Social 
Class, Education, and Criminality: A Multiple Indicator Model" in Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, Vol. 10, No.4 (August, 1981) pp. 354-364 which ties educational performance with 
criminal behaviour and Terrie Moffitt, et al., "Socioeconomic Status, IQ and Delinquency" in 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. 90, No.2 (April, 1981) pp. 152-156 who relate IQ to 
delinquency directly. See also a collection of essays regarding genetic and biological factors in 
criminal behaviour, The Causes of Crime, eds., S. A. Mednick, T. E. Moffitt and S. A. Stack 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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and treatment (if possible), could be used without the implication that this force is 
external and politicaL He does stipulate, however, that the "patient" must also be in 
agreement to the use of this coercion. In other words, Leon or Citizen AK-47 must 
agree to be interned and treated in order to protect society. If the killer feels no 
remorse, the likelihood of this happening may be minimal. Such" agreement" 
would also indicate that parties were capable of making this decision. If they were 
mentally ill such ability might be in question. It is clear that mental illness would be 
defined by science as much as possible. It is possible that many mentally ill patients 
would seek treatment voluntarily. For those who do not seek treatment and 
physically threaten society, regulation provides no predetermined solution. 
One point that could be made is violence due to mental illness is, even today, 
the exception not the rule. The rare occurrence of a violent situation does not 
necessitate a standing police force, and that as situations arise, a citizen committee 
can be discharged to handle it. Coercion would be used only in the most extreme of 
circumstances and would not generally characterise the decision-making process, 
nor would it assume institutional form. 
Undue influence 
Given that there are administrative organs which gather input, manage 
negotiations, provide information and facilitate derivation of policies or policy 
choices (much like the role of a committee chairpersont at some point a person 
would have to act as chair or manager. Would these managers gain undue 
influence to the point of threatening direct control? 
Marx suggested several direct steps to prevent these managers from gaining 
undue control: (1) any and all citizens could serve as managers; (2) the positions 
would be rotated often; (3) citizens could remove managers at any time and; (4) the 
managers would not receive any direct economic benefit for serving. The 
requirement that all general policy is dependent on individually determined 
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commitment would also reduce abuse concerns. It should also be pointed out that 
managers are not making decisions, and their function is merely to facilitate policy 
discussion or fulfilment. By the nature of the task, their "power" is limited and 
retains more of an "authoritative" quality. 
Paramount to participative decision-making is awareness of the subject at 
hand. Much information may be required to make decisions in certain fields such 
as environmental policy. Presumably, there would be specialists with superior 
knowledge of environmental dangers. Information committees could be organised 
to present data applicable to specific issues. Control over information, as pointed 
out by Weber, could be a potential source of power abuse. A specialist could 
withhold certain facts, or not clearly present information. Since specialists are not 
actually making policy, but providing information to individuals so that they can 
make policy, it is in the self-interest of the environmental specialist to present facts 
as clearly and fully as possible in order to generate a "good" policy. After all, the 
effects of decisions would be experienced by specialists as well. This being the case, 
deliberate sabotage would not be in a specialist's self-interest. 
If plan A simply did not work, perhaps due to the incomplete job of the 
environmental specialist, then another strategy would have to be devised by virtue 
of necessity. Eventually the alternative that produced the best possible result would 
be sought. With this being the sole motive in operation, then, although certain 
individuals would possess information, this information must be disseminated in 
order for policy to be made. By nature of the decision-making process, they could 
have no inordinate long-term control over information. 
Although some talented managers or information specialists might gain 
more personal influence in the polity, they could not gain economic control over 
anyone else, nor exert coercive authority over another. Obviously, many mistakes 
will be made, but as the theorists argue, the mistakes would be the responsibility of 
all and would have to be directly responsive to individual desires and needs. The 
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case of one citizen being more respected than another, or more admired may arise, 
but there are no political or economic ramifications of this influence. It is also quite 
possible, the other citizens would regard a particularly organisationally minded 
individual as simply that-a particularly talented individual with regard to 
management, as opposed to citizen B who is musical, or citizen C who is good at 
cooking. Citizen A, B, and C have the same privileges, hence their differences are 
not grounded in "power", but personality. 
Such a system might not avoid hierarchy all together. Some citizens would 
participate in more committees than others. Some might not be interested in any 
decision-making. Those with greater knowledge, more talented articulation, more 
self-confidence might be able better to persuade others and exert control this way. 
Given these possibilities, perhaps a hierarchy would develop in such an 
administrative system, but one that would not physically or economically coerce 
individuals. 
If an overall policy is not accepted by all those involved, say if a minority 
changed their minds with regard to a previous decision, will de Tocqueville's 
"tyranny of the majority" emerge? Given the nature of the decision-making 
process, it would be impossible for a majority to gain power over a minority. 
Administrative suggestions are not "voted on" per se,47 because they are not derived 
by institutions. If individuals disagree with policy, they are not forced, either 
economically or legally, to follow it; and by virtue of the decision-making process, 
policy must include their input. Thus "tyranny of the majority" could not arise by 
nature of the process itself. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing opinions of the majority might influence 
individuals. Whilst all actions might become "expressions of free subjectivity", 
47 Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel raise the excellent point that a "yes" or "no" vote would be 
difficult in some general policy issues, e.g. the environment. Given only a yes / no option, 
important opportunities to compromise might be missed. See Socialism Today and Tomorrow (no 
place: South End Press, 1981) p. 275. They also discuss a "network" approach to organisation 
similar to the one I have postulated (p. 271). 
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there might be cases where an individual choice conflicts with the feelings of a 
majority of people in the sector (or area). Certain "public pressure" may arise in 
some situations. It is important to note, however, that although this pressure may 
influence individuals, especially if they are sensitive, it cannot assume political 
power by virtue of the decision-making process itself. Since power is completely 
diffused, the degree that public pressure influences individuals is determined only 
by the individual. 
Given that all policy is an outcome of compromise, hence an individual's 
desire must be accommodated in some way, it is implied that mutually exclusive 
choices would not arise. Whilst all desires may not be met in full, they can at least 
be met in part. This is dictated by virtue of policy formation itself in that all input 
determines policy. 
Diversity 
The motive of a needs-based production basis and the social organisation 
which accompanies it is improvement of society through meeting the desires of 
individuals. What is defined as "improvement of society", or "desires of 
individuals" however, may be extremely diverse, even to the point of mutual 
exclusion. Though it is not beyond all possibility that there is a basic human 
character (perhaps what Finnis suggests in his seven basic goods)48 what 
environment would provide a condition where this character could develop or the 
exact way in which needs are met may be extremely different for various 
individuals. As Peter Binns points out, if decision-making is to be direct and not 
controlled centrally, conflict, debate, disagreement will actually increase. He writes, 
"Socialism will eliminate irreconcilable, class conflicts, but at the same time it will 
foster and nurture the articulation of other human conflicts because only through 
such a conflict can our social goals become rational and conscious."49 In such a 
48 See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
49 Peter Binns, "Law and Marxism" in Capital and Class, Issue 10 (Spring, 1980), p. 111 
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system a variety of solutions might be required to fulfil the distinct demands of 
different areas. 
The theorists provide little help in this respect. Whilst they argue that the 
need for social cooperation would be enough to regulate a society that was dedicated 
to human freedom (that is a society relieved from the burden of survival and able to 
"work" for advancement only), they did not address how diversity was to be 
handled. The point is an important one. A definition of a "unity of purpose" may 
be impossible to derive (even given a rational framework).50 Whilst the "technical 
rules" offered by Pashukanis's approach may be effective once the goal is decided, 
this approach does not help much in deciding what the goal is. Pashukanis's (and to 
some degree Lenin's) assumptions that social goals are readily discernible leads him 
to the conclusion that rules (necessary actions) will arise by nature of the goal itself; 
and thus would be, for the most part, determined by science. Rational options for 
the achievement of goals, and even the goals themselves, however, might be too 
diverse to gain any unity of purpose. Hence, the critics argue, the concept of 
technical rules is inadequate.51 With the amount of potential diversity, the need for 
strong regulation for the smooth functioning of society seems to be all the more 
necessary. 
Part of the problem stems from the misperception that "social unity" must 
reflect complete social unity. The inference that common values will emerge in 
socialist society is present in many of the theorists' writings. All they explicitly 
require, however, is unity in the basic goal that the economic system should provide 
for needs. Given that the foundation for Marx's critique of law is that individuals 
are inherently unequal and different and can only be categorised as "equal" in the 
abstract, the perception that Marx might be implying that all individuals will evolve 
to the point of complete similitude is well off the mark. Marx's concern with the 
50 For problems of rationality and choices see W. L. Morison, "Frames of reference for legal ideals" in 
Law and Society eds., Eugene Kamenka, et al. (London: Edward Arnold, 1978) pp. 18-42, esp. 33-
34. 
51 See Binns, pp. 110-111. 
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unfettered development of individual achievement and the need to be released 
from an economic system that equalises individuals in the form of things does not 
lend itself to the assumption that all people will eventually be unified in their needs 
and goals. In fact, the very premise of needs-based production is that only 
individuals can establish what they need or want or desire. The motto to each 
according to one's need from each according to one's abilities seeks to abandon social 
judgements of individual traits (e.g., "lazy" or "productive" or "greedy"). One of the 
tenets of regulation is to exclude subjective categorisation of some behaviour as 
"criminal". The theoretical premise of regulation is that only individuals can 
determine obligations. These points clearly indicate recognition of diversity is the 
underlying principle behind relegating life choices solely to individuals. 
Since consensus is not demanded, but rather compromise is, the inquiry 
regarding the diversity question has to be reformulated to address the possibility of 
situations where compromise or some sort of solution is absolutely unattainable. 
Given that the general rule emerging from a communist economic system is a 
commitment to a production for needs, the only mutually exclusive choice would 
appear to be production for profit. In order for communism to exist a vast majority 
of society must support a system that produces for need. Thus it can be safely 
assumed that individuals in a communist society who would want to compete for 
resources52 would be a small minority. The theorists assumed that given the 
opportunity of guaranteed economic sustenance and a method for pursuing 
individual interests unimpeded by ideological or economic restrictions, no 0 n e 
would want capitalism; indeed after a millennium or so people might not even 
emotively know what it was. If, however, a minority of individuals would want to 
52 It is important to recognise that systematic competition for resources is different from the quality of 
competitiveness in individuals. There is no reason to believe that competition between 
individuals would cease in communism. This competition, however, would not assume economic or 
political form. 
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establish an exploitative economic system, there is no reason why a certain suitable 
area of the world could not be donated for this purpose.53 
Other questions of diversity would not necessarily rupture the social fabric to the 
point that the economy would fail. Alan Hunt in, "A Socialist Interest in Law", 
questions whether a regulation based on a Marxist position could succeed in managing 
diversity. He sums up the Marxist position: 
... the transcendence of class antagonism would create conditions conducive to natural and 
spontaneous cooperation, under which the external constraints of state and law would 
wither away. The resulting set of social relations would exhibit a fundamental 
simplification of the problems of social coordination.54 
He critiques this position: 
The drawback is that this vision ignores all other sources of structural social conflict; after 
all, are we not only too aware today of the intractability of conflicts generated by ethnicity, 
gender, religion and nationalism? But perhaps it is the projected simplification of social 
coordination that has the most dangerous ramifications. The disappearance of class 
antagonisms is presumed to leave only non-antagonistic conflicts that are resolvable through 
consensual mechanisms of democratic participation. But is this a warrantable assumption? I 
would suggest not.55 
Hunt seems to misinterpret the notion emanating from Marx and reiterated by the 
Russian theorists that with the demise of capitalist production relations, social 
relations will become more simplified. Marx spoke little of the construction of 
communism, hardly mentioning how, exactly, socialist institutions would be 
coordinated. The premise that relations will be simplified stems from the fact that 
there will no longer be the dichotomy between public and private, between citizen 
and juridic subject, between individual and society. Varying forms of rules such as 
"law", "norm", "moral", etc. will become redundant. In this way social relations 
will be Simplified. The method of social coordination, however, may be more 
complex, but this does not affect the fact that social functions are integrated. 
Hunt is mistaken in assuming that the Marxist position ignores differences of 
"intractable" conflicts caused by ethnicity, gender, religion and nationalism. The 
53 Timothy O'Hagan in The End of Law? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) discusses the problem of 
preserving diversity of lifestyles. 
54 Alan Hunt, II A Socialist Interest in Law", New Left Review, No. 192 (March-April, 1992) p. 113 
55 Ibid. 
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point that regulation brings to the forefront is what form would these differences 
assume in a society where race, religion, ethnicity and nationality have absolutely 
no economic ramifications and where the decision-making process excludes 
political power and occurs in an economic environment which requires 
cooperation? Would they then be considered "intractable"? 
Hunt claims that with the disappearance of class antagonisms all conflict can 
be resolved by "consensual mechanisms." To reiterate an earlier point, the process 
of decision-making would most likely involve compromise rather than consensus. 
Also, the ceasing of class antagonism ends irreconcilable conflicts (primarily the 
dichotomy of economic purpose that exists in capitalism). This is not to say that all 
conflict will be resolved or disappear. Even if a future society rendered the 
differences between race or gender non-antagonistic, no doubt other problematic 
situations would arise. The fact that a cooperative productive society establishes the 
framework where the resolution of fundamental differences is possible does not 
assume that all of them will be resolved; but they must be resolved to the point 
where society can adequately function. 
How this might occur is not apparent It is conceivable that those with 
similar values will end up living in areas which support their particular 
behaviours. Similarly, various religious cults, races and ethnicities might 
"naturally" group together. Undoubtedly this question-whether outright 
embracement of diversity or segregation would prevail-simply cannot be 
answered. It is clear however, that individuals with vastly different values will 
have to co-exist. 
Rights and obligation 
Problems of diversity and conflict have been traditionally addressed through 
the concepts of rights. Christine Sypnowich in The Concept of Socialist Law 
explores the rights argument from the socialist perspective. She concludes that 
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rights have a place in socialism.56 The position seems in direct contradiction to 
Marx's complete contempt for the notion of bourgeois rights, even though he 
realised that rights were the apex of development in non-socialist period of 
history.57 If discussion is to remain firmly grounded in Marxist legal theory, a 
theory of "socialist" rights is indefensible. 
Sypnowich seeks to "refute the idea advanced by socialists, and particularly 
Marxists, that an ideal socialist society would have no need of law."58 Sypnowich is 
rightly concerned with the absence of a Marxist response to what the ideal socialist 
society would actually entail and what sort of socialist polity would develop. She 
begins with the assertion that legal and political spheres will not be dissolved, but 
rather radically reconstructed. 59 Sypnowich argues that while the critique of 
capitalist law has merit, there are certain positive aspects of the institution of law, 
namely that it can be a mediator of conflict and a protector of individual rights, that 
are necessary in socialism. Given that conflict is possible in socialism, as a mediator, 
law seems to have a place. "Regulation" may fall prey to an overwhelming social 
pressure that might abuse individual interests. She is concerned that "anti-social" 
citizens may be forced into "behavioural correctional" centres and an abuse of 
freedoms may take place (she uses ample examples. of the Soviet Union on this 
matter). Hence what arises from Sypnowich's argument is a desire to eliminate 
capitalist exploitative economic relations, yet retain the liberal concern for 
individual rights that evolved in capitalism. 
Sypnowich avers that the antagonism of socialism and rights is a result of the 
conceptual evolution of rights under capitalism. Human rights that emanate from 
private property seem to have no place in a set of socialist principles.60 Rights, 
56 As do Alan Hunt, Tom Campbell, Alice Em Soon-Tay and Eugene Kamenka. Paul Hirst calls for the 
preservation of law, but not in terms of rights. 
57 Alice Em-Soon Tay makes this point in "Marxism, Socialism and Human Rights" in Human Rights, 
eds., Eugene Kamenka and Alice Em-Soon Tay (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978) p. 105. 
58 Cmistine Sypnowich, The Concept of Socialist Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p. vii 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 109 
224 
however, that are derived from what Sypnowich identifies as "a conception of 
human dignity"61 could easily be assimilated into the socialist paradigm. She 
defines human dignity as requiring a minimum of material well-being, as being 
self-determining and as having realised individual "potential as a creative social 
being."62 Sypnowich generalises this sense of human dignity with the notion that 
we are free to develop our capacities. Inherent to this freedom is not only negative 
liberties (assembly, freedom of speech) but also positive ones as well (adequate 
income, education, medical care, etc.). "Socialist rights" would, therefore, 
incorporate both the negative liberties (developed through capitalist liberalism) and 
the positive liberties (incorporated in socialist production principles).63 Sypnowich 
further stipulates that the source of rights is in accordance with socialist philosophy. 
The term "rights," she argues, "while seemingly constant and eternal (thus 
'natural'), changes in its meaning from one society to the next. Because human 
rights are historically conditioned, they are capable of expansions and enrichment as 
human beings in societies imagine new ways of living and acquire the resources to 
translates these imaginings into practical accomplishments."64 Thus it should be 
noted that Sypnowich's suggestions as to the characteristics that define human 
dignity are considerations that are subordinate to human development during a 
certain historical period. 
Sypnowich asserts that protection of rights will take the form of socialist laws. 
Whilst she shies away from creating a "blueprint" for the institutions of the future, 
she does outline what she considers a minimalist requirement for legal institutions 
to protect socialist rights. Sypnowich assumes that some sort of socialist state (albeit 
a radically different one from a capitalist state) must arise given the political needs 
of society.65 She writes: 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., p. 110 
64 Ibid., p. 112 
65 Ibid., p. 157 
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I shall assume (indeed, I have assumed) that there will be a political apparatus for public 
decision-making of some kind in a socialist society, first because many of the reasons that 
tell against the withering away of law tell equally against the withering away of the 
state; and second, because the kinds of liberal legal institutions a socialist society must 
retrieve are difficult to imagine without a state.66 
For Sypnowich, the rule of law is an inherent quality of an institution that 
would call itself lega1.67 She sums up what a minimalist view of the rule of law 
would entail: 
The idea that law must be framed in a way that makes it a fair and rational guide for 
citizens' behaviour requires, to give just a few examples, that the severity of punishment be 
determined by the seriousness of the crime, that the system distinguish between intentional 
and unintentional crimes, that the rights of the defendant to a fair trial be honoured, that 
what counts as illegal be known, prospective, and consistent with the rules of the legal 
system as a whole, and that there be no political interference with legal cases or any 
attempt to jeopardize the consistency of the law.68 
She further requires the judicial to be separate from the legislative and executive 
arms of the state, so as to avoid the obvious political usurpation of the courts during 
the Soviet era in the former U.S.S.R. Sypnowich emphasises that the role of the 
judges not be subject to the will of the people, nor the state, and be completely, as 
she states, "intellectually independent" .69 Though she advocates more grass roots 
participation in the state to avoid corruption, she stipulates that participative 
control is not enough with regards to the administering of law. 
If judges were simply to follow the dictates of popular sovereignty, they would be 
conforming to the rule of law no more than if they decided cases according to paternalistic or 
authoritarian conception of the common good. The rule of law requires that judges be 
motivated in their judgements by reasons derived from the law alone and not from any other 
source, be it the public interest or the will of the majority.'?o 
Sypnowich also advocates a legal profession, though she admits that procedures 
should be open and fathomable. Her fears of a grass-roots justice system emanate 
from the example of the Comrade's courts in the former Soviet Union which 
"wreaked havoc on juridical standards of due process."71 She implies that lawyers 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., pp. 157-158 
68 Ibid., p. 57 
69 Ibid., p. 159 
70 Ibid., p. 160 
71 Ibid., p. 161 
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would assume the role of the moral guardians of due process and by virtue of their 
role might reduce chances for the legitimacy of the process to wane.72 
With regards to obligation, Sypnowich rejects the thesis that because "all 
citizens fully participate in the making of law, and all citizens enjoy maximum 
economic and social equality"73 that an intrinsic74 obligation to obey the law will 
arise.75 Interfering with a sense of obligation derived from participation are several 
possible situations. The first involves the cases where a minority dissents from the 
majority view.76 Second, a situation might arise where even if an individual 
supported the enactment of a law, in a given set of circumstances this individual 
may choose to break the law.77 The third difficulty Sypnowich has with the 
participation-obligation link is the phenomenon of non-participation. Even in a 
situation where all citizens could participate, does not indicate all of them would. 
She surmises that those that do not participate would not feel intrinsically obligated 
to respect the law. Hence, she concludes that an intrinsic obligation is insufficient 
for a socialist legal system?8 
Although she does not state it forthrightly, Sypnowich implies that the 
insufficient intrinsic sense of obligation generates the need for a legal system. She 
does not address the question of punishment directly, but implicates its presence in 
her definition of the rule of law and the concern that "popular justice" might end in 
"unfair punishment. II 
Proceeding from the assumptions that: (1) conflict will remain in socialism 
and there is a need for mediation and (2) the mediation process must protect against 
individual abuse in the name of society, Sypnowich retains the legal institutions 
developed in capitalism and asserts the need for the rule of law in socialism. The 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 133 
74 Sypnowich defines intrinsic as "an obligation to obey the law because it is the law." Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., pp. 144-148 
77 Ibid., pp. 148-150 
78 Ibid., p. 154 
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content of law, however, will reflect the changes evoked by socialism, especially in 
terms of rights which will assume the meaning of what are currently labelled 
positive and negative rights. 
The first problem with Sypnowich's analysis is the framework of discussion 
itself. Her initial premise is readily admitted by all the theorists: conflict will exist in 
socialism and requires arbitration. Her second premise: that individual rights will 
be abrogated in favour of the total society norm is not borne out by Marxist theory. 
The assumption that the social "norm" will prevail to the point that an individual's 
"rights" are abrogated is contradictory to the very position the theorists are trying to 
defend. First of all there is no enforceable social norm. Only individuals can 
determine their "norms", and, as Chris Arthur emphasises, these norms will be 
regarded as "free expressions of individuality". Whilst the theorists implied that 
"social consciousness" would most probably create some sense of general norms, the 
authority of these "norms"-if they can even theoretically be called that-arises 
only from the individual. 
Her fears of "forcing" individuals into "correctional" centres stems from a 
misinterpretation of Pashukanis. It should be pointed out that behaviour is only 
changed when an individual desires that change.79 
There are also some internal problems with Sypnowich's argument. If rights 
are not a "natural" phenomenon, as Sypnowich points out, but products of social 
development, then the right to the rule of law must be a "social" development as 
well. How, then, can she call for the protection of the rule of law, which according 
to her has emanated from society itself, from "grass-roots" influence? This 
objectification of a social relation is exactly what socialism is trying to extinguish. 
The entire point of the Marxist critique is that rights are only abstract unless they are 
operating in actual relations. What the theorists argue is that these rights require 
coercion in capitalism because of the economic relations that prevail. They assert 
79 Except, possibly, in the case of mentally ill, violent individuals. 
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that with socialist production relations the contradictory need for external coercive 
protection of rights will be eradicated. In socialist structures, power is diffused to the 
point that rights do not need to be protected. Without the incorporation of rights 
into actual individual relations which can only occur through social power and 
direct control which complete nullifies political power, a system of regulation 
would simply not work. 
To claim that socialist regulation would revolve around the protection of 
rights by an institution above society in the political sense, contradicts the very 
assumption of socialist production relations. The question is not whether rights 
will be protected or not in a codified socialist constitution upheld by a socialist state 
and whether such a constitution could be reconciled with Marx's critique of 
bourgeois rights, but rather will socialised production relations diffuse political 
power to the extent that the concept of rights becomes unnecessary thus allowing 
regulation to function? 
Viewed in this light, the obligation question assumes a different form. The 
question of obligation would not apply to the law (or rights) itself but to individuals 
operating within a cooperative society. Citizen Rasta was not in any way obligated 
to abstain from drugs; he was, however, aware that social cooperation must be 
preserved by virtue of his being a member of a socialist society. In communism, it is 
not a matter of obligation to norms, laws, values or rules, but rather an obligation to 
individual choices operating in the scope of social cooperation necessitated by the 
economic system. Such a demand for cooperation is not a norm in itself, but rather 
a necessity. 
Given the absence of external coercion, social pressure could not force an 
individual to do anything. The rights issue becomes irrelevant not because of the 
complete elimination of conflict between individual and society, but because the 
entire language of rights becomes unnecessary in a society which has no need for 
them. Bob Fine aptly writes: 
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For Marx, the withering away of the juridic fonns signified a process of democratization of 
the juridic sphere in its entirety; rather than counterposing its democratization to its 
withering away, Marx saw one as a culmination of the other.80 
Leszek Kolakowski correctly points out that Marx's hostility towards rights 
goes deeper than a rejection of claims to an everlasting moral order or the 
immutability of rights; but he misleadingly argues "communism ends the clash 
between the individual and society; each person naturally and spontaneously 
identifies himself with the values and aspirations of the 'whole' and the perfect 
unity of the social body is recreated ... "81 Indeed, the antagonism between 
individuals and society vested in a capitalist economic structure is eliminated, but 
this is not to claim that all conflict in every form is absent (as all the theorists readily 
acknowledge). What occurs is that conflict takes the form of social change. In this 
sense, the entire meaning of conflict changes, propelling it even farther from the 
rights paradigm. The occurrence of conflict and its accompanying method of 
resolution actually reaffirms cooperation in that intolerable situations are socially 
resolved, and individual choices are accommodated. In this way, the social diversity 
so important to Marx's position can be maintained while social order is still 
preserved. Alan Gilbert sums up the argument well: 
Marx did not seek to abolish natural differences among individuals in a dull uniformity but 
envisioned the vast flowering of distinct capacities, the 'richest flourishing of 
individuality ... ' 
The social element in this individuality would consists in cooperation in the 
production of necessities, in the regulation of conflicts between man and even a 'humanized' 
natural environment, in the creation of a varied pattern of social relationships, and in the 
solution of conflicts among individuals.82 
Sypnowich indicated that rights were intrinsically mora1.83 As expressed 
earlier, the necessity of classifying values as characteristic of "legal", "moral" or 
"social" origins becomes unnecessary when the sole authoritative source of these 
values are individuals. Nevertheless, Sypnowich's call for the retention of some 
80 Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Leichhardt, Australia: Pluto Press, 1984) p. 211 
81 Leszek Kolakowski, "Marxism and Human Rights" in Daedalus, VoL 112, No.4 (Fall, 1983) pp. 81-
92, esp. p. 85 
82 Alan Gilbert, "Historical Theory and the Structure of Moral Argument in Marx" in Political Theory, 
Vol. 9, No.2 (May, 1981) pp. 173-205 
83 Sypnowich attaches moral meaning to human rights by virtue of its definition. Sypnowich, p. 85 
230 
liberal legal principles may occur in socialism. As discussed before, certain values 
may be retained in the "social consciousness" developed over time. Perhaps, some 
embodiment of "human rights" in the social conscience would emerge. It is clear 
the theorists assumed certain similitudes among humans. Theoretically, however, 
the authority of these values strictly lies with the individual. 
The "role of socialist law" according to the theorists, clearly does not, or rather 
could not, involve, as Sypnowich indicates, the protection of rights or the 
generation of duties. First, in a society where power is diffused to the extent that it is 
in communism, the need to "protect" rights evaporates. Second, administrative 
suggestions, while they may anticipate compliance, do not intrinsically generate 
obligation. Obligation is individually determined. Whilst regulation serves to help 
negotiate differences and changes, whether this function is considered law in any 
sense84 has, as yet, not been discussed. What is clear is that a model for socialist law 
based on rights is incompatible with the theoretical tenets of regulation. 
84 Discussion regarding law so far has proceeded from the theorists' definition of law in capitalism, 
namely that it embodies principles determined by the state and its institutions and are enforced 
by those institutions. Law seeks to maintain capitalist relations. Other definitions of law, such 
as the concept of "non-coercive laws", will be addressed in Chapter six, under the section "IS 
REGULATION LAW?". 
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CHAPTER FIVE-TOWARDS A MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The theory of regulation is one that is based upon an extreme form of 
individualism, conditioned by an atmosphere of a high degree of social 
interconnectedness achieved through a revolution of economic and social relations. 
Such a revolution involves the replacement of the political apparatus by an 
administration. An administration differs from the political apparatus of a state 
primarily in that its institutions are used for the organisational purpose of 
facilitating decisions. Decisions are actually made and enforced by each individual 
operating within the larger context of an economic structure that is designed to 
produce for the needs of its components through the efforts of those individuals. 
Such an economic system is cooperative by nature, as irreconcilable class conflict 
caused by the inherent contradiction of an economic system producing for profit is 
eliminated. 
Although authority is required for the functioning of the social system, this 
authority stems from each individual. Thus "political power" is eliminated, 
meaning that no individual has power over another individual, and "social" power 
emerges. When this occurs, capitalist legal structures are also transformed. A 
system of regulation, then, does not involve notions of rights, duties, equality and 
objectivity, but rather focuses on maintaining a cooperative environment in the 
event of conflict, without such constructs. 
Whilst the theoretical basis for regulation has been explored to the point that 
the concepts in the above brief summary have been explained, a model of regulation 
should involve both the theoretical principles involved and the structural elements 
that accompany them. Though both aspects have been discussed to some degree, the 
theoretical elements have claimed the most attention. Structural elements of a 
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system of regulation should be discussed to some extent in order to draw a fuller 
picture of "regulation". 
Once structural elements of regulation are clarified, an opportunity for an 
overview of what is meant by regulation, theoretically and structurally, arises. In 
order to address further questions, such as whether such a system can be considered 
"legal" (in any sense) or whether it creates the need for a separate socialist 
jurisprudence, a concise summary of discussion proves useful. 
The theorists indicate that the authority operating in a system of regulation 
within the parameters of a social consciousness developed through the emergence 
of communist production relations enables such a social system to work despite 
conflict. Although there is no historical example that completely fulfils the 
theorists description of regulation, such a claim must be evaluated as much as 
possible in order to ground the theory of regulation within the realm of possibility. 
Thus the purpose of this chapter is three-fold: (1) to clarify structural elements 
of regulation; (2) to present a concise overview of the theoretical and structural 
components of regulation; and (3) evaluate, as much as possible, how regulation 
might function. 
STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF REGULATION 
The purpose 
The general purpose of regulation is to aid in the maintenance of a 
cooperative social environment. As previously discussed, ruptures in the potential 
cooperative functioning of society would probably occur on three general levels: (1) 
social organisation; (2) outbursts of uncontrollable behaviour; (3) differences in 
values. A more specific definition of the purpose of regulation, then, is to: (1) 
negotiate difficulties with regard to social organisation; (2) facilitate in the self-
restraint of "uncontrollable" behaviour; and (3) manage diversity. 
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The methods for accomplishing the above tasks are vast. So vast, that it is 
difficult to imagine a regulation system akin to a legal system, with defined 
parameters and internal procedures. The theorists spoke little of the actual 
construct of a system. Engels mentioned that conflict could be solved by arbitrators. 
Lenin suggested that "people themselves" will solve conflicts. Pashukanis 
mentions the fact that the resolution of conflict may be a "medical-pedagogical" task. 
These various descriptions actually demonstrate that the "system" of regulation is 
one that is not necessarily differentiated from the fulfilment of any other need in 
society. 
The lack of any discernible element of social interaction that can be labelled 
"regulatory" is the key structural element in the claim that law and legal relations 
will "disappear". As was discussed before, the authority to make and enforce any 
decisions comes from individuals. Institutions become passive structures to be used 
for organisational purposes and cease to be authoritative (in the political sense) 
sources for social direction. The source for all actions and behaviours becomes each 
individual regardless of the nature of the task. Thus, as the theorists explain, social 
relations are "simplified" in that they are not categorised as "legal" relations, 
"social" relations, "business" relations, "political" relations etc. Interactions are 
simply that, interactions, and do not carry, by definition, any expectation of 
prescribed rights and duties. How then, is regulation to actually function, if there 
are no discernible rights and duties and no method to enforce them? Theoretically 
this question has been discussed and covered by the explanation of internal 
obligation and the development of social consciousness. What structural form 
regulation might assume, however, has not been suggested. 
Structural form-the institutions 
The function of institutions in an administration is to facilitate decisions. 
This being the case, the purpose of an arbitration institution would be to facilitate 
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conflict resolution, in whatever form it may assume. This is not to say that all 
conflict must be handled by an arbitration institution. For instance, conflict with 
regard to policies and tasks would most likely be handled by the relevant 
administrative committee (as in the case with Lila). With regard to personal 
discord, an arbitration committee might be used; or, if the two disputants and their 
associates can solve the conflict themselves, such a committee would not be used. 
As the theorists suggest, conflict could be handled by a variety of methods 
depending on its nature. As the purpose of an institution is only to facilitate results, 
there is no reason to be "helped" by an institution if a solution is easily derived by 
parties involved. In fact, if conflict is effectively handled by the individuals 
involved there may not even be a need for an arbitration institution. Let us 
assume, however, that there will be such a need. 
These institutions could function much like other institutions in 
communism. Members could serve for, say, a two-week term every two years. 
Structure might include a panel of however many arbitrators, for instance, five. A 
chairperson could be selected to conduct sessions of arbitration. Arbitration 
committees could meet on a needs basis. More arbitration committees could be 
organised if the demand for services was greater than that which one group of 
people could provide. 
The tasks of arbitration committees would probably involve some of the 
following: managing negotiations between two parties; suggesting a compromise to 
a given situation; further explaining the nature of the conflict; suggesting 
explanation of the root causes of problems involved; providing a third party 
through which involved disputants could more convey opposing points of view; or 
simply providing input from an agent outside of the dispute at hand. 
N one of these suggestions would be ''binding'' in the legal sense of the word; 
but since negotiations are dependent on the genuine desire of participants to resolve 
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the situation, or at least arrive at some sort of compromise, suggestions from the 
arbitration committee would probably be taken seriously. 
Such a process hardly resembles the "legal process" in capitalism or even the 
"legal process" used in the People's Courts. By examining such institutional issues 
such as specialisation, accountability, due process and consistency, the different 
nature of regulation is illuminated. 
The theorists indicate that "anyone" could participate in the arbitration 
committee. Such a statement, however, does not imply that certain skills would not 
be beneficial. Problem-solving and reasoning capabilities might be useful. 
Creativity might also aid immensely, as would communication skills. It is quite 
clear in Marx and Engels' writings that they thought the ability to reason was an 
innate quality in human beings. However, someone's reasoning, like any other 
skill, can be better or worse than another's. Problem-solving, however, does not 
only require the ability to reason. In fact, the more diverse the problem solvers and 
their skills the more diverse the possible resolutions. One arbitration committee 
member may possess oratorical skills, one may possess a personality that lends itself 
to stabilising heated situations, another may excel at rational deduction. An 
informal system would actually breed a need for greater variety of people to be 
involved. Even if citizens possessed none of the above mentioned skills, their 
personal experiences might shed light on a situation. It is therefore not beyond 
reality to suggest that every citizen could participate in some way in arbitration. 
Nevertheless, it is probable that some citizens might acquire a reputation as a 
"great" arbitrator. Given the structure of the system, such a "great" arbitrator may 
only serve on the arbitration committee once every so often. Would it be possible, if 
all affected were in agreement, for someone to remain as a "permanent" arbitrator 
without accumulating "undue influence" over the process? In other words, is it 
possible for someone to be a professional arbitrator without danger of gaining 
"political power" over other individuals? 
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It is difficult to imagine a situation in communism when an arbitrator, even a 
permanent one, may abuse power as the decisions of arbitrators are not enforceable 
by institutional authority. With the enforcement factor residing in individual 
internal conviction, abuse, in terms of political power would be near impossible. 
Individual arbitrators could gain charismatic "power" over people. History 
has demonstrated that charisma can be quite persuasive and sometimes dangerously 
controlling. As mentioned before, there is possibility for hierarchy in communist 
institutions, including arbitration ones, by virtue of the possible greater influence of 
some individuals on the opinions and actions of others. Power derived solely by 
personality, however, is different in nature from political or economic power in that 
it is not systematically, or more specifically, institutionally derived. Abuse could not 
occur on a procedural level because there is, in essence, no prescribed procedure for 
arbitration. 
Since the goal of the arbitration committee is to find a solution to a problem, 
(as opposed to determining guilt or innocence), procedural methods would depend 
on each individual situation and the circumstances and personalities involved. 
Participants in arbitration would be presumably provide as much information as 
possible. Participants themselves could propose certain methods to follow, or 
perhaps "experts" could be consulted in determining the best approach. There 
appears to be little reason why the process of arbitration need be formalised. 
Similarly, consistency is not all that relevant to arbitration facilities. In fact, 
consistency in suggestions of arbitrators would not even be a concern. Assuming 
that no two people or situations are exactly alike, solutions to problems would 
assume a myriad of forms. The variety of results that could emerge given the vast 
array of possible conflicts and personalities virtually precludes any "regularity" in 
results. 
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Authority and institutions 
The functions of various institutions (or committees) may be differentiated by 
purpose. One committee may arbitrate, another gather information, another 
produce work schedules, etc. In this way, they resemble various institutions in 
capitalism. The authority of these institutions, however, stems completely from 
individuals. Therefore, no decision derived through the use of an institution has 
authority by virtue of its derivation in this way. Indeed, institutions, in themselves, 
do not assume any authority. 
Although institutions may increase organisational capacity, there is 
theoretically no difference between a resolution or solution derived by aid of an 
institution and one that has arisen as general practice. Thus the contrast between 
"law" and "social norm" is non-existent (hence the theorists' claim that such 
differentiation disappears). 
Interestingly, there is no theoretical authoritative difference either, between a 
practice that has been derived through the use of an institution, one that has arisen 
from majority use, or one that has been strictly individually derived. The theorists 
do claim, however, that individual values will be conditioned by their social 
environment (social consciousness). Individuals may not make some choices due 
to the fact that not many other individuals are behaving in such a manner. 
Authoritatively, however, there is no method of /I dictating" social behaviour or 
choices other than the parameters determined by the degree of cooperation 
necessary to organise society to produce for needs. 
A CONCISE OVERVIEW OF REGULATION 
The essence of the theory of regulation can be summed1 up in the following 
points: 
1 The explanation and logical interconnection of concepts have been covered and discussed already. 
The list is a summary of characteristics rather than a restatement of arguments in fulL 
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(1) Regulation emerges when the irreconcilable conflict present by two 
diversified class interests procured in the capitalist production system 
ends and is replaced by an economic system that produces solely for need. 
(2) With the subsequent dissolution of commodity fetishism, individuals are 
no longer classified as egoistic, equal, independent and objectified agents 
operating in isolation and under the premise of free self-will (juridic 
persons), but rather are regarded as operating in an integrated social 
environment where cooperative efforts are demanded in procuring for 
their own needs. 
(3) When individuals are no longer classified as isolated, independent beings, 
the false contrast between "social" and "individual" ceases causing the 
bifurcation between civil and economic to end. 
(4) With dissolution of the ideological classification of "juridic person" 
individuals are regarded as they are in actual concrete circumstances-
unequal and operating within the constraints of a social-economic 
environment. 
(5) Under such premises, only individuals determine what their needs, wants 
and desires are, as everyone is unequal and cannot be objectively 
quantified. 
(6) In part, however, individual choices are restricted by need, and by the fact 
that they must produce via a production process that is social and 
cooperative by nature. 
(7) In order to produce for individual choices, society must be organised. 
(8) Such organisation requires that decisions be made and suggested policies 
and tasks be derived. 
(9) Since the goal of society is unified in a basic sense-to produce for needs, 
and only individuals can determined what needs, desires, goals are, the 
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institutions that arise serve to aid in the coordination of individual 
choices. 
(10) Such an institutional structure is referred to as "administration" whose 
defined goal is to facilitate decision-making. 
(11) Since only individuals can determine needs and goals, an administration 
has no political power, in that one individual does not have the power of 
decision-making over another. (social power) 
(12) In order to coordinate policy and production, compromise may be required. 
This compromise, however, is only determined by the individuals 
themselves. 
(13) The generation of social policy (tasks, production priorities, environmental 
matters, etc.) comes from each individual contributing towards a 
comprehensive whole. (de centralised coordination) 
(14) Each individual has self-interest in carrying out decisions in order to fulfil 
their own needs and desires. 
(15) Administrative suggestions are organisational tools to be used for fulfilling 
an individual's own interest. They are not generated by an institution 
(which is designed only to facilitating decisions), but rather by 
individuals. (direct control) 
(16) Enforcement of decisions, then, lies with each individual as in actuality 
each individual is the one making decisions. (non-coercion) 
(17) Obligation, then, can only be internal. (internal obligation) 
(18) Since the content of decisions and source of authority for them rest solely 
with individuals, differentiation between sources of principles ceases. 
Categories of "moral", "legal", "social" "political" norms disappear. 
(19) Whilst various classifications of norms disappear, the content of them may 
be preserved in the social consciousness, which in essence, is generated by 
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the common experiences of those engaged in the construct and conduct of 
all aspect of their lives via power over society. 
(20) Although all power rests with individuals, choices take place within an 
economic system that necessitates cooperation and within the social 
consciousness developed through experience. Thus individual actions 
take place within parameters determined by need and are intrinsically 
connected to the social environment. 
(21) Rules reflect factual necessities and administrative suggestions do not 
explicitly involve a definition of rights and duties, and do not assume the 
fetishised form of "damages" when those rights and duties have not been 
fulfilled. 
(22) Conflict does not assume the form of a conflict of private interests measured 
by individual rights and duties, but rather indicates a rupture in social 
fabric or an area of social organisation that needs to be changed. 
(23) Conflict resolution then does not involve determining which set of rights 
and duties prevail and determining a retributive amount reflective of 
damages (equivalence principle), but rather involves a compromise or 
solution where a "problem" can be resolved or a needed social change can 
occur. 
(24) There are no structural institutions implicit to regulation whose 
responsibility is to resolve problems. Such a task can only be 
accomplished by individuals. 
(25) Arbitration institutions may develop in order to facilitate the generation of 
a comprise or solution to a given conflict. 
(26) The goal of such institutions would be to generate alternatives, negotiate 
compromise, and provide insight and advice. 
(27) Though all could serve as "arbitrators" some cases may need experts or 
specialists (especially if psychological problems are involved). 
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(28) As arbitrators and arbitration committees have no political power to enforce 
their decisions, resolutions which arise as a result of the use of arbitration 
committees do not carry any authority due to the fact that they have been 
derived through the aid of an institution. 
(29) It can be claimed, then, that these arbitration committees, or any other 
administrative institution, have no "institutional" (political) authority. 
(30) Given the goals and processes of arbitration, due process, consistency and 
accountability are not relevant issues. 
Summary description: 
Authority to make and enforce decisions can only come from 
individuals. In order for such a goal to be met, the process of decision-
making must involve each individual. Such a process has been labelled 
de centralised coordination. It is reflective of social, rather than political 
power. In the act of producing for needs, individuals must cooperate. 
Thus cooperation is necessary to the functioning of the social-economic 
system. Individual authority is conditioned by the need to produce 
cooperatively. In the act of producing cooperatively, social consciousness 
develops. Individuals then also operate within social consciousness. 
Regulation is the management of conflict to the point that individual 
authority can be balanced by social consciousness to the point that a 
system of cooperative production can function. 
It is theoretically plausible that the sense of cooperation demanded by the economic 
system might be effective enough to manage diversity even if it were not 100% 
effective-as no system is. There is evidence to show that a higher sense of 
integration produces a stronger sense of social connection,2 and the efficacy of social 
2 Henry Maas, People and Contexts (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984) esp. pp 12-15 and Peter Smith 
and Michael Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 
1994) esp. p. 96 
242 
influence is well-researched.3 Such evidence, however, could not adequately 
support the claim that in a society where capitalism has been eradicated and replaced 
with communist production and its corresponding social relations, conflicts will not 
reach the point where the social system cannot function. It also cannot be proved 
that political power could be diffused sufficiently that the concept of rights would 
become unnecessary. Unfortunately, the inquiry is at a severe disadvantage, as there 
is no example to analyse to see if such transformations would actually take place. 
There is one historical example, however, that is worth examining. 
THE KIBBUTZ-AN HISTORICAL4 EXAMPLE 
General description 
The first kibbutz, Degania, was established in 1910 by a small group dedicated 
to communal living and socialist ideals. The movement spread quickly, especially 
as the interest in Zionist-socialist youth movements heightened. By 1947, the 
kibbutz movement was at its peak, with 7% of the Jewish population involved. In 
1986, membership was about 120,000 persons (about 3.6% of the Jewish-Israeli 
population) spread among 260 kibbutzim.s As of 1996, the combined population of 
3 See Janusz Reykowski, "Two Approaches to the Development of Morality" in Social and Moral Rules, 
eds., Nancy Eisenberg, et al. (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989) pp. 23-44. See also 
Charles Antaki and Guy Fielding, "Research on Ordinary Explanations" in the Psychology of 
Ordinary Explanations of Social Behaviour, ed., Charles Antaki (London: Academic Press, 1981) 
pp. 27-55, esp. 45-55 and Jean Piaget, The Moral Development of the Child, trans., Marjorie 
Gabain (New York: The Free Press, 1965) esp. 395-406. Bern Allen in Social Behaviour discusses 
the results of Stanley Milgram's famous shock tests. (The subject was told by the lab technician to 
"shock" respondents if they gave wrong answers. The shocks increased with every wrong answer 
to the point of death. The respondent was working in conjunction with the lab assistant to assess 
how far people would obey authority. The shocks were fake.) The results of Milgram's test 
showed a shocking 65% total obedience (to the point of causing the respondent enormous pain or 
even death). However, when two other control subjects were placed with the subject and they 
exhorted the subject not to go any further when the shocks appeared distressing to the respondent, 
only 10% obeyed. The experiment showed the effect of "group" pressure (direct social influence) 
compared to an anonymous authority. Bern Allen, Social Behaviour (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1978) 
pp.33-63. 
4 While the kibbutz exists in modem times, most of the pertinent research to this study takes place 
before 1990. For this reason, I refer to it as an "historical" example. 
S Plural of kibbutz 
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270 kibbutzim was 129,300. The average population of a kibbutz was about 500 
persons.6 
Although specific policies are not identical in all kibbutzim, Joseph Blasi 
defines the basic principles of a kibbutz as they were defined by the first kibbutz 
federation formed in 1925: (1) small communities based on economic cooperation 
and social understanding; (2) democratic assemblies; (3) refusal to give leadership to 
anyone person or group; (4) collective rearing of children; (5) concern for all 
members of society; (6) work; (7) relinqUishing of individual property; and (8) 
cooperation with neighbours and communities? 
The economic structure of a kibbutz revolves around socialist principles. The 
means of production are owned by members. All resources are "collectively 
coordinated".8 No one receives a salary or any other type of monetary reward. 
Specialists may be assigned a "permanent" job due to expertise, while others may 
change positions more often.9 Kibbutzniks10 when trying to decide which career to 
pursue, are encouraged to take into account the demands of their kibbutz, but are 
not forced into certain needed professions. The kibbutz is interested in having 
members feel fulfilled in their jobs.!l All kibbutzniks, regardless of profession, are 
rewarded the same economically. Medical care, housing, energy resources, food, 
clothing, education and vacation expenses are provided by the kibbutz in their 
entirety. 
The earlier kibbutzim were extremely committed to the principles of 
communal life. Members shared clothing, ate together, worked together, showered 
together and in some even slept in communal rooms. In modern times, members 
"own" their clothes, have separate apartments and can eat in private. 
6 Christopher Warhurst, "High Society in a Workers' Society: Work, Community and Kibbutz" in 
Sociology, Vol. 30, No.1 (February, 1996) p. 5 
7 Joseph Blasi, The Communal Future: The Kibbutz and the Utopian Dilemma (Pennsylvania: Norwood 
Editions, 1980) p. 12 
8 Warhurst, p. 5 
9 Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Status, Power and Conflict in the Kibbutz (Hants, England: Averbury, 1988) p. 2 
10 Member of a kibbutz. 
11 Blasi, pp. 93-94 
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The decision-making process in the kibbutzim resembles decentralised 
coordination to some degree. All adult members belong to the highest institution, 
the general assembly, which decides major policy matters. Various committees (e.g. 
culture, housing, education) are elected as well as the leaders of these committees 
and the general assembly itself. Committee work is conducted during leisure time, 
and therefore is not a "profession".12 Leadership positions are rotated every two or 
three years.13 Giora Manor, a kibbutz member and journalist, writes, " .. the kibbutz 
does not function according to rules or laws imposed by some constitution or 
external authority. The kibbutz is the expression of the will of its members at any 
given point."14 
There are no courts, police or political bodies. There are no sanctions-either 
physical or economic.15 
Most kibbutzim fall in the realm of the norm of living standards. Members 
have spacious apartments, ample furniture and clothing, radios, televisions, etc. An 
increase in the standard of living accomplished through a cooperative economic 
system and participative institutions is the basis of the kibbutz organisation.16 
The usefulness of the example 
Although the organisational principles of the kibbutz do not fit the 
description of communism in full, there are present the major characteristics of a 
social organisation in which regulation could operate. 
Economically, the kibbutz operates under socialist principles and produces for 
the needs of its members. The mode of production is owned by all the members. 
Capitalist production or distribution methods are not used. The kibbutz has no 
monetary system. 
12 Ben-Rafael, pp. 3-4 
13 Ibid., p. 22 
14 Giora Manor, "The Kibbutz as an Onion" in Kibbutz Trends, No.9 (Spring, 1993) p. 24 
15 Warhurst, p. 5 
16 Ben-Rafael, p. 4 
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Structurally, all members decide policy (via participation in the general 
assembly). Various committees exist to carry out decisions. All can serve on these 
committees intermittently. Leadership positions are rotated. There are no police, 
courts or political "heads" of the kibbutz and no economic or physical sanctions. 
The kibbutz does not resemble communism in some important ways, 
however. First, these communities still operate within a capitalist environment. 
Individuals are relieved from worries of profit, but the kibbutz as a whole is not and 
seeks to strengthen its position economically in the capitalist environment with 
which it interactsP As a result, making a profit is still a large concern of all 
kibbutzim. Technological development is restricted by the equipment the kibbutz 
can purchase; therefore, all tools of advancement are not available. To sustain its 
place in the capitalist market, a kibbutznik works an average of six days a week. 
There is also a large degree of "scarcity", a situation thought to be non-existent or at 
least alleviated in socialism. 
The size of most kibbutzim is small (500 people). Such a small organisation 
might not be a representative sampling of the variety of individual interests that 
will have to be managed under regulation. Also such a number does not provide 
the vast array of human skills that may be necessary for communism on a larger 
scale. The derivation of decisions is made easier by a set number of participants. 
Nevertheless, given that the organisation of the kibbutz fulfils the basic pre-
requisites for regulation to operate, it does provide a chance to assess whether the 
social cooperation demanded in producing for need is strong enough to handle 
individual diversity. It also provides an opportunity to assess whether regulation 
can effectively negotiate conflicts. 
17 Ibid., p. 22. For a discussion of the interaction of kibbutzim and Israel's national economy, see Reuven 
Cohen, The Kibbutz Settlement, trans., Sharry Statman (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 
Publishing House, 1972) pp. 20-67. Also interesting is Ivan ValIer's article "Structural 
Differentiation, Production Imperatives and Communal Norms: The Kibbutz in Crisis" in Social 
Forces, Vol. 40, No.3 (March, 1962) pp. 233-242 which examines the tension between the kibbutz's 
communal social structure and the demands of its production system. 
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Whilst research of kibbutzim is rich and varied,18 few studies examine in-
depth, day-to-day operations of kibbutz life or provide a full description of relations 
between members and the methods for resolving problems within the scope of their 
unique social organisations. Such a full description of the operation of at least one 
kibbutz is needed as regulation involves virtually all elements of social 
organisation. 
Joseph Blasi conducted such a study (1980) of one kibbutz in depth and tried to 
rectify the problem he saw in other studies that did "not portray sufficiently the total 
and organic nature" of life on the kibbutz.19 Through personal interviews, 
questionnaires and comparative analysis of other studies, Blasi addressed some of 
the most pressing questions regarding kibbutz life and social relations. 
The kibbutz Vatik20 
This kibbutz presents an example of a group of people diversified in age, race 
and ideological tendencies living under a regulation system very much similar to 
the one described by the theorists. Given the importance of the effects of social 
structure on the success of regulation, a general description of the structure of this 
kibbutz is in order. I shall restrict the discussion of Blasi's findings to those most 
relevant to the element of regulation. 
18 E.g.: Israel Sheper, The Kibbutz: An Anthropological Study (Darby, Penn: Norwood Editions, 1983)-
analyses of the independence of individuals; Henry Near, History of the Kibbutz Movement, 2 
vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)-an historical overview; Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Crisis 
and Transformation: The Kibbutz at Century's End (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1997)-general analysis; David Mittelberg, Strangers in Paradise (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1988)-reviews attitudes to "outsiders" (visitors, volunteers, etc.). See also 
collections of articles: Democracy, Equality, and Change: The Kibbutz and Social Theory by 
Menachem Rosner (Darby, Penn.: Norwood Editions, 1982) and Integrated Cooperative in the 
Industrial Society: The Example of the Kibbutz, eds., Klaus Bart6lke, Theodor Bergman and 
Ludwig Liegle (Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1980); and case studies: Paula Rayman, The Kibbutz 
Community and Nation Building (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) and Leonard Mars, 
The Village and the State (Farnborough, England: Gower Publishing, 1980). The journal Kibbutz 
Trends (Israel) provides enjoyable articles written, for the most part, by members with regard to 
kibbutz life, issues and problems. 
19 Blasi, p. vi 
20 "Vatik" is a pseudonym. 
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Vatik was founded in 1936 and was comprised mostly of Polish Jews who 
emigrated to Israel before founding the kibbutz. The initial group comprised about 
20 adults of primarily lower middle or middle class (many of the kibbutzim 
founders were upper class) and 50 youths that had been in the leftist Zionist youth 
movement in Galitzia (Poland).21 The first members were described as 
revolutionary and extremely communitarian. Couple and family relations were de-
emphasised, communal showers, beds, clothes, etc. were encouraged, and a 
fundamental mistrust of higher education was present.22 
Beginning in 1948 about one hundred new members joined. These members 
had been severely persecuted in the war. Despite their socialist leanings, the 
founders felt they came "less out of ideology and more out of survival."23 In the 
1950's and 1960's, groups from Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the Orient joined 
Vatik. The background of members was becoming extremely diverse. The growth 
of the group's population, the revelation of the reality of Stalin's Russia, and the 
difficulty in maintaining an intimate connection between all members of Vatik led 
to a lessening of ideological ties and social connectedness. The fact that the 
economic growth of Vatik required specialists also took away from the "everyone 
being competent to do all" philosophy that was evident in the early times.24 Blasi 
describes the change in Vatik: 
In short, being an individual and being different, and having separate interests coexist 
alongside each other was becoming affirmed. The general assembly meeting minutes for the 
period of 1950-1965 show an increasing concern for making norms clear...Life was becoming 
too complex to have the whole community examine every activity. So norms governing the 
distribution of clothes, food, the use of transportation facilities ... were established to 
encourage development of a diversified society, cut down. the possibility of conflicts, 
rationalize administration, and offer the use of hard-earned economic development as a 
resource for greater choice and freedom for individual members.25 
Vatik had a total population of 480 persons. Forty-eight percent were age 50 
and over (23% were founding members), 42% percent were between ages 26-49 years 
21 Ibid., pp. 4-7 
22 Ibid., p. 16 
23 Ibid., p. 17 
24 Ibid., pp. 18-19 
25 Ibid., p. 20 
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(32% of which were married), and 5% were 25 years and younger. The other 5% 
were temporary volunteers, Ulpanim,26 and candidate members, and 5% of the 
population were in the armyP 
The relationships between people were governed by a commitment to living 
as one kibbutznik stated "in a democratic way." Emphasis on the 
interconnectedness of the social fabric was accepted, but as Blasi points out, the 
demand for intimate communality was absent. As in a majority of capitalist 
societies, most kibbutznik turned to their partners, families or friends for support.28 
As Blasi writes: 
Almost all members asked to describe the ideal relationship between two members not 
friends agreed with this assessment: relationships would be friendly and cordial, but one 
does not confide in this person or visit his house unless at a birth or death; if there is business 
to settle one should deal kindly with another member; extreme insults are out of the 
question.29 
It is interesting to note, that even without intimacy amongst all members of the 
kibbutz, mutual respect was seen as necessary to the maintenance of the social 
cooperative fabric. 
A social web not based on personal intimacy was maintained through the 
interdependence of members both in economic sustenance and administrative 
organisation. In Vatik, approximately 32 committees required members and 
coordinators.30 As pOinted out earlier, participation on committees was voluntary 
and took place in a member's spare time. Out of the 158 members Blasi surveyed, 
since 1950,42 had been coordinators of committee; 41, branch coordinators; and 62, 
26 Ulpan is a Hebrew language intensive programme. It involves part-time work and the kibbutz hopes 
to gain Ulpanim as members. 
27 Out of the total membership, there were 152 valid case studies (out of 158 total) Blasi uses in his 
questionnaires. Of these, 71% of the over 50-year-olds participated (32% of the founders, 39% 
others), 40% of the middle-aged married couples, 62% of the unmarried middle-aged group, 25% 
per cent of those in the army, 10% of guests and candidate members, and 15% of the younger group 
(all from high school age) participated in the survey. Blasi, p. 30 
28 Ibid., pp. 32-37 
29 Ibid., p. 36 
30 Committees include Education, Further Education, Consumption, Members, Culture, Health, Work, 
Youth Counsel, Music, Young People, Absorption, Outside Members, Housing, Vacation, Building, 
Newspaper, Nomination, Security, Sport, Farm Economy, Industry, Youth Camps, Political, 
Furniture, Wedding, Army Returnees, Consumption Points, Human Relations, Personal Problems. 
Blasi, pp. 39-40. 
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members of committees. Within a 25-year span, members of this group recalled 
serving on a committee 194 times cumulatively)1 Some 75.9% surveyed said they 
were concerned about kibbutz problems and were at least somewhat involved 
(15.9% said they were very involved).32 If a member serves on a committee, takes a 
role in the work place and participates in cultural activities and meets other parents 
at the children houses when they visit, a high degree of interaction and 
consequently, integration on various levels takes place. Blasi writes "The social 
arrangement oL.the kibbutz contributes to a form of interpersonal alliance and 
administrative consanguinity that is hard for inhabitants of less interdependent 
communities to imagine."33 
The interconnectedness of members was also reflected in the economic 
sphere. Blasi sums up the economic principle of Vatik as follows: 
... the kibbutz economic system is based on the premise that the complicated, social, 
personal and economic factors balance each other out, when members, whether the lazy 
ones or the aggressive ones, at least accept the principle of cooperation and try as best 
they can.34 
Type of work, training, family background, age, sex or beliefs did not affect what 
members received economically. The first priorities were to cover the basic needs of 
all which included: daily welfare, health, education, transportation, cultural 
activities, communal facilities, and investment for production expansion. After 
these priorities were met, other desires were considered (such as television sets for 
all members, which Vatik had). The family or a couple was not treated as an 
economic unit and distribution was according to individual members (including 
children))5 
31 Ibid., p. 40 
32 Ibid., p. 42 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 66 
35 Ibid., pp. 67-68 
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Work cooperation 
Vatik's work structure reflected a priority of social welfare as over half of the 
work force was involved with community services.36 Twelve percent of the 
population worked outside the kibbutz and about 5% was engaged in higher 
education at universities outside the kibbutz.37 Most kibbutznik worked in teams 
(51.8%), especially those involved in agriculture, education, mechanics, and 
cooking. Only 10% of the work force worked alone, although 36% worked around 
others but completed their task alone (such as members in the laundry, plastics, 
metal shop and administrative branches).38 A majority of the population was 
involved in blue collar work (67.2%), while 32.8% of the community was involved 
in white collar work. Several tasks such as, watching the baby house, washing pots, 
serving Saturday dinner, sending the turkeys to market, were considered too 
undesirable for one person to do all the time. In these cases duties were rotated.39 
The general structure of work was determined by the needs and resources of 
the kibbutz. Various branches were organised to meet these requirements (such as 
education, agriculture, industry, etc.). Each branch had a work coordinator (a rotated 
position that received no "extra" benefit). A work committee, along with the 
economic committee and branch coordinators, drew up a general yearly plan. 
Considerations included economic needs, production ceilings, availability of work 
force, personnel problems, worker satisfaction, concerns of individual branches, etc. 
The duties of the work committee were extremely time consuming and difficult. As 
a result, the job was unpopular and often rotated. Once the plan was pieced together 
(and it was constantly re-evaluate d), the branch coordinators tried to meet the 
requirements. Blasi denies that they operated in a managerial way. The general 
attitude at a job was to work at one's own pace. It was not the responsibility of the 
36 Eleven point five two percent labour in agriculture, 20% in industry, and 62.63% work in community 
services (e.g. education, kitchen, laundry, etc.). Ibid., p. 89 
37 Ibid. The figures were calculated for 356 out of 360 work members. 
38 Ibid., p. 91 
39 Ibid., p. 51 
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coordinator to "supervise" work speeds, but rather to make sure workers could 
operate effectively together. For instance, one may like to listen to music while 
another cannot concentrate. One worker may appear to be emotionally disturbed 
and working hyperactively to the point where others are annoyed. One worker may 
be extremely unsatisfied in the branch s /he is in. Another worker may desire more 
training in the area. The coordinator's job was to try to negotiate a good and 
efficient working environment.4o 
Blasi describes the workplace as informal. Regular breaks were scheduled, 
and sometimes informal ones were taken.41 Work relationships generally were 
described as "friendly, but not oriented towards friendship."42 The fact that the 
coordinator's position was rotated avoided the feeling that this particular person 
was "above" other workers. Branch meetings were held for the discussion of plans, 
problems and requests. In some branches these meetings were held almost daily, in 
others weekly, in some monthly. The structural aspects of work organisation and 
emphasis on member input caused compromise and negotiation to be the prime 
paradigm of operation. Blasi stresses that the free flow of information and 
discussion combined with the rotation of managers (coordinators) encouraged 
informal solutions.43 While the coordinator's duty was to facilitate compromise, 
often workers handled the situation themselves. One worker, a young female who 
worked in the kindergarten, described her situation: 
There is tension at work when one says one thing and the other thinks the other way (in the 
education of children), and sometimes when there is friction, when it seems that one of us 
did not speak properly to the children, we discuss it among ourselves, not during work 
usually, but after work, and together we reach a common denominator, or we try to know the 
direction of things ... We really try to reach a uniform way of thinking because, look the 
child can get confused when one says this and the other says that, and the child needs to 
know where he stands.44 
40 Ibid., pp. 91-98 
41 Ibid., p. 91 
42 Ibid., p. 95 
43 Ibid., pp. 101-102 
44 Ibid., pp. 95-96 
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With the increase of technology and the degree of differentiation in kibbutz 
activities, a need for specialists arose. For example, the metal factory required an 
engineer. Whilst specialists were well respected for their knowledge, they could not 
"dictate" policy. Often several members were trained for the speciality and were 
rotated (as was the case in the metal factory). Also, many other committees were 
involved with the ultimate decision of a branch's work plan and the fulfilment of 
that plan. Specialists were not economically rewarded more than any other 
member. Despite the diffusion of power, Blasi notes that specialists often explained 
to branch members the technical aspects of a proposal or decision and because of 
their greater knowledge were listened to more than other members. At the time, 
Blasi assesses that a "take-over" by specialists was not really a concern of the kibbutz. 
Given the diffuse decision-making process, and the fact that members were 
integrated in so many other ways than work, the specialist did not gain undue 
power.45 
The sense of cooperation and compromise operating within the workplace is 
summed by Yoram, a middle-aged male member: 
I do not think that you can really say that someone is not suited for work in the kibbutz. 
There is really no such thing. You can say that the person who is in charge of the garage, or 
the field crops is not the best person or maybe not doing his best. It really is a matter of the 
whole branch working together. Maybe the organization is weak or there is not a high level 
of planning; no one can ruin it by himself .. .5o if you are responsible for the branch this year 
well, there are others who directed it before you and they will come and tell you if w ha t 
you are doing is no good. There are other responsible people and they can see.46 
Most of Vatik's workers enjoyed their work. When asked to what degree, 
30.9% said very much, 58.3% said a lot, 5.0% said never, and 2.2% said they hated it. 
Blasi furthered questioned workers to elicit which part of work appealed or did not 
appeal to them. Fifty-three percent of the respondents stated they enjoy the work 
itself, 13% said they did not enjoy the work itself; 58% declared they achieved 
something, 4% said they did not achieve anything; 38% had a professional feeling, 
8% did not; 40% enjoyed personal relations at work, 3% did not; and 5% listed other 
45 Ibid., p. 97 
46 Ibid., p. 88 
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reasons. A majority felt their talents were used (39% responded a lot, 41.9% 
responded somewhat, 13.2% said very little, 3.7% stated never). Seventy point one 
percent enjoyed the responsibility they had at work. Whilst the general appraisal of 
individual work situations seemed positive, there were a number of dissatisfied 
workers. The point is relevant to the discussion of the social relations in operation 
at the kibbutz, and the effect of dissatisfaction on possible conflict.47 
General relations 
Despite the structural restraints against hierarchy, Blasi, as well as many 
others, concluded that some members had more influence than others.48 Age, sex, 
race and family status affected how the community regarded the individual, but 
prestige was the overwhelming factor in social differentiation.49 A member gained 
prestige through, skill, past achievements, effective leadership, regular participation, 
higher responsibility, good communication skills and hard work. Although all 
members voted on important issues, some members definitely sensed that they had 
less influence than others. These prestigious members were not granted better 
hOUSing, education, or a better standard of living; nor could they acquire a 
monopoly of power due to the structural controls set in place (e.g. rotation of 
leaders, direct participation, the role of leaders as coordinators more than persons of 
authority). Whilst 70% of the members felt they had much or somewhat influence 
over kibbutz life, 21.6% said little, and 14.4% said none. As a comparison Blasi asked 
47 Ibid., pp. 104-106 
48 Most studies on stratification acknowledge that despite economic equality, hierarchy does develop. 
The "top" of the hierarchy, while not receiving any material rewards, receives emotional ones. 
See Ben-Rafael, Status, Power and Conflict in the Kibbutz for an in-depth study establishing 
hierarchy and discussing its effects on the social structure in generaL See also Y. Talmon-Garber, 
"Social Differentiation in Cooperative Communities" in British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 3, No. 
4 (December, 1952) pp. 339-354; Amitai Etzioni, "Functional Differentiation of Elites in the 
Kibbutz" in American Journal of Sociology, VoL 64, No.5 (March, 1959) pp. 476-487; Eva 
Rosenfeld, "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society" in American Sociological Review, Vol. 
16, No.6 (December, 1951) pp. 766-774. Talmon-Garber concluded that elites had not crystallised 
into an upper stratum (pp. 356-357) and Etzioni claimed that elites had not become sub-collectives 
in themselves (p. 487). Rosenfeld suggested that emotional rewards were of particular 
importance. (p. 774). 
49 Blasi, p. 118 
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how much people felt in control of their personal lives, 81.1% said much or 
somewhat, 12.6% said little and 6.3% said none.50 It is important to note that while a 
political hierarchy may be structurally and normatively most unlikely, some 
members did feel "less" influential and involved in the community than others.51 
Conflicts 
Vatik, as most other kibbutzim, was virtually devoid of "crime" .52 Murders, 
suicide or violent incidents had not occurred during Vatik's entire history.53 Also 
absent for the most part was mental illness, drug and alcohol abuse. 54 The absence 
of crime, however, does not indicate the absence of conflicts. 
As stated before, there were no police, courts or judges. For the most part, 
problems at work were handled by coordinators or workers themselves. If a 
personal conflict could not be resolved by members themselves, they could take the 
issue to the social secretary or the personal problems committee. Blasi uses the 
example of a sexual affair, or the insult of another member. In such cases of conflict 
a Berur (clearing up) must be sought. There was no punishment or tampering with 
economic rewards. Blasi, as would the theorists, ascribes the absence of crime to the 
economic security provided by the kibbutz and the system of interdependency 
established by the administrative and economic structures. He stresses that the 
social environment had much to do with the regulatory aspects of kibbutz life.55 
Blasi points out the incidents of conflict were not usually viewed as isolated from 
50 Ibid., p. 130 and Ben-Rafael, pp. 34-42 
51 Blasi discusses the importance of this sensation on pp. 120-124. 
52 Michael Fischer studied the Kibbutz Resocialisation Programme where 26 offenders (non-
kibbutznik) were sent to separate kibbutzim in lieu of the final part of their prison sentences. 
Fischer concluded that the offenders were found "significantly less likely to recidivate and be 
reincarcerated than a control group." Abstract, Reform Through Community: ResociaZizing 
Offenders in the Kibbutz, PhD Thesis, State University of New York at Albany, 1989. (Published 
as a book by the same title: New York: Greenwood Press, 1991). Virtually all previously noted 
works do not mention crime. 
53 Joseph Shepher pointed out that a murder occurred (not in Vatik) in 1975 by an outside visitor, and 
several suicides have occurred. Blasi, p. 50 
54 There has been drug use, but not to the point of addiction. Ibid., pp. 66-67 
55 Ibid., p. 50 
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the member themselves. For instance, if a member does not wash pots when 
required, but is quite active in committees and has been a generally good worker; or 
if a member argues incessantly but has just been divorced, confrontation of the 
isolated incident is weighed against the disruption of the social-individual 
relationship. In short, confronting members on every problem may not be 
beneficial in the long term.56 It is interesting to survey the types of issues that arose. 
A large source of tension was the situation where other members did not feel 
someone was doing a fair share of work. As mentioned above, members were 
encouraged to work at their own pace, but if a member was exorbitantly slow, or 
refused to do one of the undesirable tasks, it was resented. A work organiser 
explained that one of the most common sources of tension in the work place was 
the refusal to take a turn in the kitchen or a similar task. For the most part, the 
number was small enough that the incidents were simply overlooked. If the 
problem was recurring, the member may be confronted as is what happened when 
one member refused to coordinate supplies in the kitchen (his assigned task). This 
particular member had been conducting research and been granted time off work. 
The community felt the member was shirking his responsibility, exacerbated by the 
fact that the kibbutz had provided research opportunities for him.57 
The kibbutz's unique, but isolated position as a communistic economy 
operating within a capitalist world caused tension in the personal relations of 
kibbutz members. For instance, kibbutz members who were university professors 
worked outside of the kibbutz since Vatik had no university. The lecturer had to 
have a car to get to work and was paid a salary by the university, yet all his social 
needs were met by the kibbutz. Also, family members who lived outside Vatik sent 
their kibbutz relative money or presents. If the presents were substantial (like a new 
car or extra vacation money) economic disparity would develop. Sometimes 
kibbutz members wanted to travel for a few years. The tension between those who 
56 Ibid., p. 94 
57 Ibid. 
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stayed to work and those who left the kibbutz for a while was sometimes evident. 
Also, since the kibbutz budget was restricted by how much profit it could make, 
certain restrictions on members' expectations occurred. For instance, if there were 
25 people that wished to go to university that year, but the kibbutz could afford to 
pay for only 20, some sort of compromise had to be arranged. 
Other sources of conflict were individual members' disagreements with 
general policy. For example, some parents did not want their children to live in the 
children's houses; or a family wanted a two-month vacation instead of the usual 
one month. While the members of Vatik saw effective policy as not favouring 
either the individual or the community exclusively,58 conflicts between individual 
interest and the community interest occurred regularly. One woman refused to let 
her new-born sleep with the other babies in the children's house. The community 
did not like her stance and hoped that eventually she would be persuaded to comply 
in the future.59 Another incident involved a member who was raising dogs and 
selling them to the outside for profit. Members gossiped about him incessantly and 
at last he was confronted by the executive committee which simply told him it was 
against the ways of the kibbutz and really had to stop.60 
Simple personality clashes also caused tensions. One member may annoy 
another in discussions, at work or in debates. Dissatisfaction with a certain 
coordinator's or committee member's approach to situations or attitude may also be 
problematic. 
Other kibbutz studies in conflict 
Ben-Rafael conducted a survey of conflicts in 1982. Forty-three kibbutzim 
were randomly selected and 90 informants in total were asked about the "most 
grave conflict that had taken place in their kibbutz during the last four years."61 
58 Ibid., p. 58 
59 Ibid., p. 111 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ben-Rafael, p. 28 
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Ben-Rafael divides the results into three major categories: (1) individual demands 
(periods of leave, job placement); (2) new social arrangements (kibbutz policy vs 
individual wants as in the case where the mother wanted her child to sleep at 
home); and (3) ideological disputes and symbolic values (question of hired labour,62 
outside membership / school children). Individual demands constituted 50% of the 
conflicts, social arrangements, 40% and ideological matters 10%.63 "Crime" was not 
mentioned by any of the informants. Ben-Rafael concludes that conflict is an 
important tool for social transformation.64 
Melford Spiro in Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia (a study of the kibbutz Kiryat 
Yedidim) addressed the problem of aggression. As he puts it: 
It is highly doubtful that any society, no matter what its culture, can abolish the existence 
of aggressive impulses in its members, and it is equally doubtful that if any society can 
prohibit all external expressions of those aggressive impulses which their members 
experience.65 
He goes on to say that aggressive interpersonal expression must be kept to a 
minimum if cooperation is to be preserved. He noted that in Kiryat Yedidim, 
aggression took the form of petty gossip, criticism and sometimes personal slurs.66 
Quarrels frequently broke out in town meetings or other gathering places. Spiro 
writes, "These arguments may assume serious proportions, and the author not 
infrequently saw chaverim [comrades] burst into rages and become blue with 
anger. .. "67 The arguments, however, remained on a verbal level. 
Spiro noted that aggression/ criticism often appeared in the form of skits. An 
influential kibbutznik, while talented, was disliked for some of his personal 
qualities. He was satirised in several skits where members responded uproariously 
to the drama, hence releasing the tension against this officia1.68 Spiro suggests that 
62 At times, kibbutzim will hire outside labourers for work they cannot do themselves, especially 
during harvesting periods. The concept is not liked by any kibbutz, but sometimes need overrides 
ideological distaste. The issue is constantly hotly debated. 
63 Ibid., p. 114; actual incidents, pp. 115-124. 
64 Ibid., p. 125 
65 Melford Spiro, Venture in Utopia (New York: Schocken, 1970) p. 103 
66 Ibid., pp. 104, 108-109 
67 Ibid., p. 105 
68 Ibid. 
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other aggression is channelled through the ability to discuss issues in committee 
meetings (it was characteristic that the "leaders" of committees that dealt with the 
most controversial issues were rotated often because of the intensity of the job), 
through writings in the newspapers and through everyday conversation.69 
Observations 
The kibbutz obviously differs from the communism envisioned by the 
theorists. No doubt they would not agree with Spiro's implication that humans are 
"naturally" aggressive. The occurrences of petty gossip and criticism, elements of 
racism70 and sexism71 or shouting at a fellow being were considered characteristics 
that would be outgrown, as would the objective evaluation of individuals (lazy, 
hard-working, etc.) The suggestion by the kibbutz data that hierarchy and some 
degree of alienation is retained even under a communistic economy and 
administrative system might also be disturbing to our theorists. Many of the 
conflict sources in the kibbutz stem from a relative scarcity of resources (e.g. 
educational budgets, vacation times, etc.) and the isolated situation of the kibbutz 
social system (e.g. "outside" gifts, work on the "outside"). These problems would 
not exist in a totally communist society (about half of the incidents in Ben-Rafael's 
study falls under these causes). The principles of communist production and 
administration, nevertheless, were being utilised. 
What is most striking about the kibbutz example is that despite the numerous 
sources for social unrest-conflicts as mentioned above, personal failures or feelings 
of alienation, dissatisfaction with compromises or decisions, racism, sexism, 
69 Ibid., pp. 107-109 
70 Ibid., pp. 108-109 
71 Despite the attempt of the early kibbutzim to have complete equality between the sexes, there is 
still much to be improved in this area. For a discussion of the issue in terms of the "nature" of men 
and women see Lionel Tiger, and Joseph Shepher, Women in the Kibbutz (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovitch, 1975). For different approaches to the issue see Alison Bowes, "Women in the 
Kibbutz Movement" in The Sociological Review, Vol. 26, No.2 (1976), pp. 237-262 and Yaffa 
Schlesinger, "Sex Roles and Social Change in the Kibbutz" in Journal oj Marriage and the 
Family, Vol. 39, No.4 (November, 1977) pp. 771-779. 
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judgmental personality traits-it did not assume an "unmanageable" form and 
there did not appear to be a need for an "external" institution. Even though the 
kibbutzniks were not of the communist character envisioned by the theorists, a 
communistic regulatory system worked for the most part. Informal solutions to 
conflict was the norm in solving problems. Conflict usually resulted as an avenue 
for social change. 
Also noteworthy is that although a situation of restricted abundance and its 
accompanying problems existed, an informal regulatory system was still adequate. 
In short, the need for external force was absent even in a situation where a great 
degree of conflict was present and the full criteria for communism were not met. 
The fundamental question, of course, is why this regulation was effective. 
Nancy Terjesen suggests that "common ideology leads to unification of the group" 
and is an important factor in the longevity of communes.72 A sense of belonging 
will foster the mutual respect so fundamental to regulation. This sort of unification 
is most evident in religious communes such as the Hutterites or the Amish, which 
are, like the Kibbutz, virtually "crimeless".73 According to this view, the absence of 
crime in the kibbutz is due to the unification produced by the commitment from the 
members to certain principles. 
Numerous studies have shown, however, that despite the socialist 
commitment of the founders, ideology was not a strong factor in kibbutz life.74 Blasi 
72 Nancy Terjesen, "Longevity Factors in Past and Present Communal Societies" in Communes, eds., Ruth 
Cavan and Man Singh Das (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979) p. 277 
73 See John Bennett, "Frames of Reference for the Study of Hutterian Society" in Communes, pp. 25-43, 
esp. pp. 31-36 and John Hostetler, Amish Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993) pp. 28-29, 34-35, 85-87, 106, 154-155. 
74 Blasi, pp. 45-50; Ben-Rafael, p. 141. Alan Arian discusses the general move away from kibbutz 
ideology in "Ideology and Administration: A Case Study in Israel" in Empathy and Ideology, 
eds., Charles Press and Alan Arian (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) pp. 181-196 and Ideology and 
Change in Israel (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, 1968) esp. pp. 117-143. Helen 
and Aron Antonovsky studied the concept of commitment and alienation in kibbutz life in 
"Commitment in an Israeli Kibbutz" in Human Relations, Vol. 27, No.3 (1974) pp. 303-319. They 
concluded that" commitment is associated with a sense of satisfaction in terms of ... fundamental 
social needs as well as in terms of one's major social roles, interpersonal relations and values." (p. 
317). Melford Spiro studied Kiryat-Yedidim, which offiCially endorses Marxist ideology; hence 
ideology plays a more important role in his analysis. Kibbutzim which officially endorse 
Marxism are an extremely small minority. Spiro, pp. 168-200. 
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concludes, "There is no uniform attitude towards social cooperation. Possibly this 
stems from the lack of ordained spiritual or radical political notion about the 
meaning of the kibbutz community."75 He describes kibbutz life as one trying to 
assimilate differences rather than exclude them: 
While the kibbutz in question has a distinct effect on persons through its unique 
arrangement of their lives, the fact that the community is organized to accept a wide 
diversity of attitudes, personalities, and philosophical styles without the control of a 
rigid religious or philosophical system is viewed as a quality of life advantage . .?6 
Ben-Rafael suggest that the "psychological" factor of a Jewish identity replaced 
a strong allegiance to an ideology.77 He writes, "The revolutionary conceptions, 
which endowed the kibbutz with its legitimacy at the beginning, have gradually 
been forgotten; Judaism was called in as an alternative basis."78 He does stress, 
however, that "for the kibbutz, the 'togetherness' of the members is based on 
comprehensive associative social structures, and is still of crucial importance."79 
Blasi claims that the integration of society administratively and economically 
provided the environment for an informal resolution of conflicts. Despite 
suggestions of a Jewish national identity and Spiro's emphasis on brotherhood,8o 
none would deny that the social and economic structure are of key importance in 
maintaining the social fabric. Richard Schwartz in his article "Democracy and 
Collectivism in the Kibbutz" concludes that " ... the economic system requires a high 
degree of solidarity which in the kvutza [kibbutz] depends on the members' belief 
that they are ultimately in control of the economic decisions affecting every aspect of 
their lives."81 
The example of the kibbutz seems to support the theorists' notion that with 
the implementation of participative institutional structure and communist 
75 Blasi, p. 59. 
76 Ibid., p. 165 
77 Charles Erasmus also emphaSises the nationalism factor in the kibbutz movement, see In Search of 
the Common Good (New York: The Free Press, 1977) pp. 167-169. 
78 Ben-Rafael, p. 141 
79 Ibid., p. 127 
80 Spiro, pp. 90-91 
81 Richard Schwartz, "Democracy and Collectivism in the Kibbutz" in Social Problems, VoL 5, No.2 
(Fall, 1957) pp. 137-147 (quote p. 146). 
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constitute law? Campbell answers in the affirmative. He thus defines law as "a 
system of behavioural norms associated with institutional procedures for the 
administration and application of behavioural norms to which recourse may be had 
to settle disagreements about how social interactions are to be ordered."17 This 
definition, however, may be too broad. For instance, the Catholic church has very 
rigid rules not essentially upheld through coercion; and it has a hierarchy of 
legislative bodies with persons of authority supervising the obedience to rules that 
prescribe certain behaviours. Similarly, a social club in a secondary schoot or for 
that matter a family would meet the same criteria. If this is the case, however, there 
seems to be no method for distinguishing law from any other sort of rules (mores, 
customs, morals). Granted, all social rules could be considered "law", but by the 
same logic there is no reason to call them laws. The term seems to have lost all 
meaning. 
Clearly, the type of "informal" institution referred to above (e.g. the family) is 
not what Campbell had in mind, nor Hart. Whilst Hart implies that second order 
rules pertain to the judicial and legislative branches of the state; Campbell, given 
that he is trying to accommodate his arguments to the socialist perspective, does not. 
It can then be asked, what sort of institutions does Campbell have in mind for the 
socialist society? He does not address this question directly; however, he does 
indicate that they will be of a highly democratic, participatory nature.18 Given the 
absence of a description of the actual structure of what Campbell assumes to be 
political institutions, but which the theorists argue have "lost their political 
character", it is difficult to assess whether his term "uncoercive law" carries any real 
meaning. Seemingly there is nothing to distinguish the custom of greeting each 
other with a wave from personal disputes from failure to remove garbage; which 
proves the theorists' point that law will be indistinguishable from other social 
interaction and hence will "disappear." 
17 Ibid., p. 27 
18 Ibid., pp. 158-170 
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Also, as explained earlier in this thesis, the function of a regulatory system is 
not to make binding decisions, nor authoritatively enforce them. We are not, as 
Campbell implies "positing a system where there are clear 'second order rules', that 
is, legislative procedures for creating binding rules and various judicial and 
administrative agencies for authoritatively applying the rules in disputed cases" and 
so we do not "have a system which is far closer to existing legal systems than to any 
set of societal rules which lack any such explicit logical structures and jural 
agencies." 
The institutional distinction and norms 
Despite Campbell's misconception of communist institutions, there may be a 
valid point in placing the "legal" distinction in the institution rather than the 
element of coercion. Since the role of regulatory institutions is devoid of any 
politically authoritative judgements, and involves only suggesting compromises or 
solutions, it seems apparent that they cannot be "legal" (by Campbell and Hart's own 
definition). Nevertheless, if there is an authoritative difference existing between a 
compromise suggested by an individual, or a group of individuals, and one 
suggested by an institution, then this would imply that institutions might have a 
distinct "authority", even if it is not political, different from an individual or group 
of individuals, and hence provide an avenue through which regulation might be 
considered legal. 
The question is more complicated than it first appears. In one way, it is 
already answered. Theoretically institutions have no authority by virtue of their 
being institutions. The theorists have argued that, theoretically, only individuals 
have "authority". Say, though, that the members of the arbitration committee 
thought that one solution was the best. They pleaded with and cajoled the 
individuals involved to act on their suggestion, despite the fact that one of the 
individuals involved did not really want to. Although they cannot enforce this 
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decision, will it authoritatively have more weight because it is five people organised 
for the purpose of suggesting compromise? 
The situation involves what was earlier referred to as social consciousness. 
The theorists emphasised that social consciousness will play a large role in 
conditioning an individual's actions and responses. Without any formal 
institutions determining and enforcing norms, individuals are made aware of social 
practices only through direct social interaction. As mentioned before, the use of the 
term "norm" when speaking of communism merits caution. It is not clear whether 
recognisable social norms will actually arise. Let as assume, however, that certain 
common practices will arise. Recall that theoretically these practices arising from 
the compilation of individual actions have no intrinsic authority. Hence labelling 
them "norms", which imply a strong expectation of compliance, is misleading. That 
is not to say, though, that common social practices may not have any influence. 
While these practices are reinforced only through individual practice, individual 
choices are greatly conditioned, as they are today, by the social environment. As 
explained before, whilst the effects of social consciousness are not considered 
external to individuals, this does not indicate that individual choices will never 
conflict with the social practices emanating from the development of social 
consciousness. Although the theorists indicate that eventually all behaviour will be 
considered free expressions of individuality, there is a possibility that a minority of 
individuals behaving one way will conflict with the way the majority is behaving 
and a certain amount of public pressure may be involved. 
If an arbitration committee made a recommendation that supported the 
general social practice, and the committee used its influence to persuade individuals 
to follow the general social practice, would the institution be, in fact, enforcing 
general social principles? If we are to accept Campbell's argument that law is "a 
system of behavioural norms associated with institutional procedures", we must 
consider whether these institutional procedures, no matter how informal they may 
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be, actually define or more likely articulate general social practices. If the regulatory 
institutions might "pressure" individuals within the scope of these practices and 
hence have influence over them, non-political institutions might have distinct 
qualities from individual authority. If this were indeed the case, then general social 
practices might become norms, that is, would possess intrinsically a high degree of 
anticipated compliance by virtue of their institutional reinforcement. On this basis, 
regulation might possibly be distinguished as "legal". 
The first logical question, then, is are regulatory institutions different 
authoritatively in any way from individual authority or public pressure? And 
secondly, if institutions do have a different kind of authority, what is the nature of 
this difference? A useful approach to this question requires a return to the kibbutz 
example. The kibbutz organised society on a "non-political" basis. Whilst there 
were no courts, police or state authority, conflicts arose and were resolved with the 
help of various committees. If these committees could be considered to have 
institutional authority there is a possibility they may be considered "legal" 
institutions. The same arguments, then, could be applied to regulatory committees. 
Alan Shapiro in his article "Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal",19 submits 
that while there appears to be no discernible political or legal institutions in the 
kibbutz, the weight of a general assembly decision has greater ramifications than the 
opinion of society at large. Within this dichotomy, it would seem that the 
institution (in this case the general assembly) acquires some sort of higher power by 
virtue of it being an institution. Such a conclusion might dispel the theorists' belief 
that institutions in communism would not acquire a distinct authority from that of 
society at large. If this were the case, Campbell's assertion that the institutional 
element of regulation distinguishes it from other social phenomena might prevail. 
19 Shapiro's article ["Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal" in Law and Society Review, VoL 10 (1976) 
pp. 415-438] was in response to an article by Richard Schwartz, "Social Factors in the 
Development of Legal Control", The Yale Law Journal, VoL 63 (1954) pp. 471-491. Schwartz 
argued that the kibbutz had no legal institutions and maintained "control" through public 
pressure. 
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Shapiro acknowledges that the kibbutz has no specific legal institutions; 
nevertheless the general assembly20 performs what can be considered "judicial 
functions". Judicial functions are defined as "enunciating the local law and passing 
judgement on offenders."21 Shapiro uses the example of a member that received a 
teakettle as a gift. No other members had kettles, and tea was generally taken in the 
communal tea room. Thus two issues were at stake, the first was the fact that one 
member had something that no others had; the second being that this member's 
absence from break would affect the communal interaction of the kibbutz as a 
whole. It was expressed by the general assembly that most felt the member should 
not keep the kettle. The member acquiesced. He compares this example to a similar 
case which was not taken to the general assembly. In this instance the member 
retained the teakettle despite public pressure. Shapiro makes the point that whether 
one decides to sustain public displeasure or not is a personal decision. Had the 
matter been taken to the general assembly in the second case, however, and the 
member chose not to obey, s /he might have been confronted with possible 
expulsion. Although this sanction is rarely used (in the kibbutz studied by Shapiro, 
only once in its history), the possibility of expulsion is always a consideration.22 
Since the power of ultimate sanction is vested in the general assembly and cannot be 
enforced by public opinion, Shapiro concludes that the institutional decision is 
more significant than general public opinion. Hence institutional authority rather 
than public opinion is the ultimate factor in social control. Shapiro categorises the 
general assembly as a legal institution. 
The situation provides a very simple but useful example. The general 
practice in the kibbutz at the time was not to have teakettles. In one instance, the 
individual chose to retain the teakettle, in another not. In both instances the 
member did not have to follow the decision made. In both situations the 
20 Recall that the general assembly consists of all adult members of the kibbutz and is headed by a 
committee whose positions are rotated. 
21 Shapiro, p. 423 
22 Ibid., pp. 424-425 
276 
consequences were the same, public displeasure. Shapiro argues, however, that the 
general assembly would have had more influence because it possessed power over 
the ultimate sanction, expulsion. This would suggest that the general assembly was 
considered legal because it had power over a sanction, not because it was an 
institution. What if, as in the case of communism, the "general assembly" had no 
ultimate sanction? Would the decision have carried any more weight? It seems 
Shapiro's attempts to distinguish public influence from institutional authority 
revert back to the coercion factor. As Shapiro himself points out, it is up to the 
individual whether or not to live in the presence of an unencouraging community. 
Since no coercive measures would be used towards this individual, a more 
organised declaration of dislike promulgated by an institution or a general public 
ambience of dislike would produce essentially the same results, namely that if the 
person chose to remain, the environment would be socially disagreeable. Shapiro 
does, however, provided more examples of "legal" decisions that do not rely on the 
coercion factor. 
Shapiro draws attention to the fact that other committees in the kibbutz 
perform what he considers judiciary functions. He uses the example of a group of 
youths who damaged a tractor during the course of an April Fool's prank. They 
were confronted by the educational committee who asked the farm manager to be 
present during the meeting. The adolescents admitted their action and expressed 
regret. The youths themselves decided to help the farm manager in their spare 
time. Shapiro acknowledges that since the tractor was kibbutz property, there was 
no "injured party" per se, nor could the youths or their parents be financially 
responsible for damages caused, since financial responsibility falls to the kibbutz as a 
whole. He proposes, nevertheless, that a compensatory principle was still in 
operation since the youths felt they "owed" something to the kibbutz. 23 This 
"sanction" was authorised by an institution (the education committee). The 
23 Ibid., pp. 425-426 
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incident was not made public, and hence public influence played no role in the 
authority of the decision. Given that a compensatory "penalty" was administered by 
an institution with the authority to do so, he reasoned the decision was a legal one. 
In this case, the youths damaged community property, admitted they did so 
and voluntarily decided to help the farm manager. Shapiro claims this all 
happened on the authority of the education committee, whereas it is obvious that 
the authority came from the youths themselves. Despite the fact that the 
compensation principle is inoperable in a socialist economic system, Shapiro seems 
to argue for some sort of emotive compensation principle. The youths (not the 
institution) may have felt they "owed" something to their kibbutz for destroying its 
property (which is in fact their own property as well), but this in no way can be 
equated with the legal notion of compensation. On the contrary, they might have 
wanted to help the farm manager to make themselves feel a little better about their 
mistake, which supports Bertell Ollman's claim that the sense of guilt of the 
"offender" in communism would be so sharp that the community's duty might be 
to console them.24 
Shapiro also argues that the ''basic norms" of the kibbutz are highly 
ambiguous and therefore require institutional specifying. He uses the example of 
the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." 
Circumstances in the kibbutz have forced the general assembly to determine the 
limits of "need". Although socialists argue that abundance will preclude the 
necessity of limiting "need", the possibility has important effects on one essential 
feature of communist production-that no one can objectively determine what 
one's needs entail. If however, the possibility of any scarcity exists, some sort of 
restriction of needs may be required. If this is institutionally determined, as Shapiro 
argues, then a distributive policy becomes "legal" .25 
24 Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Vision of Communism: A Reconstruction" in Critique 8 (Summer, 1977) p. 32. 
25 Shapiro, pp. 430-431 
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In terms of determining distribution, it is unclear why the general assembly, 
which is comprised of all adult individuals involved, is charged with this 
determination rather than each individual. There are two steps to fulfilling needs. 
The first is determining need. As stated before, an institution cannot determine 
need, but rather each individual determines his /her needs. The second step is 
providing for the need. A need may not be able to be met due to some sort of 
scarcity. Shapiro asserts that institutions decide whose needs to fulfil, and hence 
"objectively determine need." The individuals, involved, however, negotiate 
whose need to fulfil first. For instance, ten kibbutz members may want to pursue 
higher education, but the kibbutz can only afford to send eight to university that 
year. The decision does not pertain to whether all ten actually need an education, 
but rather to determining who goes when, a decision that must be worked out 
among the individuals involved (by virtue of the decision-making process). The 
general assembly's role in this process is facilitation-an organised forum where 
negotiation can take place. In this manner the subjectivity of values is maintained 
and Shapiro's claim that institutions participate in the "objective determination of 
needs"26 is not supported. 
Shapiro's examples do not demonstrate that the purpose of institutions is to 
"enunciate local law and pass judgement on offenders." Both the general assembly 
and the education committee performed regulatory tasks in that they aided in the 
derivation of solutions to diverse problems ranging from the results of pranks to 
who should attend university first. The examples demonstrate that a situation is 
handled through whichever committee or by whichever individuals the situation 
demands. This illustrates the theorists' point that there is no distinction between a 
"legal" decision and any other kind of decision. 
It should also be noted that the general assembly did not enunciate local law, 
per se. In the teakettle example, it was known beforehand that the general practice 
26 Ibid., p. 430 
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was not to possess private kettles. The role of the general assembly was not to 
promulgate law, but rather was used as a vehicle through which public displeasure 
could be expressed. Similarly, the youths did not require the education committee 
to establish that "members should not destroy tractors"; nor was it necessary 
beforehand for the general assembly to promulgate, "when there are shortages needs 
will have to be compromised." In each of these cases the institutions were engaged 
to negotiate confrontation, not to define law. 
It is doubtful whether any of Shapiro's examples could be viewed in terms of 
"judgements" and "offenders". He openly admits that the resolution of the 
damaged tractor incident was not considered "punishment" but "penance" (a 
penance determined by the youths themselves).27 This incident also illustrates how 
the equivalence principle cannot function in a socialist economy. In essence, there 
could be no retribution as the "damage" could not be assigned to one person, but 
only the entire community (including the youths). The fact that only 8 members 
could attend university at that time was not a "judgement" but was rather dictated 
by concrete circumstances (lack of money). As to who was to go, the individuals 
involved would have to decide. Thus an institutional "judgement" did not occur. 
Similarly, the member with the teakettle was not being "punished" for 
having a teakettle. At the time, the primary issues involved were equality and 
privacy vs communality, not the material fact that so and so had a teapot. Analysed 
in the sense that conflicts are a rupture in the social fabric that requires 
reconsideration or change, the teakettle incident called attention to the fact that 
perhaps the structure of the kibbutz needed to accommodate privacy more than it 
did (which eventually resulted in a change in the general kibbutz practice).28 
One must considered seriously, however, the difference between resolving 
conflicts through an institution and reaching a resolution without one. Though it 
27 Ibid., p. 425 
28 As a result, eventually, everyone had a teakettle. Likewise, the first television in the kibbutz 
induced similar debates as the "teakettle incident" and presently, most kibbutznik have 
televisions. 
280 
was not clearly proved by Shapiro's discussions, it would seem logical that a more 
organised handling of conflicts (either through a general assembly-type organisation 
or an arbitration committee) would have more influence than other informal 
attempts. The questions is, why? Most probably, the help of an arbitration 
committee (or general assembly) would be required if other attempts at compromise 
failed .. The situation, at this point, would probably be a "serious" one. For this 
reason, a compromise derived with the help of an institution may appear more 
influential because the situations involved would be more serious. For example, in 
the first instance of the teakettle, the community thought the issue was important 
enough to bring before the general assembly. The second community did not. 
Therefore, when the public collectively expressed its displeasure through the 
general assembly, it may have had more impact on the individuaL A similar 
situation might have occurred with the youths involved in the tractor prank. An 
organised vocalisation through the education committee that members were 
"displeased" with their actions might have more influence than, say, if they heard 
displeasure only from the farm manager and a few others. 
The distinguishing factor between public input and more organised public 
input, however, is not the fact that the situation has been handled through the use 
of an institution, but rather the situation has become, for want of a better term, 
more focused. If situations cannot be resolved personally, or within a work unit or 
within a committee, than perhaps a more organised method may be called for. The 
important factor, however, is that whilst an institution may influence an 
individual, it has no authority over that individual. It cannot be ignored that, 
although an institutionally derived decision may be differentiated from a non-
institutionally derived decision by virtue of its degree of focus, this differentiation 
has no authoritative basis. It should also be pointed out that whilst committee 
recommendations may affect individuals, they do not influence individuals by 
virtue of their institutional derivation, but rather by virtue of, "more focused" 
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public pressure. It should also be noted that if a particular individual is not affected 
at all by public pressure, than the use of an institution to express public sentiment 
will have no effect, suggesting that authority strictly rests with the individual. 
It seems that the general social practices cannot in actuality be enforced other 
than through individually determined obligation to comply. For this reason, such 
practices lack a strong normative component and are best considered in a similar 
manner as administrative suggestions. The theorists do indicate that social 
consciousness will playa strong role in conditioning individual choices. It is clear 
theoretically, however, that individual actions are to be considered free expressions 
of subjectivity, the compilation of which creates a social consciousness. Since 
individuals are the source of all power, public pressure, if it does arise, can only be 
one element of influence rather than any definitive criterion of judgement. 
Similarly, suggestions produce by regulation institutions do not enunciate any 
binding decisions akin to rules or norms, but rather provides a method for 
coordination of individual action. 
The above argument illustrates that, in essence, social organisation reflects 
coordination of individual choices. Through this methodology, individuals become 
the only source of power-even though they are influenced by public pressure and 
social consciousness, and must make choices within the parameters of necessity. 
Critics of this position argue that since conflict is always possible, the potential for 
conflict between "individual" and "society" will always remain, and the "public 
pressure" must be restrained in order to protect individualliberties.29 This position 
is the foundation for those that support the preservation of the rule of law.3D Even 
if values are no longer objectified, the process of arbitration and general decision-
making must be guaranteed. They argue that the rule of law becomes even m 0 r e 
important in socialist society as the participatory element is so central to its 
29 Virtually all affore-mentioned authors that call for law in socialism express this concern. 
30 Paul Hirst excluded. 
organisation. 
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Individuals, therefore, must be guaranteed the process of 
participation, thus creating a need for the "rule of law". 
The procedural distinction 
Alan Hunt's well-written article" A Socialist Interest in Law"31 defends the 
socialist need for a rule of law on a procedural basis. Hunt's thesis is designed to 
protect the notion that: 
.. .law will play a part in any form of defensible socialist society; two, constitutions are 
important in providing some degree of protection to the democratic arrangements of public 
life; three, civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law (legal mechanisms and devices 
developed within capitalist SOCieties) are essential preconditions for a defensible 
socialism.32 
The crux of his argument reads: 
The contention that politics,33 as an expression of the clash of interests, must continue under 
socialism, and that complex social arrangements require coordination and regulation, is 
not--or should not be controversial. The more important issues are whether this implies a 
continuing necessity for law, and whether the development of a specifically socialist law 
should be pursued.34 
Hunt argues that given the increased demand for higher social coordination 
produced by a more democratic organisation of decision-making, a non-legal social 
order would prove inadequate. He defines a non-legal social order as that "which 
envisages the displacement of the formal structures of law by direct or 'popular' 
justice."35 He argues that this vision of regulation fails to take into account "the 
31 Hunt," A Socialist Interest in Law". Hunt's article was in part a critique of Christine Sypnowich's 
The Concept of Socialist Law. She responds to his specific points in "The Future of Socialist 
Legality: A Reply to Hunt" in New Left Review, No. 193 (May-June, 1992) pp. 80-88. Hunt's 
position on rights is also explored in Amy Bartholomew and Alan Hunt, "What's Wrong With 
Rights" in Law and Inequality, Vol. 9, No.1 (1990) pp. 1-58. For a general discussion of law see 
Alan Hunt, "The Politics of Law and Justice" in Politics and Power, eds., Diane Adlam, et al. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981) pp. 3-26. See also, Explorations in Law and Society 
(New York: Routledge, 1993) esp. Chapter 11, "Marxism, Law, Legal Theory and Jurisprudence", 
pp. 249-266. 
32 Hunt," A Socialist Interest in Law", p. 105 
33 Why Hunt chooses politics to represent clashes of interest is not explored by him. Obviously in the 
context of this thesis, it would be safer conceptually to assume that Hunt merely meant in some 
instances "interests" would be in conflict. 
34 Hunt, "A Socialist Interest in Law", p. 113 
35 Ibid. 
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problems of coordination between units and the need to take account of the 
dispersed and divergent interests inherent in complex interdependence."36 
The need for law he argues, does not come from what he labels the typical 
liberal position-that complex social arrangements require the "predictability and 
certain of rules,"37 but rather "socialism needs law because its commitment to 
democracy requires extensive guarantees of participatory and procedural 
regularity."38 The rule of law, then, in its role of a protector of procedure, becomes 
the foundation for a socialist concept of law. Hunt makes the point that such a focus 
on the nature of law would allow the socialist to move away from substantive law, 
which he defines as explicit rules of conduct, to one focusing on procedural law, a 
framework of how decisions are to be reached.39 
With the emphasis on law as procedure as opposed to the substantive results 
reached through this procedure, Hunt maintains that law can then retain its 
autonomy. There is a mechanism for citizens to differentiate between how 
decisions are made and the decisions themselves. Hunt regards this as a "viable 
separation between law and politics,"40 -language rather confusing given the 
context of this thesis. Nevertheless, his emphasis on procedural rather than 
substantive law would not seem antagonistic to the way a socialist society would 
function. 
Hunt stops short in justifying who, exactly, "guarantees" what he labels 
"democratic rights" (e.g., right to information, participation, etc.).41 He does suggest 
that only a representative form of democracy is viable and that a constitution would 
playa fundamental role in organising authority in a future society.42 He does not 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 114 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., pp. 114-115 
40 Ibid., p. 117 
41 Ibid., p. 114 
42 Hunt defines the role of a constitution as concerning " ... the importance of formal delineation of 
spheres of competence, scope of jurisdiction, modes of accountability, and the interrelationship 
between social institutions." Ibid., p. 119 
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defend explicitly, however, why a procedure for decision-making would necessarily 
be considered law. Since he does not elaborate on the mechanism to preserve 
"procedural rights", but advocates a constitution, a form of representation and a 
preservation of legal mechanisms, it can be assumed that some sort of legal body 
with the power of enforcement would exist. This legal body would be responsible 
for ensuring democratic rights in the form of a regulated and enforceable 
participatory process. 
As is obvious by now, such a position of is incompatible with the principles of 
regulation. As discussed in Chapter four, the "enforceable rights" argument-even 
if these rights are procedural rather than substantive-would lend itself to one of 
Marx's initial critique of rights; and that is, if law is created by legal institutions,43 
than it is contradictory to assert that the law itself is "above" the institutions that 
create it. The point applies even if "law" only represents enforceable procedure. 
Paul Hirst sums up the position well: 
Law is always the product of specific agencies of decision and yet is supposed to be 
subordinate to itself. This 'fiction' is a condition of its action: it is a fiction (1) because laws 
and regulatory instances are not a homogeneous sphere of legality (Law)-there is no 'Law' 
in general, only specific bodies of rules and definite apparatuses regulating particular 
spheres of activity ... (2) because the rules of procedure that legal agencies follow are specific 
constructions of other agencies of decisions, legislatures and higher courts. The notion of the 
'rule of Law' embodies this fiction ... 44 
Since communist institutions have no power above individuals, then rights 
would not need to be "protected." Indeed, if individuals themselves are the 
institutions, than who is protecting whom against what? And who determines 
which elements of the procedure are to be enforced? If the legal institutions 
determine the "rights" of democracy and have the power to enforce them, then the 
separation of citizen and institution becomes imminent. 
43 By created, I mean that law becomes law through its institutional codification. Much akin to Hart's 
or Campbell's position, norms may be established by morals, mores or customs, but once these 
behaviours are codified by what is considered a legal institution, they then become laws. 
44 Hirst, "Law Socialism and Rights", p. 67. Hirst advocates a role for law in socialism, but strictly on 
an institutional level, rather than a rule of law based argument. 
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Moreover, if one restricts the role of enforcement to method only, but not to 
the substantive results of this decision process, than the inadequacies Hunt sees in 
"non-legal" social organisation would equally apply to a system based solely on 
procedural legal rights as well since this system could not enforce any of its actual 
decisions. If a decision were enforced, than in effect a procedural rights-based legal 
system would enforce substantive law. 
Despite these problems, Hunt's argument does expose a pertinent point to 
assessing whether regulation may be considered law. Hunt's makes a distinction 
between the process of decision-making and the decisions themselves, indicating 
the distinction of law lies primarily with the procedure associated with it rather 
than, as previously considered, on an institutional basis. Hunt suggests that 
decisions are binding because they were created by a process enforceable by legal 
mechanisms. In communist administration, however, such decisions lack 
enforcement mechanisms. Is there another distinguishing characteristic, however, 
that indicates the decision-making process in communism could be considered 
"legal"? 
What is of paramount importance in the decision-making process in 
communism is that it is designed explicitly to diffuse all political power. By 
relegating institutions to the passive role of "facilitation", power cannot be 
concentrated in them-including the "power" to enforce "rights" (either procedural 
or substantive). Only with the complete de-politicisation of institutions can 
coercion be averted and rights be rendered irrelevant. Such de-politicisation of 
institutions can occur only when the goal of economic production is not 
competitive and diversified (i.e. needs vs profit) but rather is unified in the goal of 
fulfilling need. Institutions become a method of organisation rather than a source 
of enforceable decisions. There is nothing in the negotiating process itself that 
would indicate that it should be considered a "legal" process. In theory, the process 
does not create binding rules and does not enforce them. Whilst Hunt suggests that 
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the process of coordination and regulation in socialism requires law in that the 
decision-making procedure must be enforced by legal mechanisms, the theorists 
make no such claim. Hunt's question as to whether coordination and regulation in 
socialism of "complex social arrangements .. .implies a continuing necessity for law" 
seems to have been answered in the negative. 
Conclusion 
The above arguments suggest that the core elements of regulation remove it 
from a legal paradigm. Such a conclusion can be demonstrated by comparing a 
modern law and a practice which is not legally enforced. In some states in the 
U.s.A. spitting is illegaL In the U.s.A. it is customary to give a present to a loved 
one on Valentine's Day. One is a law, one is not. Why? In both cases not following 
the practice is against the majority social behaviour (most people do not spit; most 
people give loved ones something on Valentine's Day). In the case of spitting the 
law is: (1) derived through a representative "democratic" process (the legislative 
mechanism) which is a function of the state government (2) enunciated through a 
state institution (3) enforceable by a political power (the state); (4) enforced through a 
judicial body responsible for interpreting the boundaries of the law and 
consequences of breaking it. The Valentine's Day practice is: (1) derived from 
common social behaviour; (2) is not enforceable. Obligation to follow the spitting 
law may stem from individual desire to follow it, or social pressure to follow it, but 
also has an "extra" obligation to follow it by virtue of it being derived and enforced 
through certain processes. The obligation, if not fulfilled, is punishable by the state. 
Obligation to follow the Valentine's practice stems from individ ual desire 
influenced by society. The obligation, if not fulfilled, does not result in punishment, 
but may result in social pressure. The similarities of the two cases rest with the facts 
that: (1) both arise from a social base; (2) both involve obligation; (3) both involve a 
negative response if not followed. The distinction between the two cases stems 
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from: (1) enforceability; (2) promulgation through a state institution; (3) the process 
of creating the practice; (4) the process of enforcing it; (5) multi-faceted obligation 
(e.g. individual, social, legal). 
Campbell seeks to remove numbers 1,2 and 4 as distinguishing factors of law, 
leaving only the process of creating "rules" (in Campbell's sense of the word) and 
the legal obligation to follow them. As he states, law, then, is "a system of 
behavioural norms associated with institutional procedures for the administration 
and application of behavioural norms to which recourse may be had to settle 
disagreements about how social interactions are to be ordered." As stated before, 
however, such a definition places the entirety of social interaction within the legal 
realm. For instance churches, choirs, theatre groups, businesses, children's clubs, 
rock bands, sports teams and family units could be considered "legal" if the meaning 
of "institution" is to be taken loosely (which Campbell indicates it should be by 
proposing that a legal institution is not necessarily a function of the state). One 
could label all social interaction "law", but the concept then looses all meaning. 
Consequently, since Campbell does not address what kind of institutions would 
arise in communism it is difficult to assess whether there is a legal obligation 
associated with the decisions they procure. It is clear that the communist 
institutions discussed in this thesis would not produce decisions that are binding. 
Shapiro, in analysing the kibbutz institutions, de-emphasises the specified 
nature of "judicial mechanisms" and indicates that all institutions perform legal 
functions if they are "enunciating the local law and passing judgement on 
offenders." He thus focuses on elements 2 (state institutional articulation of 
practices) and 4 (process of enforcement) of the distinguishing factors between law 
and a non-law. He failed to demonstrate, however, that the kibbutz institutions, 
and consequently communist institutions, were actually enunciating laws and 
passing judgements. Moreover, Shapiro failed to demonstrate how the authority 
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involved in the resolution of those conflicts came from the institution itself, as 
opposed to the individuals that comprised the institution. 
Hunt stresses that a democratic decision-making process had to be enforced in 
socialism, hence "law" would still have a role as a "protector" of procedural rights. 
Hunt thus stresses elements 1 (enforceability) and 3 (process of creation) of the 
distinguishing factors enunciated above. According to the theorists, however, such 
an element of enforcement is unnecessary and contradictory. Without the element 
of coercion, there seems to be nothing in the decision-making process in 
communism that would indicate it should be considered legal. 
Whilst the arguments have focused on various elements in what can be 
considered distinguishing legal factors, none seem to make a strong argument for 
why regulation should be considered a legal phenomenon; and, more generally, 
why the organisation of social relations would necessarily involve law. In reality, 
regulation fits none of the distinguishing factors of law. It is important to reiterate 
why, in brief, a law differs from a non-legal practice. 
The first distinguishing element mentioned is enforceability. Whilst an 
argument may be made that practices are "enforceable" in communism through the 
use of public pressure, it should be recognised that such "enforcement" is non-
coercive in that the results of not following a socially common behaviour are not 
threatening (either physically or economically) in any way. Admittedly, though 
public pressure may playa role in influencing individual decisions, the decision-
making process prevents such pressure from assuming coercive form. Hence, in 
reality, principles widely practised can not in actuality be enforced by any person or 
institution other than individuals themselves. It is worth noting as well that since 
all actions and decisions by individuals were to become free expressions of 
subjectivity, it is a possibility that the use of public pressure may not develop. 
The second element involves the promulgation of rules by an authoritative 
institution. Practices in communism will arise much as the Valentine's practice 
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became recognised in the U.S.A. How is such a practice articulated? And with what 
authority? Social behaviours are passed on through social interaction. The 
"authority" stems from each individual operating within the social environment. 
In much the same manner, general practices may arise in communism through the 
process of social interaction. The input of individuals is coordinated, negotiated and 
re-coordinated until a practice, or in a wider sense, a policy virtually arises from the 
various input of participants. Such decisions are not promulgated by institutions 
but derived through the use of them. Their authority does not stem from the 
institution, but from individuals who create the decisions, then choose to comply. 
The third factor focuses on the process of the creation of decisions. As with 
social practices in capitalism, there is no institutional process in communism that 
creates decisions. Administrative suggestions are negotiated and changed through 
the active input of individuals. Practices arise through social interaction and not 
from institutional authority. This process is one of "decentralised coordination", 
which differs from "democratic" decision-making in that there is no institutional 
authority. 
The fourth factor deals with the process of enforcement. In capitalism, such a 
process involves judicial procedure with regard to defined legal bodies whose duty 
is to carry out various functions (e.g. judgement, punishment, arrest). Since in 
communism there is no enforcement of decisions, such mechanisms become 
unnecessary. There may, however, be a need for an arbitration institution whose 
task is to facilitate conflict resolution. This institution is not charged with enforcing 
law or defining the parameters of legal jurisdiction but rather is used as a method 
for negotiation. Thus, its purpose is singularly different than the purpose of legal 
institutions in capitalism. 
The last distinguishing factor is that of obligation. While obligation both to 
the law and the non-legal practice have elements of individual conviction 
conditioned by the social environment, only the law, which has been derived 
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through a prescribed process and institution and is enforceable via sanctions, carries 
an extra "legal" obligation which is independent of the feelings of obligation 
generated by the individual operating in a social environment. Obligation in 
regulation is absent of such an external, independent obligation. 
Regulation clearly falls from the purview of the realm that is considered legal. 
First, decisions and practices are not institutionally determined and can only arise 
from the coordinated input of individuals. Second, they are not binding by virtue of 
their institutional source. Third, they cannot be coercively enforced. Fourth, they 
do not carry obligation that is "external" to a sense of individually determined 
obligation. Fifth, regulatory institutions are not charged with making, articulating 
or enforcing decisions and social practices, but rather assisting in derivations of 
solutions to social problems. 
Those that propose the need for law in socialism do so as a concern over the 
possible abuse of power. What this genre of thought fails to recognise, though, is 
that communism seeks to diffuse power completely so that no legal mechanism is 
needed to "control" it. The term regulation, then, does not indicate a method of 
control over power because "communism" indicates that power is completely 
decentralised and de-politicised. The function of regulation becomes to negotiate 
solutions to conflict, conflict that arises not due to power usage and abuses, but 
rather to the difficulties of the social coordination and organisation of a vast array of 
different human personalities. 
E.P. Thompson in his book Whigs and Hunters, which is an historical 
examination of the circumstances surrounding the Black Act, best sums up the 
justification for the general support of the eternity of the rule of law. Despite the 
overwhelming evidence presented through his historiography of the eighteenth 
century which indicates that legality often was subject directly to state power and 
largely affected by economic circumstances, he concludes that the rule of law is an 
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unqualified human good.45 He justifies this position by asserting, in his words, an 
"obvious point that some modern Marxists have overlooked, that there is a 
difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law."46 And that while "[w]e 
ought to expose the shams and inequities that may be concealed beneath this law," 
we must also strive to preserve "the rule of law itself, the imposing effective 
inhibitions upon power and the defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive 
claims."47 Thompson concludes: 
In a context of gross class inequalities, the equity of law must always be in some part sham. 
Transplanted as it was to even more inequitable contexts, this law could become an 
instrument of imperialism. For this law has found its way to a good many parts of the globe. 
But even here the rules and rhetoric have imposed some inhibitions upon the imperial 
power.48 
Thompson's verdict that the fight against unmitigated power in the fo rm of 
the rule of law should be considered an "unqualified" human good contrasts 
sharply with the Marxist position that at best the rule of law is slightly better than 
complete arbitrary power. Pashukanis' point that the form of the rule of law directly 
results from the economically defined social relationships of capitalism is pertinent 
to Thompson's claim. Thompson's de facto definition of the rule of law as a tool 
against unrestricted power side-steps the point that there are other methods to battle 
unrestricted power such as a decentralised coordination and direct control over 
resources. He does not address why the rule of law, even under the disparity of 
economic relations, would be a more successful tool than de centralised coordination 
and control of resources in the battle against power's "all-intrusive claims." 
Nonetheless, Thompson has captured the sentiment of those that reject the notion 
of "non-legal" regulation which abandons the concept of the rule of law. Marx 
himself acknowledges that rights, such as the rule of law, developed in capitalism 
were "the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world 
45 E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters (NY: Pantheon Books, 1975) p. 266 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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order,"49 but that society must move beyond capitalist production and beyond 
rights.5o 
Regulation does not call for the demise of the rule of law only for it to be 
replaced with arbitrary "public" power. The conclusion to be drawn from theories 
examined in this thesis is not the result of a choice between the rule of law and 
arbitrary power; but rather a move towards a third choice, one of non-legal 
regulation under a system that completely diffuses power. Krylenko's words seem 
all the more fitting, call it "anything you like, but not law." 
A SEPARATE JURISPRUDENCE? 
Despite the fact that there seems to be no substantive or theoretical grounds to 
label communist regulation law, there is reason to distinguish the communist 
theory of law (as derived from Marx, Engels and the early Russian theorists)51 from 
other realms of bourgeois jurisprudence. Although regulation is not law, it has 
developed through the progress of legal systems and therefore is intrinsically linked 
to the achievements of these systems. 
Whilst there is a distinct socialist critique of law in capitalism, the theory of a 
communist regulatory system would seem to fall beyond the scope of jurisprudence, 
which is after all a study of the theory of law. The relation between regulation and 
law, nevertheless, requires an analysis of capitalist law to derive communist 
regulation. Tracing the connection between the two illuminates both. Discussing 
the "future of law" further delineates how different the communist theory really is 
from other paradigms of law. While one classification (such as "positivist" or 
"naturalist") may appear to apply to a socialist theoretical analysis of law in 
49 Marx, On The Jewish Question in Marx and Engels Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1975) voL 3, p. 155 
50 Engels, in an article completed by Kautsky, re-emphasises this argument. See "Juridical Socialism" 
in Politics and Society, VoL 7, No.2 (1977) pp. 203-220, esp. pp. 219-220. 
51 When referring to a communist theory of law in this discussion, I am referring to the conclusions and 
arguments presented from the selection of theorists chosen. It does not include official legal 
ideology of the former Soviet Union or any other "communist" nation. 
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capitalism, such a label may prove misleading when further carried to the theory of 
communist regulation. 
There is a plethora of theories of law. I have reduced the scope of discussion, 
however, to those prominent in modern legal discourse: positivist (including the 
normative approach), naturalist and sociological jurisprudence. Most approaches 
to law can be classified broadly under one of these three headings. The single most 
distinctive element in the communist concept of law is the assertion that law 
cannot be analysed apart from the social relations produced by the concrete realities 
of the mode of production. The theorists addressed both the source, content and 
function of law, as well as analysed the various forms legalism assumed during 
certain stages in history. Through examining the source, content, form and 
function of law and regulation, the characteristics unique to communist theory are 
revealed. 
Positivism 
Materialism would appear to lend itself to the positivist tradition, in that 
analysis must begin with observable phenomena. The association, however, is quite 
weak. Although there are obvious difficulties with trying to define legal 
"positivism", several characteristics can generally apply. The Austinian model 
indicates that the source of law can be traced directly to the sovereign (whether this 
be a parliament or a king) and hence the content of law is essentially the command 
of the sovereign. For the modern positivist, the source of law is vested in legitimate 
legal institutions. The content of law is what is encoded and validated by those 
institutions, regardless of its "moral" properties. Whilst the two positions have 
obvious differences, they are similar in that the content of law is determined solely 
by an institution or sovereign. Though the function of law in the Austinian sense 
would be to carry out the demands of the sovereign, a more general description of 
the function of positive law is to regulate relationships and disputes (both between 
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individuals, institutions and within the legal institutions themselves). Laws 
assume the form of statutes. 
The first conflict a communist theory of law has with the positivist tradition 
is the source of law itself. Legal institutions, for the most part, are regarded as a 
facade. The source of law stems from production relations in general, and for 
Pashukanis, the commodity form in specific. Legislators cannot "create" law, law 
itself arises from given situations. This is not to say that the content of specific 
statutes are not determined by those that write them, but rather laws must take 
shape within the scope of the development of production relations. The 
relationship, however, is dialectic rather than linear. The connection of law to the 
economic realm is one of generality. Pashukanis stressed that the form law 
assumed was directly determined by the form of production relations (which was 
determined by commodity fetishism). The content, while restrained by economic 
conditions, can also affect those very conditions, albeit in a limited fashion. For 
instance a law can be passed increasing wages or reducing the work week or 
empowering unions, thus affecting the management/worker relations somewhat, 
but the fundamental relationship has not been changed. Whilst the source of law is 
economic relations and hence legal institutions cannot "determine" laws, they can 
determine the specific codification of these laws and even carry the power to "fine 
tune" those economic relations. The content of law, then, is determined by the 
legislative and judicial bodies, but only within the general restrictions imposed by 
economic relations. 
The function of law from the theorists' perspective is actually not to resolve 
"conflicts" but to perpetuate them. Law is a tool of the class war, both substantively 
and ideologically. Behaviour which is determined by economic relations is 
controlled by criminalisation of certain acts. For instance, as the critical 
criminologists pointed out, white collar crime is treated as mischief, street robbery is 
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threatening the very moral fibre of society, despite the fact that the overall cost of 
the two types of crimes is enormously larger in the realm of "white collar" crime.52 
Ideologically, law functions to legitimise the power of the ruling class and 
legalise capitalist social relations. The dichotomy between isolated individuals and 
integrated ones which is created by capitalist production relations causes a need for 
law to regulate the realm of isolated individuals. In this way, law "mystifies" actual 
social relations. The theorists argue economic principles, rather than legal ones, 
govern relations. Law is essentially a reflective form of this regulatory function. As 
far as criminal law is concerned, they clearly thought that law could not resolve 
behaviours such as murder or assault; only a drastic change in social relations could 
manifest conditions where these acts would decrease. 
The form law assumed in capitalism was, in one sense, codification but in a 
larger sense a culmination of legality in total. The transformation to a non-legal 
regulatory order could only occur when the form of law had reached its peak. The 
theorists emphasise that regulation of relations can occur in other forms, but they 
did not see this regulation as necessarily entailing law. The prime function of law 
for them, was a legitimisation of the ruling class. 
The fact that the theorists reject in total the fundamental significance of legal 
institutions propel them far from the positivist model. The assertion that relations 
give rise to law rather than the reverse would seem to place them in a natural law 
or a sociological paradigm far more than a positivist one. Also significant in the 
differences between the two is that the basis for legal phenomena does not occur in 
the legal realm, but in the economic one; and that the regulatory requirement of 
society does not demand law. A legal system cannot be examined outside of its 
52 Johnson and Douglas point out that the 1970's managerial fraud in Equity Funding involved losses 
between two and three billion dollars, which was more than the totaIlosses caused by all street 
crime in the U.S.A. during one year [Crime at the Top: Deviance in Business and Professions, eds., 
J. Johnson and J. Douglas (Philadelphia: J B Lippincott, 1978) p. 151]. The U. S. Chamber of 
Commerce in 1974 admitted that even the short-term, direct cost of white-collar crime was a 
least 40 billion annually [James Sorenson, et aI., "Detecting Management Fraud: The Role of the 
Independent Auditor" in White Collar Crime, eds., Gilbert Geis and Ezra Stotland (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1980) p. 246]. 
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This fundamental rejection of the autonomy (or semi-
autonomy) of law places them at severe odds with the positivists. 
The differences are magnified when carried to the context of communist 
regulation. The positivist position assumes the continuation of law in all societies, 
whereas the theorists argue that regulation will supersede law. With the reordering 
of production relations, the mystifying role of law is unnecessary. The absence of 
legal institutions in communist regulation renders the positivist viewpoint 
inoperable. 
Though the normativist approach to law operates for the most part within 
the positivist framework, the emphasis is slightly different. The importance of legal 
institutions to the normativist view resembles the positivist one to a large degree. 
The primary difference lies with the source of law. Whilst the source of law for the 
positivist is clearly legal institutions (and legislative ones), for the normativist the 
source of law is the norms emanating from society itself. Thus the content of the 
law is directly reflective of societal norms. The form the laws take are codes enacted 
by valid legal institutions, but the personnel of these legal institutions must take 
into account and interpret societal norms. The function of law-also similar to the 
positivists- is the regulation of relations.53 
The normativist approach has some similarities with our theorists, namely 
that they turn to already existing relations as a basis for law. Pashukanis criticised 
the normativists in that they regarded norms as objective rather than as a reflection 
of production relations. Normativists would not necessarily commit themselves to 
the position that norms directly emanate from production relations. It could be 
argued, however, that perhaps the socialist theorists could be labelled "materialist 
normativists". Such a categorisation, however, disregards the fact that, as discussed 
above, the socialist does not connect the need for regulation with the phenomenon 
of law. While normativists see law as regulating relations via a formalisation of 
53 Or in Kelsen's case, the regulation of relations via the prescriptions for the administration of 
sanction. 
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norms, or in Kelsen's case a hierarchy of norms (and this is where legal institutions 
become significant), 54 communists see the source of social regulation emanating 
from production relations. For them, there is no intrinsic connection between law 
and norms; and this is directly borne out in their concept of non-legal social 
regulation. 
Natural law 
As surprising as it may seem, some of the theorists' assessments of law bear 
similarity to Aquinas, essentially in that law is bound to the needs of human 
nature.55 Although the metaphysical framework within which Aquinas categorises 
various aspects of law is obviously completely unacceptable to them, the fact that 
Aquinas relates the validity of law to the fulfilment of human needs strikes a 
similar chord with the theorists. Carried to a broader sense, the claim that the 
fundamental content of law is not determined by lawmakers might place the 
theorists loosely in the naturalist realm. In examining the other elements of law, 
however, it becomes clear that the theorist fall well outside the naturalist umbrella. 
The naturalist is unwilling to divorce law from its validity, or to state it 
simply, law and "good" law should not be as separate as the positivist would 
advocate. The source of law entails an "external" measure of validity. For Aquinas 
the ultimate measure of the goodness of human law was the natural law. Human 
nature has certain universal aspects; laws that forsake human nature are at best a 
corruption or debasement of law.56 For modem naturalists like Finnis, this external 
validity appealed to a sense of "human good" discernible through practical reason 
(not, after all, that much different from Aquinas)P Fuller's naturalist approach 
stipulates that laws are valid only if they fit certain internal logical requirements, 
54 See Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
55 See St. Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics, eds., William Baumgarth and Richard 
Regan (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing" 1988) esp. Summa Theologiae I-II (qq. 90-96); pp. 11-
76. 
56 Or, in the worst case, not laws at alL 
57 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 
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what he labels the "internal morality of law" (e.g. they are not self-contradictory, 
they must be made understandable to affected parties, there must not be a lack of 
congruity between rules and the administration of them, etc.).58 Although this 
measure of validity is intrinsic to the legal sphere itself, the more encompassing 
principle of "rationality" might be the "external" validator. 
Whilst economic relations are deemed the source of law by our theorists, this 
has no effect on the validity of the law. The theorists arguments, for the most part, 
are not concerned with the "goodness" of laws. As Alan Gilbert writes: 
As a defender of historicism might note, Marx often warned against substituting moral 
outrage at injustice and an accompanying inaccurate social theory for a materialist analysis 
of social and political forces and of realizable alternative courses of development.59 
Paul Phillips rightly points out, however, that Marx's earlier writings on law-
notably "Debates on Freedom of the Press"60-have a "distinctly Natural Law cast,"61 
given especially that Marx discusses the difference between "real" law and only a 
"form" of law. In this instance, he was contrasting censorship with the press law. 
The first censored material before publication, the latter criminalised the publication 
of "sensitive" material. Marx proclaimed that the press law was a "real" law because 
it at least recognised that the press was inherently free (even though an act of 
exercising that freedom may be punishable); and criticised the censorship law as it 
did not recognise that the "true" nature of the press was to be free. Despite the 
obvious natural law elements, Marx did not state either law was "good" or "valid". 
It also must be remembered that these articles were written before the theory of 
materialism was fully developed and during a time that Marx was writing for 
Rheinische Zeitung-where censorship was, to say the least, menacing. Given the 
context of Marx's entire works, it would be unjust to classify him as a "naturalist" 
based on these writings alone.62 
58 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969). 
59 Alan Gilbert, "Historical Theory and the Structure of Moral Argument in Marx" in Political Theory, 
Vol. 9, No.2 (May, 1981) p. 174 
60 Marx and Engels Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975) vol. 1 
61 Paul Phillips, Marx and Engels on Law and Laws (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1980) p. 7 
62 See Phillips, esp. pp. 6-13 and Wojciech Sadurski, "Marxism and legal positivism" in Essays in 
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Hans Kelsen asserts that because Marx made his arguments for socialism in 
terms of justice, he should be considered a naturalist: 
The means for the solution of the class conflict: the just social order of communist society, is 
immanent in the social reality of production and hence, can be discovered by an examination 
of this reality. This is genuine natural-law doctrine. 
Since according to the natural-law doctrine reason or justice is immanent in nature as 
a creation of God, and especially in the nature of man (as the image of God), man is by his 
very nature good, that is, just; and since justice means freedom, man is by his very nature 
free.63 
He contends that Marx proclaimed communism to be just because man could be 
truly free. 
First, to equate "justice", "goodness" and "freedom" is to over-simplify the 
phenomenological implications of such terms. Marx's argument (as opposed to 
rhetoric) stated that communism would eliminate contradictions that capitalism 
contained within its own order (e.g. that "all men are equal" when in reality they 
are not). Thus these contradictions arise not from man's nature, but are created by 
man's nature as determined by capitalist production relations. Whether these 
contradictions are "unjust" or not is a separate question. As Robert Tucker points 
out, Marx and Engels' condemnation of capitalist exploitation "has nothing 
whatsoever to do with justice and injustice."64 
Piers Beirne sums up an article written by Engels and Kautsky against 
Austrian jurist Anton Menger who argues that the injustice of capitalism must be 
overcome by a legal programme which incorporates the right to full compensation 
for work: 
Engels' and Kautsky's reply to these demands was premised on the notion that capitalist 
societies are neither 'just' nor' unjust'. All modes of production give rise to particular concepts 
of right and justice.65 
Legal Theory, ed., D.J. Galligan (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1984) esp. pp. 195-198. 
63 Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1955) p. 21 
64 Robert Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970) esp. Chapter two, 
"Marx and Distributive Justice", pp. 33-53. Quote is from p. 44. Leszek Kolakowski supports the 
assessment that Marx abandoned the moralistic approach to social change-see "Marxism and 
Human Rights" in Daedalus, Vol. 112, No.4 (Fall, 1983) esp. p. 86. 
65 Piers Beirne, Introduction to "Juridical Socialism" by Engels and Kautsky, p. 200 
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Engels describes justice as ''but the ideologised, glorified expression of the existing 
economic relations, now from their conservative and now from the revolutionary 
angle [in reference to Proudhon]."66 
Even if Kelsen's case for classification of Marxist theory as natural-law cannot 
be won through the justice aspect, it does have merit in another regard. Kelsen 
draws attention to the fact that just as natural law doctrine categorises law as a 
phenomenon not completely determined by man (e.g., God, nature, Reason), Marx 
places the source of law in production relations, which Kelsen asserts is also beyond 
man's contro1.67 Although there is divergence over the naturalist concern with the 
"goodness" of the content of law, and the socialists indifference to it; there is in 
common the notion that the content of the law cannot be determined solely by 
lawmakers. 
Though there is some validity to the point, it does ignore the operation of 
dialectical logic. As stated before, the fundamental content of law cannot be altered. 
For instance, laws against theft cannot be repealed in a capitalist economic system. 
Yet the specificities of laws can be altered greatly. In the theft example, thieves may 
be executed, fined a minimal fee, incarcerated for one day or ten years. Theft due to 
circumstances of poverty may be treated more leniently than theft for malicious 
reasons. Corporate theft may be treated more leniently that "street" theft, or more 
severely. The ideological changes these laws generate may in effect lead to the 
alteration of the economic structure itself. After all, the entire point of communist 
production relations is to gain control over social forces. The dialectical relationship 
between the base and superstructure is not deterministic. The fact that legal 
66 Engels, "The Housing Question" in Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp. 624-625 as cited in 
The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, p. 42. 
67 Olufemi Taiwo in Legal Naturalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996) makes a similar 
argument. He asserts that "The natural law of a mode of production is that regime of law which 
is essential to its constitution ... "(p. 59.) While Taiwo argues that "every mode of production 
comes with its own natural law," (p. 165) he also states that "Law is not always a constitutive of 
modes of production, only some." (p. 166) Taiwo suggests that law, according to Marxist theory, 
will whither away as the needs it fulfils will be better met by other elements of social 
organisation. 
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structures can influence economic ones fades the naturalist colour of the socialist 
position. Kelsen could not argue that laws may effectuate change in God, nature or 
reason. Finnis, or Aquinas, could not maintain that the legal system can re-direct 
the needs of human nature; nor could Fuller contend that the legal system can alter 
its internal demand of rationality. 
When the function of law is examined, the socialists fall further from the 
naturalist paradigm. The function of law from the naturalist point of view is to aid 
in promoting human welfare. The position leads directly to the notion that the law, 
in whatever form, is perpetual. Law, as long as society is concerned with human 
welfare, will not" disappear". This cannot be further from the theorists' position. In 
fact, the they assert that law must "wither away" in order for human welfare to 
progress. 
The dialectical nature of legal phenomena, the rejection of the need for law for 
the furtherance of human welfare, and the rejection of the perpetuality of the legal 
form firmly places the theorists position well outside of the naturalist boundaries. 
The sociological school 
The theories that are included in this very broad paradigm may be considered 
too diverse to be of much use. Both the American and Scandinavian Realists have 
been placed under its umbrella as well as the vast literature from critical legal 
studies, the economists and the functionalists. Such a categorisation would place 
Holmes and Jhering in the same arena. Despite the broadness, there are several 
identifying factors in this particular field. It is perhaps the most important one to 
the question of a separate jurisprudence, for Marxism has often been considered part 
of the functionalist or realist paradigm and a direct inspiration to the critical legal 
studies. It is the sociological aspect of jurisprudence that seems to closely resemble 
the communist position.68 
68 Maureen Cain draws attention to Marx's influence on Durkheim and Weber as well as his implied 
critique of Parsons in "The Main Themes of Marx and Engels' Sociology of Law" in British Journal 
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Because the sociological school may incorporate both a positivist perspective 
and a naturalist one, the analysis of source, content, function and form would be 
difficult to apply. It is a school of thought, rather than a particular brand of theory. 
What generally separates sociological jurisprudence from other approaches is that 
its primary concern is with what role law plays in society, rather than the specific 
form or content it assumes. The form and content of law should be determined by 
the social purpose it serves. Thus the effectiveness of a legal system may be 
evaluated by how readily it serves its ends. The title, itself, of Jhering's work Law as 
a Means to and End69 is indicative of this position. 
Within such a framework a variety of positions can be adopted. Jhering 
argued that the purpose of law was to protect interests (although Stuchka criticised 
him for ignoring the fact that these interests were class-based).7O One could claim 
that the purpose of law was to protect human good or maintain a hierarchy of 
norms. From a sociological standpoint, the form and content of law is moulded by 
the specific social environment. 
Such a position fits well the analysis of law in capitalism presented by the 
theorists. The content and form of law directly reflects the function of law-the 
sustaining of class power both materially and ideologically. The primary 
importance of law for the theorists (especially illuminated by Pashukanis), however, 
was not the function of law in its social environment, although this certainly a large 
part of their analysis, but rather why the legal formed evolved at all. Such an 
approach logically led Marx back to economic structure. Once the function of law 
was directly attributed to economic relations, the path towards a non-legal 
regulatory system became clear. Whilst most in the sociological school would 
of Law and Society, Vol. 1, No.2 (Summer, 1974) pp. 136-148. For a commentary on Cain's work 
see Piers Beirne, "Marxism and the Sociology of Law: Theory or Practice" in The Sociology of 
Law, eds., Charles Reasons and Robert Rich (Toronto: Butterworth, 1978) pp. 471-475. Dobrin 
draws attention to Jhering's influence on Pashukanis in "Soviet Jurisprudence and Socialism" in 
Law Quarterly Review, No. 52 Quly, 1936) pp. 405-406. 
69 Actually in German Der Zweck im Recht (Purpose in Law). 
70 See Rudolf von !hering, Law as a Means to an End, trans., Isaac Husik (New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1913, 1968 reprint). 
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acknowledge that law can change with the alteration in societal circumstances and 
attitudes, none maintains that law could be completely superseded with non-legal 
regulation brought about by the change in economic circumstances. Once the 
socialist analysis of law in capitalism is taken in context with the historical 
progression towards a non-legal regulatory system, placing the communist theory of 
law in the realm of sociological jurisprudence would be misleading. 
Conclusion 
The theory of regulation explored and developed through this thesis falls 
outside the general paradigms of Western jurisprudence, and therefore, deserves a 
separate category of jurisprudence. This conclusion may seem at odds with the fact 
that communist regulation cannot be considered law. Indeed, is it not contradictory 
to call for a socialist jurisprudence whose logical conclusion is that law will be 
superseded by other forms of regulation? Not at alL First, the socialist analysis of 
law in capitalism taken in conjunction with its supersedence by regulation proves to 
be a unique interpretation of law. Second, according to the materialist perspective, 
the intrinsic link between regulation of human and institutional interaction and 
principles of societal organisation can be developed through direct observation of 
history. The capitalist legal form is one such observable development and will 
always be of historical relevance, regardless of what the future of law may be. In 
these ways, a socialist jurisprudence proves invaluable. 
Other general benefits of a socialist jurisprudence occur at several levels. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, the "withering away of law" has long been a 
cornerstone of Marxist theory. Surprisingly, however, discussions as to what will 
replace law and the theoretical basis of its replacement have long been ignored. This 
lacuna has led to much confusion, and even to positions that assert a "socialist law" 
is a viable theoretical position within the Marxist paradigm. A socialist 
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jurisprudence provides a viable framework for socialists to discuss further the 
essence and future of legal phenomena. 
Exploring what is actually meant by regulation and its dependence on a non-
political decision-making structure refocuses the legal discussion by calling into 
question the perception of law itself. Even those not interested in socialism would 
find of interest the suggestion that perhaps law is not needed in the organisation of 
social relations, that perhaps a radical social restructuring would replace the 
function of law with other mechanisms. Such a suggestion stimulates other 
fundamental jurisprudential questions: What exactly is law? How is it 
interconnected to social organisation? What are the merits and demerits of such a 
system? Could the function of law actually be replaced with other mechanisms that 
perhaps avoid some of a legal system's shortcomings? Whilst the Marxist 
interpretation of capitalist legal phenomena and the future of law offers a 
perspective that some may reject, or that can be critiqued at various levels, it does 
pose a significant alternative to other paradigms of jurisprudence which can only 
add to the further delineation of those paradigms. Thus a socialist jurisprudence 
contributes also to current Western paradigms of jurisprudence. 
Finally, if a socialist jurisprudence incorporates the notion that non-legal 
regulation might at some point evolve on an economic basis, questions such as how 
it might work, is it possible or is it desirable must be explored-opening a new 
realm of study in the field of legal theory. 
FURTHER WORK 
The central contribution of this thesis to the field of jurisprudence is to define 
what is meant by regulation in communism and explore its theoretical principles 
through the use of historical example, philosophic works and theoretical constructs. 
Such a definition, to this date, has not been put forward. In defining such a system, 
it became evident that regulation could not be considered law. With such a 
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conclusion the traditional Marxist position that law will "wither away" has been 
greatly illuminated by the exploration of regulation. 
The clarification of the withering away of law, and the discussion a system of 
regulation hopefully relieves the pressure in the socialist debate to either be "for 
law" or "against law", and propels the discussion forward towards exploring how to 
progress towards regulation, or further expanding on the concept of a "non-legal" 
regulatory society in generaL In these regards this thesis, as with any initial inquiry, 
has only been a first step. 
Essential in the search for the definitional principles of regulation was the 
need to develop a decision-making process that was "non-political". Such a process 
is fundamental to the development of a regulatory system. Without it, power will 
not be diffused and its abuse and misuse become imminent. Although this process 
was theoretically described in the thesis, questions regarding its viability must be 
addressed. Whilst the kibbutz example suggested the possibility of such a decision-
making structure and confirmed the theorists' conclusions that a socialist economic 
structure would bring about "non-political" institutions and allow regulation to 
function, this example is not by any stretch conclusive. Further exploration into the 
possible establishment of such a system is demanded, as is further evaluation as to 
whether such a system could handle the number and complexities of decisions that 
must be made in a modern industrial world. A discussion of the organisation of 
socialist economics must be included in this discussion. Only then can criticisms 
posed by F. A. Hayek and Alec Nove be given their full scope of discussion. 
Another area of inquiry essential to the further study of regulation is one that 
has long plagued socialism. As Alan Hunt most correctly asserts, " .. .it is important 
to keep the question of transition on the agenda. It remains one of the more 
difficult problems that confront any contemporary socialist project."71 Part of the 
reason that the transition period poses such a problem is the fact that more work 
71 Hunt, A Socialist Interest in Law, p. 116. 
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needs to be done with regard to defining, even generally, how communism might 
meet its theoretical aims. A discussion of the transition period seems premature 
when what society is being transformed to remains so vague. Whilst this thesis 
attempts to clarify what law was being transformed to, other elements, such as non-
political institutions and economic structure must be explored before any serious 
progress can be accomplished regarding transition period analysis.72 With respect to 
law, many transition period questions would arise: What strategies might be used to 
evolve towards regulation? How are the problems that the People's Courts faced to 
be avoided? How can a transfer of power from highly trained legal specialists 
actually occur? What steps can be taken to abolish punishment yet maintain order? 
Will the rule of law need to be maintained for a period of time? If not will 
"proletarian" state power grow unwieldy? The experiment of the Soviet Union was 
a valuable lesson. The next steps involve using the concrete lessons of history and 
the possibilities of theoretical analysis to move towards a clearer understanding of 
socialism, its regulation, decision-making process and economic structure in order 
to fruitfully engage in strategies and suggestions for the transition period. 
During the course of such work, no doubt new issues regarding regulation 
and its principles will arise as will new challenges to our current legal system. Only 
through rigorous inquiry and analysis can such issues be addressed, allowing other 
ones to rise to the surface. The results of such a process are a constantly developing 
degree of clarity accompanied by a growing precision of inquiry. This thesis is but 
one step towards that process of clarification. 
72 Such a statement is not meant to denigrate the efforts of those that have attempted to address the 
question of a transition period such as Martin Buber's Paths in Utopia trans., R.F.C. Hull (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1958) or G.D.H. Cole's Guild Socialism Re-stated (London: Leonard Parsons, 1920). 
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